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Teacher accountability policy and sociocultural context:  
A cross-country study focusing on Finland and Singapore 
Hwa, Yue-Yi 
 
Abstract 
In this thesis, I address two polarised debates in education policy: how teachers should be held 
accountable, and whether ‘best practices’ from high-performing education systems should be 
adopted in other countries. I construct a conceptual framework that maps the intended effects of 
teacher accountability instruments on student outcomes, via changes in teacher motivation. In this 
framework, the efficacy of any teacher accountability instrument depends partly on its 
compatibility with sociocultural context. This is partly because an accountability instrument will 
only influence a teacher’s motivation if the teacher regards the instrument as sufficiently 
meaningful, legitimate, or otherwise persuasive—and perceptions of meaning and legitimacy can 
be shaped by sociocultural patterns. To test this framework, I draw on two sets of empirical 
sources. Firstly, I use multilevel modelling to analyse cross-country survey data on education (e.g. 
PISA) and culture (e.g. the World Values Survey). I find that the relationship between teacher 
accountability instruments and student outcomes in these datasets varies with one aspect of 
sociocultural context, i.e. the strength of adherence to civic norms. Secondly, I analyse semi-
structured interviews that I conducted with 12 lower secondary school teachers in Finland and 12 
in secondary school teachers in Singapore. I find that teacher accountability instruments can have 
considerable effects (and side effects) on teacher motivation. However, interview participants’ 
responses to accountability instruments are strongly influenced by sociocultural context, and 
Finland’s and Singapore’s contrasting but comparably effective approaches to teacher 
accountability are each compatible with their respective sociocultural contexts. Based on these 
findings, I argue that the efficacy of teacher accountability instruments is contingent on 
sociocultural context (among other factors). Consequently, an accountability instrument from a 
top-ranked education system may have null or negative effects if transplanted elsewhere. Instead, 
teacher accountability policymaking needs to accommodate local sociocultural patterns. To my 
knowledge, this is the first study to combine cross-country educational and cultural surveys to 
explore the relationship between teacher accountability and sociocultural context. It is also the first 
study to conduct a fieldwork-based comparison of teacher accountability in Finland and Singapore.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Why study teacher accountability and sociocultural context? 
If you were a secondary school teacher in Singapore, one of your annual responsibilities would 
be formulating your plans for the year in three areas: student, professional, and organisational 
outcomes. At the beginning of the year, you would formally discuss these plans with your 
reporting officer (a teacher holding management-level responsibilities) and record them in a 
work review form. You would revisit this work review form at the middle and the end of the 
year in subsequent meetings with your reporting officer, who would also observe at least one of 
your lessons. Additionally, you would probably receive a scheme of work from your subject 
head, detailing the topics, objectives, and types of assignments that should be covered each week, 
and identifying a few points during the year when your students will face internal or external 
standardised assessments. Toward the end of the year, your reporting officer would confer with 
other senior teachers in the school at closed-door ranking panel meetings, during which they 
would award you a grade based on your performance in comparison to that of other teachers at 
your level of seniority. This performance grade would affect the size of your annual bonus and 
the speed of your promotion, among other things. 
 
If you were a lower secondary school teacher in Finland, your principal might ask you to submit 
a basic plan of how you intend to fulfil national curricular objectives throughout the year—but 
you would be free to modify those plans as the need arose. In the autumn, you would likely have 
a developmental discussion with the principal, where you would discuss your general well-being 
and how your work is going. In most schools, however, there would not be any follow-up after 
this discussion. You would be expected to assess your students’ learning, but you would have 
ample leeway in how you do so. Whether or not any adults are aware of what happens in your 
classroom would depend on how busy your principal is; how closely you collaborate with other 
teachers in your subject group (which can vary considerably); how often the special education 
teacher works alongside you; and what your students tell their parents. The biggest material 
reward you could expect is a small salary supplement if you take on additional school 
responsibilities. Conversely, you would not face any performance-based penalties, besides written 
warnings for failing to deliver your designated lesson hours, or getting fired if you abuse your 
students or show up at school drunk. 
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Both the Finnish and the Singaporean approaches to teacher accountability have been lauded 
internationally as ‘best practices’, under headlines such as ‘Scotland eyes Singapore in “radical” 
overhaul of teaching career paths’ (Hepburn, 2017) or ‘Highly trained, respected and free: why 
Finland’s teachers are different’ (Crouch, 2015). Yet these two ‘best’ approaches are clearly 
disparate. This disparity may be puzzling—but only if education policymaking is viewed as a 
universal, context-neutral endeavour. Instead, if education policy in general and teacher 
accountability policy in particular are regarded as a matter of ‘what works for whom in what 
circumstances and in what respects, and how’ (Pawson & Tilley, 2004, p. 2), then this disparity is 
not only unsurprising, but also desirable: if Finland’s and Singapore’s educational contexts differ, 
then their accountability policies should reflect salient differences. 
 
In this thesis, I focus on an aspect of context that is central to the efficacy of teacher 
accountability, i.e. sociocultural context. Although it typically receives less scholarly attention 
than other similarly important aspects of context, such as material constraints and teachers’ 
pedagogical competence, sociocultural context can help to explain how Finland’s and Singapore’s 
divergent teacher accountability approaches are comparably successful. 
 
My analysis also looks closely at teacher motivation: a concept that is implicit in any teacher 
accountability policy that aims to prompt teachers to work harder or work differently, i.e. to raise 
or reorient their motivation. Motivation is curiously under-theorised in the teacher accountability 
literature, despite its inclusion in some prominent frameworks for educational accountability (e.g. 
Pritchett, 2015; UNESCO, 2017, fig. 1.2). Also, despite an extensive body of psychological 
research on motivation in work and in education, there is far less research on teacher motivation 
than on student motivation (Urdan, 2014). Nonetheless, I believe that teacher accountability 
policies are more likely to influence teacher motivation as intended by policymakers if the 
policies are tailored to fit sociocultural particularities. 
 
In the following chapters, I investigate whether there is any evidence for this claim, using 
multilevel modelling of cross-country educational and cultural surveys alongside interviews with 
teachers in Finland and Singapore. Even though Finland and Singapore are among the most 
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admired and idealised high-performing education systems, this is, to my knowledge, the first 
comparative study of teacher accountability and sociocultural context in these two countries.1  
 
The context of this study 
The impetus for this research project comes from two prominent but problematic discussions on 
education. Firstly, there is the perennially contentious issue of teacher accountability for student 
outcomes. The debate on teacher accountability is longstanding and global. For example, 
‘payment by results’ was attempted in English schools as early as the 1860s (Jabbar, 2013; 
Rapple, 1994). Recently, some scholars have noted a growing emphasis on accountability in 
education policy (Tulowitzki, 2016; Verger & Parcerisa, 2017a) and in public management more 
generally (Muller, 2018; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017). In 2015, routine teacher appraisals directly 
affected teachers’ pay in countries ranging from Chile to Hungary to Singapore (OECD, 2016f). 
 
Still, the popularity of teacher performance management and other associated policies has been 
neither uniform nor universal. A review of studies on educational decentralisation in the 
developing world found extensive evidence of decentralisation reforms, which are often 
associated with accountability reforms, in Central America, but almost none in Northern Africa, 
East Asia, and the Pacific region (Edwards & DeMatthews, 2014). Also, scholars have noted 
increasing incidence of external exams, school inspections, and other accountability instruments 
across European countries—but also significant variation between countries, often tied to 
historical path dependencies (Altrichter & Kemethofer, 2015; Herbst & Wojciuk, 2017; Hudson, 
2007; Maroy, 2009; Mattei, 2012). 
 
It is fairly uncontroversial to say that teachers should be accountable, in a broad sense, for the 
pivotal work that they do in developing individual well-being, cultural socialisation, and national 
economic growth—and for the funding that they receive to do so. But there is much less 
agreement about how teacher accountability instruments can, and should, facilitate optimal 
student outcomes. While some prominent voices advocate for test-based accountability (e.g. 
Hanushek, 2019), such policies also face fierce opposition. To illustrate, Finnish educationist Pasi 
 
1  I searched in ERIC and Scopus on 20 August 2019 for peer-reviewed studies containing the terms ‘Finland’, 
‘Singapore’, and ‘accountability’ in their titles, abstracts, or keywords. These searches yielded seven and three 
results respectively, none of which focused on accountability, or examined in rich empirical detail the 
relationship between policy implementation and sociocultural context. The closest results were two desk-based 
studies of curricula in high-performing countries, which discussed some aspects of accountability, e.g. student 
assessment (Creese, Gonzalez, & Isaacs, 2016; Hollins & Reiss, 2016). 
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Sahlberg (2012, 2015a, 2016) disparages the advocacy of school choice, standardisation, and test-
based accountability by dubbing it the Global Education Reform Movement, or GERM—a term 
that has gained some traction among GERM opponents (e.g. Robertson, 2015).2  
 
However, Sahlberg himself is a central figure in the second set of discussions composing the 
backdrop of this thesis. Sahlberg’s book, Finnish Lessons: What Can the World Learn from Educational 
Change in Finland? (2012), along with titles such as Surpassing Shanghai: An Agenda for American 
Education Built on the World’s Leading Systems (Tucker, 2011), are part of the popular discourse on 
best practices in high-performing education systems. Other examples include two widely 
publicised reports by McKinsey & Company, which used cross-country student assessment data 
to identify, respectively, the ‘best performing’ and ‘most improved’ school systems (Barber & 
Mourshed, 2007; Mourshed, Chijioke, & Barber, 2010), and distilled the policies used in these 
countries into sets of ‘best practices … [that] work irrespective of the culture in which they are 
applied … [and] demonstrate that substantial improvement in outcomes is possible in a short 
period of time’ (Barber & Mourshed, 2007, p. 5). 
 
This discourse is driven by league tables from cross-country student assessments such as the 
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) and the Trends in International 
Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS). In many participating countries, these assessments 
trigger competitive anxiety about how well their education system stacks up to its peers, as well 
as feverish curiosity about which policies can be adopted from countries at the top of the tables 
(Breakspear, 2012; Grek, 2009). Claiming that a policy initiative mimics that of high-performing 
systems can be a persuasive political strategy (Steiner-Khamsi, 2014). For example, policymakers 
in England have justified autonomous academies and high-stakes accountability on the basis that 
these policies mirror high-performing East Asian education systems—despite the fact that these 
English policies look very different from the East Asian models that they purportedly mimic 
(You, 2017). 
 
 
2  It is worth noting that both Finland’s and Singapore’s approaches to teacher accountability diverge from the 
stereotypical form of high-stakes, test-based accountability associated with ‘neoliberal’ trends in education 
policy. Singapore may seem a prototype of neoliberalism, with emphases on meritocracy and on the economic 
productivity of education—but some elements of Singaporean public education, such as restricted freedom of 
expression and extensive central planning, deviate from classical free-market principles (Chua, 2018; Weninger, 
2016). In contrast, education in Finland may be portrayed as antithetical to neoliberalism, with its refusal to rank 
schools or impose consequences based on test scores (Conway & Murphy, 2013; Hurley, 2013; Simola, 2014). 
However, the OECD has strong influence in Finland (Simola, 2014), and policies adopted in the 1990s give 
parents free choice among public schools in the country, and put principals in charge of school finances (Rinne, 
Kivirauma, & Simola, 2002; Webb et al., 2004). 
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Against this backdrop, I look at teacher accountability practices in high-performing Finland and 
Singapore, and I also explore teacher accountability using multi-country PISA and TIMSS 
datasets. My outlook is informed by prior studies emphasising the social and relational nature of 
the teaching profession (e.g. Ingersoll, 2003), and by the growing body of policy analysis models 
that emphasise compatibility with the implementation context (see Section 2.2 below).3 Beyond 
academic research, my interest in how sociocultural context affects the implementation of 
teacher accountability policy emerged during my two years as a secondary school teacher in 
Malaysia. In the school where I taught, local cultural priorities meant that the responsibility to 
protect the school from losing face was more important than the responsibility to be honest 
when filling in paperwork for faceless bureaucrats—such that many administrative instruments 
for teacher accountability neither collected accurate information nor influenced classroom 
practice. While sociocultural priorities inhibited the efficacy of some accountability instruments 
in this low-performing Malaysian school, such priorities can also enable effective teacher 
accountability processes, as I will show subsequently. 
 
1.2 Contributions to research and policy 
In this thesis, I explore the extent to which the efficacy of teacher accountability instruments 
depends on sociocultural context. This exploration uses multilevel modelling of international 
large-scale assessments (ILSAs) such as PISA, alongside international surveys of cultural values. 
To my knowledge, based on a systematic literature search that I conducted (see Section 2.3, as 
well as footnote 13 in Section 3.3), this is the first cross-country ILSA analysis of sociocultural 
factors influencing teacher accountability. 
 
Additionally, I interview 12 teachers in Finland and 12 in Singapore, resulting in a detailed 
comparison of teacher accountability and sociocultural context. Although there have been other 
fieldwork-based studies arguing for the centrality of sociocultural context to Finland’s education 
policy choices (e.g. Andere, 2014; Chung, 2009), I believe this thesis to be the first comparative 
analysis of educational accountability in these two countries, as noted above. This matters 
because Finland’s and Singapore’s education systems are often cited as references for 
policymaking (as observed by Chung, 2009; Dobbins & Martens, 2012; Takayama, Waldow, & 
 
3  I realised retrospectively that this study also echoes some of the arguments of neo-institutionalism (H.-D. Meyer 
& Rowan, 2006; J. W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977), e.g. that institutions are socially constructed and that (cultural) 
institutions influence behaviour. However, I did not draw specifically on this school of thought while working 
on this thesis. 
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Sung, 2013 on Finland; and Clapham & Vickers, 2018; de Roock & Espeña, 2018 on Singapore). 
Notwithstanding their popularity as policy references, Finland and Singapore pose some 
constraints to comparative education researchers, which may heighten the risk of superficial and 
inappropriate policy borrowing. In Finland’s case, this is partly a language matter, since national 
policy documents, classroom interactions, and educational research largely use Finnish and, to a 
lesser extent, Swedish (Y. Li & Dervin, 2018). In Singapore’s case, this is partly because 
Singapore has a single institute for all teacher training (Low & Tan, 2017; Teh, Hogan, & 
Dimmock, 2013), which is closely aligned to the authoritarian state via the Ministry of Education, 
and which is the academic home of all university-based education researchers. In both cases, 
another constraint is that foreign visitors’ observations are often restricted to whatever their host 
institutions decide to show them (as observed by Y. Li & Dervin, 2018 on Finland; see Reimers 
& O’Donnell, 2016 for an example of a tightly planned visit for U.S. educators in Singapore). 
Although I conducted all interviews in English, thus requiring Finnish participants to use a 
second language, the fact that I recruited participants via personal, educational, and local contacts 
rather than through government sampling frames facilitated candid discussions of teachers’ 
firsthand experiences. 
 
Another strength of this research project is that the combination of large-scale statistics and 
granular teacher interviews allows for insight into whether relationships exist between teacher 
accountability and sociocultural context at an aggregate, cross-country level, and also into how 
these relationships manifest in particular national contexts. While the cross-country statistics can 
give a black-box indication of whether it is likely to be worthwhile for policymakers to 
investigate sociocultural context when designing accountability policy, the interview analysis can 
suggest specific areas and processes that may warrant investigation. 
 
Furthermore, I develop and attempt to validate a conceptual framework for mapping the 
intended effects of teacher accountability instruments, and for considering potential pitfalls along 
these intended pathways. Despite increasing emphasis in the grey literature on the importance of 
implementation contexts in education policy and accountability (e.g. Schleicher, 2018; UNESCO, 
2017), there is little clear guidance on how education policymakers should take sociocultural 
patterns into account. My framework is preliminary and only addresses a limited subset of 
education accountability. Nonetheless, based on formative feedback from policy practitioners in 
the Teach For All alumni community of practice in education policy, I have been encouraged to 
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hope that this framework has the potential to prompt constructive reflections on teacher 
accountability policymaking among practitioners. 
 
1.3 Outline of the chapters 
In the next chapter, I review the literature on teacher accountability and sociocultural context. 
Specifically, I discuss the scope of relevant prior studies in educational research as well as in 
adjacent fields such as public policy and psychology. This includes a systematic search for 
literature about teacher accountability and sociocultural context. Based on this literature, I 
develop a conceptual framework for this study and propose three research questions emerging 
from the framework. 
 
In Chapter 3, I lay out the methodology of this study. I discuss the theoretical perspective that I 
adopt—a realist ontology alongside a constructivist epistemology—as well as its implications for 
my empirical research. I then give an overview of how my data sources fit together with different 
aspects of the conceptual framework and research questions. Next, I describe and justify my 
approach to data collection and analysis for the secondary statistical analysis and the field 
interviews in Finland and Singapore, before discussing the ethical implications and limitations of 
this research project. 
 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 present the results for each of the three research questions. In Chapter 4, I 
investigate the extent to which the relationship between teacher accountability instruments and 
student outcomes varies with sociocultural context, using secondary statistical data. This includes 
a discussion of how these results link to the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, and a consideration 
of alternative explanations for the empirical results. A similar discussion of links to the literature 
and of alternative explanations is also included in each of the other two results chapters. In 
Chapter 5, I investigate the extent to which teacher accountability instruments influence teacher 
motivation—and, by so doing, affect student outcomes—using the statistical datasets as well as 
the field interviews with teachers in Finland and Singapore. In Chapter 6, I investigate the extent 
to which the influence of teacher accountability instruments on teacher motivation depends on 
sociocultural context, again using both the statistical datasets and the teacher interviews 
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Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the thesis, with a brief overall discussion of the extent to which the 
empirical evidence supports my conceptual framework. I also lay out some caveats about my 
argument, suggest directions for future research, and offer final reflections. 
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Chapter 2: Literature review and conceptual framework 
In this chapter, I discuss prior research on the relationships between teacher accountability 
instruments, sociocultural context, and teacher motivation. In Section 2.1, I discuss different 
conceptions of teacher accountability and explain my definition of teacher accountability 
instruments. Next, I describe the varied effects of such instruments and illustrate how these 
variations can be due to differences in policy design and implementation contexts. In Section 2.2, 
I give a brief overview of strands of policy analysis and education research that pay attention to 
the influence of context generally and of sociocultural context particularly. I then define 
sociocultural context as discussed in this study. In Section 2.3, I describe a systematic literature 
search that I conducted on teacher accountability and sociocultural context, and outline evidence 
from this search suggesting that sociocultural context influences a range of processes within 
teacher accountability. In Section 2.4, I begin by defining motivation and outlining some theories 
of motivation from psychology and management studies. I then discuss the relationship between 
accountability and motivation; and illustrate how sociocultural context might influence teacher 
motivation and, relatedly, teachers’ responses to accountability instruments. Finally, I lay out my 
conceptual framework in Section 2.5 and propose three research questions in Section 2.6. 
 
2.1 Teacher accountability policy: multiple definitions, mixed results 
Defining teacher accountability instruments 
Conceptions of accountability, whether for teachers or for other actors, vary across time and 
space (Broadfoot & Osborn, 1993; Hopmann, 2008; Koppell, 2005; UNESCO, 2017). As 
Mulgan (2000) outlines, ‘accountability’ is used to denote not only answerability to an external 
authority, but also an internal sense of responsibility, an attribute of governments that respond to 
the wishes of the electorate, or any institutional constraints on the behaviour of actors in public 
organisations, among other things. 
 
In this project, I conceptualise accountability as a principal-agent relationship (Bovens, 
Schillemans, & Goodin, 2014; Gailmard, 2014; Pritchett, 2015; see also World Bank, 2003). 
Within principal-agent accountability, one prominent strand of work entails formal rational-
choice modelling of electoral politics, where politicians are accountable to voters (e.g. Besley, 
2007, Ch. 3), or of bureaucracy, where bureaucrats are accountable to political authorities (e.g. 
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Dixit, 2002). However, I draw on principal-agent conceptualisations of accountability in the 
broader sense that analysing an accountability relationship entails identifying who (agent) is 
accountable to whom (principal), and what is being accounted for (numerically or otherwise) in this 
relationship. This accords with Bovens’ (2007) definition of accountability as  
a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to 
explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass 
judgement, and the actor may face consequences. (p. 450) 
This conception encompasses a wide range of accountability relationships; regardless of whether 
the power distribution between principals and agents is hierarchical or horizontal (Bovens, 2007); 
whether agents’ responsibility is specified using rigid metrics or contingent expectations (Honig 
& Pritchett, 2019); and whether the relationship prioritises ex ante selection of agents or ex post 
consequences for agents’ fulfilment of responsibilities (Mansbridge, 2014); among other 
variations. 
 
Notwithstanding the breadth of this relational conceptualisation of accountability, it is distinct 
from the concepts of governance and quality assurance. Some aspects of these concepts overlap 
with principal-agent accountability, as posited in theoretical frameworks that categorise 
accountability as a subcomponent within governance (van Kersbergen & van Waarden, 2004) or 
within quality assurance (Middlehurst & Woodhouse, 1995). However, governance and quality 
assurance do not encapsulate all forms of accountability. Like accountability, governance is a 
diffuse concept with varied meanings (Levi-Faur, 2012; Peters, 2012; van Kersbergen & van 
Waarden, 2004; Weiss, 2010). Also, like accountability, governance is often conceptualised in 
terms of its subtypes, such as good governance and global governance (Weiss, 2010) or 
hierarchical governance and horizontal governance (Levy, 2018; see also Greany & Higham, 
2018, on hierarchies, markets, and networks in school governance). Nonetheless, governance is 
often situated in analyses of the changing roles of state and nonstate actors following the 
incorporation of markets and networks into public service delivery, amid globalisation and 
disenchantment with hierarchical bureaucracy (Bevir, 2007; Hudson, 2007; van Kersbergen & 
van Waarden, 2004; Zumbansen, 2012). Some conceptualisations of governance relate closely to 
principal-agent accountability, but others do not. Despite some overlaps, governance places 
primacy on processes and structures of governing (Fukuyama, 2013; Levi-Faur, 2012), whereas 
accountability is defined by the principal-agent relationship, at least for the purposes of this 
thesis. Moreover, some conceptualisations of governance prioritise the actors that do the 
governing (e.g. Fukuyama, 2013, on governance as government capacity), while my 
conceptualisation of accountability places equal weight on principal and agent.  
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In turn, quality assurance relates to processes for managing the quality of operations and outputs, 
whether these processes are internally determined or driven by external monitoring bodies (J. 
Williams, 2016). Quality assurance is conceptualised narrowly in some fields (e.g. regulatory 
compliance in pharmaceutical laboratories; Gawadi, 1996; Visschedijk, Henrdiks, & Nuyts, 
2005), but takes a broader range of conceptualisations in education (e.g. Harvey & Green, 1993; 
Simola et al., 2009), where it is a particularly prominent concept in higher education research (as 
manifest in the journal Quality in Higher Education, currently in its 26th volume), and to a lesser 
extent in discussions of ‘quality assurance and evaluation’ in the governance of some European 
education systems (Grek et al., 2009; Simola et al, 2017). Still, quality assurance implies 
formalised standards (‘quality’) defined by the principal for measuring the agent’s performance, 
whereas an accountability relationship can be based on informal, tacit, or dynamic expectations. 
More importantly, governance and quality assurance may overlap with managerial, top-down 
accountability relationships—or, in some subtypes of governance, with accountability 
relationships between equal-status partner organisations (e.g. Greany & Higham, 2018)—but 
these concepts typically exclude relationships such as informal accountability to local 
communities or ad hoc horizontal accountability between individual colleagues. 
 
If accountability is defined as a principal-agent relationship, then it entails not only processes of 
account-giving and judgement emphasised in Bovens’ (2007) definition of accountability, but 
also the processes of selecting the agent (Mansbridge, 2009, 2014) and of setting the standards 
for the agent’s fulfilment of responsibilities. Selection of agents is discussed under ‘Pathways 
from teacher accountability instruments to student outcomes’ in Section 2.5. For standard-
setting, note the following four characteristics. Firstly, standard-setting concerns not only the 
results or outputs of the agent’s actions, but also standards for the conditions under which they 
perform those actions. If a teacher is not given a standard of instructional resources, pedagogical 
training, and decision-making discretion adequate for fulfilling any stipulated standards for 
student learning, then it would be unfair to hold them accountable for those outcome standards, 
because the terms of the accountability relationship render such outcomes beyond the teacher’s 
control (Wagner, 1989). Secondly, these standards need not be formally codified, nor rigidly 
standardised. Tacit social expectations can carry at least as much weight as explicit legal 
guidelines. Thirdly, standard-setting can be particularly important when the agents under 
consideration are teachers, given that teachers are beholden to a range of stakeholders—
students, communities, headteachers, education authorities—and that the teaching profession 
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serves multiple and often ambiguous goals (Murnane & Cohen, 1986; Wagner, 1989; for 
empirical examples, see Atuhurra & Kaffenberger, 2019, and Kurniasih, Utari, & Akhmadi, 
2018). This applies to public service jobs more generally (Lipsky, 2010; see also Hölmstrom & 
Milgrom, 1991). As Romzek and Dubnick’s (1987) argue, ‘public administration accountability 
involves the means by which public agencies and their workers manage the diverse expectations 
generated within and outside the organization’ (p. 228). Finally, such processes of managing 
expectations and setting standards involve social perceptions of what matters most in education, 
and are often influenced by power dynamics between different stakeholders (Day & Klein, 1987; 
see also Rittel & Webber, 1973, on the challenge of formulating objectives in resolving wicked 
problems). For example, the shifting forms of teacher accountability in the United States have 
been shaped by shifting conceptions of educational equity (McDermott, 2011), and by problem-
solving models from higher-status fields such as business and national defence (Mehta, 2013). 
More generally, the determination of what counts as a desirable outcome and how it should be 
counted is a fundamental and contestable part of teacher accountability. 
 
To gain some analytic traction within the expansive domain of principal-agent accountability, in 
this thesis I focus on the instruments within teacher accountability relationships. Bringing 
together Bovens’ (2007) emphasis on answerability and judgement in principal-agent 
relationships and Romzek and Dubnick’s (1987) attention to managing expectations within such 
relationships, I define teacher accountability instruments as tools, practices, and structures that aim to 
orient teacher practice toward stakeholder expectations by (a) collecting information about teachers’ individual or 
collective practice and communicating this information to stakeholders, (b) setting standards by which stakeholders 
judge teacher practice, and/or (c) allocating consequences based on stakeholders’ judgements of teachers’ practice.  
 
This definition states that accountability instruments ‘aim to orient teacher practice’, because 
teacher practice does not change mechanistically in response to accountability instruments. 
Rather, teachers have some agency over how they respond to such instruments, as discussed in 
Section 2.4. Note also that this definition includes instruments targeting not only teachers’ 
individual actions but also their collective practice, since department- or school-level evaluation 
and incentives can also affect teachers’ professional experiences and play a key role in managing 
teachers’ performance (e.g. Ingersoll, Merrill, & May, 2016). It further includes teacher 
accountability instruments that may not be officially codified but nonetheless influence teachers’ 
work within their respective accountability relationships, such as social networks carrying 
observations from Israeli Bedouin classrooms to the tribal sheikh (Mizel, 2009) and regular 
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telephone calls from Norwegian parents to teachers (Czerniawski, 2011). Additionally, this 
definition includes instruments for which the stakeholders in question are teachers themselves, as 
in professional accountability (e.g. Fullan, Rincón-Gallardo, & Hargreaves, 2015; Romzek & 
Dubnick, 1987). Such professional accountability relationships can be conceptualised as 
principal-agent relationships in which individual teachers are accountable to the collective body 
of fellow teachers, who hold a legitimate stake in each individual’s work because of how such 
work affects their collective reputations, morale, and working conditions. The three mechanisms 
by which accountability instruments can attempt to influence teacher practice—communicating 
information, setting standards, and allocating consequences—are discussed further in Section 
2.5.  
 
The inconsistent effects of teacher accountability instruments 
Teacher accountability instruments have a patchy track record in improving student outcomes 
(Ganimian & Murnane, 2016; Kozlowski & Lauen, 2019; National Research Council, 2011). In 
some experimental and quasi-experimental studies, performance-related incentives for teachers 
helped to raise student outcomes (Duflo, Hanna, & Ryan, 2012; Glewwe, Ilias, & Kremer, 2010; 
Lavy, 2009; Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2011). However, other such studies found no 
significant effects on student outcomes (Fryer, 2013; Glazerman & Seifullah, 2012; Springer et 
al., 2010, 2012). 
 
Besides these direct effects on student outcomes, teacher accountability instruments can have 
numerous side effects (Thiel, Schweizer, & Bellmann, 2017; Zhao, 2018). Many tests with high 
stakes for students, teachers, or schools inadvertently embody Campbell’s Law that:  
The more any quantitative social indicator is used for social decision-making, the more 
subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort and 
corrupt the social processes it is intended to monitor. (Campbell, 1979, p. 85) 
In particular, high-stakes tests have prompted strategic, and arguably detrimental, behaviour 
among teachers and school leaders, such as focusing narrowly on subjects and learning objectives 
that are prioritised in assessments (Altrichter & Kemethofer, 2015; Ng & Chan, 2008; Weninger, 
2016), or disproportionately allocating resources to test preparation (Thomas, 2013). More 
pernicious actions include diverting educational resources toward students hovering below 
performance thresholds (Booher-Jennings, 2005), reclassifying students as having special 
education needs so that they would be excluded from accountability calculations (ibid), and 
outright cheating (Vogell, 2011). Furthermore, test-based accountability can unhealthily heighten 
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students’ competitiveness, stress levels, and passivity in learning (Luna, 2015; Redden & Low, 
2012; A. Walker, Qian, & Zhang, 2011). It can also raise teacher stress and compromise school 
climate (von der Embse, Pendergast, Segool, Saeki, & Ryan, 2016). 
 
One reason why teacher accountability instruments can have divergent effects is that apparently 
similar accountability policies can differ in pivotal ways (Verger & Parcerisa, 2017a). In short, 
policy design matters (Pritchett, 2017). Analyses of effective performance-based pay schemes for 
teachers posit that programme design—such as using multiple measures of teacher performance 
(Lavy, 2009) and awarding bonuses based on clear criteria that teachers recognise as fair 
(Murnane & Cohen, 1986)—plays a decisive role in minimising perverse incentives. Additionally, 
the presentation and framing of a policy can be influential. One experiment found that framing 
financial incentives as losses rather than gains can elicit greater increases in teacher productivity, 
even if the incentives are of equal magnitude and are based on identical performance criteria 
(Fryer & Levitt, 2010). 
 
Another reason behind the differential efficacy of teacher accountability instruments is that 
implementation contexts differ. One such area of difference is the larger policy environment. 
Some studies suggest that accountability instruments may be most effective when other policy 
instruments give teachers and schools enough latitude, whether in administrative autonomy or 
resource levels, to meet accountability standards. In terms of autonomy, Woessmann (2005) 
found that central exit examinations are associated with higher scores in international 
assessments when the former are combined with certain forms of school decision-making 
autonomy. Ingersoll, Merrill, and May (2016) found that autonomy can mitigate a negative side 
effect of accountability instruments: among American schools that faced sanctions for falling 
below accountability standards, most saw higher teacher turnover than in schools that met the 
standards, but sanctioned schools that gave teachers significant classroom autonomy had 
turnover rates on par with their higher-performing counterparts. Ineffectual delegation can also 
compromise efficacy, as in a Pakistani province where the supervisors who inspected schools 
were not empowered to administer the teacher transfers, rewards, or punishments that they 
believed were necessary, while the authorities who were thus empowered rarely acted on 
supervisors’ recommendations (Jaffer, 2010). In terms of resources, a performance-based pay 
intervention in Uganda only improved student attendance and achievement in schools that had 
textbooks (Gilligan, Karachiwalla, Kasirye, Lucas, & Neal, 2018). A Tanzanian experiment found 
that performance-based pay on its own had ambiguous effects on student achievement, whereas 
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performance-based pay combined with additional school funding raised student performance 
(Mbiti et al., 2019). Similarly, accountability instruments can falter due to inadequate resources 
for implementing the instruments themselves, such as when school inspectorates lack the 
personnel or transportation to visit all the schools under their purview (De Grauwe & Lugaz, 
2007; Ehren, Eddy-Spicer, Bangpan, & Reid, 2016; Schwartz, 2000).  
 
Beyond the policy environment, other contextual features can also affect the efficacy of 
accountability instruments. For example, some forms of test-based accountability appear to have 
a more positive effect on student achievement in lower-performing countries than in higher-
performing ones (Bergbauer, Hanushek, & Woessmann, 2018). At a more granular level, 
individuals and small groups can be key to increasing the benefits of teacher accountability while 
minimising potential harm. Such individuals and groups may be especially important for 
cultivating non-bureaucratic forms of accountability, such as professional accountability or 
community accountability, as R. Iyengar (2012) shows in two Indian villages and Skrla, Mckenzie, 
Scheurich, and Dickerson (2011) demonstrate in a Texas school district. Conversely, interest 
groups can also precipitate the failure of teacher accountability instruments, as with partisan 
capture for patronage in a scheme for community-managed schools in Honduras (Altschuler, 
2013) and a merit pay programme in Mexico (Douglas, 2014). Moreover, as I show below, the 
implementation and outcomes of teacher accountability instruments can be influenced 
considerably by sociocultural factors. 
 
2.2 Why sociocultural context matters 
The role of sociocultural context in policy implementation 
In the previous section, I showed how some aspects of the implementation context can affect 
teacher accountability policy. In this section, I focus on a particular aspect of context—the 
sociocultural—while considering not only education policy, but also public policy more broadly. 
 
It is worth noting, firstly, that a growing number of policy analysis models emphasise the 
theories of change that connect policy instruments to their desired outcomes, and the contextual 
features that influence these change processes (e.g. Andrews, Pritchett, & Woolcock, 2017; and 
Bates & Glennerster, 2017 in public policy generally; and Cambridge Assessment, 2018; 
McDonnell & Elmore, 1987; and Monaghan & King, 2018 in education policy). Pawson and 
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Tilley’s (1997) landmark work on realist policy evaluation included not only the mantra ‘what 
works for whom in what circumstances’ (p. 210 and elsewhere), but also the formulation 
‘mechanism + context = outcome’ (p. xv and elsewhere), which emphasises that policy 
outcomes depend not only on appropriate change processes (mechanisms), but also contextual 
suitability. Similarly, Cartwright and Hardie (2012) argue that policies can only play their intended 
causal roles if the necessary support factors are in place. In a framework pitched at policymakers 
rather than scholars, M.J. Williams (2017) maps the inputs, activities, and outputs of a policy 
programme onto its intended intermediate outcomes and final outcomes; thus helping 
policymakers to consider whether the contextual assumptions at each stage hold true in the 
actual implementation context. One thread running through all of these models is the argument 
that a policy will only work if it is compatible with its context. 
 
Alongside this growing attention to theories of change and implementation contexts, there has 
been increasing attention to the role of culture in human behaviour change. In economics, 
Alesina and Giuliano (2015) recently emphasised the importance of studying bidirectional causal 
relationships between culture and institutions, rather than seeing culture solely as a cause or 
solely as an effect. Woolcock (2018) likewise observes that development studies has shifted away 
from earlier discussions about ‘backward’ cultures as determinants of poverty, and from 
modernisation theories which assume that economic, political, and cultural development occur in 
lockstep, toward regarding culture as a set of context-specific tools for engaging the world. 
Similarly, Collier (2017) argues that incorporating culture into formal models as an endogenous 
and influential element allows for better explanations of socioeconomic and political 
phenomena. Beyond political economy and development, there is a long-established body of 
work in cross-cultural psychology examining differences in thought, values, and behaviour 
between cultural groups (Berry, 2011; Gelfand et al., 2011; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 
2004). Adjacent to such psychological research, some strands of organisational studies investigate 
the interaction between culture and optimal organisation design, notably in Hofstede’s (1980) 
influential survey programme (see Nardon & Steers, 2009 for a review of other cultural models 
in organisational research). 
 
Additionally, there are established cross-cultural research programmes in some areas of 
educational research. Notable studies of cultural differences in teaching and learning include 
Tobin, Wu, and Davidson’s (1989) Preschool in Three Cultures on Japan, China, and the United 
States; Stevenson and Stigler’s (1992) The Learning Gap, comparing the same three countries (see 
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also Stigler and Hiebert’s, 1999, subsequent work with the TIMSS video study); Alexander’s 
(2001) Culture and Pedagogy, examining primary education in England, France, India, Russia and 
the United States; and Li’s (2012) Cultural Foundations of Learning: East and West on how the 
distinct learning philosophies of East Asia and the West manifest in different pedagogies and 
psychologies of learning. All of these studies emphasise the influence of cultural values, 
priorities, and practices on teaching and learning. Others have demonstrated how the 
implementation of imported curricula and pedagogies may be hampered or, at least, modified by 
local cultural pressures (Clapham & Vickers, 2018; Heng & Song, 2020; S. Kim, 2017).  
 
However, as I show in the next section, there has been little systematic comparative work on the 
relationship between culture and teacher accountability. Before I examine the evidence for such 
cultural influence over teacher accountability policy, I first define sociocultural context as 
conceptualised in this thesis. 
 
Defining sociocultural context 
Culture, like accountability, is a diffuse and contested concept. To gain some analytic traction, I 
focus not on culture as a broad concept, but on sociocultural context. In defining sociocultural 
context, I draw on two sources. Firstly, Maxwell’s (2012) realist-informed proposition that ‘a 
culture is a system of individuals’ conceptual/meaningful structures (minds) found in a given 
social system, and is not intrinsically shared, but participated in’ (p. 28, emphasis original). 
Secondly, Markus and Kitayama’s (2010) work in cultural psychology, in which they locate 
culture not in stable beliefs inside people, but in ‘patterns of ideas, practices, institutions, 
products, and artifacts’ (p. 422) situated in the world (see also Adams & Markus, 2001; Kitayama, 
2002; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Hence, I define sociocultural context as dominant patterns of ideas 
and practices in a given social system that influence people’s interactions with their environments. 
 
Thus, this definition is aligned not only with the realist ontological stance of this thesis 
(discussed in Section 3.1), but also with a strand of psychological research. Additionally, this 
definition coheres with the secondary sources on cultural data that I analyse. It emphasises that 
sociocultural context is a characteristic of groups, not of individuals; but also that it need not be 
distributed uniformly throughout a group (as in the seminal work of Wallace, 1970, in 
anthropology). Both of these properties of culture are affirmed by key theorists associated with 
the two sociocultural datasets that I analyse: Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, the most 
CHAPTER 2   18 
prominent analysts of the World Values Survey, and Geert Hofstede, who developed the Values 
Survey Module. Theoretically, both Inglehart and Welzel (2005) as well as Hofstede (2001) draw 
a distinction between the collective frames of meaning that influence the social environment, and 
the unique beliefs and values that shape individual actions. Methodologically, their quantitative 
sociocultural constructs derive from the proportion of people in each country who subscribe to 
particular views—thus, the constructs are necessarily collective, but are based on degrees of 
difference rather than presumed uniformity within the group. 
 
As a system of dominant patterns, sociocultural context has emergent properties that can differ 
from the individual tendencies within it. For example, a teacher may believe that unequal 
distributions of power are inherently unjust—but if she lives in a context where such inequalities 
are largely accepted, then she is likely to conform to hierarchical norms in school management, 
whatever her personal inclinations. 
 
2.3 Teacher accountability and sociocultural context: a systematic literature 
search 
I conducted a systematic literature search in April 2017, using the Institute of Educational 
Sciences’ ERIC and Elsevier’s Scopus databases. (I chose Scopus over Web of Science to 
maximise geographic coverage, as the former covers more non-Western journals [Elsevier, 2016; 
Vieira & Gomes, 2009].) In each database, I searched for records containing the terms (1) 
‘accountability’ and (2) ‘teacher’ or ‘school’, as well as (3) at least one of following terms: 
• ‘culture’, ‘social’, ‘societal’, or ‘sociocultural’, to explore existing research about the 
interaction of sociocultural context and teacher accountability;4 
• ‘cross-country’, ‘across countries’, ‘cross national’, or ‘national differences’, to investigate 
differences across education systems; 
• ‘production function’, ‘input-output’, or ‘productivity’, to identify other studies using the 
family of statistical models that I intend to use; or 
• ‘PISA’, ‘TIMSS’, or ‘TALIS’, to ascertain the scope of prior teacher accountability studies 
that used large-scale international survey data. 
 
4  I used a wildcard indicator to include different word endings, e.g. ‘cultural’ as well as ‘culture’. This set of search 
terms initially yielded over 1,000 results in each database. To make the results list more manageable, I limited 
the search to studies published from 2008 to 2017 (inclusive) and only looked for the search terms in abstracts 
(rather than abstracts, titles, and keywords). These restrictions were not applied to the other sets of search 
terms. 
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All searches were restricted to peer-reviewed studies. 
 
After eliminating duplicates and non-English-language publications, I was left with 1,740 
records. I skimmed the abstracts from these records over the course of two weeks, identifying 
studies that either compared teacher accountability instruments across countries; or discussed the 
interaction of teacher accountability instruments and sociocultural context, whether at the 
national, regional, or school level. In order to maintain a manageable scope, I excluded studies 
on early childhood education and higher education. In total, 89 journal articles, 2 book chapters, 
and 4 books fit these inclusion criteria. In the interests of conciseness, the discussion below 
focuses on studies discussing the relationship between teacher accountability and sociocultural 
context. Other studies from this systematic search have also informed this research project, and 
many are cited elsewhere in this chapter. 
 
Based on the systematic literature search, there has been little empirical cross-country research 
focusing specifically on the relationship between sociocultural context and teacher accountability 
policy (although there have been numerous context-sensitive single-country case studies, such as 
Easley & Tulowitzki, 2016, which synthesises 12 geographically diverse single-country studies). 
Nevertheless, I found studies indicating, across a range of countries, that sociocultural context 
influences the design of teacher accountability policy, the range of stakeholders to whom 
teachers are accountable, and the implementation of teacher accountability instruments. I discuss 
each in turn. 
 
First, there is some cross-country evidence that sociocultural context can shape the formulation 
of teacher accountability policy. Hopmann (2008) attributes the different emphases of the 
accountability policies enacted in the United States, Nordic countries, Germany, and Austria to 
‘deeply engrained ways of understanding the relation between the public and its institutions’ (p. 
425). For example, a deep-seated trust in teacher quality led Nordic countries to accommodate 
accountability pressure by introducing decentralisation to better support teachers’ work; while a 
widespread perception in the United States that education was in crisis precipitated high-stakes 
tests based on national standards (ibid). Similarly, others have linked contemporary 
accountability policies and schooling structures in some European countries to longstanding 
traditions in education and governance (see Mattei, 2012, on England, Germany, France, and 
Italy; Møller & Skedsmo, 2013, on Norway; Osborn, 2006, on Denmark, France, and England). 
Contemporary sociopolitical forces can also exert influence. For example, post-World War II 
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decentralisation policies were influenced by allegiances to liberalism and socialism: in South 
Korea, decentralisation discourse emphasised fostering liberal democracy through schooling, 
while decentralisation in China and Tanzania was linked to socialist rural cooperatives (Edwards 
& DeMatthews, 2014). 
 
Second, some studies suggest that sociocultural context can influence the configuration of 
stakeholders to whom teachers are accountable, as well as the tenor of these accountability 
relationships. For example, Tanzanian teachers feel strongly accountable to parents, but this 
accountability is rooted in a sense of shared moral responsibility for children’s futures, which 
implies that parents hold reciprocal responsibility for supporting their children’s education—and 
which contrasts with the neoliberal view of parents as the customers of the school (Barrett, 
2005). In a fascinating insider study, Mizel (2009) discusses how Israeli Bedouin teachers face 
conflicting accountability demands from the Ministry—which expects them to be apolitical 
employees—and from the tribal sheikh—who expects them to participate in the political 
leadership of the community. Other studies have found between-country differences in the 
stakeholders to whom teachers feel accountable, as well as the processes and goals emphasised 
within these relationships (Czerniawski, 2011, on Norway, Germany, and England; Farrand, 
1988, on Mexico, England, and France; Müller & Hernández, 2010, on Finland, England, and 
Ireland). 
 
Third, sociocultural context can affect teachers’ beliefs about priorities and principles, which in 
turn affects the implementation and efficacy of teacher accountability policy. For example, a 
major teacher quality reform in Indonesia included plans to train teachers as peer evaluators, but 
teachers in this highly hierarchical society questioned colleagues’ authority to evaluate their work, 
believing that such authority should only be held by supervisors or head teachers (Broekman, 
2016). Similarly, some teachers in India challenged community accountability structures because 
they expect to be treated as high-status professionals who should be beyond the purview of low-
status villagers (Narwana, 2015). Mizel’s (2009) study of Israeli Bedouin schooling found 
numerous sociocultural challenges to formal teacher accountability. One issue was the 
prioritisation of cultural preservation over academic achievement. Despite the Ministry’s 
expectation that the schools would adhere to the official curriculum, curricular standards and 
documentation were not prioritised in practice: principals were required to report to the tribal 
sheikh if students transgressed behavioural norms, but neither principals nor sheikh emphasised 
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pedagogical planning and reporting. Thus, sociocultural beliefs—whether about education, 
hierarchy, or social status—can threaten the efficacy of planned accountability instruments. 
 
In addition to offering examples of how sociocultural context can affect teacher accountability, 
articles from the systematic literature search also indicate two particular aspects of sociocultural 
context that may play a role in accountability: social capital and power distance. Social capital—a 
community-based complement to other forms of productivity-enhancing capital—has been 
defined in numerous ways (e.g. Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1995). These 
definitions share an emphasis on aspects of social relationships that facilitate the actions of those 
who possess such capital, whether at the individual level (e.g. facilitating access to opportunities) 
or the group level (e.g. facilitating cooperation). From the systematic search, two studies 
examined the relationship between social capital and accountability, through interviews in 14 
villages in a central Indian district (R. Iyengar, 2012) and regressions of student outcomes against 
voter turnout for Missouri school board elections (Webber, 2010). Both conclude that there is a 
link between social capital and accountability-related improvement, though this relationship may 
only apply to certain student outcomes and under certain enabling conditions. For example, in 12 
out of the 14 villages in R. Iyengar’s (2012) study, informal social networks did not lead to 
community participation in school accountability. However, such community participation did 
exist in two of the villages, where village elders and a local NGO, respectively, had mobilised 
informal networks for accountability. Beyond these examples from the systematic search, social 
trust—a key component of social capital—may strengthen the benefits of accountability 
instruments when it strengthens teachers’ and stakeholders’ commitment to shared expectations 
(Bryk & Schneider, 2002; Cerna, 2014). Conversely, if teachers are used to being trusted as 
professionals, introducing new accountability instruments may imply suspicion, which may harm 
teacher motivation and student outcomes (O’Neill, 2002; Sahlberg, 2010). 
 
While social capital is a measure of interpersonal interactions, power distance is a measure of 
hierarchy. Drawing on Mulder’s (1977) work on power, Hofstede (2001) defines the power 
distance between a boss (B) and a subordinate (S) as ‘the difference between the extent to which 
B can determine the behaviour of S and the extent to which S can determine the behaviour of B’ 
(p. 83). On a societal level, power distance thus measures acceptance of hierarchical distributions 
of power. Although no articles from the systematic literature search examined power distance 
explicitly, Broekman’s (2016) and Narwana’s (2015) studies give instances in which strong social 
hierarchies hampered teacher accountability, because teachers believed that, respectively, fellow 
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teachers in Indonesia and low-status villagers in India could not legitimately appraise them, as 
noted above. Beyond the systematic search, H.-D. Meyer and Schiller (2013) argue that high-
performing countries in PISA have a high GDP as well as either high individualism and low 
power distance, or low individualism and high power distance. More pertinently, some studies in 
psychology and management argue that different levels of power distance often lead to different 
modes of accountability (Gelfand, Lim, & Raver, 2004; Velayutham & Perera, 2004). On one 
hand, strong social hierarchies may hamper accountability instruments if the instruments require 
teachers to be appraised by stakeholders of equal or lower social status, as noted above 
(Broekman, 2016; Narwana, 2015). On the other, a greater acceptance of hierarchy can enhance 
the efficacy of accountability instruments because it promotes compliance (Jaques, 1990).  
 
Another sociocultural factor that may influence teacher accountability processes is uncertainty 
avoidance, which was also constructed in Hofstede’s influential research programme. He derived 
his measure of uncertainty avoidance from questionnaire items about rule-orientedness, 
preferences for job stability, and stress levels (Hofstede, 2001, p. 150). Although uncertainty 
avoidance was not mentioned in the studies from the systematic literature search, Velayutham 
and Perera (2004) include uncertainty avoidance among the societal values that affect the 
emotional states associated with accountability. Specifically, higher levels of uncertainty 
avoidance may boost the efficacy of rule-based forms of teacher accountability, since stronger 
preferences for stability may encourage conformity to accountability standards (see also Hood, 
2011 on policy strategies for blame avoidance). 
 
Overall, these studies offer numerous examples of the interplay between teacher accountability 
and sociocultural context. In the next section, I propose a pathway through which sociocultural 
context can influence the efficacy of policy instruments for teacher accountability. 
 
2.4 Linking teacher motivation, sociocultural context, and accountability 
instruments 
As discussed above, analyses of public policies should consider the processes of change that 
connect policy programmes to their intended outcomes. In this thesis, I focus on the ways in 
which teacher accountability instruments influence teachers and their work. I frame this analysis 
using the concept of teacher motivation, for reasons I explain below. 
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Defining and explaining teacher motivation 
Whether implicitly or explicitly, accountability instruments targeting teacher practice assume that 
student outcomes can improve when teachers work harder, i.e. with raised motivation, and/or 
work differently, i.e. with motivation reoriented toward other activities or goals (c.f. Kozlowski 
& Lauen, 2019; Wagner, 1989). (Of course, some accountability instruments collect information 
on teacher practice for the sake of informing stakeholder decisions rather than influencing 
teacher practice directly. I discuss this pathway further in Section 2.5.) Hence, in this project, I 
focus on teacher motivation as the pivot of accountability instruments that successfully change 
teacher practice. For conceptual clarity, I adopt Schunk, Pintrich, and Meece’s (2010) definition 
of motivation as ‘the process whereby goal-directed activity is instigated and sustained’ (p.4). 
 
However, as with accountability and with culture, motivation is a complex and contested 
concept. Psychological research has developed multiple empirically validated theories for 
explaining motivational processes (Deci, 1992). Current theories agree that motivation is a 
cognitive phenomenon, involving subjective mental processes that exert causal influence on 
action (Schunk et al., 2010). Nonetheless, these theories diverge considerably. Different theories 
emphasise different motivational factors and have different implications for the design of teacher 
accountability instruments. Additionally, different fields of inquiry tend to emphasise different 
theories or variants of theories. I discuss a few such theories below. 
 
In education, one prominent set of theories focuses on the goals to which motivation is directed. 
This includes earlier needs-satisfaction theories such as Murray’s (1938) taxonomy of primary 
and secondary needs and Maslow’s (1954) hierarchy of higher and lower needs; as well as more 
recent theories such as work by Dweck and her collaborators (Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Elliott & 
Dweck, 1988) that connects learning goals and performance goals to distinct theories of 
intelligence and patterns of behaviour. These goal-related theories suggest that teachers’ 
motivational responses to accountability instruments may depend on factors such as whether 
they view their students’ (and their own) intelligence as fixed or malleable, and the degree to 
which the instruments support the satisfaction of their particular needs. 
 
Another set of theories focuses on different types of motivation. The most prominent 
articulation here is Ryan and Deci’s (2000a, 2000b, 2000c) self-determination theory, which 
distinguishes between intrinsic motivation (doing an activity for its own sake) and extrinsic 
motivation (doing an activity for the sake of some external reward, constraint, or other 
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compulsion). One of the propositions of self-determination theory is that intrinsic motivation is 
sustained when the actor feels autonomous, competent, and meaningfully related to others. 
Drawing on this theory, Jang (2019) found that the content of teacher motivation influenced 
classroom practices, as reported by both the teachers and their students. Specifically, when 
teachers’ self-reported instructional goals were intrinsic (i.e. students’ personal and relational 
growth), their classroom styles supported pupil autonomy, whereas teachers whose instructional 
goals were extrinsic (i.e. students’ test scores or the teacher’s professional success) adopted more 
controlling styles. More relevant to teacher accountability is Deci and Ryan’s (2000) proposition 
that external rewards—such as performance-based pay for teachers—may reduce intrinsic 
motivation if they compromise actors’ sense of autonomy (see also related arguments in other 
fields, e.g. Deming, 1993, in management; Stout, 2010, on law and public policy). 
 
Besides educational psychology, another area that is relevant to this project is research into 
management, organisational behaviour, and work motivation. Theories of motivation that are 
prominent in this field include Herzberg’s motivation-hygiene theory (Herzberg, 1966, 1968; 
Herzberg, Mausner, & Snyderman, 1959). Herzberg’s theory overlaps with Murray’s (1938) and 
Maslow’s (1954) needs-focused theories by distinguishing between basic needs stemming from 
biological necessity and pain avoidance, and the need for achievement and growth. In the 
workplace, the former are supported by hygiene factors (e.g. adequate compensation and job 
security), which can reduce job dissatisfaction but do not positively affect satisfaction; whereas 
the latter are supported by motivator factors (e.g. suitably challenging tasks and professional 
advancement), which can raise job satisfaction. Thus, Herzberg’s theory would predict that 
performance-based bonuses—which are often regarded as an incentive for better teacher 
performance—could decrease teachers’ dissatisfaction with their jobs if their compensation was 
previously inadequate. However, such bonuses would be less likely to have any impact on 
teachers’ job satisfaction or their motivation to improve classroom practice. 
 
In contrast, Vroom’s (1964) expectancy theory—another prominent theory among management 
scholars and practitioners—would predict that salary bonuses could, under the right 
circumstances, boost teacher motivation. Vroom’s theory centres on three motivational factors: 
expectancy, the belief that effort will lead to successful performance; instrumentality, the belief 
that successful performance will lead to desired outcomes; and valence, or how much value the 
actor expects to gain from the outcome. Thus, if a teacher believes that working harder will raise 
their students’ test scores, and that raising these test scores will lead to a financial reward, and if 
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they eagerly desire such financial gains, then establishing performance-based bonuses would raise 
this teacher’s motivation. 
 
Hence, conceptually, there are both overlaps and divergences between different theories of 
motivation. There are also overlaps and divergences between the research programmes studying 
motivation. To illustrate, Vroom’s theory is cited frequently in management (Pinder, 1992), but 
rarely in education. However, an analogous framework in education psychology is expectancy-
value theory (Wigfield & Eccles, 2000). Like Vroom’s framework, expectancy-value theory draws 
on Lewin’s (1935) and Atkinson’s (1957) earlier work on expectancy and valence. Unlike 
Vroom’s work, expectancy-value theory does not emphasise instrumentality, and it is often used 
as an analytic framework for teaching and learning processes (Schunk et al., 2010; see also 
Robertson-Kraft, 2014 for an example using expectancy-value theory to analyse a teacher 
evaluation system). However, Bandura’s (1977) social cognitive theory, which is also popular in 
educational research, draws on different theoretical traditions but includes concepts that are 
similar to both instrumentality and expectancy. In Bandura’s (1977) framework, there is a 
distinction between outcome expectancy, i.e. ‘a person’s estimate that a given behavior will lead 
to certain outcomes’ (p. 193), which is analogous to Vroom’s instrumentality; and efficacy 
expectations or self-efficacy, i.e. ‘the conviction that one can successfully execute the behavior 
required to produce the outcomes’ (p. 193), which is analogous to Vroom’s expectancy. 
 
The range of these theories indicates that motivational processes—and the analysis thereof—are 
complex. This complexity may help to account for the variable effects of teacher accountability 
instruments, since influencing teacher motivation may not be a straightforward process, as 
indicated by the diverse predictions of these theories of motivation. In this thesis, I do not 
subscribe to any single motivational theory. This is partly because I am not a psychologist by 
training and hence am not equipped to weigh the empirical validity of different theories. More 
importantly, all theories of motivation—like any other abstractions—are necessarily incomplete, 
and different theories may have greater explanatory power in different empirical situations. Next, 
I discuss how and why teacher motivation is pivotal to teacher accountability. 
 
The relationship between teacher motivation and teacher accountability instruments 
There are theoretical grounds for expecting a close connection between motivation and 
accountability. For example, Pawson and Tilley (1997, Chapter 3) argue that real change in any 
CHAPTER 2   26 
social process—including classroom teaching—results from changes in individual actors’ 
choices, reasoning, and effort. As McLaughlin (1987) observes, 
change ultimately is a problem of the smallest unit. At each point in the policy process, 
a policy is transformed as individuals interpret and respond to it. What actually is 
delivered or provided under the aegis of a policy depends finally on the individual at the 
end of the line. (p. 174) 
This emphasis on individual agency also appears in Wagner’s (1989) argument that the likelihood 
of an actor fulfilling an accountability-related obligation depends on how they interpret this 
obligation morally, and whether circumstances are conducive to compliance (e.g. whether the 
obligation is compatible with prior obligations). More recently, Andrews, Pritchett, and 
Woolcock (2017) have drawn a distinction between accounting (i.e. reporting standardised 
information about one’s work for institutional accountability processes) and accounts (i.e. ‘the 
justificatory narrative I tell myself which reconciles my actions with my identity’, p. 114). They 
argue not only that organisational success requires complementarity between accounting and 
accounts; but also that success in complex fields (such as education) depends less on the 
accounting and more on the strength and alignment of individual and organisational accounts 
(see also Abelmann & Elmore, 1999, on the distinctions between responsibility, expectations, 
and accountability). All of this suggests that changes in individual teachers’ motivation—i.e. the 
cognitive processes that drive goal-directed behaviour (Schunk et al., 2010, p. 4)—underlie any 
changes in teacher practice that are prompted by accountability instruments. 
 
Notwithstanding these theoretical foundations, the empirical basis for linking teacher 
accountability and teacher motivation is not particularly strong. This may be due in part to the 
difficulty of measuring teacher motivation: since motivation is a cognitive process, both 
observational and self-report measurements will necessarily be imperfect proxies (Schunk et al., 
2010, Chapter 1). Still, some analyses have found that teacher accountability instruments can 
raise teacher effort, as measured by different proxies: Lavy (2009) used teachers’ self-reports of 
additional instructional time after regular school hours as a proxy for their effort; Karachiwalla 
and Park (2017) instead used teachers’ annual performance evaluation scores (which were 
awarded by district-level committees based on student test scores and teacher attitude, 
attendance, and classroom preparation); and Macartney, McMillan, and Petronijevic (2018) 
designated incentive-invariant teacher effects on test scores as ‘teacher ability’ and teacher effects 
that did vary with incentives as ‘teacher effort’. Although these three studies did find that 
accountability instruments can raise teacher effort, some analyses did not find any such 
association between teacher accountability instruments and teacher motivation. In Yuan et al. 
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(2013), randomised studies of three different pay-for-performance programmes did not find 
effects on the number of hours teachers worked, nor on their instructional practices. It is 
important to note that these effort measures—hours of work, instructional practices, evaluation 
scores, and test results—are also influenced by non-motivational factors. At best, they indicate 
symptoms of teacher motivation, rather than motivation itself. Hence, the evidence for a direct 
connection between teacher motivation and accountability instruments is relatively weak. 
 
However, there is stronger evidence that teachers’ subjective priorities and choices—which are, 
arguably, closely tied to motivation—intervene in between accountability instruments and 
teachers’ manifested actions, as posited by the theorists discussed above. From the systematic 
literature search, in addition to the examples discussed above of sociocultural context influencing 
teachers’ responses to accountability instruments (i.e. Broekman, 2016; Mizel, 2009; Narwana, 
2015), Müller and Hernández’s (2010) mixed-methods study of seven European countries found 
that teachers were largely sceptical about accountability instruments because these policies 
generated peripheral paperwork rather than enhancing the classroom teaching that they regarded 
as their chief responsibility. More broadly, scholars have suggested that certain education 
reforms in Mexico and in France failed to take root partly because these reforms were not 
aligned with teachers’ conceptions of their responsibilities (Farrand, 1988; Osborn, 2006). 
 
Beyond the systematic search, Bjork (2016) observed that Japanese teachers were submitting 
official reports that indicated compliance with new curricular directives—even though their 
actual classroom activities conformed more to established practice, local expectations, and 
parental demands than to national-level policy. Similarly, Ingram, Louis, and Schroeder (2004) 
found that one barrier to American teachers’ uptake of data-driven accountability instruments is 
that teachers’ conceptions of classroom efficacy are much broader than the test scores that these 
instruments emphasise. Both of these studies suggest that accountability instruments can be 
hampered by a mismatch between their goals and the goals that teachers are already motivated to 
pursue. More generally, a review of 29 empirical studies on accountability policy and teachers’ 
workplace relations found that teachers’ responses to accountability policies depend on their 
ethical and professional stances (Mausethagen, 2013). In another review article, Rowan (1990) 
proposes that where teaching is viewed as a routine task, schools should be organised following a 
control-oriented strategy; whereas a commitment-building strategy would be more effective 
where teaching is viewed as complex. Looking beyond education, Lerner and Tetlock’s (1999) 
review of psychological research on how accountability affects social choices found that 
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accountability instruments only prompt desirable increases in cognitive effort when numerous 
contingent factors coincide. One such factor is that the actor must view the source of the 
accountability as legitimate. 
 
Taken together, these studies suggest that teachers’ subjective perspectives matter greatly to the 
implementation and efficacy of accountability instruments (see also Spillane, 2009; Verger & 
Parcerisa, 2017a). As Abelmann and Elmore (1999) argue in their study of accountability in 
schools: 
The distinguishing characteristic of responsibility … is that it is personal and individual 
in nature and it stems from the values and beliefs of individuals. … organizational and 
external influences may play a part in teachers’ perceptions of their role, but … 
individual values are certainly influential. (p. 3, emphasis original) 
Hence, an accountability instrument will only influence a teacher as intended if the teacher 
regards the instrument as sufficiently persuasive in some way. In my systematic literature search 
and other explorations of the literature, I did not find any established bodies of research about 
the characteristics that are likely to render an accountability instrument persuasive to its targeted 
actors. Nonetheless, given the range of motivational theories discussed above as well as the 
complexity of teachers as individuals and of teaching as a profession, the bases of such 
persuasion are probably diverse—including moral principles, the desire for financial gain, and the 
fear of legal repercussions. 
 
Some studies suggest that policy directives in general are more likely to receive compliance when 
they are regarded as legitimate. For example, Tyler (2006) argues that when legitimacy ‘exists in 
the thinking of people within groups, organisations, or societies, it leads them to feel personally 
obligated to defer to those authorities, institutions, and social arrangements’ (p. 376). 
Empirically, perceptions of legitimacy depend on the belief that an institution’s procedures are 
fair and that the outcomes it generates are desirable, among other factors (Tyler, 2006; Wallner, 
2008). This is borne out in some studies of teacher accountability. In a study of school inspection 
feedback in Flanders, teachers were more likely to accept feedback when they viewed the 
inspectors as professionally and ethically credible (Quintelier, Vanhoof, & De Maeyer, 2018). 
Similarly, teachers experiencing an accountability policy change in Virginia were more likely to 
view the new evaluation policy as legitimate when they believed that it had valid and reliable 
instruments, fair procedures, and worthwhile outcomes—and those teachers who regarded the 
new policy as legitimate were more likely to improve their instructional practices in response (J. 
Kim, Sun, & Youngs, 2019). Note the parallel here with Vroom’s (1964) expectancy theory of 
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motivation, described above: Vroom argues that instrumentality, i.e. belief that successful 
performance will yield the desired reward, is a key factor in motivation; just as the studies 
outlined in this paragraph suggest that belief in the procedural justice of an institution is key to 
regarding it as legitimate and, thus, to accepting its authority. 
 
A caveat: even though it is clear that teachers’ subjective perspectives play a critical role in 
accountability processes, these subjective perspectives cannot be reduced solely to motivation. 
Teachers’ perspectives can be conceptualised using various constructs; including teacher identity 
(Barrett, 2005; Czerniawski, 2011), to give an example from the systematic literature search. 
Nonetheless, in this project I focus on teacher motivation, for two reasons. From a policy 
standpoint, as noted above, many teacher accountability instruments implicitly or explicitly aim 
to raise or reorient teacher motivation (e.g. Adkins, 2004). From a conceptual standpoint, 
motivation by definition relates to goal-directed behaviour—which can be mapped onto to the 
standards and expectations implicit in any accountability instrument. Framed in this way, the 
crux of the matter becomes how to design accountability instruments that influence teacher 
motivation in desirable ways. 
 
How sociocultural context influences teacher motivation 
Teachers’ responses to accountability instruments can differ considerably—even for the same 
instruments in the same locality (e.g. J. Kim et al., 2019; Quintelier et al., 2018). This underscores 
the fact that, as argued above, educational change via teacher accountability instruments requires 
change at the level of individual teachers, who are heterogeneous. Heterogeneity 
notwithstanding, within a given setting there will be some broad patterns in the accountability 
instruments that most teachers regard as compelling. This is because teachers’ perspectives and, 
in turn, the overall efficacy of teacher accountability instruments are shaped by context. As 
Pawson and Tilley (1997) observe, ‘subjects will only act upon the resources and choices offered 
by a program if they are in conducive settings’ (p. 216)—and most settings have some dominant 
characteristics that will influence the actions of most actors within them. 
 
Importantly, it is not only teachers who are heterogeneous, but also the contexts they inhabit. 
Such contextual differences can include differences in how motivation-related processes operate. 
Contemporary research in both psychology (e.g. Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 2004) and 
organisational studies (e.g. Kirkman, Lowe, & Gibson, 2006) posits that motivation and its 
CHAPTER 2   30 
related processes may be influenced by different factors depending on the sociocultural context. 
In a landmark study, S.S. Iyengar and Lepper (1999) showed that Anglo-American children were 
most motivated when they could choose between different tasks, whereas their Asian-American 
counterparts were most motivated when tasks were ostensibly chosen by their mothers or their 
classmates. This runs counter to one interpretation of self-determination theory, which posits 
that independent choice raises intrinsic motivation universally.5  
 
Looking at teachers specifically, empirical studies suggest that sociocultural context may 
influence teachers’ professional priorities and goals (which would, in turn, shape teacher 
motivation). Besides the studies from the systematic literature search discussed above, Chistolini 
(2010) found cross-country differences in teachers’ conceptions of ‘the good teacher’ in eight 
countries (Belgium, Cyprus, Italy, Libya, Poland, Slovakia, Turkey, and the United States). 
Broadfoot and Osborn (1993) likewise found systematic differences between English and French 
teachers’ perceptions of their professional responsibilities, which were influenced by cultural and 
ideological assumptions. Furthermore, in a cross-cultural analysis of teacher motivation in 
Western and Chinese contexts, Ho and Hau (2014) concluded that some motivational processes 
function similarly across contexts (e.g. the association between high intrinsic motivation and 
positive teacher practices), whereas other aspects of motivation are culture-dependent (e.g. 
teachers’ goals and values, as well as their beliefs about what good practice looks like). Similarly, 
Klassen, Usher, and Bong (2010) found that the associations between teacher job satisfaction, 
job stress, and collectivism (a cultural construct) differed between samples of teachers surveyed 
in the United States, Canada, and South Korea. In another study, Klassen et al. (2018) found that 
teachers and teacher educators in England, Finland, Malawi, and Oman differed in the non-
cognitive attributes that they viewed as most important for effective teaching, and that these 
differences corresponded to differences in cultural context. 
 
 
5  Ryan and Deci (2000c) disagree with this interpretation. While arguing that a sense of autonomy is necessary to 
sustain intrinsic motivation, they emphasise that autonomy does not necessarily mean independent or isolated 
action, but rather ‘the extent to which people genuinely and authentically concur with the forces that do influence 
their behaviour’ (p. 328, emphasis original). This view is compatible with S.S. Iyengar and Lepper’s (1999) 
findings. 
CHAPTER 2   31 
2.5 Conceptual framework: mapping teacher accountability pathways and 
mechanisms 
Taken together, the research discussed in the previous sections suggests that whether 
accountability instruments will prompt desirable or undesirable changes in teacher motivation 
depends partly on the compatibility between the instruments and teachers’ culturally shaped 
conceptions of their work. To clarify these relationships conceptually and to facilitate their 
testing empirically, I now present a framework for mapping the intended outcomes of teacher 
accountability instruments. This framework, shown in Figure 2.1, is agnostic about the types and 
forms of student outcomes that are most desirable. My use of ‘student outcomes’ encapsulates 
any goals for students’ development, whether individual—such as cognitive or socioemotional 
growth—or collective—such as equity—that stakeholders in the context deem desirable (Allen, 
2016; Biesta, 2011). Also, it does not imply that any particular teacher accountability instrument 
is inherently superior. Instead, it emphasises the interplay between different elements and actors 
along the policy pathway. 
 
Figure 2.1   Conceptual framework for mapping the intended outcomes of teacher accountability instruments 
 
 
Rather than attempting to comprehensively diagram all the key factors in teacher accountability 
processes, this conceptual framework reflects my analytic interests in this thesis. I am interested 
in the implementation and efficacy of teacher accountability instruments, rather than their 
formulation. Accordingly, the starting point of the framework is the teacher accountability 
instruments themselves, instead of the cumulative processes of conceptualisation, negotiation, 
and habituation that underlie policy formulation and/or the emergence of informal 
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accountability practices. Also, rather than enumerating the full spectrum of contextual factors 
that may affect teacher accountability instruments, I only delineate ‘sociocultural context’ from 
‘other contextual factors’. This is not to imply that sociocultural context exerts as much influence 
as the totality of other contextual factors, but merely that this thesis focuses on sociocultural 
context. 
 
This framework was developed iteratively over the course of this project. I developed the overall 
pathways—i.e. from teacher accountability instruments to student outcomes via changes in 
teacher motivation or in stakeholder decisions—based on my reading of the literature, prior to 
conducting my fieldwork. At that point, I was also interested in identifying the mechanisms 
underlying such changes in teacher motivation, and I had tentatively outlined some potential 
mechanisms. However, it was only when analysing my field interviews that I became convinced 
that the three mechanisms shown in Figure 2.1—i.e. communicating information, setting 
standards, and allocating consequences—encompassed all the motivational effects that interview 
participants had mentioned. For example, prior to analysing the interviews, I had posited a 
separate mechanism wherein teachers’ motivation may be increased through their desire to 
protect professional reputations or maintain collegial esteem, as implied in some discussions of 
professional accountability (e.g. Fullan, et al., 2015; Müller & Hernández, 2010) and informal 
accountability (e.g. Romzek, 2014). However, as I analysed the data, it became clear that the 
mechanism underlying such collegial accountability was the same mechanism underlying 
informational accountability instruments, as I discuss below and in Section 5.4. Hence their 
consolidation into a single mechanism. The alignment between these three mechanisms and the 
three categories in my definition of teacher accountability instruments is a happy coincidence, 
since the categories in this definition have been largely unchanged since I submitted my 
registration report in September 2017. To recall, in Section 2.1 I defined teacher accountability 
instruments as ‘tools, practices, and structures that aim to orient teacher practice toward 
stakeholder expectations by (a) collecting information about teachers’ individual or collective 
practice and communicating this information to stakeholders, (b) setting standards by which 
stakeholders judge teacher practice, and/or (c) allocating consequences based on stakeholders’ 
judgements of teachers’ practice’. 
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Pathways from teacher accountability instruments to student outcomes 
As shown in Figure 2.1, I propose two causal pathways by which teacher accountability 
instruments may improve student outcomes: either by (a) changing stakeholder decisions, or (b) 
raising teacher motivation or reorienting their motivation toward different tasks or goals. Such 
changes in stakeholder decisions and teacher motivation are what M.J. Williams (2017; see also 
Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017, p. 15) calls intermediate outcomes, i.e. changes that are triggered by 
the policy instrument and that lead, in turn, to the desired final outcomes—in this case, 
improved student outcomes (however defined). 
 
However, the pathway from stakeholder decisions to student outcomes is indirect. Even if a 
school leader decides to hire or fire a teacher (or a teacher decides to support or shun a 
colleague, or a guardian decides to enrol a child in a private school, or a policymaker decides to 
modify teacher compensation rules), further intermediate outcomes must occur before this 
decision can influence the classroom teaching and learning processes that ultimately impact 
student outcomes. Some of these intermediate outcomes may entail stakeholders instituting or 
altering teacher accountability instruments that aim to directly influence the teacher motivation 
pathway instead. Hence, I focus instead on the teacher motivation pathway, since teachers are 
frontline implementors of education policy. 
 
It is important to note that none of the processes in Figure 2.1 are sure-fire. To illustrate, for the 
teacher motivation pathway, teachers’ subjective perspectives are crucial determinants of whether 
an accountability instrument works as intended (as discussed in Section 2.4). As McLaughlin 
(1987) argues, successful policy implementation is not only a matter of local capacity, but also of 
will, i.e. ‘the attitudes, motivation, and beliefs that underlie an implementor’s response to a 
policy’s goals or strategies’ (p. 172). Teachers may not usually be active participants in 
formulating accountability policies, but they certainly have some agency over how they respond 
to policy instruments. For example, under a national reform in England emphasising 
performance-related pay, one of the three most common reasons given by headteachers for 
revising their pay policies was to raise teacher motivation (Sharp et al., 2017). However, only 
27% of surveyed teachers agreed that these performance-related pay policies helped to motivate 
underperforming teachers, and only 38% agreed that these policies further motivated teachers 
who were already performing well (ibid)—indicating that many teachers did not respond to the 
pay policies as principals intended. 
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Additionally, note that ‘teacher motivation’ in the framework can be interpreted either 
individually or collectively. An accountability instrument could raise the motivation of individual 
teachers by prompting them to work harder, or it could raise the collective motivation of 
teachers in a given setting by influencing the configuration of people who enter and remain in 
the teaching profession. In prior studies, this distinction has been conceptualised as incentives 
vs. sorting (Lazear, 2000, 2003), motivation effects vs. selection effects (Podgursky & Springer, 
2007) or changes in effort vs. compositional change (Biasi, 2018). Such selection effects can be 
triggered by various instruments, such as salary structures intended to render the profession 
unattractive to unmotivated teachers (e.g. Gerhart & Fang, 2017; Leaver, Ozier, Serneels, & 
Zeitlin, 2019), or entry criteria for pre-service training. Selection-oriented instruments fall within 
the conceptualisation of accountability as a principal-agent relationship, because identifying the 
agent is no less important than determining the agent’s obligations, as noted in Section 2.1. 
 
Even if the level or direction of teachers’ individual or collective motivation changes positively, 
this may not translate into improved student outcomes. For this to happen, the changes in 
teacher motivation must, in turn, change teacher practice in ways that positively influence 
student learning. Although this is the implicit theory of change in many teacher accountability 
policies, the empirical evidence base for the causal influence of teacher motivation on student 
outcomes is not particularly strong. For example, a major review of research on teacher efficacy, 
which is a key construct in Bandura’s theory of motivation (see Section 2.4), found that only 6 
out of the 218 reviewed studies of teacher efficacy examined its relationship with student 
outcomes, finding modest empirical support for this link (Klassen, Tze, Betts, & Gordon, 2011). 
Nonetheless, there is evidence that higher levels of teachers’ self-reported motivation are 
associated with better instructional practices, as reported by students (Holzberger, Philipp, & 
Kunter, 2014; Kunter et al., 2008). There is also some evidence that higher levels of teacher 
motivation are associated with higher levels of student motivation (Roth, Assor, Kanat-Maymon, 
& Kaplan, 2007) and with better student achievement (Caprara, Barbaranelli, Steca, & Malone, 
2006). However, these relationships may be influenced by other factors, including teacher 
knowledge (Keller, Neumann, & Fischer, 2017). 
 
Finally, it is also worth noting that even though the stakeholder decisions pathway and the 
teacher motivation pathway are clearly delineated conceptually, this distinction may be harder to 
identify empirically since teachers’ and other stakeholders’ interactions with accountability 
instruments are often entangled. For example, one analysis of school-level accountability grades 
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in New York found that schools receiving unfavourable grades subsequently experienced lower 
teacher turnover, which suggests a rise in teacher motivation; but that this lower turnover is 
likely due to principals’ actions, which instead indicates changes in stakeholder decisions in 
response to the accountability grades (Dizon-Ross, 2018). Entanglements notwithstanding, it is 
worthwhile to distinguish between the stakeholder and teacher pathways, both for analytic clarity 
and for effective policy design. 
 
Mechanisms for influencing teacher motivation: information, standards, and 
consequences 
Besides drawing a distinction between the stakeholder and teacher pathways of change, my 
framework also recognises three different mechanisms through which such change can be 
initiated. These mechanisms are: communicating information on teacher practice, thus informing 
stakeholders’ decisions or activating a teacher’s desire to compare favourably with a set of 
expectations; setting standards for teacher practice, thus directing the teacher’s efforts toward 
certain expectations; and allocating consequences based on judgements of teacher practice, thus 
creating incentives to gain rewards and avoid penalties. 
 
One reason why it is worth exploring such mechanisms empirically is that seemingly similar 
teacher accountability instruments can lead to dramatically different outcomes. As discussed in 
Section 2.1, this variability can stem not only from variations in policy design and 
implementation quality, but also from variations in context. Furthermore, the fact that radically 
different sets of teacher accountability instruments can contribute to equally desirable student 
outcomes—as in Finland’s and Singapore’s respective approaches to teacher accountability—
indicates multiple pathways of change. This suggests that there is much to be learnt from 
examining the mechanisms underlying the effects of teacher accountability instruments. 
 
However, any attempt to analyse such mechanisms also entails a lot of variability and 
contingency, not least because social scientists define mechanisms in numerous different ways. 
Elster’s definition of mechanisms as ‘frequently occurring and easily recognizable causal patterns 
that are triggered under generally unknown conditions or with indeterminate consequences’ 
(1998, p. 45) is widely cited but far from definitive. Mahoney (2001), for example, lists over 20 
different definitions from various scholarly publications. In addition to defining mechanisms, 
some scholars have created typologies of mechanisms across different settings or different 
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change processes (e.g. Hedström & Swedberg, 1998; Westhorp, 2018). Variability 
notwithstanding, most definitions treat mechanisms as the crucial, causal links between inputs 
and outputs. Focusing on such mechanisms facilitates comparison between entities or events 
that may differ in complex ways yet share the same underlying causal processes (Steinmetz, 
2004).6  
 
Apart from the variability and contingency of teacher accountability instruments, another reason 
why it is important to look at the mechanisms underlying teacher accountability is to 
counterbalance an influential strand of policy rhetoric about accountability. This strand of 
rhetoric advocates for a particular form of accountability—establishing quantitative metrics of 
success, tracking performance on these metrics, and making these metrics public—even though 
such metric-based accountability instruments have a mixed track record, often failing to deliver 
the promised improvements while triggering undesirable side effects (Muller, 2018; O’Neill, 
2002; Zhao, 2018). As Dubnick (2005) argues, in order to move beyond the assumption that 
accountability instruments necessarily lead to improved performance, we need to examine the 
mechanisms underlying this presumed relationship. 
 
Such attention to mechanisms and theories of change is central to some of the policy analysis 
models discussed in Section 2.2 above. For example, Cartwright and Hardie (2012) argue that 
evidence-based policy requires the identification of causal roles and support factors. While 
support factors concern the context of policy implementation, causal roles concern the 
mechanisms of change. Policies that play causal roles are INUS conditions for a particular effect: 
‘Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition for producing a 
contribution to the effect’ (ibid, p. 25, emphasis original; see also Mackie, 1965). In other words, 
(a) there are multiple sets of circumstances that could (potentially) contribute to a desired policy 
outcome; and (b) a particular policy instrument will only contribute positively under the right 
circumstances. In Cartwright and Hardie’s terminology, each of the three teacher accountability 
mechanisms that I propose is an INUS condition for improving educational outcomes. 
Depending on the context, they can (but do not necessarily) influence teacher motivation or 
stakeholder decisions in ways that may (or may not) improve teacher practice and student 
outcomes. 
 
 
6  Merton (1968) makes a similar argument in his discussion of middle-range theory (see also Pawson, 2000). 
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One of the three mechanisms entails communicating information on teacher practice to stakeholders. 
This informational mechanism can prompt stakeholders to change their decisions, as when the 
publication of school rankings prompts families to avoid enrolling students in poorly ranked 
schools (Nunes, Reis, & Seabra, 2015) or when school evaluation ratings prompt administrators 
to alter budgetary allocations (Craig, Imberman, & Perdue, 2015). However, accountability 
instruments that use the informational mechanism can also initiate change along the teacher 
motivation pathway. Such motivational change occurs by activating teachers’ desires to be 
regarded favourably when information about their practice is compared to stakeholder 
expectations. This can occur through accountability instruments that directly convey feedback to 
teachers, whether on student test results (Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2010) or on classroom 
practice (Garet et al., 2017). However, the desire to compare favourably with stakeholder 
expectations can be triggered merely by the consciousness that information is being collected 
about their practice, even if the information is not relayed to teachers themselves. Psychology 
experiments have shown that the mere awareness of being observed can raise cognitive effort 
(Lerner & Tetlock, 1999), probably due to the desire to safeguard or improve one’s image 
(Tetlock, 1991). In education, this awareness can result from tacit monitoring by colleagues 
(Ahmad, 2016; Müller & Hernández, 2010, p. 313), with one school promoting such monitoring 
by designing classroom windows that render teachers visible to others in the hallway (Gill, 
Lerner, & Meosky, 2016). 
 
Informational instruments for teacher accountability can vary greatly, encompassing compulsory 
standardised questionnaires on classroom activities and casual troubleshooting sessions with 
colleagues. As noted, the recipients of the information can be other stakeholders or teachers 
themselves, or both. (For example, Singapore’s teacher appraisal system, which I describe in 
Section 5.2, provides developmental feedback to teachers while also providing school leaders and 
government officials with data for workforce planning.) The stakeholder expectations to which 
the information is compared may be codified or tacit, shared or unilateral, precise or vague, 
externally imposed or personally espoused.7  
 
7  I suspect that the direct, targeted action of human stakeholders may not be necessary to trigger the 
informational mechanism. Conceivably, a teacher who receives an automated electronic report showing their 
pupils’ test scores as compared to a national distribution may be prompted to work harder or to work 
differently. Even the mere requirement for a teacher to report on test scores or lesson objectives may activate 
the consciousness that their practice is being compared to standards and, thus, may alter the level or direction of 
their motivation. However, even such impersonal instruments were designed by human stakeholders at some 
point. Moreover, all of the participants in my field interviews referred to specific people or groups of people 
when describing the workings of informational accountability instruments, so I do not focus on the impersonal 
possibilities in my analysis. 
CHAPTER 2   38 
 
These expectations may come from accountability instruments that invoke the second 
mechanism, which is to set standards for teacher practice. Unlike the informational mechanism, which 
operates through teachers’ awareness that their practice is being actively compared to a set of 
expectations, the standard-setting mechanism passively directs teacher motivation toward general 
or particular expectations set by stakeholders. As noted in Section 2.1, standard-setting is central 
to teacher accountability because education serves many competing and amorphous goals. 
Passivity notwithstanding, standards can be highly influential. For example, accountability 
standards in the United States have triggered substantial changes in kindergarten teachers’ 
instructional priorities, even though their pupils are not subject to monitoring via standardised 
tests (Bassok, Latham, & Rorem, 2016). Within principal-agent relationships, standard-setting 
pertains not only to expectations for the results of teachers’ work, but also to reciprocal 
expectations for the conditions under which they do that work, as noted in Section 2.1. If the 
principals—whether actual school principals, the national or subnational government, parents, 
and the local community—provide teachers with an appropriate standard of support, then 
teachers as the agents may feel a corresponding obligation to meet the standards set for their 
work, even if these standards are passive. Some instruments may play a dual role in setting 
standards for teacher practice while providing support in the form of guidance and structure for 
meeting those standards. In Finland, textbooks—which supplement the standards set by the 
national curriculum—influence teachers’ pedagogical decisions extensively, even though teachers 
are usually free to choose which textbooks their classes will use (Crehan, 2016, pp. 59–60; 
Törnroos, 2005; Viholainen, Partanen, Piiroinen, Asikainen, & Hirvonen, 2015). Other standard-
setting instruments include teacher codes of conduct, school-level goals, and criteria for entry 
into the teaching profession, such as licensure requirements or admissions screening for initial 
teacher training. (Refer to the previous subsection for a discussion of entry standards as 
accountability instruments that influence teacher practice collectively at the point of becoming an 
agent in the accountability relationship, rather than individually in-service). 
 
The third mechanism in my conceptual framework is that accountability instruments can allocate 
consequences based on stakeholders’ judgements of teacher practice, thus influencing teacher motivation via 
the desire to gain rewards and avoid penalties. These consequences can be individual (e.g. merit-
based career progression) or collective (e.g. budgetary incentives for school-level improvements). 
As discussed in Section 2.1, such performance-based consequences have been shown to 
influence teachers considerably, whether in desirable ways, such as raising the amount of time 
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that teachers invest in their work (Duflo et al., 2012; Lavy, 2009), or undesirable ones, such as 
perverse behaviours that aim to raise test scores rather than meaningfully improving student 
learning (Booher-Jennings, 2005; Vogell, 2011). 
 
An accountability instrument may involve more than one mechanism, as with a self-evaluation 
form that collects information on teacher practice while concurrently specifying standards via the 
categories of information required. Also, many teacher accountability approaches deploy several 
interrelated instruments which use different mechanisms, as with pay-for-performance schemes 
that award bonuses based on information about student test scores (e.g. Chiang et al., 2015). 
 
The role of context 
For any teacher accountability instrument or set of instruments, its mechanism(s) will only work 
as intended if the context is conducive. The influence of contexts—cultural and historical, 
national and local, sectoral and institutional—in policy implementation has been emphasised in 
studies of public policy in general (Lipsky, 2010; McLaughlin, 1987; Weaver, 2010), as well as in 
education policy (Ball et al., 2012; Spillane, 2009) and in educational assessment and 
accountability in particular (Easley & Tulowitzki, 2016; Feniger & Lefstein, 2014). 
 
Since teaching involves numerous interacting factors, a given context will only be conducive to 
the desired effects of an accountability instrument if multiple factors align. For example, even if a 
teacher accountability instrument successfully raises or reorients a teacher’s motivation, this may 
not lead to any improvements in student outcomes if the teacher lacks the training to teach 
effectively. These contextual enablers and constraints operate at numerous levels. The success of 
accountability instruments can hinge on a single district administrator (e.g. Skrla et al., 2011) or a 
few village elders (e.g. R. Iyengar, 2012). Moreover, context can affect the efficacy of any of the 
steps along the pathways in Figure 2.1. A teacher accountability instrument may fail to improve 
student outcomes because it does not fit teachers’ socioculturally embedded beliefs about 
educational priorities and thus does not influence their motivation (e.g. Mizel, 2009). Equally, a 
teacher accountability instrument may boost teacher motivation but fail to improve student 
outcomes because of other contextual constraints, such as inadequate resources, as noted in 
Section 2.1. This may have been the case in a performance-based pay experiment in Uganda, 
which found that teachers across treatment schools exerted more effort than those in the control 
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group, but student outcomes only improved in treatment schools that had textbooks (Gilligan et 
al., 2018). 
 
Among these various aspects and levels of context, I focus in this project on sociocultural 
context at the national level. I focus on sociocultural patterns because, as shown, they can have 
profound effects on teacher accountability processes, yet there has been little systematic 
comparative research on the relationship between teacher accountability policy and sociocultural 
context. Having chosen to investigate sociocultural factors, it made sense to also focus on 
national-level differences. Pragmatically, there are public-access secondary datasets measuring 
sociocultural variation at the national level (EVS, 2011; Hofstede, 2001; Inglehart et al., 2014b). 
Moreover, a significant amount of policy discourse about teacher accountability is oriented 
toward cross-country variation, not least because of ILSA league tables and their associated ‘best 
practices’ discussions. 
 
How this relates to existing frameworks 
There is hardly a shortage of frameworks for analysing different aspects of accountability (e.g. 
Dubnick, 2003; Koppell, 2005; Romzek & Dubnick, 1987; see Verger & Parcerisa, 2017b for an 
overview of typologies in educational accountability). Furthermore, as noted in Section 2.1, there 
is also no lack of policy analysis models that unpick the theories of change and enabling 
conditions implicit in policy programmes. However, my conceptual framework differs from 
existing frameworks in ways that, I believe, make it uniquely suited for thinking through the 
process of influencing teacher practice using accountability policy instruments and for identifying 
potential pitfalls along the intended causal pathway. 
 
Established conceptual frameworks for accountability relationships within education include 
Pritchett’s (2015; see also World Bank, 2003) accountability triangle, which identifies different 
accountability relationships between educational stakeholders (e.g. the relationship of client 
power from families and communities to frontline providers), with four design elements (i.e. 
delegation, finance, information, and motivation) within each accountability relationship. My 
framework zooms in on a single set of stakeholders, i.e. teachers, and focuses primarily on the 
element of motivation. Abelmann and Elmore (1999) develop a framework that is narrower than 
Pritchett’s landscape of accountability stakeholders but broader than my framework for teacher 
accountability. Their Venn diagrams for analysing accountability within schools look at overlaps 
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and mismatches between collective expectations, individual responsibility, and accountability (i.e. 
account-giving practices). I am likewise interested in such overlaps and mismatches, but whereas 
their emphasis is on diagramming the interplay of school-based actors’ conceptions of 
accountability, mine is on examining how accountability instruments can change student 
outcomes by influencing teacher motivation. Firestone and Pennell’s (1993) framework and mine 
are more similar in that both look at the relationship between teacher accountability instruments 
(which they call ‘incentive policies’) and teacher motivation (‘teacher commitment’). However, 
they differ in that Firestone and Pennell identify in detail various elements within this 
relationship (e.g. variables for working conditions, such as job design, feedback, and 
collaboration), whereas I take a coarser-grained view of this relationship but also consider the 
link from teacher motivation to student outcomes. 
 
Another difference between Firestone and Pennell’s (1993) framework and mine is that I take a 
fairly broad view of what constitutes a teacher accountability instrument, whereas they look 
primarily at ‘differential incentive policies’, i.e. material or professional rewards that are allocated 
based on some assessment of performance. Bruns and Luque’s (2014) threefold classification of 
incentives that motivate teachers (i.e. ‘professional rewards, accountability pressure, and financial 
incentives’, p. 224) likewise foregrounds incentives. In contrast, although two of the mechanisms 
in my framework relate to incentives; with an obvious link to incentives in the consequence-
based mechanism and an indirect link in the informational mechanism, which can reward 
teachers emotionally through the awareness that they have satisfied the expectations that are 
stated or implied in an informational instrument. However, the standard-setting mechanism does 
not invoke incentives. 
 
By affirming the passive but potentially influential role of standard-setting mechanisms in teacher 
practice, and by drawing a distinction between the standard-setting and informational 
mechanisms, I also diverge from Lerner and Tetlock’s (1999) typology of four psychological 
mechanisms for accountability (see also Gill et al., 2016, for an application of their typology 
education). While my consequence-based mechanism coincides with their ‘evaluation’, and my 
informational mechanism encompasses their other three mechanisms (mere presence of another, 
identifiability, and reason-giving), they do not have an equivalent for my standard-setting 
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mechanism.8 On the other hand, McDonnell and Elmore’s (1987) classification of policy 
instruments does include standard-setting instruments (‘mandates’) and consequence-based 
instruments (‘inducements’), but it does not treat informational instruments separately. (Their 
classification also has additional categories for capacity-building and system-changing 
instruments that extend beyond the realm of teacher accountability.) 
 
In short, my conceptual framework has a distinctive focus on teacher accountability as a subset 
of educational accountability. It traces the teacher accountability pathway from the instruments 
that generate accountability to the hoped-for student outcomes at the other end of the process. 
Along the way, it categorises different mechanisms by which accountability instruments can seek 
to influence teacher motivation—offering a menu for policy planning similar to McDonnell and 
Elmore’s (1987) policy instruments and Hood’s (1983; Hood & Margetts, 2007) tools of 
government, but in a small, specific policy area. 
 
2.6 Research questions 
To test the validity of this conceptual framework, I investigate three research questions: 
 
1. To what extent does the influence of teacher accountability instruments on student outcomes depend on 
sociocultural context? 
First, I look at the start and end points of the framework, and consider the evidence for whether 
there is a link between teacher accountability instruments and student outcomes to begin with, 
and the degree to which this link is affected by sociocultural context 
 
2. To what extent, and how, does teacher motivation mediate the influence of teacher accountability instruments on 
student outcomes? 
Next, I examine the pathway from teacher accountability instruments to student outcomes in 
order to determine whether accountability instruments influence teacher motivation as an 
intermediate step along this pathway. I also look at empirical evidence for the three teacher 
 
8  This is likely due to the different empirical approaches of our frameworks. Lerner and Tetlock (1999) parse out 
subtle psychological manipulations to be tested in laboratory settings, where the conditions that yield observable 
changes in the level and manifestation of participants’ motivation within the span of an experiment would be of 
greater interest than the standards that direct pre-existing motivation towards particular goals and practices. In 
contrast, my data on accountability mechanisms come from interviews about teachers’ daily work, in which 
standards play an important guiding role, and where it can be messier to distinguish between, for example, the 
effects identifiability versus that of the presence of an observer. 
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accountability mechanisms that I have proposed: setting standards, communicating information, 
and allocating consequences. 
 
3. To what extent does the influence of teacher accountability instruments on teacher motivation depend on 
sociocultural context? 
Finally, I consider the degree to which sociocultural context affects the relationship between 
teacher accountability instruments and teacher motivation. In the next chapter, I lay out my 
approach to answering these questions. 
45 
 
Chapter 3: Methodology  
As discussed above, the aim of this research project is to investigate some of the ways in which 
sociocultural context may (or may not) influence the processes underlying teacher accountability 
policy. This investigation is designed as an attempt to validate a conceptual framework that maps 
potential pathways from teacher accountability instruments to their intended outcomes. Each of 
the three research questions proposed above in Section 2.6 focuses on a subset of the 
relationships within this conceptual framework. 
 
In this chapter, I describe the methodology I use to address the proposed research questions. I 
begin in Section 3.1 by explaining why I take a realist-constructivist theoretical standpoint, and 
what this perspective implies for my research design. Next, in Section 3.2, I outline the overall 
research design, linking each research question to empirical sources and analytic methods. I then 
describe each of the two empirical sources—cross-country surveys of education and culture, and 
teacher interviews in Finland and Singapore—and how I analyse each source, in Sections 3.3 and 
3.4 respectively. Finally, I discuss the ethical considerations and limitations of this project in 
Sections 3.5 and 3.6. 
 
3.1 Theoretical perspective: mechanisms, realist research, and validity 
Why adopt a realist ontology with a constructivist epistemology? 
As described in Section 2.5, my conceptual framework posits three mechanisms by which teacher 
accountability instruments can attempt to influence the level or direction of teacher motivation 
and, thus, student outcomes. Much of the social scientific research on causal mechanisms falls 
under the banner of realism (Porpora, 2015). One of the most prominent articulations here is 
Pawson and Tilley’s (1997) seminal book on realist policy evaluation, with its ‘mechanism + 
context = outcome’ (p. xv and elsewhere) formula and its emphasis on ‘what works for whom in 
what circumstances’ (p. 210 and elsewhere). Pawson and Tilley’s work is particularly relevant 
given their conception of mechanisms as ‘the choices and capacities which lead to regular 
patterns of social behavior’ (ibid, p. 216). They argue that social programmes generate change by 
influencing actors’ reasoning and, thus, behaviour (Pawson, 2013). While there are other forms 
of mechanisms that do not operate primarily via actors’ decision-making (see Westhorp, 2018, 
for some examples), Pawson and Tilley’s reasoning-focused conception of social behaviour 
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suffices for this project, given my focus on teacher motivation, which is itself a cognitive process. 
I propose that teacher accountability instruments can generate improvements in student 
outcomes by influencing teachers’ motivation and, thus, classroom practice. 
 
Beyond Pawson and Tilley, scientific realism is a broad school of thought, spanning philosophy, 
sociology, and policy evaluation, among other disciplines (Maxwell, 2012; Pawson, 2018). The 
unifying element here is a realist ontology, i.e. the view that there are real entities that exist 
independently of our perceptions of them (Maxwell, 2012). One implication of this ontological 
stance is that causation is real. Realist researchers say that A causes B not because they observe 
that the occurrence of A is consistently followed by the occurrence of B, as in black-box 
understandings of causality that draw on Hume’s ‘constant conjunction’ argument. Rather, 
realists deem A to cause B if A actually generates B—in other words, A is a mechanism that, 
under certain circumstances, can lead to outcome B (Pawson & Tilley, 1997). This notion of 
causality accords with the implicit assumption of teacher accountability policymaking: that such 
policy instruments can meaningfully change student outcomes. (This is not to deny that some 
teacher accountability policies may be instituted with the more cynical aim of superficially 
appeasing voter demands or deflecting blame for subpar student outcomes [see Hood, 2011]. 
However, since improving student outcomes is not only a more valuable goal, but also one 
which—hopefully—guides the bulk of teacher accountability policymaking, I focus on this goal 
rather than its more cynical counterparts.) 
 
Alongside this realist ontology, I adopt a constructivist epistemology that is shared by many 
strands of realism. That is, although entities in the world exist independently of our perceptions, 
our understanding of these entities is necessarily contingent and fallible (Maxwell & Mittapalli, 
2010). In Hammersley’s (1998) words, ‘No knowledge is certain, but knowledge claims can be 
judged in terms of their likely truth’ (p. 66)—implying a constructivist epistemology—and, 
‘There are phenomena independent of us as researchers or readers of which we can have such 
knowledge’ (p. 66)—implying a realist ontology. (This combination of a realist ontology and a 
constructivist epistemology is sometimes called ‘critical realism’. However, some strands of 
critical realism include theoretical commitments that would add unnecessary complexity to this 
project, e.g. Bhaskar’s dialectics [1993; see Gorski, 2013 for a short overview]. For simplicity’s 
sake, I take a more general realist stance [Maxwell, 2012; Pawson & Tilley, 1997].) This realist-
constructivist theoretical stance has been used extensively in health-related research (e.g. Luetsch, 
Twigg, Rowett, & Wong, 2019; Manzano-Santaella, 2011; Marchal, Dedzo, & Kegels, 2010), 
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including in research on the intersections of health and education (e.g. Pearson et al., 2015 on 
health promotion programmes in schools; Wong, Greenhalgh, Westhorp, & Pawson, 2012 on 
medical education) and of healthcare provision and accountability (Maluka et al., 2011). More 
pertinently, this theoretical perspective has been used in a field study of teacher performance in 
Tanzania (Tao, 2013) and in systematic reviews of educational accountability in low- and middle-
income countries (Eddy-Spicer, Ehren, Bangpan, Khatwa, & Perrone, 2016; Westhorp et al., 
2014). 
 
The subject matter of this thesis fits well with the combination of a realist ontology and 
constructivist epistemology. Ontologically, the focal points in this project—teacher 
accountability instruments, teacher motivation, and student outcomes; embedded within 
sociocultural contexts— are treated as real entities by actors in educational settings. For example, 
the measurement of student outcomes may be contentious, but the desirability of good student 
outcomes is widely accepted. Also, the fierce debates around teacher accountability suggest that 
its impact on teachers and students is palpably felt in real ways. Epistemologically, although these 
entities are real, they are also enmeshed in individual and social constructions that require 
interpretation. For example, even the most banal education policy text contains implicit 
normative beliefs about the purpose of education. Test scores may masquerade as objective 
measures, but they result from assessment items and marking schemes that comprise a series of 
subjective decisions about what students should know. Equally, research on teacher 
accountability is inevitably shaped by researchers’ values and ideologies, whether tacit or explicit. 
Hence the aptness of a constructivist epistemology that acknowledges multiple perspectives on 
entities and relationships in the real world. 
 
Realism, research design, and validity 
These ontological and epistemological commitments have a few implications for my research 
design. For instance, I use quantitative and qualitative data sources to address different aspects of 
the research questions, and realism offers coherent theoretical basis for such research (Maxwell 
& Mittapalli, 2010). From a realist standpoint, quantitative and qualitative data sources can both 
provide (fallible) insight into real phenomena. A given data source or analytic method cannot be 
deemed better than the alternatives on the basis of data collection methods or analytic 
procedures (although these should be rigorous). Rather, what matters is whether the data source 
can meaningfully provide evidence for the particular theory under consideration. To illustrate, 
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Porpora (2015) describes a research project in which ‘[t]o the extent that what we were asking 
here was a “how” question, what was required was a qualitative analysis’, whereas for other 
aspects of the project, ‘questions about relative frequency are quantitative in nature, answerable 
only by comparative counts’ (p. 63). Similarly, in exploring RQ2, I use cross-country statistical 
analysis to discern to what extent teacher motivation mediates the relationship between teacher 
accountability instruments and student outcomes, whereas I use field interviews to investigate 
how this happens, as outlined below in Section 3.2. 
 
Realism—at least, Pawson and Tilley’s brand of realism—also had practical implications for how 
I use teacher interviews in Finland and Singapore to construct evidence for my conceptual 
framework. In particular, Pawson and Tilley (1997) argue that realism’s commitment to building 
causal theories implies that research interviews should not be driven by the participant’s ideas. 
Rather, ‘the researcher’s theory is the subject matter of the interview and the interviewee is there 
to confirm or falsify and, above all, to refine that theory’ (p. 159). Thus, realist researchers should 
not approach interviews by operationalising their theories into interview questions that obliquely 
elicit relevant data from interview participants. Instead, researchers should teach their theories to 
participants, so that participants can directly address the aspects of the theory that do or do not 
fit their experiences and observations. I discuss how this approach to conceptual refinement 
influenced my field interviews in Section 3.4. 
 
Furthermore, realist arguments about validity influenced my analytic approach. Given that I aim 
to validate a conceptual framework involving cognitive processes that cannot be directly 
observed (e.g. changes in teacher motivation), concerns about validity are paramount. Some 
realist theorists argue that validity does not derive primarily from the rigour of the methods used 
to construct empirical evidence. Rather, the validity of a descriptive or explanatory account 
hinges on its relationship to the entities that it aims to describe or explain (Maxwell, 2017). 
Consequently, a key way of strengthening the validity of a theory is by comparing it with 
alternative explanations (Pawson, 2013; Porpora, 2015; see also Elster, 2015 on lateral support 
for an explanation). For example, in answering RQ1, I propose that the efficacy of teacher 
accountability instruments is contingent on their compatibility with sociocultural context. 
However, it is also possible that this efficacy hinges primarily on non-sociocultural factors, such 
as the internal coherence of a given set of accountability instruments. If each of these possible 
explanations could independently account for the empirical evidence that I examine for RQ1, 
then this evidence on its own would not allow me to decide which explanation is more valid. 
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However, if there is further evidence of a separate but related phenomenon that fits the 
sociocultural explanation but not the alternative explanation, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
sociocultural explanation has greater validity, at least in this context. Hence, for each research 
question, I consider an alternative explanation that can also account for some of my empirical 
observations, and I discuss the extent to which these explanations can be refuted. 
 
3.2 Research design overview 
In this section, I justify my choice of research methods and overall strategy, as summarised in 
Table 3.1. Details about the selection, collection, and analysis of data will be discussed in 
subsequent sections. To use Pawson and Tilley’s (1997) terminology, I examine the evidence for 
linking context with outcome in RQ1, mechanism with outcome in RQ2, and mechanism with 
context in RQ3. 
 
As noted in Section 2.6, the three research questions aim to test different relationships within the 
conceptual framework that I have proposed. The first research question (RQ1) seeks to establish 
whether or not there is a case for looking at socioculturally embedded mechanisms for teacher 
accountability in the first place. Hence, answering RQ1 entails investigating whether there is 
evidence for a relationship between teacher accountability instruments and student achievement, 
and whether this relationship is contingent on sociocultural context. Given that much of the 
variation in education policy structures and in sociocultural context manifests across countries 
rather than within them (Wagemaker, 2010; Woessmann, 2007), I investigate RQ1 using cross-
country secondary datasets. Specifically, I draw on PISA 2015 data that operationalise aspects of 
accountability and student outcomes, alongside sociocultural indicators from the World Values 
Survey/European Values Study (WVS/EVS) and Hofstede’s Values Survey Module. Using these 
cross-country surveys, I construct scales for teacher accountability instruments and for 
theoretically salient sociocultural constructs. I then use these scales in multilevel models that test 
whether sociocultural context moderates the relationship between teacher accountability and 
student outcomes—that is, whether different sociocultural conditions can either intensify or 
attenuate this relationship. This moderation relationship is tested statistically by including an 
interaction between the predictor (i.e. teacher accountability) and the potential moderator (i.e. 
sociocultural context) in the regression model. Note that I am not making any causal arguments 
at this stage of the analysis. Methodologically, the analysis of cross-sectional datasets without an 
identification strategy does not allow for causal inference. Theoretically—and more 
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importantly—a causal explanation in realist research requires an explication of the mechanisms 
that generate change, which I examine next. 
 
Table 3.1   Correspondence between research questions, conceptual framework, and empirical sources 
 
 
Having considered the overall relationship between teacher accountability, student outcomes, 
and sociocultural context in RQ1, I then delve into the mechanisms that may underlie this 
relationship. In RQ2, I test the possibility that the relationship between teacher accountability 
instruments and student outcomes is mediated by teacher motivation, such that accountability 
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instruments cause changes in teacher motivation, which in turn change student outcomes. 
Statistically, mediation is tested by examining (a) whether the main predictor (i.e. teacher 
accountability) significantly predicts the mediator (i.e. teacher motivation), and (b) whether the 
addition of the mediator to the regression model shifts predictive power from the main predictor 
to the mediator (i.e. the coefficient on teacher motivation is significant, and there is a 
corresponding reduction in the coefficient on accountability instruments; Hayes, 2013). Here, the 
main educational dataset is TIMSS 2015, which includes a teacher-level proxy for teacher 
motivation.9 Next, having examined the extent of this mediation relationship, I set aside student 
outcomes and investigate how teacher accountability instruments may influence teacher 
motivation, using the interviews that I conducted with teachers in Finland and Singapore. As I 
explain in Section 3.4, I chose Finland and Singapore for comparative field research because they 
are a pair of countries that have high student achievement, contrasting approaches to teacher 
accountability, and distinctly different sociocultural contexts. In addressing RQ2, I use these 
interviews first to map out the extent to which teacher accountability instruments have affected 
the motivation of the interview participants and their colleagues, and then to parse out the 
mechanisms that generate this motivational influence. 
 
Subsequently, to address RQ3, I look more closely at this motivational influence and its 
association with wider sociocultural patterns. Specifically, I consider the extent to which the 
relationship between teacher accountability instruments and teacher motivation depends on 
sociocultural context. Formally, RQ3 mirrors RQ1, except that the outcome of interest here is 
the intermediate outcome, i.e. teacher motivation, rather than the final outcome, i.e. student 
learning. Similar to the investigation of RQ1, I also investigate RQ3 using a series of moderated 
multilevel models. This time, the main educational dataset is TALIS 2013, which has teacher-
reported indicators of teacher motivation as well as school-level indicators of teacher 
accountability. I also draw on my field interviews with teachers, to establish the degree to which 
the interview participants themselves believe that the influence of teacher accountability 
instruments on their motivation is contingent on sociocultural context. I also use these 
interviews to construct detailed descriptions of Finland’s and Singapore’s sociocultural contexts, 
thus adding nuance to the summary scales obtained from the standardised cross-country surveys. 
 
 
9  I use TIMSS 2015 as the main dataset because the proxies for teacher motivation in the PISA datasets are 
drawn from school-level (i.e. principal-reported) questionnaires. However, TIMSS 2015 does not include 
questionnaire items on teacher accountability. Instead, as I detail in Section 3.3, I match the TIMSS data to 
country-level weighted means of the PISA teacher accountability scales. 
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3.3 Statistical analysis of cross-country datasets 
Since institutional setups and education policies are often quite homogeneous within countries, 
cross-country statistical datasets, such as the OECD’s PISA, can be an important source of 
information for analysing the effects of different institutions and policies on student learning 
(Hanushek & Woessmann, 2011; Wagemaker, 2010). Such international large-scale assessments 
(ILSAs) are especially informative for policy areas where scale and complexity make randomised-
control trials difficult, such as national-level accountability systems. 
 
While ILSAs capture some cross-country variation in education policy, they lack indicators of 
other cross-country influences on student outcomes, such as culture (Hanushek & Woessmann, 
2011). The influence of sociocultural context on educational outcomes is indeterminate but 
probably far-reaching, as suggested by studies in which students of East Asian heritage in 
Oceania attained PISA scores that were closer to their counterparts in Asia than to peers in their 
countries of residence (Feniger & Lefstein, 2014; Jerrim, 2015). One statistical strategy for 
dealing with cultural influence is to use country-level fixed effects, thus parsing out such 
unmeasured variation. However, since this sociocultural variation is a key variable of interest in 
this study, rather than a nuisance to be ‘dummied out’ of the regression, I employ an alternative 
strategy: incorporating this variation into the model using contextual data from other sources.10  
 
While the national economic context, as proxied by GDP-related measures, is often incorporated 
into ILSA analyses, fewer analyses include data on the national sociocultural context. Still, 
country-level sociocultural indicators have been productively merged with ILSA data for at least 
three purposes. Firstly, West and Woessmann (2010) and Heller-Sahlgren (2018) use external 
 
10  As Clarke, Crawford, Steele, and Vignoles (2010) argue, the comparative quality of estimates from fixed-effects 
versus random-effects models depends on a number of factors. For example, random-effects models take into 
account the size of higher-level units (e.g. schools), thus reducing the influence of unusually small higher-level 
units that may otherwise distort the results. However, random-effects models also require the additional 
assumption that higher-level residuals (e.g. unobserved school-level variation that is associated with student 
outcomes) are uncorrelated with the covariates in the model. If this assumption is violated (e.g. students are 
sorted into schools based on non-random school-level covariates that are correlated with some other factors 
which are not measured in the dataset), then fixed-effects estimates may be superior. Nevertheless, these 
considerations are not central to my decision to use random-effects modelling. Instead, my decision is driven by 
the prior consideration that one of the key variables of interest—i.e. sociocultural context—is only measured at 
the country level in the available survey datasets. Hence, models with country-level fixed effects are unable to 
address my research questions. I recognise that my regression models may well incorporate bias from non-
random sorting of students and schools into countries. To mitigate this bias statistically, I include 
socioeconomic status as a student-level covariate and GDP as country-level covariate to somewhat control for 
between-country sorting, and I run multiple sensitivity checks. To mitigate this bias analytically, I do not use 
these cross-sectional random-effects models to make strong causal claims, but rather to demonstrate broad 
associations. 
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contextual data in causal identification, by constructing instrumental-variable models that use 
historic data on Catholic population shares and on whether Catholicism was the state religion to 
provide a source of exogenous variation in private school enrolment. However, I do not use the 
sociocultural indicators as instruments because I am interested in sociocultural context in itself. 
(Besides, I am investigating a moderation relationship, and it is difficult to conceive of an 
instrument providing measurable source of exogenous variation in the interaction between 
teacher accountability instruments and sociocultural context.) 
 
A second use of external contextual data in ILSA analysis is to identify country-level correlates of 
various student outcomes. Some scholars have looked at straightforward relationships between 
country-level correlates and student achievement, with little agreement between these studies. 
Specifically, Benoliel and Berkovich’s (2018) analysis of PISA 2012 data and six sociocultural 
indicators from the WVS finds that the strongest positive sociocultural predictor of student 
achievement is conservatism, i.e. valuing security, the status quo, and traditional social roles, 
among other things. In contrast, He, van de Vijver, and Kulikova (2017) examine a wider set of 
sociocultural indicators alongside both PISA and TIMSS data, and find that conservatism and 
uncertainty avoidance have a significant negative association with student achievement, whereas 
there are significant positive associations between student achievement and sociocultural 
indicators related to modernity (such as autonomy, individualism, and favouring secular-rational 
authority). H.-D. Meyer and Schiller (2013), in turn, argue that there are two different clusters of 
high-performing PISA countries: a group of Western countries that have high scores for 
individualism but low scores on power distance (i.e. low acceptance of hierarchy), and a group of 
East Asian countries for which the converse is true. Others have used national contextual data to 
show that gender gaps in mathematics proficiency are influenced by societal gender norms 
(Guiso, Monte, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2008; Rodríguez-Planas & Nollenberger, 2018).11 S.W. 
Han, Borgonovi, and Guerriero (2018) examine PISA data alongside WVS data and show that 
students are slightly more likely to aspire to teaching careers in countries where respect and 
responsibility are regarded important job characteristics. 
 
Finally, cross-country datasets on education and culture can be combined to examine how 
contextual variables moderate—that is, either intensify or attenuate—the relationship between 
educational inputs and outcomes. Using data from both PISA and Hofstede’s survey, Chiu and 
 
11  However, Fryer and Levitt (2010) suggest that the Guiso et al (2008) analysis may be vulnerable to the 
composition of the country-level sample. 
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Klassen (2010) find that some aspects of sociocultural context moderate the relationship 
between students’ mathematics self-concept and their mathematics proficiency. Specifically, in 
countries that are more hierarchical, more uncertainty-averse, or more ‘masculine’,12 a student’s 
perception of their mathematical competence was less likely to correspond with their 
demonstrated mathematics proficiency in PISA. However, these moderation effects are small. 
Coco and Lagravinese (2014) find that the relationship between educational expenditure and 
PISA scores is moderated by cronyism, as measured in the WVS—suggesting that cronyism 
creates disincentives to acquire skills, thus reducing the efficiency of educational spending. 
 
In this vein, I use WVS/EVS and Hofstede data to investigate how sociocultural context 
moderates the relationship between teacher accountability instruments, teacher motivation, and 
student achievement. While other studies have investigated whether the relationship between 
accountability instruments and student outcomes is moderated by other institutional features 
(e.g. school autonomy, as in Hanushek, Link, & Woessmann, 2013; and Woessmann, 2016) or by 
average country-level educational achievement (e.g. Bergbauer et al., 2018), this study is novel, to 
my knowledge, in investigating moderation effects from sociocultural context.13  
 
I used a few computer programmes for these statistical analyses. I used SPSS 22 to clean and 
merge all the datasets, since the OECD and the IEA provide SPSS macros for manipulating 
ILSA data. I also used SPSS to construct scales for social capital using factor analysis, as reported 
in Section 4.2. However, I subsequently decided to derive teacher accountability scores using 
item-response theory (IRT) modelling, a function which SPSS 22 lacks. Consequently, I ran the 
IRT models in Stata, as reported in Section 4.1. Finally, I used MLwiN for the multilevel 
regression models, as noted in Section 3.3. This latter decision was because MLwiN has specialist 
 
12  In Hofstede’s (2001; Chiu & Klassen, 2010) framework, more masculine cultures place more value on 
employment that brings higher earnings, recognition, opportunities for advancement, and greater levels of 
challenge; whereas more feminine cultures place more value on employment that involves job security, the 
opportunity to live in a desirable area, and good relationships with colleagues and with managers. 
13  In addition to the systematic literature search on teacher accountability and sociocultural context described in 
Section 2.3, I checked specifically for prior statistical analyses by searching in Scopus on 13 August 2019 for 
studies containing the term ‘accountability’ as well as either (a) ‘World Values Survey’ or ‘European Values 
Study’ (10 results); (b) ‘Inglehart’ or ‘Welzel’, i.e. the two most prominent WVS/EVS researchers (1 result); or 
(c) ‘Hofstede’ (10 results, including duplicates from the two other searches). None of the studies from this 
search investigated the extent to which sociocultural context moderates the effect of accountability instruments 
on an outcome. Topically, the closest matches were two cross-country statistical analyses examining correlations 
between corruption perception scales and sociocultural scales (Akbar & Vujić, 2014; Stanfill et al., 2016) and 
one cross-country statistical analysis on the relationship between education levels and preferences for 
democracy (A. Chong & Gradstein, 2015). In terms of statistical approaches, the closest match was a multilevel 
moderated mediation exploring whether the influence of development (predictor) on gay and lesbian rights 
(outcome) was mediated by tolerance toward the LGBTQ community (derived from the WVS) and moderated 
by political regime type (Hildebrandt, Trüdinger, & Wyss, 2018). 
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functions that facilitate multilevel modelling, and I had received training in MLwiN at the 
multilevel modelling course that I completed at the Essex Summer School in 2017. 
 
Data and sampling 
All statistical analyses in this study used publicly available secondary datasets. These datasets 
cover a range of educational and sociocultural constructs that are of theoretical interest to this 
study, as shown in Table 3.2. The table also shows how each dataset is used in addressing the 
different research questions, which I discuss in subsequent subsections. In each regression, data 
from one educational survey is matched with GDP data from the Penn World Table and 
sociocultural data from the WVS/EVS, Hofstede’s survey, or both.  
 
Table 3.2   Levels of measurement across secondary datasets, and alignment of datasets with research questions  
 
*PISA 2015 outcome data are not used to investigate RQ2 and RQ3; however, PISA 2015 country-level weighted 
means for teacher accountability are used in the RQ2 and RQ3 regressions with TIMSS 2015 outcome data. 
 
Missing values are excluded listwise. There is little consensus about the proportion of missing 
data that will result in biased estimates, with suggested cut-offs ranging from 5% to 20% 
(Schlomer, Bauman, & Card, 2010). In my datasets, the level of missingness is around the lower 
cut-off for the proportion of total missing values across all cases (i.e. 5.8% missing values for 
PISA 2015, 3.8% for TIMSS 2015, and 5.9% for TALIS 2013) and comfortably within the higher 
suggested cut-off for cases with any missing values (i.e. 10.0% for PISA 2015, 12.5% for TIMSS 
2015, and 15.9% for TALIS 2013). Moreover, there are no missing values for the main outcome 
variable, student proficiency; nor at the country level, where variables of key policy interest are 
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located (i.e. country-level teacher accountability and sociocultural context). At the levels of 
analysis that do have missing data, the regressions are more than adequately powered due to the 
large samples of students, teachers, and schools. Rather than listwise deletion, two recent 
multilevel analyses of PISA data used group-mean imputation of missing values (Bergbauer et al., 
2018; Heller-Sahlgren, 2018). However, when I attempted group-mean imputation with a PISA 
2015 regression, this did not change coefficient estimates, but it did reduce the standard errors—
which I believe to be an erroneous reduction because the group-mean imputation inadvertently 
lessened the variance of the data. Another technique, multiple imputation of missing values, may 
introduce additional bias to my analysis because the data appear to be ‘not missing at random’ 
(NMAR) in indeterminate ways. Little’s test rules out the possibility of the data being ‘missing 
completely at random’ (MCAR), and the lack of correlation between dummy variables for 
missingness and the explanatory variables in the model suggests that ‘missing at random’ (MAR) 
does not apply (Schlomer et al, 2010). Given that both of these methods for imputing missing 
data may introduce additional bias and measurement error, I follow Cheema’s (2014) guidelines 
and use listwise deletion for efficiency’s sake. 
 
One of the ILSA datasets that I analyse is the 2015 wave of PISA, the OECD’s Programme for 
International Student Assessment (OECD, 2016d). The PISA 2015 dataset covers not only 
student-level proficiency scores for a nationally representative sample of school-going 15-year-
olds, but also a wide range of contextual variables, including school-level questionnaire items 
related to teacher accountability. In the main PISA 2015 analysis, I use a dataset which has no 
missing observations for any of the PISA variables of interest, nor for the WVS/EVS and 
Hofstede sociocultural scales. This dataset comprises 346,726 pupils from 12,764 schools across 
57 countries. These countries are identified in Table 3.3. As shown in the table, there were 14 
countries that participated in PISA 2015 but were not included in this dataset because they had 
not participated in the sociocultural surveys. However, in some sensitivity checks, I include 
countries for which data are available for only a subset of the sociocultural indicators, even if 
they do not have the full complement of WVS/EVS and Hofstede indicators. (I discuss 
sensitivity checks in more detail below.) 
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Table 3.3   Country participation in the educational and sociocultural surveys  
     ●   Included in the main dataset for the ILSA cycle.  
     ○   Participated in the ILSA cycle but not included in the main dataset due to unavailability of sociocultural, accountability, or GDP data. 
     *   Data source is not Hofstede’s personal work, but a replication that he has endorsed. 
Note. Regional (rather than national) survey participation in the survey is denoted by the name of the participating regions (where B-S-J-G stands for Beijing-Shanghai-Jiangsu-Guangdong). The WVS5/WVS6/EVS4 column 
shows the two most recent year(s) of data collection, where applicable. The four nations of the United Kingdom were treated as separate countries due to uneven participation across the surveys, as shown. Countries that took 
part in a survey but were excluded because of data quality or availability issues are not shown (PISA 2015: Albania, Cyprus, Kazakhstan, Malaysia; PISA 2012: Albania; TALIS 2013: Iceland, Malaysia, Serbia, United States). 
Some countries were excluded from the main datasets because they lacked data on particular WVS/EVS questions despite having participated in the pertinent WVS/EVS wave. The TIMSS 2015 main dataset is paired with 
country-level teacher accountability data from PISA 2015. Penn World Table data are available for all listed countries except Kosovo and Liechtenstein. Sources: EVS (2011); Feenstra, Inklaar, & Timmer (2016); Hofstede 
(2015); itim International (2017); Inglehart et al. (2014a, 2014b); Martin et al. (2016a); OECD (2014a, 2014c, 2016d).   
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Additionally, I also use data from PISA 2012 (OECD, 2014a). The main PISA 2012 analyses are 
based on a dataset of 375,207 pupils from 14,840 schools across 52 countries. In addition to 
offering a different dataset for sensitivity checks, the PISA 2012 questionnaires have a richer set 
of items on accountability than PISA 2015. While the 2015 cycle asked principals about 
processes for collecting and disseminating teacher performance information, and for setting 
standards for teacher performance (i.e. the first two accountability mechanisms in my conceptual 
framework), the 2012 cycle included these two components as well as questions about the 
consequences of teacher appraisals (i.e. the third teacher accountability mechanism). For more 
details on these accountability-related questionnaire items, see Section 4.1. 
 
Besides PISA, I analyse data on eighth-grade pupils from the 2015 wave of the IEA’s Trends in 
International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS; Martin, Mullis, Foy, et al., 2016a). TIMSS 
2015 questionnaires do not include enough accountability-related items to construct a measure 
of teacher accountability instruments, so I run analyses using student outcome and background 
data from TIMSS 2015 matched with country-level weighted means of the teacher accountability 
scales from PISA 2012 and 2015, in turn. While the schools that participated in PISA 2015 may 
not be the same as those in TIMSS 2015 (nor those in PISA 2012), all of these datasets are 
nationally representative. Thus, when the accountability and student outcome data come from 
different assessment cycles, the accountability variables will only enter the model at the national 
level—similar to analyses combining student-level PISA data with national-level data on per 
capita GDP or the GINI coefficient (e.g. Condron, 2011; Woessmann, Luedemann, Schuetz, & 
West, 2009). For the main TIMSS 2015 analysis that uses teacher accountability data from PISA 
2015, the dataset includes 118,363 pupils taught by 6,147 mathematics teachers in 3,761 across 
23 countries. (Note that TIMSS is administered to students in both Grades 4 and 8. However, 
there may be significant differences in accountability instruments between the schools attended 
by PISA 15-year-olds and those attended by TIMSS Grade 4 students, so I focus on the TIMSS 
Grade 8 sample. Hence, to analyse TIMSS student outcome data matched with country-level 
PISA teacher accountability data, I assume that accountability instruments affecting teachers of 
Grade 8 students in TIMSS are sufficiently similar to the accountability instruments affecting 
teachers of 15-year-old students in PISA. In PISA 2015, 31.1% of surveyed 15-year-olds were 
enrolled in Grade 9 and 52.2% were enrolled in Grade 10 (OECD, 2016c). Although in some 
countries Grades 8 and Grades 9-10 may fall under different levels of schooling, e.g. 
middle/junior high school vs. high school in the United States, in many countries they fall within 
the same level, e.g. secondary or lower secondary school. Moreover, neither the TIMSS Grade 8 
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students nor the PISA 15-year-old students are likely to face the secondary school exit 
examinations that have substantial accountability implications.) 
 
The final educational dataset is the 2013 wave of the OECD’s Teaching and Learning 
International Survey (TALIS; OECD, 2014c). TALIS is administered to teachers and principals 
as a set of self-report questionnaires on educational contexts. Although it does not include data 
on student outcomes, it has data on the other two educational constructs in the conceptual 
framework, i.e. teacher accountability instruments and teacher motivation. The main TALIS 
2013 analyses look at 79,252 teachers in 5,259 schools across 29 countries. 
 
For national sociocultural context, I draw on two survey programmes. First, I use two waves of 
the World Values Survey (WVS), i.e. Wave 5 (conducted between 2005 and 2009; Inglehart et al., 
2014a) and Wave 6 (2010–2014; Inglehart et al., 2014b), alongside one wave of the European 
Values Study (EVS), i.e. Wave 4 (2008–2010; EVS, 2011). WVS/EVS is the largest international 
survey programme on values and culture, conducted as face-to-face interviews with nationally 
representative samples of at least 1,000 adult residents in each participating country per wave 
(EVS, 2016a; WVS Association, n.d.). Additionally, I use two sociocultural indices from Geert 
Hofstede’s Values Survey Module. Hofstede’s dataset is also known as the IBM study because 
the bulk of the surveying was conducted with IBM employees in 72 countries between 1967 and 
1973 (Hofstede, 2001). This longstanding research programme is highly influential in cross-
cultural survey measurement and in organisational behaviour (see Taras, Kirkman, & Steel, 2010, 
for a review). Besides sociocultural context, I also include country-level GDP data from the Penn 
World Table 9.0 (Feenstra et al., 2016). 
 
Matching country-level sociocultural data to the multilevel educational datasets requires the 
strong assumption that the survey-based indicators are adequate proxies for sociocultural context 
despite time lags between the sociocultural and educational surveys. For example, most of the 
Hofstede data were collected over 40 years prior to the educational surveys that I analyse. 
Although the WVS/EVS data are much more recent, this assumption of sociocultural stability 
over time comes into play nonetheless, because I match data from each PISA/TIMSS/TALIS 
wave with sociocultural data from multiple WVS/EVS waves, in order to maximise the number 
of countries included in each regression. This is possible because many of the questionnaire 
items across the WVS and EVS have been matched through a shared dictionary (EVS, 2015), 
and cross-wave data have been analysed together in prior scholarly studies (e.g. Inglehart & 
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Welzel, 2005; Norris & Inglehart, 2004). In so doing, I assume that these different waves of 
country-level sociocultural data are comparably accurate despite their different time lags. For 
example, collection dates for the sociocultural data that I match to PISA 2015 countries range 
from 2006 (for some WVS 5 countries) to 2014 (for some WVS 6 countries). Even within a 
single WVS wave, data collection across countries takes place over five years. These sociocultural 
data will only be reliable proxies if the cultural patterns that they capture are reasonably 
consistent over time. Hofstede (2001) makes such an assumption, arguing that national cultures 
are relatively stable, barring external shocks. Inglehart and Welzel (2005), the most prominent 
WVS/EVS scholars, broadly agree. They further argue that many post-industrial societies have 
become more culturally similar over time, but that such cultural shifts are subject to strong path 
dependencies. Empirically, Merritt (2000) attempted to replicate four of Hofstede’s scales in a 
1993–1997 survey of airline pilots in 19 countries, and found that two of the replicated scales 
correlated significantly with Hofstede’s (including power distance, for which r=0.74), while the 
others did not (including uncertainty avoidance, for which r=0.31). While my field interviews did 
not involve adequate sample sizes for such replication, in the secondary statistical analysis I 
examine the stability of national-level WVS/EVS averages across different waves of the study 
(see Section 4.2). Additionally, I asked interview participants whether the summary sociocultural 
data accurately reflect their experience of their respective sociocultural contexts (see Section 
6.2).14 
 
In matching the country-level sociocultural data to educational data at the student, teacher, and 
school levels, I ensure appropriate time-ordering of predictor and outcome variables. For 
example, when analysing PISA 2012 student outcome data, I use sociocultural data that was 
collected prior to the PISA testing dates. Note that PISA 2015 surveys were administered a few 
months later than TIMSS 2015 surveys, with some overlap in survey periods (March 2015 to 
December 2015 for PISA, compared to October 2014 to May 2015 for TIMSS). Thus, for some 
 
14  I am particularly conscious of the possibility of cultural change in between the Hofstede surveys and the ILSAs 
because Singapore’s uncertainty avoidance score in the Hofstede dataset seems distinctly inaccurate to me, 
based on my experience of living in Singapore between 2003 and 2006. In the Hofstede dataset, Singapore has 
the lowest uncertainty avoidance score among all countries, falling over 2.5 standard deviations below the mean. 
This does not accord with Singapore’s notoriously kiasu (a Chinese dialect term meaning ‘afraid of losing’) and 
kiasi (‘afraid of death’) society. I suspect that the difference is due to the fact that (a) only 58 Singaporeans took 
part in Hofstede’s 1971–73 survey, making it the smallest sample size among the 40 countries that participated 
in Hofstede’s initial 1967–69 and 1971–73 surveys; and (b) these 58 participants were all IBM employees in the 
early 1970s, at which point IBM Singapore was a relatively small branch of technology firm (with just 100 
employees in 1970; IBM, 2019) in the early days of Singapore’s industrialisation boom, which suggests that they 
may have been less risk-averse than their contemporaries. Unfortunately, I have not been able to find 
comparable recent surveys in Singapore covering constructs like the Hofstede scales that I analyse, so I do not 
have the means to ascertain the extent of such sample bias and/or change over time. 
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countries within these datasets, there may be a slight violation of time ordering when I combine 
PISA accountability data from PISA 2015 with student outcome data from TIMSS 2015. This 
time-ordering issue, however minor, reinforces the importance of paying attention to sensitivity 
checks from the other datasets. 
 
As mentioned above, the number of countries in each regression depends on the overlap in 
country participation between the educational, cultural, and economic datasets in question, and 
on whether the items composing each sociocultural construct were included in each country’s 
version of the WVS questionnaires. (Specifically, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar did not administer 
some of the items about civic networks; Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, and Qatar did not administer 
some of the items about confidence in institutions; Qatar did not administer one of the items 
about civic norms; and New Zealand did not administer one of the items about trust. 
Consequently, these countries are not included in the main ILSA regressions. Additionally, 
Colombia, Hong Kong, and Peru did not administer some pertinent items in WVS 4, but 
subsequently included these items in WVS6. Consequently, they are excluded from the main 
PISA 2012 regressions, but included in the main PISA 2015 regressions.) Some PISA 2015 
regressions have as many as 64 countries, while one set of TIMSS 2015 regressions has just 22. 
However, besides the TIMSS regressions, the other regressions reported in this thesis are 
comfortably above the minimum sample size of 25 countries that Bryan and Jenkins (2013) 
recommend for unbiased estimates of country-level parameters in multilevel models.15 Also, 
every regression includes both high- and low-performing education systems, from both the 
majority and minority worlds. While the TALIS regressions do not include any African countries, 
the other regressions span all six continents. 
 
Operationalisation 
For summary statistics and descriptions of all included variables, see Table 3.4. 
 
 
15  However, this is far from being a hard-and-fast rule, as Bryan and Jenkins (2013) note in their review of 
recommended sample sizes. For example, Maas and Hox (2005) recommend a sample size of at least 50 
countries, while Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) suggest that the required number of country-level observations 
depends on the number of country-level predictors included in the regression model. The possible inadequacy 
of some of my country-level sample sizes reinforces the importance of the sensitivity checks that I describe 
below. For an analysis of whether the relatively small sample sizes for TIMSS are likely to result in overfitting 
and multicollinearity, see Appendix A. 
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Table 3.4   Descriptive statistics 
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Table 3.4    (continued) 
 
Note. IRT=item response theory. 2PL=two parameter logistic. PCA=principal component analysis. 
CFA=confirmatory factor analysis. Sources: EVS (2011); Feenstra et al. (2016); Hofstede (2001); Inglehart et al. 
(2014a, 2014b); Martin, Mullis, & Hooper, 2016; OECD (2014b; 2014d; 2016e; 2016f); and my calculations. 
*Value used depends on assessment year. Descriptive statistics are shown for values used with 2015 assessment data. 
**Descriptive statistics shown are for 2014. Note: mean is greater for countries in the regression samples. 
 
Teacher accountability instruments. To operationalise teacher accountability instruments—
defined in this study as tools, practices, and structures that aim to orient teacher practice toward stakeholder 
expectations by (a) collecting information about teachers’ individual or collective practice and communicating this 
information to stakeholders, (b) setting standards by which stakeholders judge teacher practice, and/or (c) 
allocating consequences based on stakeholders’ judgements of teachers’ practice—I draw on school principals’ 
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reports in PISA and TALIS questionnaires of whether particular teacher accountability 
instruments are present in the school.  
 
I operationalise this by using item-response theory (IRT) modelling to construct scales for the 
extensiveness of teacher accountability instruments in any given school. For PISA 2012 and 
2015, the scale draws on 21 principal-reported questionnaire items. These items fell into four 
categories: how teachers are monitored (4 items, e.g. lesson observations by school leaders); what 
quality assurance approaches are used (7 items, e.g. external evaluation); how student achievement data are 
shared (3 items, e.g. achievement data are provided directly to parents), and what consequences might 
result from teacher appraisals (7 items, PISA 2012 only, e.g. a change in salary). For TALIS 2013, the 
13 principal-reported items fell into two categories: the frequency of formal teacher appraisal by different 
stakeholders (5 items, e.g. formal appraisal by the principal) and the frequency of different consequences of 
teacher appraisals (8 items, e.g. a change in the likelihood of career advancement). Further details 
on the construction of these teacher accountability scales are available in Section 4.1. 
 
In any statistical analysis of questionnaire data, both theoretical and methodological 
considerations need to be weighed in the decision about whether to represent a construct using 
raw questionnaire items (e.g. binary indicators for which of several approaches are used to 
monitor teacher practice), a set of scales (e.g. test-based teacher accountability policies and test-
based school accountability as in S. W. Han, 2018), or a single aggregate scale (e.g. a single scale 
for teacher accountability instruments). Some forms of aggregation are widely accepted as 
summary representations of a construct, such as test scores that aggregate responses across 
multiple questionnaire items; or socioeconomic status scales that aggregate responses about 
different indicators of household privilege, as with the PISA index of student’s economic, social, 
and cultural status (OECD, 2017). For teacher accountability instruments in this statistical 
analysis, none of the options—raw questionnaire items, a set of scales, nor a single aggregate 
scale—would be unambiguously advantageous. Having weighed the reasons for and against 
different measurements, I decided to use a single aggregate scale for teacher accountability 
instruments in each analysis, for both theoretical and methodological reasons. 
 
One important argument against such an aggregate scale is that aggregation complicates 
interpretation. This can be due to both theoretical reasons, such as if the aggregated 
questionnaire items do not share enough similarity to be legitimately conceptualised as indicators 
of the same construct, and methodological reasons, because modelling assumptions of the 
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aggregation method add a further layer of interpretation to the analysis. In an analysis that aspires 
to be policy-relevant, such interpretive considerations are especially important. For example, 
using separate variables for individual teacher accountability instruments or using a set of scales 
that each represent a category of teacher accountability instruments may be more informative for 
accountability policy design than a single scale for the overall extensiveness of teacher 
accountability instruments.  
 
However, in the context of this analysis, it is unlikely that those interpretive advantages of 
disaggregated items or multiple scales would have been realised. Firstly, using individual 
questionnaire items would not reflect educational realities because teacher accountability 
instruments do not usually operate in isolation. Rather, they function as systems (Pritchett, 2015; 
UNESCO, 2017). For example, merit pay systems typically operate together with performance 
standards as well as systems for observing lessons and/or tracking test scores. Consequently, I 
do not focus on the effects of individual accountability instruments, but rather on systems of 
accountability instruments working in concert.  
 
Secondly, using a set of scales for different types of teacher accountability instruments would 
require theoretically rigorous and policy relevant reasons for sorting the questionnaire items into 
their respective categories. My conceptual framework lays out three theoretically delineated 
categories of teacher accountability instruments based on their underlying mechanisms: 
communicating information, setting standards, and allocating consequences. However, it is 
unclear how the accountability instruments in the ILSA survey data would map onto these 
mechanisms, especially when considering the biases and range of respondents’ interpretations 
within such self-report questionnaire items. For some items and the instruments they represent, 
this mapping may be relatively straightforward. For example, if a school principal reports that 
tests or assessment of student achievement are used to monitor teacher practice in their school 
(OECD 2013a, 2016b), it is relatively safe to assume that if this test-based monitoring influences 
teacher motivation, it does so through a combination of the informational and standard-setting 
mechanisms. However, this mapping is less straightforward for some other items/instruments. 
For example, if a lesson observation by the principal or senior staff (OECD 2013a, 2016b) 
influences teacher motivation, it likely does so through the informational mechanism; but 
whether or not it concurrently sets standards for teacher practice could vary depending on 
whether the observation is based on a rubric, or focuses informally on any elements of teaching 
mentioned by the observer either before or after the observation, or does not involve any such 
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communication to the teacher. A further issue arising from the nature of the questionnaire data 
is that these data are based on principals’ self-reported responses that may not tally with teachers’ 
experiences: a principal may believe that they have publicly recognised a teacher following an 
appraisal (OECD, 2013a), but the teacher may not have experienced this recognition as such, 
and thus this recognition may not have oriented the teacher’s motivation toward the goals that 
the principal regards as desirable, as in the consequence-allocation mechanism. Moreover, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, within any given category or type of accountability instruments, the 
context-specific design of an instrument matters tremendously for its efficacy (Pawson & Tilley, 
1997; Pritchett, 2017; Williams, 2017). Hence, even if an analysis using multiple scales found that 
more extensive use of informational teacher accountability instruments (or, to use a category 
from the original questionnaires, e.g. changes in teachers’ responsibilities, careers, or 
compensation following an appraisal or feedback; OECD, 2013a) was associated with better 
student outcomes in certain sociocultural contexts, this finding would offer little information to 
policymakers on the crucial questions of which particular informational instruments should be 
chosen, and how exactly they should be designed. Indeed, one minor argument against using a 
set of scales for different categories of accountability instruments it that the statistical analysis 
would then lend itself to interpretations that have the appearance of adequate nuance while 
giving a highly reductive picture of the context-sensitive orientation of this research project. 
 
Although a single aggregate scale constitutes an even more reductive representation of teacher 
accountability instruments, I regard this aggregate scale as the best option for operationalising 
teacher accountability instruments for several reasons. Firstly, despite reducing teacher 
accountability instruments to a single dimension of greater or lesser extensiveness, it reflects the 
fact that accountability instruments operate interactively rather than in isolation. Secondly, it 
does not require ambiguous decisions about fitting self-report questionnaire items into various 
categories, and instead can be constructed using principled higher-level decisions about whether 
each questionnaire item fits within the overall definition of teacher accountability instruments. 
(For a discussion of how well these items fit empirically in a single scale, see Section 4.1.) 
Thirdly, although (like the other two measurement options) this aggregate scale cannot yield 
granular policy implications about which accountability instruments are best for which contexts, 
it has the potential to make a clearer case against the acontextual ‘more accountability and more 
best practices = better student outcomes’ arguments that lurk in the background of research on 
accountability in high-performing education systems, as outlined in Section 1.1. That is, if my 
operationalisation of teacher accountability instruments adopts the reductive more/less logic of 
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such arguments, and if my analysis uses the same ILSA datasets that are typically used to identify 
‘best practices’ from high-performing countries, and if this analysis can demonstrate the context-
dependence of even this reductive aggregate measure of teacher accountability instruments, then 
the analysis would lack policy relevance at an instrument-specific level, but it would gain policy 
relevance in making a case against a prominent argument in education policy debates. Finally, an 
additional methodological benefit is that these single aggregate measures eliminate the 
multicollinearity that would result from including multiple, correlated variables for accountability 
in the same regression model. They also aid model convergence when looking at country-level 
weighted means for teacher accountability, given the limited number of countries available in the 
data. These scales offer an overall snapshot of teacher accountability instruments, facilitating 
cross-country comparison.  
 
Student outcomes. In both PISA and TIMSS, student proficiency scores are generated by their 
respective administering institutions (the OECD and the IEA) using item-response theory (IRT) 
modelling. PISA and TIMSS assess multiple subjects, but individual students’ proficiency scores 
are highly correlated across subjects. Accordingly, for the sake of simplicity I focus on one 
subject per assessment wave. PISA includes questions on reading, mathematics, and science, but 
every wave emphasises one of the three subjects, assessing it in particular detail. I focus on the 
emphasised subject from each wave; i.e. science for PISA 2015 and mathematics for PISA 2012. 
TIMSS 2015 allocates equal coverage to mathematics and science, and I focus on mathematics. 
To check the soundness of this decision to focus on one subject per assessment wave, I re-
estimated model 1 (outlined below and reported in Section 4.3) using each of the other PISA and 
TIMSS subjects as outcome variables. Across the subjects, there were no differences in the 
direction or significance of key variables, thus justifying my decision to focus on one subject per 
assessment cycle.  
 
Teacher motivation. To proxy for teacher motivation, I use three scales that were constructed 
by the respective survey administrators and are included in the public-access datasets. Two of the 
datasets offered teacher-reported scales for job satisfaction. The TALIS 2013 job satisfaction 
scale was computed as the mean of two confirmatory factor-analysis scores, each based on four 
questionnaire items, for satisfaction with (a) the current work environment (e.g. ‘I would 
recommend my school as a good place to work’) and (b) the teaching profession (e.g. ‘If I could 
decide again, I would still choose to work as a teacher’), respectively (OECD, 2014d, pp. 204–
14). The TIMSS 2015 job satisfaction scale was generated using IRT partial-credit scaling, based 
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on seven questionnaire items (e.g. ‘I am proud of the work that I do’; Martin, Mullis, & Hooper, 
2016, pp. 15.298–15.302). While there is thematic overlap between the TALIS and TIMSS items 
for teacher job satisfaction, none of the items are identical. Although the PISA datasets do not 
include teacher-level questionnaires,16 the PISA 2012 principal questionnaires did include items 
pertaining to school-level teacher morale. This teacher morale scale was generated using IRT 
partial-credit scaling of five principal-reported items (e.g. ‘Teachers work with enthusiasm’; 
OECD, 2014b, p. 349). The differences between these three scales, as well as how valid they may 
be as proxies for teacher motivation, are discussed in Section 5.1. 
 
National sociocultural context. Given the multidimensionality of culture and society, I draw 
on two data sources on country-level sociocultural context, as noted above. From these datasets, 
I use proxy scales for social capital, power distance, and uncertainty avoidance. Although there 
are numerous other ways of conceptualising and measuring sociocultural differences (e.g. Green, 
Janmaat, & Han, 2009; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Markus & Conner, 2013; Thompson, Ellis, & 
Wildavsky, 1990), I focus on these constructs because they represent cultural patterns that are 
theoretically expected to moderate the effects of accountability instruments, as discussed in 
Section 2.3. 
 
First, from the WVS/EVS datasets, I use factor analysis to construct four scale variables for 
aspects of social capital. (Inglehart and Welzel [2005] also use factor analysis to construct their 
WVS scales for traditional vs. secular-rational values and for survival vs. self-expression values. 
However, while Inglehart and Welzel chose items for inclusion in their factor variables based on 
how much cross-national variation the items collectively explained, I have chosen items for 
inclusion based on their conceptual relevance.) As noted in Section 2.3, there are both theoretical 
and empirical reasons for expecting social capital to moderate the effects of teacher 
accountability instruments on teachers and students. For this statistical analysis, I identify four 
sets of WVS/EVS questionnaire items that relate to social capital and are available in all three 
survey waves: confidence in institutions (12 items, e.g. parliament); membership in civic networks (7 
items, e.g. religious organisations); how justifiable it is to breach civic norms (4 items, reverse 
coded, e.g. cheating on taxes); and social trust (2 items: whether most people can be trusted; to 
what degree most people would try to take advantage of you). Further details on the construction 
of these social capital scales are available in Section 4.2. 
 
 
16  PISA 2015 included an optional teacher questionnaire, but only 19 countries administered it. 
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Alongside these WVS/EVS factor variables, I include two pre-existing sociocultural scales from 
Hofstede’s IBM dataset. The first scale, power distance, is a measure of hierarchy. As discussed 
in Section 2.3, power distance measures the acceptance of hierarchical distributions of power. I 
also use Hofstede’s index of uncertainty avoidance, which indicates a tendency toward anxiety 
and preferences for stability, even if that entails organisational rigidity (Hofstede, 2001). 
Hofstede calculates the power distance and uncertainty avoidance indices through linear 
combinations of country-level average responses to the pertinent questionnaire items (Hofstede, 
2001, pp. 86, 150). For this analysis, I standardise power distance and uncertainty avoidance 
scores to match the mean and spread of the social capital factor scores. 
 
Control variables. In every regression model, I include a control variable at each level of 
analysis. At the student level, I control for socioeconomic background, using the PISA scale for 
economic, social, and cultural status (ESCS) or the TIMSS scale for home educational resources, 
respectively. At the teacher level, in TALIS and TIMSS regressions, I control for years of 
teaching experience. At the school level, for PISA and TALIS I control for the degree of school 
autonomy in decision-making. TIMSS 2015 did not include questionnaire items on decision-
making autonomy, so instead I use a pre-existing TIMSS scale for the degree to which 
instructional capacity is constrained by inadequate resources (whether general resources and 
mathematics-specific ones), as reported by the principal. Finally, at the country level, I control 
for per-capita GDP. The GDP variable was scaled in 2011 US$10,000s and centred at $30,000, 
to give it an order of magnitude similar to that of the country-level sociocultural variables while 
remaining meaningfully interpretable. 
 
This is a relatively parsimonious set of control variables, because my aim is not to capture as 
much variability in student achievement (or teacher motivation) as possible; but rather to 
determine whether the proposed conceptual framework holds empirically. Accordingly, I focus 
on the relationships mapped out in the framework—between teacher accountability, teacher 
motivation, and student outcomes—and the extent to which these relationships are affected by 
measurable aspects of context. Control variables are included only if there are theoretical or 
empirical grounds for expecting them to affect the relationship between teacher accountability, 
teacher motivation, sociocultural context, and student outcomes. 
 
Specifically, I control for pupil socioeconomic status, since the effects of teacher accountability 
instruments may depend on how privileged pupils are. For example, since less privileged students 
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tend to be concentrated in lower-performing schools, Diamond and Spillane (2004) argue that 
the perverse effects of high-stakes accountability instruments, such as curriculum narrowing and 
diverting resources to students at the pass/fail margin, may disproportionately affect less 
privileged students. At the teacher level, I control for years of teaching experience. Since 
teaching experience has been associated with different levels of both student outcomes 
(Hanushek & Rivkin, 2006; Murnane & Phillips, 1981) and of motivational factors such as 
teacher self-efficacy and job satisfaction (Chiong, Menzies, & Parameshwaran, 2017; Klassen & 
Chiu, 2010; Liu & Ramsey, 2008; Wolters & Daugherty, 2007), it may affect the mediation 
relationship between teacher accountability, teacher motivation, and student outcomes. 
 
Beyond these individual-level factors, I also control for school autonomy, since teacher 
accountability instruments may be more effective when schools have more freedom to change 
their practices in response to accountability incentives (see Woessmann, 2016 for a related 
empirical analysis). As mentioned above, the TIMSS 2015 questionnaires did not include items 
related to school autonomy. Instead, I use a principal-reported measure of the extent to which 
school instructional capacity is constrained by resource shortages. While resource constraints 
differ considerably from decision-making constraints, both affect schools’ capacity for 
autonomous action. Thus, the measure of school resource shortages may not be a close 
equivalent for school autonomy, but it is the best available substitute. Furthermore, Kim, Sun, 
and Youngs (2019) found that teachers were more likely to perceive a teacher evaluation 
programme as legitimate if they had adequate time and resources to complete the evaluation 
process; thus lending support to the inclusion of school resources as a control in its own right.  
 
Finally, I control for national GDP per capita. Although I do not subscribe to modernisation 
theories that associate developed countries with ‘modern’ values and developing countries with 
‘traditional’ values (e.g. Inglehart & Welzel, 2005), it is empirically true in my dataset that GDP is 
moderately correlated with some of the sociocultural constructs (see Table A.2 in Appendix A). 
Hence, to forestall the spurious attribution of moderation from national resource levels to 
moderation from national culture, I interact teacher accountability not only with the sociocultural 
scales but also with GDP. 
 
In interpreting parameter estimates from these control variables, it is important to bear in mind 
that the pupil- and school-level measures differ across the datasets. As noted above and shown 
in Table 3.4, the PISA and TIMSS proxies for student socioeconomic background use different 
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questionnaire items and scaling procedures. For the school-level controls, the TIMSS variable 
concerns school resources whereas the PISA and TALIS variables concern school autonomy. 
Additionally, the three PISA and TALIS school autonomy scales all differ from each other, even 
though all three are based on principal-reported items. Although the PISA 2012 and 2015 scales 
were based on identical questionnaire items, the 2012 scale was constructed using IRT partial-
credit scaling, whereas the 2015 scale was constructed using an approach that weighted each item 
equally [OECD 2014b, pp. 312–313, 346–347; 2016e, pp. 243–244]. Although the TALIS 2013 
school questionnaire included a set of 11 items that were similar to the 12 PISA school 
autonomy items, the dataset did not have a pre-existing school autonomy scale. Instead, I used 
these TALIS school autonomy items (i.e. the TC2G18A to TC2G18K items) to construct a 
simple scale based on the proportion of the 11 items for which at least one set of school-level 
actors had significant responsibility. 
 
Modelling 
This statistical analysis is framed as a mediated moderation, as shown in the first panel of Figure 
3.1. That is, I posit firstly that the influence of teacher accountability instruments on student 
outcomes is transmitted indirectly via their influence on teacher motivation, which in turn 
influences student outcomes; thus, teacher motivation mediates the relationship between 
accountability instruments and student outcomes. Secondly, I posit that the relationship between 
teacher accountability instruments and student outcomes (as well as the relationships within the 
mediation pathway) can either intensified or weakened by sociocultural context; thus, 
sociocultural context moderates the relationship between accountability instruments and student 
outcomes.17  
 
 
17  It is also possible that teacher motivation may itself moderate—that is, intensify or weaken—the relationship 
between accountability instruments and student outcomes. For example, accountability instruments may have 
stronger effects on student outcomes when teachers are more motivated to begin with, and weaker effects when 
teachers are less motivated. In fact, some of the teachers whom I interviewed in Finland and Singapore 
observed that demotivated teachers may pay little attention to accountability instruments, unlike their more 
motivated colleagues. I tested the possibility of teacher motivation moderating the effects of accountability 
instruments, by adding an interaction between accountability and motivation to the main TIMSS 2015 and PISA 
2012 models. In both cases, the coefficients on these interaction terms were insignificant. This may well be due 
to measurement issues with teacher motivation, which I address in Sections 3.6 and 5.1. Nonetheless, such 
differential effects of accountability instruments contingent on teachers’ pre-existing motivation levels are not 
the primary focus of this study. Rather, I am mainly interested in differential effects of accountability 
instruments contingent on variation in national-level sociocultural context. Accordingly, the results presented in 
this thesis do not include any accountability*motivation interaction terms. 
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To test these relationships, I estimate three different sets of models, which correspond to 
different research questions, as shown in Figure 3.1. First, for RQ1, on the extent to which the 
relationship between teacher accountability instruments and student outcomes depends on sociocultural context, I 
estimate a moderation model for the effects of teacher accountability instruments on student 
outcomes, moderated by the six sociocultural constructs (model 1). Next, to test the mediation 
pathway in RQ2, on the extent to which teacher motivation mediates the relationship between teacher 
accountability instruments and student outcomes, I estimate two different models, in which the outcome 
variables are, respectively, student outcomes (model 2) and teacher motivation (model 3). To 
address RQ3, on the extent to which the relationship between teacher accountability instruments and teacher 
motivation depends on sociocultural context, I run another set of model 3 estimations. Whereas for RQ2 
I interpret the model 3 results with an eye to the mediation relationship, for RQ3 I focus on the 
degree to which each of the six sociocultural constructs moderates the effect of teacher 
accountability on teacher motivation. 
 
Figure 3.1   Conceptual diagrams for the overall analysis and each statistical model 
 
 
In all of these regressions, I use statistical techniques that are appropriate for the sampling and 
assessment designs of the educational surveys (Jerrim, Lopez-Agudo, Marcenaro-Gutierrez, & 
Shure, 2017; Martin, Mullis, & Hooper, 2016; OECD, 2014b, 2014d, 2017; Rutkowski, 
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Gonzalez, Joncas, & von Davier, 2010). PISA, TIMSS, and TALIS all use stratified random 
sampling such that students and teachers are clustered in classes and/or schools. The multilevel 
models account for this clustering and avoid the inaccurately low standard errors that would 
result from straightforward single-level analyses. Another feature of the sampling design is that 
some countries choose to oversample certain strata (e.g. certain regions or certain school types) 
to obtain higher-resolution data on these subpopulations. To simulate nationally representative 
populations, each observation is weighted with school-level weights and conditional student- and 
teacher-level weights, as provided by dataset administrators and standardised by MLwiN 
(Gebhardt, 2009; Laukaityte & Wiberg, 2017a; Pillinger, 2011). Next, because PISA and TIMSS 
student proficiency scores are estimated using IRT, the datasets include several plausible values 
(ten plausible values in PISA 2015, and five in TIMSS 2015 and PISA 2012) for each student 
proficiency score, in order to capture the measurement error associated with the estimation 
process. Accordingly, I re-estimate every regression for each plausible value, and then combine 
the coefficient and standard error estimates using Rubin’s rules (Laukaityte & Wiberg, 2017b; 
OECD, 2009; Rubin, 1996). 
 
All regressions are estimated using the iterated generalised least squares procedure, a form of 
full-information maximum likelihood estimation, in MLwiN 3.0.2. The number of levels in each 
model depends on the sampling design of the educational dataset in question: PISA models in 
which the outcome variable is student proficiency have three levels (pupil, school, country) and  
those in which the outcome is teacher motivation have two levels (school, country); TIMSS 
models have four levels for student outcomes (pupil, teacher, school, country) and three for 
teacher motivation (teacher, school, country); and TALIS models for teacher motivation have 
three levels (teacher, school, country). I preserve the levels of analyses at which the survey data 
were collected so that the calculated standard errors will account for any non-random similarity 
within sampled clusters at each level. All regressions use sandwich estimators for standard errors 
to mitigate the effects of potential heteroskedasticity. 
 
Since I am interested in associations with teacher accountability instruments both between 
countries and within countries, the models include terms for both the country-level weighted 
mean of the school-level IRT estimate for teacher accountability as well as the difference 
between each school’s score and the respective country weighted mean. This is sometimes called 
a within-between model (e.g. Bell & Jones, 2015), since country-level mean measures variation 
between countries, whereas the school-level differential measures variation within countries. As 
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Snijders and Bosker (2011) show, this within-between model is statistically equivalent to the 
Mundlak model, which includes the higher-level group mean alongside the original lower-level 
predictor (rather than a group-mean-centred differential for the lower-level predictor, as in the 
within-between model). Despite this statistical equivalence, these two models differ in how the 
parameter estimates for the group mean variable are interpreted. In the Mundlak model, the 
coefficient on the group mean variable gives the ‘contextual’ effect, i.e. the expected difference 
between two lower-level units with the same value of the lower-level predictor but belonging to 
higher-level groups that differ by 1 in their group means for the predictor (in this case, two 
schools with the same teacher accountability scale scores, in countries with different mean 
teacher accountability scores). In the within-between model, the coefficient on the group mean 
variable gives the ‘between’ effect, i.e. the expected difference between the mean responses of 
two groups that differ by 1 in their group means for the predictor (Bell & Jones, 2015). Since I 
am more interested in between-country differences—especially when considering the interaction 
between country-level accountability and sociocultural context—rather than in contextual 
effects, I estimate the within-between model rather than the Mundlak model. A further benefit 
of the within-between model is reduced multicollinearity due to group-mean-centring of the 
lower-level predictor.  
 
Where possible, I estimate two sets of regressions for each dataset: (a) a regression that includes 
all six sociocultural constructs and their associated interaction terms; and (b) six separate 
regressions that each include just one sociocultural construct and its associated interaction term. 
While (a) is analytically preferable, because it accounts for the interplay between the sociocultural 
constructs, it is not always empirically feasible. Specifically, due to the small number of countries 
in the TIMSS and TALIS datasets, regressions following option (a) showed indications of 
multicollinearity. Since such indications did not appear in TIMSS and TALIS regressions 
following option (b), it is likely that the multicollinearity in (a) is due to overfitting, i.e. including 
too many country-level variables in a regression with too few country cases. Accordingly, I 
present results from (a) where possible, but show results from (b) when (a) appears overfitted. 
(Additionally, when (a) appears statistically sound, I treat the (b) regressions as sensitivity 
checks.) In both cases, I present results for a wide range of regressions, both from the main 
dataset and from sensitivity checks, to convey a clear picture of how robust the results may be 
across all six sociocultural constructs. For evidence of overfitting in (a) and a lack thereof in (b) 
for the TIMSS 2015 main dataset, see Appendix A, where I present results for both approaches. 
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For each research question, I focus on the educational dataset offering the most granular 
information on key variables, as shown above in Table 3.2. For RQ1, which looks at the 
relationship between teacher accountability, student outcomes, and sociocultural context, my 
main dataset is PISA 2015. This is because the PISA 2015 dataset covers not only student-level 
proficiency scores, but also school-level questionnaire items on teacher accountability. Thus, for 
model 1 with PISA 2015 data, I estimate: 
 
Proficiencypsc = β0 + β1ESCSpsc + β2Autonomysc + β3GDPc 
   + β4AccountabilityDiffsc + β5Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ c 
   + β6AccountabilityDiffsc*ESCSpsc + β7AccountabilityDiffsc*Autonomysc + β8AccountabilityDiffsc*GDPc 
   + β9Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ c*ESCSpsc + β10Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ c*Autonomysc + β11Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ c *GDPc 
   + βiSocioculturalc + βjAccountabilityDiffsc*Socioculturalc + βkAccountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ c *Socioculturalc 
   + vc + usc + epsc          Equation (1) 
 
where Proficiencypsc is the science proficiency score of pupil p in school s in country c. Control 
variables comprise pupil economic, social, and cultural status (ESCSpsc), school autonomy 
(Autonomysc), and national per-capita GDP (GDPc). The main explanatory variables are 
Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ c, the country-level weighted mean of teacher accountability, and 
AccountabilityDiffsc, the school-level teacher accountability differential. Socioculturalc represents 
a vector of the six sociocultural constructs. I also include interactions between each of the two 
accountability variables and each of the other explanatory variables, to determine the extent to 
which the effects of school- and country-level teacher accountability are moderated by 
sociocultural context as well as each control variable. The latter are included to ensure that I do 
not erroneously attribute moderation effects to sociocultural context when those effects instead 
result from other contextual characteristics that may be correlated with the sociocultural 
constructs, such as GDP. Finally, vc, usc, and epsc are error terms at each level. 
 
For RQ2, which focuses on the relationship between teacher accountability instruments, teacher 
motivation, and student outcomes, the main dataset is TIMSS 2015. Since TIMSS 2015 included 
teacher questionnaires for all participating countries, this dataset has a measure of teacher 
motivation self-reported by teachers, which is likely to be a better proxy than the PISA 2012 
principal-reported measures of school-level teacher morale. For model 2 with TIMSS 2015 data, 
I estimate: 
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Proficiencyptsc = β0 + β1HomeResourcesptsc + β2Experiencetsc + β3SchoolResourcessc+ β4GDPc 
   + β5Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ c + β6Motivationtsc 
   + β7Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ c*HomeResourcesptsc + β8Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ c*Experiencetsc  
   + β9Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ c*SchoolResourcessc + β10Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ c*GDPc 
   + βiSocioculturalc + βjAccountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ c*Socioculturalc 
   + βkMotivationtsc*Socioculturalc 
   + wc+ vsc + utsc + eptsc         Equation (2) 
 
where Proficiencyptsc is the mathematics proficiency score of pupil p taught by teacher t in school 
s in country c. Control variables comprise pupil home educational resources (HomeResourcesptsc), 
teachers’ years of experience (Experiencetsc), school resource levels (SchoolResourcessc), and 
national per-capita GDP (GDPc). Equation (2) is similar to (1), except for (a) the addition of 
teacher-reported job satisfaction (Motivationtsc) and its interaction with Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ c, to test 
for mediation; and (b) the absence of a school-level teacher accountability differential, since 
TIMSS questionnaires lacked sufficient teacher accountability items, so the teacher accountability 
data here are taken from PISA and matched at the country level. Also, given the risk of 
overfitting described above, Socioculturalc here represents each sociocultural construct entered 
singly, in turn (rather than a vector of all six constructs concurrently). Finally, wc, vsc, utsc, and eptsc 
are error terms at each level. 
 
Testing for a mediation relationship in RQ2 also involves running model 3 on the TIMSS data to 
determine whether accountability instruments are associated with teacher motivation. However, 
for reasons I explain in Section 5.1, my statistical analysis presentation for RQ2 pays more 
attention to model 2. In turn, model 3 takes the spotlight in the RQ3 analysis. For RQ3, which 
examines the influence of sociocultural context on the relationship between teacher 
accountability instruments on teacher motivation, the main dataset is TALIS 2013. TALIS 2013 
collected data on both of the educational variables in RQ3, at the lowest possible levels of 
analysis: teacher motivation as reported by teachers, and teacher accountability instruments as 
reported by principals. For model 3 with TALIS 2013 data, I estimate: 
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Motivationtsc = β0 + β1Experiencetsc + β2Autonomysc + β3GDPc 
   + β4AccountabilityDiffsc + β5Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ c 
   + β6AccountabilityDiffsc*Experiencetsc+ β7AccountabilityDiffsc*Autonomysc + β8AccountabilityDiffsc*GDPc 
   + β9Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ c*Experiencetsc + β10Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ c *Autonomysc + β11Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ c *GDPc 
   + βiSocioculturalc + βjAccountabilityDiffsc*Socioculturalc + βkAccountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ c*Socioculturalc 
   + vc + usc + etsc          Equation (3) 
 
where Motivationtsc is the job satisfaction of teacher t in school s in country c. Equation (3) is 
similar in form to equation (1), with the pupil proficiency score being replaced by teacher job 
satisfaction (Motivationtsc), and pupil socioeconomic status being replaced by years of teaching 
experience (Experiencetsc). Also, given the relatively small sample of countries, Socioculturalc 
represents each sociocultural construct entering the model singly, rather than a vector of all six 
constructs, as with the TIMSS regressions under equation (2). The other difference from 
equation (1) is that the lowest-level error term here is etsc, representing teachers nested within 
schools nested within countries, as compared to pupils in equation (1). 
 
Sensitivity checks 
For each research question, I run a number of sensitivity checks alongside regressions for the 
main dataset, as indicated above in Table 3.2. For RQ1, for which the main statistical analysis 
estimates model 1 using PISA 2015 data, I also estimate model 1 using data from PISA 2012 and 
TIMSS 2015. I use the PISA 2012 data in two ways: simply re-estimating model 1 using PISA 
2012 data, to check the robustness of the model across assessment waves; and matching student 
outcome data from PISA 2015 with country-level accountability data from PISA 2012, to 
account for possible time lags in the effect of accountability instruments. It is important to check 
whether the results are robust with and without time lags between the measurement of teacher 
accountability and the measurement of student outcomes, because education policy 
implementation faces time lags in adoption and impact, with different factors operating at 
different phases of policy development (de Lancer Julnes & Holzer, 2001; Podgursky & Springer, 
2007). For example, a principal’s answers to the PISA 2015 school questionnaire may reflect 
recent changes in national policy or local initiatives, but these changes might not yet be affecting 
student performance in the accompanying science, mathematics, and reading tests. I also 
estimate model 1 for two separate TIMSS datasets, one matched with country-level 
accountability data from PISA 2015, and another with accountability data from PISA 2012. 
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Additionally, I analyse subsamples of the PISA 2015 and 2012 datasets containing observations 
only from OECD countries, as well as a subset of PISA 2015 data containing observations only 
from publicly funded schools. 
 
For RQ2, to supplement the main analysis with models 2 and 3 using TIMSS 2015 data matched 
with country-level accountability data from PISA 2015, I run a sensitivity check with TIMSS 
2015 data matched with accountability data from PISA 2012. Additionally, I tested the models 
using PISA 2012 data, both the full sample and an OECD-only subsample. PISA 2015 did not 
include a suitable proxy for teacher motivation, so it was not included in the sensitivity checks. 
For RQ3, in addition to the main TALIS 2013 dataset, I ran sensitivity checks using the two 
TIMSS 2015 datasets and the two PISA 2012 datasets used in RQ2. 
 
In addition, as mentioned above, whenever the dataset included an adequate number of 
countries, I estimated models that included all six sociocultural constructs simultaneously, as well 
as models with each sociocultural construct singly, in turn. For the model 1 regressions with 
single sociocultural constructs, I also re-estimated the regressions using a separate cut of the data 
for each construct, such that countries that were excluded from the main dataset because they 
had participated in either WVS/EVS or Hofstede but not both (or because they had 
administered WVS/EVS items for some but not all of the social capital-related scales) would 
now be included in these separate cuts for the applicable sociocultural constructs, thus increasing 
the country sample sizes. 
 
Finally, for models that had significant interactions between accountability and sociocultural 
context, I re-estimated the regressions with dummy variables for outlying countries (e.g. Vietnam 
and China in PISA 2015 student achievement and Mexico in TALIS 2013 teacher job 
satisfaction, as identified in residual plots). The inclusion of these country dummies did not 
materially affect either the magnitude or the significance of the interaction terms of interest. 
 
3.4 Teacher interviews in Finland and Singapore 
In addition to large-scale secondary datasets, I draw on semi-structured individual interviews 
with 12 teachers from secondary schools in Singapore (for pupils from ages 13 to 16/17), and 12 
teachers from lower secondary schools in Finland (for ages 13 to 15). The level of schooling was 
chosen to match the level of students participating in the PISA (age 15) and TIMSS (Grade 8) 
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datasets used in the statistical analysis. Additionally, Singapore’s secondary schools and Finland’s 
lower secondary schools are, in their respective countries, the stage of schooling immediately 
preceding specialisation into academic and vocational pre-tertiary institutions. I conducted the 
interviews in Singapore during July 2018 and in Finland during September 2018. (I also 
conducted an additional interview for the Singapore sample via video conference from 
Cambridge in August 2018.) 
 
In this project, the teacher interviews serve two main functions. Firstly, the interviews add 
country-specific granularity to the standardised statistics of the cross-country educational and 
cultural surveys. For example, while PISA 2012 and TALIS 2013 include data on whether 
teacher appraisals can result in a financial bonus or a change in salary, this conceals vast 
differences in the magnitude of reward and the pervasiveness of the reward schemes, as 
observed in Section 5.2. Secondly, the interviews offer evidence that could support or challenge 
the causal pathway from accountability instruments to teacher motivation.18 Given that teachers 
are the subjects—and, in some cases, implementors—of teacher accountability instruments, they 
have direct knowledge of the mechanisms underlying these instruments (Pawson & Tilley, 1997, 
Chapter 6). The usual limits of human awareness and memory apply, as well as the various 
inhibitions of interviewer-interviewee relationships, but I approach the interviews with the 
assumption that teachers are reflective practitioners who are capable of articulating meaningful 
observations about their experiences and contexts. This assumption is especially reasonable in 
the countries of interest, given that Finnish teachers are trained to conduct research and apply it 
to their practice (Sahlberg, 2015a), and Singaporean teachers participate in professional leaning 
programmes throughout their careers (Goh & Lee, 2008; Low & Tan, 2017). 
 
Given the brand of realism that I adopt, the aim of these interviews was to refine my 
conceptualisation of teacher accountability instruments (Pawson & Tilley, 1997), as noted in 
Section 2.1. Accordingly, interview questions and procedures were framed around my conceptual 
framework and a working hypothesis—not in the sense of a falsifiable hypothesis to be rejected 
or temporarily retained based on the data; but rather an articulation of my current best guess 
about the relationship in question (Maxwell, 2013). Below, I explain how this theory-driven 
stance informed my fieldwork. 
 
18  As discussed above in Section 2.1, I use the term ‘causal’ in a realist sense, which is concerned with identifying 
mechanisms that actually generate a pattern of change—not a statistical or experimental sense, which is 
concerned with identifying and isolating all sources of variation that may bias the relationship between 
treatment, comparison, and outcomes. 
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Country selection: Why Finland and Singapore? 
Finland and Singapore are appropriate cases to compare because they (a) both have highly 
successful school systems, but with (b) contrasting approaches to teacher accountability, 
embedded within (c) different sociocultural contexts, despite (d) other similarities that facilitate 
comparison both analytically and logistically. I discuss each of these in turn. 
 
In terms of educational efficacy, both countries have consistently shown outstanding 
performance in international student assessments. In recent international comparisons, Finland’s 
scores have declined somewhat (alongside other concerns about declining educational attainment 
in Finland; Teivainen, 2019), whereas Singapore has been on an upward trajectory that has 
propelled it to the top of the tables across PISA and TIMSS subjects (Martin, Mullis, Foy, & 
Hooper, 2016b; Martin, Mullis, Foy, et al., 2016a; OECD, 2016d). Still, both education systems 
continue to receive international adulation, and justifiably so. 
 
However, they have disparate approaches to teacher accountability. In Singapore, teachers’ work 
is managed within the Enhanced Performance Management System (EPMS), a national system 
of tiered performance standards and formal appraisals, with a structured career ladder and 
sizeable bonuses (Kan, 2014; Sclafani & Lim, 2008). In contrast, Finland’s teachers are not 
subject to formal appraisals. Teachers do not receive promotions (principalship is considered 
separate profession, requiring distinct qualifications), and formal rewards and punishments are 
minimal (Finnish National Board of Education, 2013; Sahlberg, 2015a). These differences are 
reflected in cross-country surveys. As shown in Figure 3.2, Singapore and Finland fall 
respectively in the highest and lowest quartiles of the teacher accountability scale that I derived 
from the PISA 2015 school questionnaires. (The same is true of these countries for the teacher 
accountability scales from PISA 2012 and TALIS 2013. See Section 4.1 for details of the 
accountability scale construction.) 
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Figure 3.2   Box plots of country-level average scores for teacher accountability instruments and sociocultural 
context among PISA 2015 countries, including Finland (dotted line) and Singapore (solid line) 
 
 
Note. Sources: (a) teacher accountability instruments: PISA 2015, my calculations; (b) confidence in institutions, civic 
networks, civic norms, social trust: World Values Survey/European Values study, my calculations, (c) power 
distance, uncertainty avoidance: Hofstede, standardised. 
 
Additionally, they differ considerably in sociocultural context. Again referring to Figure 3.2, 
Finland and Singapore are in opposite extreme quartiles for civic norms and power distance, 
meaning that Singaporeans are much more likely than Finns to accept hierarchical distributions 
of power, and to justify antisocial behaviour such as cheating on taxes or avoiding a fare on 
public transport. For the other four sociocultural constructs, both countries fall on the same side 
of the median, but never in the same quartile. Finns have unusually high levels of social trust, 
while Singapore is an outlier in its levels of confidence in institutions. The only sociocultural 
measure in which they do not differ substantially is civic networks, i.e. how much residents 
participate in local organisations (whether political, religious, professional, or leisure-related). For 
further illustrative data, Finland and Singapore fall at opposite ends of Oxfam’s 2018 
Commitment to Reducing Inequality Index, ranking 3rd and 149th, respectively, out of 157 
countries (Lawson & Martin, 2018). 
 
Despite these different accountability approaches and sociocultural contexts, Finland and 
Singapore are also similar in ways that facilitate comparison between them. Educationally, both 
countries had relatively low levels of educational attainment in the mid-20th century, but 
implemented pivotal education policy reforms in the 1970s and 1980s (Goh & Gopinathan, 
2008; Sahlberg, 2015a). Moreover, both countries have long regarded education as pivotal to 
both economic development (S. K. Lee, Goh, Fredriksen, & Tan, 2008; Tirri, 2014) and the 
construction of national identity (Gopinathan, 2015; Heller-Sahlgren, 2015). Today, both 
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countries are lionised as educational ‘reference societies’ (de Roock & Espeña, 2018; Takayama 
et al., 2013), and both governments have actively cultivated educational ‘brands’ to encourage 
profitable international consumption of their educational services (Candido & Eriksson, 2019; K. 
P. Tan, 2018). However, despite this global limelight, there has been relatively little research on 
the apparently effective processes of teaching and learning in Finland and Singapore (Dimmock 
& Tan, 2013; Simola, Kauko, Varjo, Kalalahti, & Sahlstrom, 2017). To illustrate, literature 
searches on 7 June 2019 in ERIC and Scopus for the terms ‘Singapore’ and ‘Enhanced 
Performance Management System’ yielded only two results (Kaur, 2010; Liew, 2012), despite this 
system being much lauded and used for as a template for teacher performance management 
elsewhere (e.g. in Scotland; Hepburn, 2017). 
 
Further similarities between these countries also facilitate comparative study. Both countries 
have high levels of development and populations of approximately 5.5 million (United Nations, 
2017), with ethnic diversity but a numerically dominant ethnolinguistic group. Logistically, 
although Finland has a far larger land area than Singapore, both countries have well-organised 
public transport systems. Moreover, most adults in both countries are fluent in English, so I 
could conduct interviews without translation. In Singapore, my research was further aided by the 
fact that I attended Singapore secondary schools for four years and still maintain friendships 
there; and my 2013 master’s thesis was a comparative analysis of political developments in 
Singapore and Malaysia. Although I initially had far less familiarity with the Finnish context, I 
attended an education policy conference in Helsinki in May 2018, which allowed me to orient 
myself in the country prior to fieldwork that September. During my fieldwork there, I was 
affiliated with the University of Tampere’s Faculty of Education as a visiting researcher, which 
allowed me to clarify my preliminary observations through discussions with local academics. 
 
Sample design and recruitment 
I set out to interview 10 to 15 teachers in each country, in order to represent a range of salient 
background characteristics among the interview participants, within a manageable amount of 
qualitative data for a PhD thesis that also analyses secondary quantitative datasets. My goal in 
seeking diverse interview participants was not to identify systematic differences in teachers’ 
responses to accountability instruments—indeed, the samples were far too small to do so 
rigorously. Rather, I simply intended to test and refine my working theory of teacher 
accountability instruments with as wide a range of teachers as possible. In both countries, the 
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interviews reached saturation (Bleich & Pekkanen, 2013), with additional participants adding 
specific details based on their respective experiences, but broadly echoing what prior participants 
has said about teacher accountability instruments, sociocultural context, and motivational 
processes. 
 
In both countries, I aimed to speak with teachers across a range of subjects, years of teaching 
experience, management roles, and school characteristics; and of personal characteristics such as 
ethnolinguistic background and gender. Some of these categories differed between the countries. 
For example, the main ethnolinguistic classification in Finland is between the Finnish-speaking 
majority and the Swedish-speaking minority, whereas in Singapore the distinction is between the 
Chinese majority and the non-Chinese minorities.19 Given the emphasis on national sociocultural 
context, I also aimed to interview at least one teacher in each country who had grown up in 
another sociocultural context, since their perspectives on the accountability system may differ 
from those who had been formatively socialised into the wider social system. 
 
Educationally, in Singapore I wanted to interview teachers at different levels of the career ladder: 
‘regular’ teachers (who are formally known as general education officers), as well as management-
level teachers (known as senior education officers) who were responsible for appraising their 
colleagues. I also aimed for good representation across ‘mainstream’ schools and the more 
privileged autonomous and independent schools, which not only have more administrative 
leeway (which may affect teacher accountability) but also tend to have higher test scores and 
greater prestige (J. Tan & Gopinathan, 2000). In Finland, I aimed to interview teachers from 
both Finnish- and Swedish-medium schools, given the historic cultural differences between these 
schools (Heller-Sahlgren, 2015); as well teachers from urban, semi-urban, and rural schools, 
given the different working conditions across school localities (Kalaoja & Pietarinen, 2009). I 
also hoped to speak with teachers from different municipalities, because educational resources 
and governance can differ considerably across municipal administrations (Public School Insights, 
2008; Simola et al., 2017). Additionally, I wanted to interview a few teachers from private schools 
that offered the Finnish national curriculum, as a parallel to Singapore’s autonomous and 
 
19  Of course, these binary classifications efface a lot of diversity. For example, Finland has a third official language, 
Sami, which is spoken by a small population in the north. Finland also has a small but growing immigrant 
population. Singapore’s dominant racial classification groups citizens into Chinese, Malay, Indian, and Other, 
alongside a diverse immigrant population. However, I use these larger binary categories both for convenience 
(in Finland’s case, given that I was unable to speak with any interview participants from smaller minority 
groups, despite having circulated my participant information sheet among a network of migrant teachers) and 
for participant anonymity (in Singapore’s case, given that naming the specific ethnolinguistic background of 
non-Chinese participants would considerably increase identifiability). 
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independent schools. (Finland’s private school system is small, and most private schools are not 
sharply differentiated from their public counterparts. Such private schools are government-
funded and non-fee-paying [Kauko, Corvalán, Simola, & Carrasco, 2015], but they retain some 
administrative autonomy. While most interview participants from public schools said there was 
no manifest difference between the two categories, a participant from a private school pointed 
out that their school principal had more control over the school budget than the typical public-
school principal.) 
 
Given the small targeted sample size, it was more efficient to recruit interview participants 
through personal and educational networks rather than seeking access to national administrative 
directories of teachers. Accordingly, I circulated my participant information sheets (which are 
available in Appendix B) in emails to personal contacts and via Facebook, posting it on my 
personal profile and in relevant Facebook groups (such as the Cambridge University Finnish 
Society and HundrED Suomi, a Finland-based education networking group). In Finland, the call 
for participants was also circulated by Jaakko Kauko, my faculty host at the University of 
Tampere. Given my smaller network of contacts in Finland, I supplemented this network-based 
recruitment with some cold contacting once I had arrived in Tampere. Specifically, I emailed and 
telephoned a number of Tampere schools, as well as schools in rural areas within reach of 
Tampere. I also emailed the national teachers’ union (Opetusalan Ammattijärjestö, OAJ), but did 
not receive a reply.  
 
In the final sample of interview participants, three participants in the Singapore sample were 
people whom I knew personally, while the remaining nine were contacts of people whom I knew 
personally. In the Finland sample, one participant was a contact of my University of Tampere 
host; four were contacts of people whom I knew personally; two were contacts of people within 
my extended networks whom I did not know personally; two were contacts of other interview 
participants, snowball-style; and three resulted from speculative emails to school principals.  
 
Salient characteristics of interview participants are summarised in Table 3.5. The 12 Singaporean 
participants represent 11 different secondary schools, while the 12 Finnish participants represent 
10 lower secondary schools. Broadly, both samples covered the range of characteristics I sought 
to represent. However, the balance of this coverage varied. The Singapore sample was skewed 
towards teachers with 10 or fewer years of teaching experience, due to the demographic skew of 
my personal networks. Still, the sample still had reasonably balanced coverage between (a) 
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teachers who entered the profession prior to the introduction of the current performance 
management system in 2005, (b) those who entered the profession prior to a major revision of 
the system in 2014, and (c) those who had only experienced the revised system, as observed in 
Section 5.5. Among Singaporean participants, there was also better representation of subjects in 
the social sciences and humanities, although all STEM subjects were also represented. In 
Finland, only 3 out of my 12 interview participants were men; however, this corresponds loosely 
with the gender distribution of Finnish teachers (in 2016, 23% of basic education teachers were 
male; Paronen & Lappi, 2018). Although I spoke with participants from 8 municipalities across 4 
out of Finland’s 21 regions (i.e. Helsinki-Uusimaa, Pirkanmaa, Southwest Finland, and Central 
Finland), I only managed to interview one teacher from a rural school. This was due partly to 
logistical constraints, since I was based in urban Tampere and met participants at locations 
within a daytrip from Tampere, and partly to the limits of my networks.  
 
That said, in both countries, the sample included a good mix of teachers across administrative 
responsibilities and school types. In each country, one participant originated from the United 
States but had been through local teacher training programmes and had taught in the system for 
several years. (The fact that both non-national participants were American men was purely 
coincidental.) Also, as shown in Table 3.5, the Singapore sample also included four teachers from 
Malaysia who had first moved to Singapore to attend secondary school or university. However, 
given the large (though far from total) similarity in sociocultural context between Malaysia and 
Singapore, this is a less significant source of sociocultural variation than the teachers of 
American origin. 
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Table 3.5   Characteristics of interview participants, sorted by country and years of experience 
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Some teacher characteristics are not included in Table 3.5, in order to minimise participants’ 
identifiability. In both countries, some teachers had experience in teaching other school levels, 
whether primary or upper secondary. Furthermore, one participant in the Singapore sample had 
left the teaching profession one year prior to the interview, and another had been transferred to 
the Ministry headquarters (while retaining the same ‘education officer’ job title as any 
Singaporean teacher) two weeks prior to the interview. One Singaporean participant had been on 
medical leave for several months. In Finland, one participant had been working for a Finland-
based international education organisation since 2015. However, there had not been any major 
changes in teacher accountability policy since these Singaporean and Finnish teachers left their 
respective classrooms, and there were no apparent differences between their views and other 
participants’ views of teacher accountability processes. When I quote observations from these 
participants for which their background differences are relevant (e.g. when the Finnish 
participant working in international education discussing their experience in other countries), I 
will cite the pertinent distinguishing characteristic without giving the participant’s pseudonym. 
Thus, I hope to avoid associating these distinguishing characteristics with the characteristics in 
Table 3.5, to further safeguard against identifiability. 
 
Designing the interview guide 
All 24 participants were interviewed using the same interview guide, with some country-specific 
variations. The guide is shown in Table 3.6, along with explanations of why I asked each 
question. In designing the interview guide, I followed three guiding principles. Firstly, in 
accordance with Pawson and Tilley’s (1997) mode of realist interviewing (discussed above in 
Section 3.1), I explicitly told participants about some aspects of my conceptual framework, and 
asked for their input on both the entities within the framework and the soundness of the 
framework as a whole. For example, early in the interview I explained, with examples, how I 
defined teacher accountability instruments, and asked teachers about the instruments they had 
encountered. Toward the end of the interview, I described my working hypothesis and asked 
participants whether they agreed with it, and why. Unfortunately, at the point of conducting the 
interviews, I was in the process of developing the framework with accountability mechanisms 
and pathways described in Section 2.5, but I was not yet confident enough in this formulation to 
ask interview participants about it. Consequently, the most specific statement of my working 
theory that I gave in the interviews took the form of a platitude with which it would have been 
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difficult to disagree: ‘effective education systems have teacher accountability instruments that are 
compatible with their sociocultural context’. Unsurprisingly, every participant did agree with this 
generalised hypothesis. (This agreement is even less surprising since my attempt to contextualise 
this hypothesis, as shown in #11 in Table 3.6, probably primed participants to agree for social 
desirability’s sake, since I positioned the hypothesis in opposition to superficial headlines and 
education rankings.) Fortunately, they did not only state their agreement, but also provided 
insightful elaborations that aided subsequent refinement of the conceptual framework. 
 
Secondly, the progression of questions in the interview guide loosely followed the principle of 
‘hierarchical focusing’ (Tomlinson, 1989)—that is, moving from more open to more focused 
questions. The goal here was to maximise coverage of participants’ views independent of 
researcher influence, while maintaining a focus on the research agenda. However, I do not follow 
all of the procedures that Tomlinson (1989) recommends, e.g. laying out interview questions in a 
strict visual hierarchy. This is partly because Tomlinson’s approach aims to minimise researcher 
framing and direction throughout the whole interview. In contrast, I sought to minimise my 
framing of the issues at the start of the interviews, but by the end of each interview I had 
explicitly communicated a significant portion of my conceptual framework, in line with Pawson 
and Tilley’s (1997) approach. For example, in discussing sociocultural context, I first asked 
participants to identify aspects of society and culture that affect their country’s education 
generally, then I asked about aspects of culture that affect teachers’ responses to accountability 
instruments. At the end of the interview, I asked whether they agreed with specific sociocultural 
descriptors drawn from the cross-country survey datasets that I used in the statistical analysis. 
(As shown in Table 3.6, the aggregate measures that I asked Singaporean participants about were 
high confidence in public institutions, high power distance, and weak adherence to civic norms. 
In turn, I asked Finnish participants about high social trust, low power distance, and strong 
adherence to civic norms. Even though Singapore also had the lowest uncertainty avoidance 
score in Hofstede’s sample, I did not ask participants about uncertainty avoidance, since I have 
reasons for doubting this measure, as noted in footnote 14 in Section 3.3.) 
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Table 3.6   Questions asked in the interviews, and their respective purposes 
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Table 3.6   (continued) 
 
 
 
Thirdly, in line with the realist emphasis on assessing the validity of an argument by considering 
of alternative explanations, I asked some questions that would allow me to weigh the evidence 
for or against some rival hypotheses. For example, one alternative hypothesis is that teacher 
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accountability instruments influence people’s decisions about whether to self-select into the 
teaching profession, rather than influencing teacher motivation in-service, as noted in Section 
2.5. Accordingly, I asked each participant why they had decided to become a teacher (#1 in 
Table 3.6), to see whether there were systematic differences in the motivations of teachers who 
entered the profession during different incarnations of the teacher accountability system. 
 
Besides these general principles, I referred to interview guides from previous accountability-
related studies (e.g. Abelmann et al., 1999; Broadfoot & Osborn, 1993) when designing my 
interview guide. Additionally, I piloted the guide with a Singaporean teacher, a Singaporean 
Ministry official, and a Finnish principal, all of whom suggested ways of clarifying the phrasing 
of some questions.  
 
Recognising the collective but not necessarily universal nature of sociocultural context, as 
discussed in Section 2.2, I asked participants not only about their own experiences and 
sentiments, but also their observations of the practices and values of other teachers and other 
Finns/Singaporeans (see, e.g. #10 and #12 in Table 3.6). Thus, I aim to gain insight into the 
group-level context, without effacing the heterogeneous individuals whose personal senses of 
responsibility is fundamental to meaningful accountability (Abelmann et al., 1999). 
 
As my fieldwork progressed, I made three minor modifications to the interview guide. After 
conducting the first interview in Singapore and reflecting on realist-informed research methods, I 
began asking participants explicitly about whether they agreed with (a) my working hypothesis 
and (b) the summary descriptions of their country’s sociocultural context derived from the 
secondary statistical datasets (#11 and #12, respectively, in Table 3.6). Secondly, I had initially 
asked participants about two hypothetical situations: what would happen if their country took 
away all teacher accountability instruments, and what would happen if if their country adopted 
the other country’s teacher accountability approach (i.e. if Singapore adopted Finland’s approach, 
or vice versa). However, after the second interview, I dropped the hypothetical about removing 
all teacher accountability instruments, because it seemed implausible given the breadth of my 
definition of accountability instruments, and because the second hypothetical appeared to be an 
adequate elicitation device. Finally, the first Finnish interview participant briefly struggled to 
understand my conceptualisation of teacher accountability instruments, partly because of second-
language issues and partly because there is no convenient translation of ‘accountability’ in 
Finnish. In subsequent interviews, rather than reading out the definition, I gave participants a 
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printout of my definition of teacher accountability instruments, in both English and Finnish, and 
suggested that they read the definition at their own pace. A copy of this printout is shown in 
Appendix B, together with copies of the participant information sheets, consent forms, and 
interview guide printouts.  
 
Conducting the interviews 
Each interview was conducted in a location of the participant’s choosing, with the stipulation 
that the location had to be suitably quiet. Half the interviews—four for Singapore, eight for 
Finland—took place in the participants’ schools. Among the other Singapore interviews, seven 
took place in cafés, and the final one took place via video conference a few weeks later, as the 
participant was not in Singapore at that time. As for the other Finland interviews, one was in a 
café, and the other three were in meeting rooms. The average interview duration was 61 minutes. 
(Coincidentally, this mean duration was the same for each country subsample as well as the full 
sample of 24 interviews. The Singapore interviews ranged from 31 minutes to 1 hour 27 minutes, 
and the Finland interviews ranged from 36 minutes to 1 hour 39 minutes.) All interviews were 
conducted in English, which is the dominant language in Singapore. In Finland, English is a 
widely spoken second language. Although some Finnish participants occasionally grasped for 
words, I asked follow-up questions to clarify ambiguities, and we consulted a dictionary when 
necessary. In a few instances, participants used Finnish terms, which I subsequently looked up.20  
 
Procedurally, I began each interview by explaining my background and outlining the study. I then 
gave the participant a printout of the information sheet (which they would have received in 
advance electronically) and asked them to read it and to complete the consent form, if they 
agreed. All interviews were audio-recorded. In each interview, I referred to a copy of the 
interview guide to ensure consistency of coverage and of phrasing. I also used the guides to jot 
down clarifying notes. Where appropriate, I added follow-up questions, especially for those 
participants who were happy to spend more time on the interview. In a few cases, I skipped 
some questions because the participant faced time constraints. 
 
 
20  Chung (2009) conducted field interviews among education stakeholders in Finland using a mix of English, 
Swedish, and Finnish, and concluded that these interviews were enriched by participants’ freedom to express 
themselves in their preferred languages. However, given the time constraints facing my PhD project and the 
complementary insight offered by the Singapore interviews and the statistical analysis, I believe that the English-
medium interviews provided more than adequate insight from Finnish participants. 
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As soon as possible after completing each interview, I wrote down some field notes on the 
interview setting, our interactions, any participant remarks that might be ambiguous in the audio-
recording (e.g. because of body language that the recording would not have captured), reflections 
on how to improve my interviewing technique, and my overall impressions from the interview. 
Subsequently, I transcribed all interviews verbatim, using the notation system in Table 30.4 of 
Poland (2001), which captures some conversation features (e.g. pauses) but not the minutiae of 
formal conversation analysis. I then played back each recording in full, in order to check 
transcription accuracy.  
 
For confidentiality, personally identifying information has been redacted from the transcripts, 
and transcripts are identified using pseudonyms. In Singapore, I gave participants the option of 
choosing their own pseudonym, to strengthen participants’ ownership over the interview 
process. I did not offer this option in Finland, as my University of Tampere host viewed this as 
unnecessary. Accordingly, for Finnish participants and for the Singaporean participants who did 
not want to choose their own pseudonym, I referred to lists of popular names by the 
participant’s approximate birth cohort (e.g. from Finland’s Population Register Centre, 
www.vrk.fi). I chose pseudonyms that matched the linguistic origin of participants’ names (e.g., 
for Singaporean participants, Anglicised names or Chinese names).  
 
For member validation, I emailed a copy of their respective transcript to the nine Singaporean 
and five Finnish participants who had requested it. All five participants who responded said that 
they were satisfied with the interview and transcription process. 
 
Analytic approach 
To facilitate analysis, I coded the interview transcripts in QDA Miner Lite. Since the aim of the 
interviews was to test and refine my conceptual framework, I began with a preliminary coding 
scheme that was based on the framework. The categories (and subcategories) in the preliminary 
scheme were: (a) teacher accountability (instruments, mechanisms, effects); (b) sociocultural 
context; (c) hypothesis, for text segments related to the interaction between accountability and 
sociocultural context; and (d) other (teacher role conceptions, change over time). As I coded 
each transcript, I added subcategories and codes where appropriate. In between coding each 
transcript, I reread the full coding scheme, conducted code retrievals to check the aptness of any 
code assignments that I was uncertain about, and made revisions to codes and code assignments. 
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After making any substantial change to the coding scheme, I revisited already-coded transcripts 
to reassess and update their code assignments. 
 
Thus, this coding process involved a mixture of deductive and inductive analysis. I began the 
process with a rough coding scheme organised in broad categories, as noted above. Also, the 
overall causal pathway in the conceptual framework—where teacher accountability instruments 
use various mechanisms to influence teachers (or change stakeholders’ decisions) in ways that 
improve student outcomes, with the whole pathway being shaped by context—did not change as 
a result of the interview analysis. These features of the process imply a deductive approach. 
 
However, much of the coding and concept formation was guided by the data, reflecting an 
inductive approach. In terms of coding, I added and iteratively revised new subcategories and 
codes depending on what emerged from the data, such as a subcategory for trade-offs (e.g. 
monitoring costs vs. information availability) under the teacher accountability category, and 
codes for ‘autonomy and conformity’ and ‘competitiveness and disinterestedness’ under 
sociocultural context. As for concept formation, the interview analysis directly shaped the 
accountability mechanisms included in the framework. Prior to the interview analysis, the 
mechanisms had gone through several permutations, and the most recent version comprised 
four mechanisms. These were the standard-setting, informational, and consequential mechanisms 
that were eventually included in the final conceptual framework; as well as a reputational 
mechanism, i.e. accountability pressure resulting from teachers’ desires to maintain their 
professional reputations in colleagues’ or other stakeholders’ eyes. However, interview 
participants’ descriptions of such reputational pressure made it clear that this reputational 
mechanism was merely a special case of the informational mechanism, wherein accountability 
pressure results from teachers’ desires to be regarded favourably when information about their 
practice is compared to implicit or explicit expectations (see Section 5.4 for specific examples). 
Accordingly, I took out the reputational mechanism, leaving the three other accountability 
mechanisms. In using the interview data to progressively refine a working theory, my analysis 
broadly followed Pawson and Tilley’s (1997, Chapter 6) realist approach to interview research. 
 
Although I coded each transcript in full, the primary function of this coding was to organise the 
interview corpus and to facilitate retrieval of related quotes. Given the small, non-systematic 
sample of interview participants, it could be misleading to present numerical counts or 
percentages of any of the codes or themes. Instead, I summarise some theoretically pertinent 
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aspects of the interviews using matrices in which each column represents a participant, and the 
rows contain symbols (e.g. a fully shaded circle for ‘agree’, and a half-shaded circle for ‘partially 
agree’) based on my interpretations of each transcript as a whole. This provides a visual summary 
of the interview corpus, without a false impression of statistical precision. (For similar 
approaches to visualising qualitative data, see Abraham and Dohan [2015] and Wilkinson and 
Friendly [2009].) I also include illustrative quotes, which are edited for readability (e.g. removing 
‘umm’s and repetitions). If the participant stressed a particular word or phrase, I indicate this 
emphasis using italics. In some instances, portions of the quotes have been excluded for 
conciseness. Where this occurs, excluded portions are indicated with ‘[…]’, and care has been 
taken to ensure that the exclusions do not alter the meaning of the quote. Usually, quotes 
illustrate general themes in the interview corpus. Where I use a quote to illustrate an uncommon 
position, I state this explicitly (Bleich & Pekkanen, 2013). 
 
To strengthen the reliability of the interview analysis, I reread each transcript in full after the 
initial round of constructing summary matrices and selecting representative quotes, in order to 
ensure that the matrices and quotes accurately represented the interview in question. (In this 
project, it would not have been particularly meaningful to approach reliability using the 
intra/inter-rater reliability statistics. The inter/intra-rater reliability approach focuses on the 
consistency of coding across two separate instances of coding the same segments of text. 
However, I conducted, transcribed, and analysed all the interviews myself, with iterative checks 
and revisions to the coding along the way, so it was more appropriate to check reliability in a 
more holistic, interpretive way. Moreover, since I used the codes instrumentally—i.e. to make 
text retrieval and analysis more efficient rather than to constitute final classifications—it makes 
more sense for the reliability checks to focus on the summary matrices and quotes rather than 
the coding.) I also regularly reread my field notes and listened to portions of the original audio 
throughout the process of analysis. Additionally, I recorded my analytic decisions in memos, 
which I referred to when appropriate (and which I had likewise done while working on the 
statistical analysis). Finally, I referred to other sources to corroborate my observations from the 
interviews, e.g. consulting available policy texts on teacher accountability instruments, and 
referring to prior descriptions of sociocultural context in these countries. 
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3.5 Ethical considerations  
Throughout this research project, I adhered to BERA’s (2011) Ethical Guidelines for 
Educational Research. I applied for, and received, ethical clearance from the Faculty of 
Education. Additionally, I submitted an application for fieldwork approval to the Corporate 
Research Office of Singapore’s Ministry of Education. However, I was informed that I was ‘not 
required to seek approval from MOE for data collection because [I was] recruiting participants 
through personal networks, and not using schools / MOE as a formal platform to recruit 
participants’ (email from Ang Lee Cheng Stephanie, senior research analyst, 28 March 2018). For 
the Finland fieldwork, there was no requirement to apply for either ministerial or municipal 
approval because I was working with adult participants. 
 
In the interviews, I ensured that all participants gave their voluntary informed consent, by 
providing them during initial contact with an electronic copy of the participant information sheet 
and consent form, which detailed the purpose of the research and what it would require of them. 
At the beginning of each interview, I discussed the contents of the consent form with the 
participant, and requested their signed endorsement of a copy of the form. I also ensured that 
participants were aware of their right to withdraw from the research at any point, and I sought 
verbal consent prior to turning on the audio recorder. As stated above, I also conducted member 
checks of interview transcripts, allowing participants to raise concerns or clarifications. 
 
After the completion of the interviews, the protection of participants’ personally identifying 
information is crucial, both to minimise any potential harm resulting from these interviews and 
to comply with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Accordingly, interview 
transcripts only include pseudonyms, rather than real names, and I have redacted any potentially 
identifying proper nouns mentioned during the interviews. (I also made sure that I did not write 
down participants’ names in the notebook with my field notes.) Pseudonyms are matched to 
participants’ names only in a spreadsheet with two layers of password protection. Audio 
recordings of interviews as well as the scanned copies of participants’ consent forms and 
interview guides are likewise protected by two sets of passwords, one of which enables 
Microsoft’s Bitlocker encryption.21 In this thesis and in other research reports, personal details 
 
21  Besides the main copy of these files on my computer hard drive, I have a backup copy on a Bitlocker-encrypted 
USB stick, and another Bitlocker-encrypted copy uploaded to my University of Cambridge Microsoft OneDrive 
account, which is also password-protected. Microsoft states that its processors are GDPR-compliant (Microsoft 
Trust Center, n.d.). 
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are generalised into broad categories (e.g. I used five-year ranges for participants’ teaching 
experience, rather than stating the exact year in which they started teaching), to ensure that 
participants are not identifiable. After the completion of this study and its associated reports and 
publications, I will destroy all personal data from which interview participants may be identified, 
including the audio recordings, interview guides, and the spreadsheet containing contact details 
and pseudonyms. As indicated on the blank consent forms in Appendix B, participants have 
given their consent for the anonymised transcripts to be retained for my own reference in 
password-protected storage after the completion of the study. I will also retain digitised copies of 
the consent forms, under separate password protection, for as long as I retain the transcripts. 
 
Another set of ethical considerations surrounds the analysis and presentation of data from PISA 
and TIMSS. These international student assessments have, inadvertently or otherwise, been used 
in high-visibility global academic horse races that intensify performance pressures on students, 
teachers, and schools. Additionally, some scholars assert that data from these assessments have 
been used to justify harmful policy programmes (e.g. Komatsu & Rappleye, 2017a). Despite 
these adverse circumstances, I also believe that there is an ethical obligation to make education 
policy decisions as rigorous as possible, which includes using relevant, high-quality data to 
inform such decisions where appropriate. In this project, I attempt to mitigate the potential 
adverse effects of using ILSA data by balancing observations from the statistical analysis with 
teachers’ voices from the interviews. 
 
A thornier ethical issue in my statistical analyses surrounds the measurement of sociocultural 
context. Even setting aside the fact that sociocultural context is difficult to categorise, much less 
quantify (since it varies greatly even within countries, and its characteristics are neither clearly 
bounded nor distinctly separable), classifications of sociocultural context have a history of 
morally objectionable applications. For example, the factually inaccurate notion of ‘Asian values’ 
was influentially advanced by authoritarian leaders in Singapore and elsewhere in Southeast Asia 
to justify non-democratic rule (D. J. Kim, 1994; Sen, 1999). More generally, analysing 
sociocultural data at the national level may yield unfair generalisations that reinforce cultural 
prejudices. 
 
To lessen the risk of such generalisations, I will analyse multiple sociocultural constructs, thus 
portraying sociocultural context as complex. The bulk of the sociocultural data will be drawn 
from the nationally representative WVS/EVS surveys. As far as possible, I will identify the 
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sociocultural variables using language that is descriptively close to the questionnaire items, rather 
than layering on unnecessary interpretations or connotations (e.g. naming the scale derived from 
items about membership in various voluntary organisations as ‘civic networks’, rather than 
‘community strength’ or ‘enthusiasm for volunteering’; see Section 4.2). Also, I will not define 
sociocultural constructs as polarities (as in Inglehart and Welzel’s, 2005, traditional vs. secular-
rational and survival vs. self-expression values), because such polarities may facilitate pigeon-
holing. For example, one of my sociocultural constructs is derived from questionnaire items 
asking respondents whether they would say that ‘that most people can be trusted or that you 
need to be very careful in dealing with people’ and to what degree ‘most people would try to take 
advantage of you if they got a chance’ (WVS Association, 2012). I am labelling this construct 
‘social trust’, such that countries have more or less social trust; rather than ‘trust vs. suspicion’, 
which would favour an arbitrary designation of some countries as trusting and others as 
suspicious. Moreover, I complement these statistical scales with interview participants’ firsthand 
descriptions. When asking participants about sociocultural context, I begin with questions that 
are as open as possible in order to elicit their independent descriptions of their contexts, as 
shown in Table 3.6. Subsequently, I ask them about the extent to which the statistical constructs 
reflect their own perceptions. Thus, I aim to construct sociocultural descriptions that are 
nuanced rather than caricatured. 
 
3.6 Limitations 
Besides these ethical considerations, this project faces a range of analytical limitations. To 
continue the discussion on sociocultural context, both of my sources of sociocultural data come 
from self-reports, whether from survey respondents or interview participants. Self-report data 
may incorporate substantial bias from participants’ frames of reference and survey response 
styles (He, van de Vijver, Dominguez Espinosa, & Mui, 2014; Johansson, 2018), as well as social 
desirability bias. Such perceptional biases are far smaller in observational studies, such as Cohn, 
Maréchal, Tannenbaum, and Zünd’s (2019) study of civic honesty using 17,000 ‘lost’ wallets in 
40 countries around the world. However, such large-scale comparative studies are rare. 
(Unfortunately, the Cohn et al. study was published in June 2019, which was too late for me to 
re-estimate the statistical models using their wallet return rates as a sociocultural proxy. 
Additionally, since their experiment was carried out between July 2013 and December 2016, 
there would be a slight problem with the time-ordering of the ILSA outcome data and their 
sociocultural data, even for TIMSS and PISA 2015. However, it would be fascinating to analyse 
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TALIS 2018 and, once released, PISA 2018 data alongside their wallet return rates.) Whatever 
the biases of the WVS/EVS data, they are far more extensive than extant observational studies 
of sociocultural context, whether in their coverage of countries or of sociocultural domains. 
 
More generally, cross-country surveys face numerous issues with measurement quality (Survey 
Research Center, 2016). Scholars have raised questions about the limited forms of learning that 
PISA scores measure (Komatsu & Rappleye, 2017b), the comparability of PISA proficiency 
scores across paper- and computer-based testing (Jerrim, Micklewright, Heine, Salzer, & 
McKeown, 2018), the comparability of PISA attitudinal scales across countries (Liaw, Wu, 
Rutkowski, & Rutkowski, 2018),22 the translation of WVS items (Kurzman, 2014; Mellon, 2011), 
and the replicability of Hofstede’s indices (Merritt, 2000). 
 
Further issues can arise in scale construction. The construction of any statistical scale entails 
choices about modelling and item inclusion, all of which can alter the meaning and validity of the 
scale. For example, Carrasco Ogaz (2016) proposes an alternative approach to constructing the 
TALIS 2013 teacher job satisfaction scale that yields better model fit than the OECD’s official 
approach. Besides inheriting the biases inherent in any of the pre-existing OECD, IEA, and 
Hofstede scales that I use, additional biases arise from the scales that I construct. For example, 
although my accountability scales selectively included only the items that fit my definition of 
teacher accountability instruments, I was nevertheless limited to items that were administered in 
the questionnaires. Accordingly, these accountability scales include far more formal teacher 
accountability instruments than informal ones, as described in Section 4.1. 
 
In addition, both the ILSA data and the teacher interviews have sample bias. With the ILSAs, 
there is selection bias in country participation.23 Given that participation in such assessments 
incurs substantial resource costs (Engel & Rutkowski, 2018) and can place pressure on countries 
perceived as underperforming, the countries that choose to participate may differ systematically 
from those that do not, whether in wealth or in policy priorities. This would bias the results of 
my statistical analysis if participating countries tend to implement certain accountability 
instruments or tend to share certain sociocultural traits. (This is likely to be the case, especially 
 
22  For a recent overview of technical critiques of PISA data, see Hopfenbeck et al (2018). 
23  Another form of selection bias is that PISA and TIMSS only assess children who are enrolled in school, which, 
in some countries, excludes a large proportion of the relevant age group. This exclusion of out-of-school 
children may significantly skew country-level measures of educational achievement, thus affecting comparisons 
over time and space (Spaull, 2019). However, I do not expect that this will systematically bias my analysis, since 
I focus on in-school effects rather than aggregate learning levels countrywide. 
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since all OECD countries participate in PISA, and OECD countries tend to have higher levels of 
development, which is often associated with higher levels of social capital. In fact, t-tests indicate 
that countries participating and not participating in PISA and TIMSS do differ significantly in 
social trust and power distance, though not in the other sociocultural constructs. It is worth 
noting that social trust and power distance are also the constructs that are most strongly 
correlated with GDP, as shown in Table A.2, and that wealthier countries are more likely to 
participate in ILSAs. However, it is also possible that controlling for GDP may attenuate this 
particular bias.) Nonetheless, there is still a wide range of sociocultural contexts and approaches 
to teacher accountability among the sample of countries in these educational surveys. For 
example, according to principal-reported data in PISA 2015, only 3.4% of 15-year-olds in 
Germany attend schools where standardised tests are used to make judgements about teachers’ 
effectiveness, while the corresponding figure for Russia is 89.1%. Additionally, the countries with 
the highest and lowest scores for power distance (Malaysia/the Slovak Republic and Austria, 
respectively) and for uncertainty avoidance (Greece and Singapore, respectively) all participated 
in both PISA 2012 and 2015.24 
 
With the teacher interviews, one nontrivial source of bias is that all participating teachers were 
willing to take the time to speak to a researcher. This suggests that they all value education 
research, at least to some degree, and probably value educational improvement as well. While 
participants from both countries mentioned colleagues who were happy to do the bare 
minimum, and Singaporean participants mentioned colleagues who unapologetically focused on 
climbing the career ladder at the expense of classroom practice, none of the 24 interview 
participants appeared to fit into these categories. That said, given the demonstrated quality of 
teaching and learning in Finland and Singapore, my interview participants are likely to be more 
representative of their respective professions than the less principled colleagues they mentioned. 
 
Finally, the nature of my data sources limits the scope of the causal arguments that I can make. 
From a statistical standpoint, the cross-sectional ILSA data do not permit causal inference.  
Beyond the ILSA data, the granular interview data paired with the realist approach of assessing 
alternative explanations do allow me to argue for some of the causal pathways in the conceptual 
framework. However, my field interviews, like the ILSA data, are temporally flat. As such, the 
 
24  As stated in the note on Table 3.3, Malaysian data is not included in the main PISA 2015 dataset because of data 
quality issues. Also, as stated in footnote 14 in Section 3.3, I doubt the accuracy of Singapore’s uncertainty 
avoidance score. Nonetheless, the point still stands: there is considerable sociocultural variation within the 
datasets analysed in this thesis.  
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interviews cannot account for certain causal pathways that might yield endogeneities over time, 
such as cases where teacher accountability instruments gradually shape teachers’ socioculturally 
embedded understandings of what constitutes good teaching and, by extension, how their 
motivation should be oriented (J. Holloway & Brass, 2018). Moreover, the interviews are not 
accompanied by any observational data on how self-reported teacher motivation might manifest 
in classroom practice and student learning, which limits my qualitative arguments to the first part 
of the teacher motivation causal pathway. 
 
Still, PISA and TIMSS remain the most internationally representative datasets on teacher 
accountability and student outcomes that can be viably analysed for a PhD project. The same 
applies to WVS/EVS and Hofstede’s scales for sociocultural context. Furthermore, although 
classroom observations alongside longitudinal student assessments may shed more light on the 
link between teacher motivation and student outcomes, it would not have been feasible to 
conduct such observations in addition secondary statistical analysis and field interviews within a 
three-year PhD project. Thus, given these limitations, my hope here is not to produce definitive 
answers to every possible question about teacher accountability and sociocultural context, but 
rather to make a case for the importance of sociocultural considerations in designing teacher 
accountability policies, and to build support for a framework that may facilitate such context-
sensitive policy design. 
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Chapter 4: Teacher accountability, student outcomes, and 
sociocultural context 
In this chapter, I begin by describing the process of constructing scales from the cross-country 
survey data on teacher accountability instruments (Section 4.1) and on four aspects of social 
capital (Section 4.2). I then present results from the multilevel moderation analysis (Section 4.3), 
thus addressing my first research question: to what extent does the influence of teacher accountability 
instruments on student outcomes depend on sociocultural context? 
 
As noted above, the multilevel models in this chapter analyse cross-sectional datasets without an 
identification strategy. From a statistical standpoint, this analysis can establish, at best, an 
association rather than causation. Nonetheless, RQ1 refers to the influence of teacher 
accountability on student outcomes, because this phrasing reflects the realist ontological 
standpoint of this thesis. As discussed in Section 3.1, the realist conception of causality hinges on 
whether entity A (e.g. teacher accountability instruments) actually generates change in entity B 
(e.g. student outcomes)—in contrast to the statistical ‘constant conjunction’ understanding of 
causality. Accordingly, in investigating RQ1 using a realist approach, I end the chapter by 
complementing the essentially correlational statistical analysis with a consideration of the 
evidence for and against some alternative explanations for the statistical findings (Section 4.4). 
 
4.1 Scale construction for teacher accountability instruments 
As noted in Section 3.3, I operationalise teacher accountability instruments by constructing 
school-level scale variables for teacher accountability instruments in PISA and TALIS. In this 
section, I discuss the construction of these scale variables, as indicated in Figure 4.1. Descriptive 
statistics for both scales are available in Table 3.4 in the previous chapter. 
 
To construct these scales, I used item-response theory (IRT) modelling in Stata 15.1. IRT is 
likewise used by the OECD and the IEA to construct the scales that are included in the public-
release PISA and TIMSS datasets. One benefit of IRT modelling is that it can generate scores for 
any cases that have data on at least one of the items underlying the scale, thus yielding far less 
missingness in the generated scale variable. Specifically, 5.3% of schools in the pooled PISA 
2012 and 2015 dataset did not have data on any of the included teacher accountability 
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questionnaire items, and hence do not have an IRT score for accountability. In contrast, three 
times as many schools, 16.0%, did not have data on one or more items. If I had used a scale 
construction method that could only generate scores for cases that have observations for all 
items, e.g. constructing a simple sum of all included questionnaire items, then all 16.0% of these 
schools would have been excluded from the analysis. (There did not appear to be systematic 
differences between the cases that had data on at least one teacher accountability item—and, 
hence, were included in the multilevel regressions—and the 5.3% that did not have data on any 
of the accountability items. In the PISA 2015 dataset, the mean science proficiency scores for 
these groups differed by 3.20 points [SD=105.09 points] in favour of the group with at least 
some teacher accountability data. The difference for student socioeconomic status was 0.09 
[SD=1.10] in favour of the group without any accountability data. The differences for PISA 2012 
were similarly small.) Additionally, this capability of IRT modelling for constructing scores with 
partially missing data meant that I could pool school-level data across both PISA waves, even 
though the PISA 2015 school questionnaires lacked some accountability-related items that were 
included in PISA 2012. With this larger pooled dataset, the teacher accountability scale is more 
reliable than similar scales constructed from single-cycle datasets would have been. 
 
Figure 4.1   Relationship between Section 4.1 and the overall conceptual framework 
 
 
Accountability-related items from the school (i.e. principal-reported) questionnaires were 
identified for inclusion in the scales based on whether they fell within my definition of teacher 
accountability instruments, i.e. tools, practices, and structures that aim to orient teacher practice toward 
stakeholder expectations by (a) collecting information about teachers’ individual or collective practice and 
communicating this information to stakeholders, (b) setting standards by which stakeholders judge teacher practice, 
and/or (c) allocating consequences based on stakeholders’ judgements of teachers’ practice. Thus, I included 
school-level accountability instruments that had clear implications for teacher practice (e.g. 
school self-evaluation), but excluded items that may not necessarily have direct impact on 
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teachers’ work (e.g. ‘regular consultation aimed at school improvement with one or more 
experts’; OECD, 2016b, p. 137; where it is unclear whether the instrument only affects principal 
leadership or whether it also affects teachers’ work). 
 
Table 4.1 summarises the teacher accountability instruments from each survey cycle that are 
included in the scale measures. The table also gives examples of evaluation studies in which each 
instrument was found to have a significant relationship with student achievement or a related 
outcome in an accountability-related intervention. Most of these studies involved a comparison 
of treatment and control groups, whether in randomised trials or natural experiments; while 
others use identification strategies to analyse longitudinal datasets. This is not to imply that these 
teacher accountability instruments always improve educational outcomes in all contexts. For 
example, Glewwe, Ilias, and Kremer (2010) found that financial incentives for teachers raised 
student outcomes, as indicated in the table, whereas Fryer (2013) found no effect from such 
incentives. (see also Section 2.1 on the inconsistent effects of teacher accountability instruments). 
Two further caveats: firstly, some of these interventions involved not only accountability 
instruments, but also other treatments, such as providing resources for improvement (e.g. 
Speckesser et al., 2018, evaluated a programme that entailed peer observation and discussion, but 
it also included a series of professional development workshops). Based on the evaluation 
designs, it is difficult to disentangle the degree to which the positive effects derived from the 
accountability instruments as compared to the other components of the intervention, or from 
the interaction of both. Secondly, even though all the cited studies found at least one significant 
positive outcome, these effects did not always occur across the board (e.g. Garet et al., 2017, 
found a significant positive effect for mathematics achievement, but not for reading). 
Nonetheless, to use Cartwright and Hardie’s (2012) terminology, the studies summarised in 
Table 4.1 show that these accountability instruments have the potential to play a causal role in 
education, at least with certain programme designs in certain settings. Hence the inclusion of 
these items in the scales measuring the extensiveness of teacher accountability instruments in 
schools. 
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Table 4.1   Teacher accountability instruments included in the scale measures, and studies indicating their 
potential for positive influence on education-related outcomes 
 
Note. Teacher accountability instruments are grouped according to questionnaire item sets in the PISA and TALIS 
surveys. All studies cited are experimental, quasi-experimental, or longitudinal with an identification strategy.  
 
That said, as discussed in Section 2.1, there is considerable disagreement about whether more or 
less extensive approaches to teacher accountability will lead to better student outcomes. While 
some scholars weigh the evidence and recommend more extensive forms of teacher 
accountability (e.g. Hanushek, 2019), others call for caution (e.g. Zhao, 2018). Based on the 
findings that I present in this thesis, I believe there is more evidence for tailoring teacher 
accountability instruments to particular settings rather than for applying similar approaches 
across the board. The latter argument is implicit in, for example, the theoretical justifications 
advanced for introducing more accountability instruments in educational settings, on the basis 
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that more extensive measurement and monitoring will improve outcomes (e.g. Barber, 
Rodriguez, & Artis, 2016). As I argue in Chapter 7, effective teacher accountability is not merely 
a matter of extent. However, for the purposes of this multilevel cross-country statistical analysis, 
having unidimensional teacher accountability scales greatly facilitates the modelling process. 
Furthermore, if I can reduce the PISA and TALIS teacher accountability items to a single scale 
with some construct validity, and if I can then use this scale to show that the relationship 
between the extensiveness of teacher accountability and student outcomes depends on context, 
then this could be a useful piece of evidence against the ‘more accountability instruments=better 
outcomes’ argument, as outlined in the ‘Operationalisation’ subsection of Section 3.3.  
 
To proceed with the IRT scale construction for the pooled PISA 2012 and 2015 dataset, most of 
the PISA teacher accountability questionnaire items collected binary ‘yes’/‘no’ responses, as 
shown in Table 4.2. Since the response categories of the remaining non-binary variables also fell 
neatly into whether or not an instrument was implemented in the school, I recoded them into 
binary form for scaling. (As shown in Table 4.2, these non-binary response categories were that 
(a) the PISA 2015 items on school-level quality assurance and improvement separated ‘yes’ 
responses into whether each instrument was school-initiated or externally mandated; and (b) the 
PISA 2012 items on consequences of teacher appraisals collected ordinal responses on whether 
there was no change, or a small, moderate or large change in each area. For the PISA 2015 items 
on school quality assurance and improvement, it is unlikely that there would be consistent cross-
school and cross-country patterns across the dataset in whether an externally mandated 
accountability instrument would affect teachers’ work more or less intensively than a school-
initiated one. Neither is it likely, for the PISA 2012 items on consequences of teacher appraisals, 
that principals’ qualitative assessments of these degrees of change would be comparable across 
schools and countries. Hence, if I had retained these variables in non-binary form, this would 
have complicated the analysis without adding obvious analytic utility.)  
 
With these binary items, I constructed the scale using a two-parameter logistic (2PL) IRT model. 
This type of model is also used for official PISA 2015 scales from binary data (OECD, 2017). 
Having confirmed the unidimensionality of this teacher accountability scale using exploratory 
factor analysis, I ran a 2PL IRT analysis. Questionnaire items, together with discrimination and 
difficulty parameters, are shown in Table 4.2. (For comparison, I also ran a 1PL model, which 
estimates difficulty parameters for each item but assumes equal discrimination across all items. 
However, a likelihood ratio test showed a better fit for the 2PL model than the 1PL model, so I 
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retained the former.) From this analysis, I treat the resulting latent trait parameter estimate for 
each school as a measure of school-level teacher accountability instruments. For this measure, 
higher scores correspond to a greater incidence of teacher accountability instruments in the 
school. The mean score for teacher accountability instruments was 0.00, with a standard 
deviation of 0.839 (n=34,130 schools).25  
 
As shown in Table 4.2, the difficulty parameters of the PISA teacher accountability items range 
from -3.48 for ‘Achievement data are provided directly to parents’ to 0.81 for ‘Achievement data 
are posted publicly’. This indicates that, all else equal, providing achievement data to parents is 
likely to be practised even in schools with few teacher accountability instruments overall; 
whereas posting achievement data publicly tends to happen only in schools that also implement 
many other accountability instruments. However, these two items have lower discrimination 
parameters than any other items. These low discrimination parameters indicate that knowing 
whether or not a school provides achievement data directly to parents (or posts it publicly) does 
not convey very much information about how many teacher accountability instruments it 
probably implements overall. In contrast, items with larger discrimination parameters, such as 
teacher appraisals leading directly to a change in the likelihood of career advancement, tend to 
offer more predictive insight into a school’s overall teacher accountability scale score.  
 
Notably, the parameter estimates indicate some construct validity. In particular, the items with 
the greatest difficulty parameters correspond to the most intensive or ‘managerial’ forms of 
teacher accountability: public posting of student achievement data, teacher appraisal by external 
individuals, and financial rewards from teacher appraisals, as shown in Table 4.2. That is, the 
schools that implement these teacher accountability instruments are very likely to implement 
many other teacher accountability instruments as well. This makes intuitive sense, because these 
teacher accountability instruments are intensive not only in their potential impact on teachers’ 
work, but also in the resources required for implementing them (with the possible exception of 
public posting of student test results). Consequently, it would be reasonable to suppose that the 
schools that implement these intensive accountability instruments probably prioritise teacher 
 
25  These descriptive statistics differ slightly from those shown in Table 3.4 in the methodology chapter, because 
(a) Table 3.4 shows descriptive statistics for separate PISA 2012 and PISA 2015 subsamples rather than for the 
pooled teacher accountability IRT sample, and (b) the subsamples summarised in Table 3.4 exclude 
supplementary region-specific samples for Russia in PISA 2012 and Spain in PISA 2015 that were not part of 
the main PISA survey for Russia and Spain respectively, but which I included in the IRT scale construction to 
increase sample size and, thus, scale reliability. 
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accountability instruments in general, and hence would be likely to implement the lower-hanging 
fruit among accountability instruments as well. 
 
Table 4.2   Questionnaire items and IRT 2PL parameters for PISA 2012 and 2015 teacher accountability 
 
Note. IRT 2PL = item-response theory 2-parameter logistic model. N = 34,130, of which n (PISA 2012) = 17,691 
and n (PISA 2015) = 16,439. Questionnaire item phrasing is from OECD (2013a, 2016b). 
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For TALIS 2013, the teacher accountability scale had fewer questionnaire items and fewer 
categories of accountability instruments than its PISA counterpart, as indicated in Table 4.1 
above. All of these TALIS 2013 accountability items collected ordinal responses on the degree to 
which an instrument was used in the school, so I ran a graded-response IRT model (GRM) 
rather than the 2PL model used for the binary PISA data. (Although the OECD typically uses 
the generalised partial-credit model [GPCM] for polytomous IRT scales, I chose to use the GRM 
instead because the latter yielded more logically coherent parameter estimates. Specifically, in a 
GPCM analysis of the TALIS 2013 teacher accountability items, some of the difficulty 
parameters did not follow a logical sequence between the ordinal categories. For example, for 
some items, the threshold between implementing an accountability instrument ‘never’ and 
implementing it ‘sometimes’ had a higher difficulty estimate than the threshold between 
‘sometimes’ and ‘most of the time’. That said, the difference in latent trait parameter estimates 
was trivial in practice, with a correlation of 0.989 between the GRM and GPCM estimates.) 
 
Again, an exploratory factor analysis prior to running the GRM analysis indicated scale 
unidimensionality. (The scree plot suggested a two-factor solution, but the first factor was clearly 
dominant, both in individual item loadings and in the proportion of variance explained.) 
Questionnaire items included in the GRM analysis, together with discrimination and difficulty 
parameters, are shown in Table 4.3. As with the PISA data, I used the latent trait parameter 
estimate as a measure of school-level teacher accountability. Higher scores correspond to more 
extensive teacher accountability instruments in the given school. The mean score for the TALIS 
2013 teacher accountability instruments scale was 0.000, with a standard deviation of 0.905 
(n=7,007 schools).26 
 
With the TALIS 2013 GRM analysis shown in Table 4.3, it is less straightforward to compare the 
discrimination and difficultly parameters of different items than for the PISA 2PL analysis above. 
This is because each item with n ordinal categories has (n-1) difficulty parameters to mark the 
thresholds between each pair of categories, and the distribution of questionnaire responses 
across categories affects how informative an item may be. For example, the fact that ‘Dismissal 
or non-renewal of contract’ following a teacher appraisal has the smallest discrimination 
 
26  Again, these descriptive statistics differ slightly from those shown in Table 3.4 in the methodology chapter. The 
TALIS 2013 sample used for Table 3.4 excluded schools in Malaysia, Serbia, and the United States, for which 
there were survey administration issues that affect the representativeness of the overall survey dataset matched 
across schools and teachers (which are used in the main multilevel analysis), but not the quality of the principal-
reported questionnaire data on their own (which were used in the IRT scale construction). 
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parameter despite having by far the largest difficulty parameters is likely due to the skewed 
distribution across its response categories. Only 3.6% of principals who gave valid responses to 
this item reported such dismissal or non-renewal happening most of the time, and 1.8% reported 
it happening always. This translates into large difficulty parameters, since only the schools with 
the most intensive teacher accountability approaches are likely to implement dismissal/non-
renewal most of the time or always. It also contributes to the small discrimination parameter, 
since the relatively small number of schools responding ‘most of the time’ and ‘always’ means the 
model has less information to associate with these response categories. 
 
Table 4.3   Questionnaire items and IRT GRM parameters for TALIS 2013 teacher accountability 
 
Note. IRT GRM = item-response theory graded-response model. N = 7,007. Questionnaire item phrasing is from 
OECD (2014d). 
 
Nonetheless, the TALIS parameter estimates in Table 4.3 do align with the PISA estimates in 
Table 4.2 in that (a) the mode of teacher appraisal with the highest difficulty estimate is 
observations by inspectors or other external persons, and (b) the post-appraisal consequences 
with the highest difficulty estimates (i.e. dismissal or non-renewal of contract, a change in the 
likelihood of career advancement, a change in responsibilities, and financial or material 
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consequences) are also the consequences that would be expected to have the largest effects on 
teachers’ lives and livelihoods. Hence, this TALIS 2013 teacher accountability scale appears to 
have at least some construct validity, as with its PISA 2012 and 2015 counterpart. 
 
These teacher accountability scale variables have some flaws, but they also have clear advantages. 
Weaknesses include the emphasis in the questionnaires on formal teacher accountability 
instruments, such that these scales leave out some forms of teacher accountability, such as 
teachers’ interactions with parents. Furthermore, as with any statistical model for aggregating 
data, IRT incorporates assumptions that may not fully match the empirical data (e.g. IRT 
assumes that the latent trait is normally distributed, but the 2015 subset of the PISA teacher 
accountability latent trait estimates are somewhat left-skewed, though still within rules-of-thumb 
for normality). Moreover, these assumptions may not reflect lived reality (e.g. contrary to the 
notion of a latent trait for teacher accountability, implemented teacher accountability policy is 
not a manifestation of some shadowy, universal, bell-curved trait of ‘accountability-ness’). 
 
Weaknesses notwithstanding, the parameter estimates for both the PISA and TALIS scales show 
some construct validity, as described above. Also, the scales appear to be reasonably consistent at 
the country level, with correlations of 0.86 between country-level weighted means for both (a) 
PISA 2012 and PISA 2015 (n=63 countries) and (b) PISA 2012 and TALIS 2013 (n=35 
countries), and a correlation of 0.77 for (c) TALIS 2013 and PISA 2015 (n=34 countries). 
 
That said, as shown in Figure 4.2, almost every country had a higher weighted mean teacher 
accountability score in PISA 2015 than in 2012. This rise in the extensiveness of teacher 
accountability instruments is evident not only in the scale scores, but also when comparing 
country-level weighted mean responses to the individual questionnaire items across the two 
survey cycles. Hence, the higher average teacher accountability scale scores in 2015 are not due 
to bias in the scale construction process. Instead, as far as can be determined from the principal-
reported data, there were real increases in the average extent of teacher accountability 
instruments in these schools between 2012 and 2015. This growing intensity of accountability 
instruments in education has been observed in other studies, as noted in Section 1.1.  
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Figure 4.2   PISA 2012 and 2015 teacher accountability scale scores, by country 
 
 
4.2 Measuring national sociocultural context: scale construction for social 
capital 
Besides constructing scales for teacher accountability instruments, I also constructed scales for 
four elements of social capital. As detailed in Chapter 2, there are both theoretical and empirical 
reasons for expecting social capital and other sociocultural patterns to affect the efficacy of 
accountability instruments. To see whether this relationship holds for teacher accountability 
between countries, I draw on sociocultural data from two cross-country survey programmes. As 
noted in Section 3.3, I use two pre-existing scales from Hofstede’s IBM dataset, as well as four 
scales related to social capital that I construct using data from the World Values 
Survey/European Values Study (WVS/EVS). In this section, I discuss the construction of these 
four WVS/EVS scales, as indicated in Figure 4.3. Descriptive statistics are available in Table 3.4 
in the previous chapter. 
 
Figure 4.3   Relationship between Section 4.2 and the overall conceptual framework 
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I derive the social capital scales from country-level averages for each questionnaire item, rather 
than using questionnaire data from individual respondents. This is partly because I am interested 
in sociocultural context at the national level, and also because the individual respondents in the 
WVS/EVS samples of these sociocultural surveys do not correspond to the respondents in the 
educational surveys. This approach to scale construction using country-level averages for each 
item aligns with Inglehart’s (1997; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005) approach to aggregating WVS 
data.27 For this process, I use factor analysis in SPSS 22. 
 
As noted in Section 2.3, social capital has been defined in a number of different ways. Given the 
focus in this thesis on institutional relationships within teacher accountability, I am less 
interested in the forms of social capital that further an individual’s opportunities for productivity 
(e.g. Bourdieu, 1986), and more so in the forms of social capital that concern groups. For 
example, Putnam (1995) defines social capital as ‘features of social organisation such as 
networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit’ 
(p. 67). 
 
Accordingly, I identified WVS/EVS questionnaire items that capture aspects of such group-
based social capital. I found 25 such questionnaire items, which appeared in four clusters (which 
I describe below). Having identified these items, I ran an exploratory factor analysis of the 
country-level averages for each of these 25 items. As with the PISA accountability scale, I pooled 
the datasets across survey waves to increase scale reliability, such that each case was a country-
by-wave value (e.g. Finland in EVS 4). This analysis indicated a four-factor solution in which the 
factor loadings aligned with each cluster of questionnaire items. (While the scree plot indicated a 
four-factor solution, Kaiser’s criterion of retaining any factors with Eigenvalues greater than 1 
suggested five factors. However, the fifth factor explained less than 3% of the variance. 
Moreover, it was not the primary factor for any of the variables, i.e. every variable loaded more 
heavily onto one of the first four factors.)  
 
 
27  For another approach to constructing scales for social trust and civic norms, Knack and Keefer (1997) 
construct (a) a scale for trust based on the proportion of respondents in each country who agree that ‘most 
people can be trusted’, and (b) a scale for civic norms by taking the sum of respondents’ answers to whether it 
is never justifiable (=1) or always justifiable (=10) to breach each of five different norms. Knack and Keefer’s 
approach has the virtue of being more straightforward than factor analysis. However, my factor analytic 
approach gives a better picture of the cross-country variation because each scale draws on more than one item 
(unlike their trust scale), and because factor analysis assigns greater weight to items better reflect the overall 
variability (unlike their uniformly weighted civic norms scale). 
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Given that these four aspects of social capital are somewhat correlated, I ran a separate analysis 
to extract each factor (rather than running a single analysis with all 25 items to obtain four 
orthogonal factors). Each set of variables had a high Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of 
sampling adequacy and rejected the null hypothesis in Bartlett’s test of sphericity. An exception 
here is the two-item factor for social trust, which did reject the null in Bartlett’s test, but had a 
KMO value of 0.500. Since this factor has only two component variables that load equally onto 
the factor, I could have constructed this scale simply from taking the sum of the standardised 
values of each country-level average. In fact, this sum correlates fully (r=1.000, for both 
Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlations) with the factor variable. However, for consistency with 
the other social capital variables, I retain the factor variable for social trust. 
 
This resulted in four separate scales for different aspects of social capital. The first scale was 
derived from the set of questionnaire items that asked respondents how much confidence they 
have in a range of organisations, as shown in Table 4.4, along with factor loadings and model 
diagnostics. I call this the confidence in institutions scale. Next, the civic networks scale was derived 
from items asking respondents how many organisations they belong to (whether religious, 
political, professional, cultural, or leisure-related), as shown in Table 4.5. The civic norms scale was 
derived from items asking respondents about the degree to which certain self-interested but 
socially detrimental behaviours are justifiable, as shown in Table 4.6. Finally, the social trust scale 
draws on items about how trustworthy respondents believe most other people to be, as shown in 
Table 4.7. (For the ‘confidence in institutions’, ‘civic networks’, and ‘civic norms’ factors below, 
the variables included in the scale are not the full set of questionnaire items asked in each survey, 
but only the items that overlap across all three survey waves. For example, for the ‘confidence in 
institutions’ items, WVS respondents were asked about women’s organisations, but EVS 
respondents were not; whereas EVS respondents were asked about the health care system, while 
WVS respondents were not; so these items were excluded.) 
 
There are clear conceptual links between all of these elements of social capital—not least that 
higher levels of each element within a group could reasonably be expected to foster mutually 
beneficial cooperation, as in Putnam’s definition. Conceptual links notwithstanding, high levels 
of one aspect of social capital may not correspond empirically to high levels of other such 
aspects (Newton, 2001). Hence the value of using separate scales to measure different aspects of 
social capital, rather than a single aggregate scale. For each of the factor variables, higher scores 
correspond to higher levels of social capital.  
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Table 4.4   Questionnaire items and factor loadings for confidence in institutions 
 
Note. Questionnaire item phrasing is from EVS (2016b) and WVS Association (2012). 
***p < .001. 
 
Table 4.5   Questionnaire items and factor loadings for civic networks 
 
Note. Questionnaire item phrasing is from EVS (2016b) and WVS Association (2012). 
***p < .001. 
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Table 4.6   Questionnaire items and factor loadings for civic norms 
 
Note. Questionnaire item phrasing is from EVS (2016b) and WVS Association (2012). 
***p < .001. 
 
Table 4.7   Questionnaire items and factor loadings for social trust 
 
Note. Questionnaire item phrasing is from EVS (2016b) and WVS Association (2012). 
***p < .001. 
 
For each country, I match social capital scales from the most recent available WVS/EVS wave to 
each ILSA, as long as the WVS/EVS data were collected prior to the ILSA. This requires the 
strong assumption that the sociocultural scales are reasonably stable in between the earliest used 
WVS/EVS survey and the ILSA survey, such that different time lags for different countries do 
not compromise the analysis (see Section 3.3). As shown in Figure 4.4, some countries vary 
considerably on these social capital scales across survey waves. On the whole, however, there is 
fairly good agreement across survey waves. This is particularly visible for social trust. As shown 
in Table 4.8, there are moderate to strong correlations for most constructs across the survey 
cycles, with one exception that is likely affected by the small number of overlapping countries 
(i.e. confidence in institutions between EVS 4 and WVS 6). 
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Figure 4.4   WVS and EVS social capital scale scores, by country 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.8   Pairwise correlations (and number of countries) between country-level scale scores for WVS/EVS 
social capital constructs 
 
                *p < 0.05. **p < 0.01. (two-tailed) 
 
Although the correlations across survey cycles for each construct in Table 4.8 are far from 
perfect, I consider them adequate. Across sociocultural constructs, the average within-country 
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difference between any pair of survey cycles (e.g. Argentina’s social trust score in WVS 6 minus 
its social trust score in WVS 5) is -0.070, or approximately 7% of a standard deviation. 
Importantly, there were no systematic patterns in the magnitude of change across cycles. For 
example, if the accuracy of these sociocultural scales consistently worsened over time, we would 
expect the average within-country change in scale scores to increase in proportion to the time lag 
in between survey cycles, with the largest average changes appearing between WVS 5 and WVS 
6. However, no such pattern appears. Accordingly, I do not anticipate any systematic bias from 
matching country-level sociocultural scores from different WVS/EVS cycles to the same ILSA 
cycle.28  
 
4.3 PISA 2015 analysis: Teacher accountability, student outcomes, and 
moderating variables 
Having constructed scales for social capital and teacher accountability, I use the cross-country 
survey datasets to investigate RQ1, To what extent does the influence of teacher accountability instruments 
on student outcomes depend on sociocultural context? Thus, as indicated in Figure 4.5, in this section I 
investigate whether the ILSA and sociocultural survey data offer empirical evidence linking the 
starting point and endpoint of my conceptual framework (i.e. teacher accountability instruments 
and student outcomes, respectively), with sociocultural context. 
 
As detailed in Section 3.3, I address this question using model 1, a multilevel moderation model. 
In model 1, the outcome variable is pupil proficiency scores. The main independent variables are 
(1) teacher accountability, both the country-level weighted mean and the school-level differential; 
 
28  I tested the possibility of such bias by re-estimating the model 1 civic norms regressions for PISA 2015 (which 
are presented in Section 4.3 below) using different cuts of the data. Specifically, I estimated the models using 
civic norms scores (a) only from WVS 6 (n=32 countries); (b) only from EVS 4 (n=39); (c) only from WVS 5 
(n=40); (d) from WVS 6, but only for countries that participated in both WVS 5 and WVS 6 (n=25); and (e) 
from WVS 5, but only for countries that participated in both WVS 5 and WVS 6 (n=25). In all but one of these 
regressions, the coefficient on the interaction term of interest—i.e. the interaction between civic norms and 
country-level teacher accountability instruments—was similar in direction, magnitude, and significance to the 
main PISA 2015 regression that drew on all three WVS/EVS cycles for civic norms scores across countries 
(n=57). The sole exception was regression (c) with civic norms scores only from WVS 5, where the coefficient 
estimate was smaller and the standard error was larger than in the main regression, such that coefficient was 
insignificant. However, it seems likely that this may be a fluke due to the distribution of countries that happened 
to be included, rather than to an attenuation of WVS 5 accuracy over time. The reason for this claim is that 
regressions (d) and (e)—both of which included the same 25 countries, but differed in that their civic norms 
scores were either from WVS 6 and or from WVS 5, respectively—are comparable across all key variables in the 
size and significance of their coefficient estimates, as well as in the proportion of variance explained at the 
country, school, and student levels. For the main model 1 results and other sensitivity checks, see the next 
section. 
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and (2) sociocultural context, represented using six different sociocultural constructs. As 
described in Section 3.3, the model also includes control variables at each level of analysis, along 
with interaction terms to capture any moderation of the relationship between teacher 
accountability instruments and pupil proficiency by sociocultural context and by other contextual 
characteristics represented in the control variables. The main dataset for this analysis is PISA 
2015 with pupil science proficiency as the outcome variable. 
 
Figure 4.5   Relationship between Section 4.3 and the overall conceptual framework 
 
 
Table 4.9 shows results for five nested models for PISA 2015 science proficiency, culminating in 
the full model 1. Column (a) shows a model without any predictors, to indicate how the variance 
in pupil science scores is distributed across levels. Column (b) introduces both of the teacher 
accountability terms. Notably, neither the school- nor country-level teacher accountability terms 
have a significant unmoderated effect on science proficiency. These two accountability terms are, 
again, insignificant in column (c), which includes control variables for pupil economic, social, 
and cultural status (ESCS), school autonomy, and national GDP per capita as well as the 
interaction terms associated with each of these controls. Neither are they significant in column 
(d), which adds in the six country-level sociocultural constructs. In column (e), which introduces 
the interactions between these sociocultural constructs and the accountability terms, the country-
level accountability term remains insignificant, whereas the school-level accountability 
differential is significant at the 5-percent level, though small in magnitude. Overall, the full model 
in column (e) accounted for 75% of all the between-country variation. That is, moving from the 
null model in column (a) to the full model in column (e) reduced the unexplained country-level 
variance in the dataset from 1980.19 to 500.19. 
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Table 4.9   Model 1: results for nested models for PISA 2015 science proficiency 
 
Note. ESCS=economic, social, and cultural status. VPC=variance partition coefficient. N(pupils)=346 726; 
N(schools)=12 764; N(countries)=57.  
*p<0.05; **p<0.01. 
 
As for the moderation effects, none of the interaction terms for the school-level accountability 
differential are significant. However, the relationship between science proficiency and the 
country-level weighted mean of teacher accountability is dependent on context, as seen in 
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column (e) in the significant coefficients of the interactions between Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  and some 
contextual moderators. This indicates that between-country differences in teacher accountability 
matter more to student outcomes than between-school differences, at least in the PISA 2015 
data. 
 
As for the interaction terms, three were significant: Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ *ESCS, Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ *GDP, 
and Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ *civic norms. Among these significant estimates, the most pertinent to the 
research question is that civic norms significantly and substantially moderates the relationship 
between teacher accountability and science proficiency. Crucially, these moderation effects are 
present despite controlling for moderation from pupil socioeconomic status, school autonomy, 
and national per-capita GDP. Besides the large and significant Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ *civic norms 
interaction, parameter estimates for the country-level interaction with the three other social 
capital scales—confidence in institutions, civic networks, and social trust—are fairly large, 
though insignificant. (Social trust also has a significant unmoderated relationship with pupil 
science proficiency, as seen in columns (d) and (e). However, given space constraints and the 
focus in this project on teacher accountability policy, I am less interested in this unmoderated 
effect of social trust and more so in whether social trust moderates the relationship between 
teacher accountability instruments and student outcomes.) 
 
To determine the relative importance of the predictors, I re-estimated the full model in column 
(e) with standardised predictors. In this model, parameter estimates for four of the non-
interacted predictors were sizable: 19.5 for GDP, 19.1 for ESCS, 17.5 for social trust, and 9.4 for 
school autonomy. Civic norms had the fifth largest parameter estimate among non-interacted 
predictors, at 5.8. For comparison, PISA scores are scaled to have a standard deviation of 
approximately 100 points (OECD, 2016d, p. 58). Five of the interaction terms were noticeably 
larger than the other interactions. These were the interactions between Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  and, 
respectively, civic norms (–7.9), confidence in institutions (7.6), social trust (7.3), GDP (6.6), and 
civic networks (–6.1), in order of decreasing magnitude. Among the three variables that 
significantly moderated the effects of teacher accountability on student outcomes, civic norms 
had a smaller unmoderated effect on science proficiency than ESCS or GDP. However, the civic 
norms interaction term not only had the largest magnitude (-7.9), but also the smallest p-value 
(0.004). 
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Figure 4.6 illustrates these moderation relationships by showing predicted science proficiency 
scores against Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  at the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles of different contextual 
moderators, with all other variables held constant at their means. Thus, these predicted scores 
incorporate (1) all of the parameter estimates in column (e) of Table 4.9, including both the non-
interacted and interacted terms; as well as (2) the empirical values of each explanatory variable, 
represented by the range of Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ , the various percentiles of the contextual moderator 
of interest in each row, and the mean values of all the other variables. The figure shows 
predictions for different levels of the three contextual variables that significantly moderated the 
relationship between Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  and science proficiency, i.e. civic norms, ESCS, and GDP 
(ordered from the largest p-value on the interaction term to the smallest). I also include school 
autonomy, as an example of a contextual variable that did not interact with Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  
significantly. 
 
Figure 4.6   Predicted PISA 2015 science proficiency scores (and 95% confidence intervals) against 
Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ , for the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles of each contextual moderator 
 
Note. All predictions are based on the regression in column (e) of Table 4.9. Each row shows predicted science 
proficiency scores against Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  for the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentile of the named contextual predictor. All 
other variables are held constant at their means. Rows are sorted by decreasing magnitude of the p-value on the 
coefficient of corresponding interaction term. 
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From the variety of slopes in these graphs, it is evident that teacher accountability instruments 
can have a positive (upward-sloping), negative (downward-sloping), or negligible (flat) overall 
effect on student outcomes, depending on context. For example, in the civic norms row, the 
leftmost graph reflects the model prediction that pupil science proficiency scores will increase as 
Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  increases, for a hypothetical country with a civic norms score at the 10th 
percentile. However, for a country at the 50th percentile of civic norms, increasing levels of 
Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  have no effect of predicted science proficiency. At the 90th percentile of civic 
norms, pupil science proficiency is expected to decrease as Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  increases. In contrast, 
the relationship between Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  and science proficiency is not affected by school 
autonomy, since the predicted score plots are similarly flat for all three levels of school 
autonomy. (However, school autonomy does have an independent effect on pupil science 
proficiency, as indicated by the different intercepts in the three plots and by the significant 
coefficient on the unmoderated school autonomy variable in Table 4.9.) Interestingly, for an 
average student in an average school in a hypothetical average country—that is, when all 
independent variables except Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  are held constant at their means (or medians, for the 
focal control variable in each row)—the level of teacher accountability instruments makes little 
difference to student outcomes, as shown in the flat slopes in all of the plots in the 50th 
percentile column.  
 
The civic norms plots also indicate the degree to which sociocultural context can affect the 
relationship between teacher accountability and student outcomes. Comparing the rightmost 
ends of each plot—that is, at the 100th percentile of Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ —a country at the 10th 
percentile of civic norms adherence would be expected to outscore a country at the 90th 
percentile of civic norms by 30 points, with all other variables held constant at their means. 
(Empirically, the 100th percentile of Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  corresponds to Russia, where the typical 
school had 13 out of the 14 the teacher accountability instruments in the PISA 2015 
questionnaires.) Conversely, at the 0th percentile of Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  shown at the leftmost ends of 
each plot (which corresponds to Greece, where the typical school had approximately half of the 
14 teacher accountability instruments), a country at the 90th percentile of civic norms would 
outscore a country at the 10th percentile of civic norms by 73 points. Given that PISA 
proficiency scores are scaled to have a standard deviation of approximately 100 points, as noted 
above, these differences are considerable. 
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To examine how well model 1 predicts actual PISA 2015 science scores, Figure 4.7 plots the 
official OECD-calculated country-level science scores against predicted scores from (A) model 1, 
which corresponds to column (e) of Table 4.9, and (B) a version of model 1 that drops all 
sociocultural variables and all interaction terms involving sociocultural variables except for civic 
norms and its interactions. Both models perform fairly well, with predictions for all but six 
countries falling within 50 points (≈0.5 SD) of their actual scores in (A). The same is true for all 
but five countries in (B). Unsurprisingly, the deviations for some of these outlying countries were 
considerably larger for (B), since it was the more parsimonious model. Still, the average country-
level deviations for both countries were similar, at 24.61 points for (A) and 26.87 points for (B).29 
For the countries where I conducted fieldwork, both models performed very well for Singapore, 
with deviations for 1.80 points for (A) and 7.99 points for (B); but worse than average for 
Finland, with deviations of 42.43 points for (A) and 37.99 points for (B).  
 
Figure 4.7   Actual vs. predicted PISA 2015 science proficiency scores from model 1 (A) with all 6 sociocultural 
constructs and (B) with civic norms only 
 
Note. Predicted values in (A) are drawn from the regression model shown in column (e) of Table 4.9. Predicted 
values in (B) are from a similar model that drops all other sociocultural variables and interaction terms involving 
sociocultural variables other than civic norms. Data labels indicate Finland (FIN) and Singapore (SIN), as well as 
countries that over- or underperformed by more than 50 points: China (CHN), Spain (ESP), Estonia (EST), Malta 
(MLT), Peru (PER), Poland (POL), and Vietnam (VNM). Source for the actual PISA 2015 scores: OECD (2016d). 
 
29  Note that deviations from the y=x line in these plots are not country-level regression residuals, since the y-values 
here are official country weighted averages from the full PISA dataset, rather than the country weighted 
averages from the sample used in this analysis (which only includes cases that had complete observations for all 
predictors in the model). As for the actual residual plots for the full model (i.e. the regression shown in column 
(e) of Table 4.9), country-level Q-Q plots and standardised residual plots did not indicate any obvious 
departures from either normality or homoscedasticity. However, they did indicate (1) that China was an outlier, 
and (2) that there was a cluster of high-GDP countries that were underperforming relative to the model. Adding 
a dummy variable for China and removing all GDP-related terms from the model eliminated these irregularities 
from the diagnostic plots, while almost doubling the magnitude of the coefficient of the Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ *civic 
norms interaction term, with a slight reduction in its standard error. Hence, it appears that any deviations in 
model 1 caused by (1) and (2) attenuate rather than falsely inflating the moderation effect of civic norms. 
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It is worth noting that different aspects of social capital moderate the relationship between 
teacher accountability and pupil science scores in different directions. While the coefficients of 
the interaction terms for civic norms and civic networks are negative (i.e. more extensive teacher 
accountability is associated with better student outcomes in countries with weaker adherence to 
civic norms and less extensive civic networks), the coefficients of the confidence in institutions 
and social trust interactions are positive (i.e. more extensive teacher accountability is associated 
with better student outcomes in countries with greater confidence in institutions and higher 
social trust). While these results should be treated with caution, given that only the civic norms 
interaction term is significant, they suggest that national sociocultural context may affect the 
implementation of teacher accountability instruments in multiple cross-cutting ways. I discuss 
some aspects of this complexity in Chapter 6, using interview data from Finland and Singapore. 
 
Sensitivity checks 
To test the robustness of these results, I re-estimated model 1 using different cuts of the PISA 
2015 data, and also using PISA 2012 and TIMSS 2015 data. The PISA 2015 and 2012 regressions 
use the same functional form as in column (e) of Table 4.9, with all six sociocultural constructs 
included concurrently. However, the TIMSS 2015 model 1 regressions with all six sociocultural 
constructs showed evidence of multicollinearity due to too many country-level variables relative 
to the country sample size, as described in the ‘Modelling’ subsection of Section 3.3, and as 
demonstrated in Appendix A. Accordingly, I ran six separate models for each TIMSS 2015 
sample, where each model tested one of the six sociocultural constructs, in turn. Table 4.10 
summarises the significance and direction of parameter estimates for the interaction between 
country-level teacher accountability and each of the six sociocultural constructs. 
 
As shown in Table 4.10, the interaction between Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  and civic norms is consistently 
negative and significant for all of the PISA 2015, PISA 2012, and TIMSS 2015 models tested. 
These include the PISA 2015 and TIMSS 2015 datasets matched with teacher accountability data 
from PISA 2012 in order to test for potential time lags in the effects of accountability 
instruments; as well as the OECD-only subsamples for both PISA cycles and the PISA 2015 
subsample with only publicly funded schools. None of the other sociocultural constructs 
consistently moderated the relationship between teacher accountability instruments and student 
outcomes.  
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Table 4.10   Summary of sociocultural constructs that significantly moderate the relationship between 
Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  and pupil test scores 
 
Note. 1 symbol (+/–) indicates p<.05; 2 symbols (+ +/– –) indicate p<.01. Full results can be provided upon 
request. 
 
For a more detailed look, Table 4.11 shows parameter estimates from the sensitivity checks for 
the main effect of Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  as well as its interactions with civic norms and the non-
sociocultural moderators. As with the main PISA 2015 regressions, the unmoderated effect of 
Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  is insignificant in all the models. However, many of the interactions between 
Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  and the contextual moderators are significant, most consistently with civic norms. 
The consistency of the significant interaction between Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  and civic norms across 
different test cycles and cuts of the data suggests that this aspect of national sociocultural context 
does, in fact, moderate the relationship between student outcomes and teacher accountability 
instruments.  
 
For further sensitivity checks, I also ran models with each sociocultural construct entered singly 
(rather than all six constructs concurrently) for each cut of the PISA 2015 and 2012 data. These 
results, which are not shown in the tables, were broadly consistent with those shown in Table 
4.10, with four exceptions, one of which related to civic norms. Specifically, for the PISA 2012 
full sample, the interaction between Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  and civic norms was insignificant, unlike in 
the model with all six sociocultural constructs, although it was similarly negative.30  
 
 
30  The other three differences between the models with all six sociocultural constructs shown in Table 4.10 and 
the models with each sociocultural constructs entered singly were: (1) for the PISA 2015 data matched with 
Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  from PISA 2012, the interaction between Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  and confidence in institutions was 
significant and positive, in contrast to the insignificant coefficient in the model with all six sociocultural 
constructs; and for the PISA 2012 OECD-only sample, the interactions between Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  and (2) civic 
networks and (3) social trust were insignificant, unlike the significant interactions in the model with all six 
sociocultural constructs. 
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Table 4.11   Model 1: sensitivity checks (showing selected variables only) 
 
Note. ESCS = economic, social, and cultural status. Full results can be provided upon request. 
*p < 0.05. **p < 0.01. 
 
To increase the country sample size, I also ran regressions using separate cuts of the data for 
each of the six sociocultural constructs; such that a country that had WVS/EVS data but lacked 
Hofstede data would appear in the regression for, say, civic norms, but not those for power 
distance. This raised the maximum sample size from 57 to 64 countries (for PISA 2015 with 
WVS/EVS sociocultural data), and the minimum sample size from 22 to 24 countries (for 
TIMSS 2015 with WVS/EVS sociocultural data and accountability data from PISA 2012). 
Results for civic norms were broadly consistent with those shown in Table 4.11, again with the 
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exception that the Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ *civic norms interaction was insignificant (though also negative) 
for the single-sociocultural-construct model with the full sample of PISA 2012 (n=56 countries). 
 
In summary, out of the six sociocultural constructs that were theoretically expected to affect the 
relationship between teacher accountability instruments and student outcomes, the regressions 
presented in this section found evidence for moderation by only one of these six constructs, i.e. 
civic norms. Still, the three other constructs related to social capital—i.e. confidence in 
institutions, social trust, and civic networks—also had sizable though insignificant interactions 
with country-level teacher accountability in the main dataset. Moreover, the civic norms 
interaction terms were robust across different assessment cycles and subsamples of the data, with 
very minor exceptions. 
 
4.4 Discussion 
To the extent that we want to use cross-sectional analyses of international large-scale assessments 
as sources of policy evidence, the results in the previous section suggest that we cannot overlook 
the influence of national sociocultural context on the efficacy of teacher accountability 
instruments. Although the interaction between country-level teacher accountability and national 
sociocultural context was only significant for one of the six sociocultural constructs in the main 
model 1 regression, these results were consistent across different subsamples of PISA 2015, 
PISA 2012, and TIMSS 2015 data. Moreover, the magnitude of these effects was large, with a 
divergence of 73 points in PISA 2015 science scores between the 10th and 90th percentiles of 
civic norms at the lowest levels of teacher accountability. For comparison, the PISA science 
score was scaled to have a standard deviation of approximately 100 points, and the PISA 2015 
results report interprets 30 score points as being approximately equal to one year of schooling 
(OECD, 2016d, pp. 58, 65). 
 
While this result shares the weaknesses of other cross-sectional ILSA analyses—such as non-
causal conclusions and measurement errors—it also shares their strengths. A key advantage of 
these analyses is scale. My analysis shows the existence of a relationship across hundreds of 
thousands of students in dozens of countries. I am not denying the numerous measurement and 
modelling assumptions required for comparisons at this scale, nor the fact that this probabilistic 
relationship does not uniformly affect all students in all countries. Nonetheless, the scope of 
these datasets and the magnitude of the interaction effects are a persuasive piece of suggestive 
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evidence for the influence of sociocultural context on teacher accountability. This evidence is 
especially noteworthy because it is based on the same ILSA datasets that fuel the preoccupation 
with acontextual best practices in education, as noted in Section 1.1.  
 
Thus, as shown in Figure 4.8, the statistical analysis in this chapter gives suggestive evidence that 
(a) there is a relationship between teacher accountability instruments and student outcomes; but 
(b) this relationship varies with sociocultural context. These findings cohere with the systematic 
literature search presented in Section 2.3. Studies from this search found that sociocultural 
context can influence various teacher accountability processes, from policy formulation (e.g. 
Hopmann, 2008; Mattei, 2012; Osborn, 2006) to implementation (e.g. Broekman, 2016; Mizel, 
2009; Narwana, 2015). Furthermore, the specific finding that teacher accountability instruments 
are associated with lower student outcomes in countries with strong adherence to civic norms 
accords with arguments from other disciplines that some constructive and altruistic behaviours 
may be undermined by certain forms of accountability (e.g. Deming, 1993 in management; 
O’Neill, 2002 in philosophy; Stout, 2010 in legal studies). 
 
Figure 4.8   Evidence for the conceptual framework from the RQ1 analysis 
 
 
Still, as noted above, this analysis uses cross-sectional data, so these relationships are 
correlational rather than causal. This is reflected in Figure 4.8 with a line—rather than an 
arrow—connecting accountability instruments and student outcomes. Other features of these 
results also indicate a need for caution. For one, the significant interaction terms had large 
standard errors. Also, given that the analysis did not include a causal identification strategy, it is 
possible that all these relationships may be spurious. 
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As noted in Section 3.1, one important way of strengthening the validity of an argument, 
especially in realist research, is by weighing it against alternative explanations. One alternative 
explanation for the results presented in this chapter is that the association between teacher 
accountability instruments, civic norms, and student outcomes is simply a matter of 
happenstance—that there is no causal pathway linking (context-compatible) teacher 
accountability instruments to student outcomes. This all the more possible given that the largest 
country sample had just 64 countries. Not only is this a relatively small regression sample, but it 
also constitutes less than one-third of all sovereign states globally. Another possible explanation 
is that there are confounding variables. Rather than sociocultural context, the differential effects 
of teacher accountability instruments may be due to capacity constraints, or to the internal 
coherence (see Pritchett, 2015, for a theoretical argument) or implementation quality (see Dee & 
Dizon-Ross, 2019, for an empirical case) of any given set of instruments. 
 
However, based on the field interviews I conducted in Finland and Singapore, as well as prior 
studies reviewed thus far, I believe the most plausible explanation is that teacher accountability 
instruments can affect student outcomes, and that these effects are influenced by sociocultural 
context (among other factors). To address the first alternative explanation, i.e. that the 
association between teacher accountability instruments and student outcomes is coincidental 
rather than reflecting a real causal pathway, recall the evaluation studies listed in Table 4.1. These 
studies found that certain teacher accountability instruments can play positive causal role in 
educational outcomes, given the right combinations of instrument and context. Some of these 
effects were small, and all of them were limited to particular intervention designs and contexts, 
but they offer evidence that such a causal pathway is possible. Besides this evidence of statistical 
causality, my field interviews offer evidence of realist causality along one step of the causal 
pathway, i.e. that teacher accountability instruments can generate real change in teacher 
motivation. I discuss this evidence in the next chapter. 
 
The second alternative explanation does not deny the existence of this causal pathway. Rather, it 
argues that the key contextual moderators come from some non-sociocultural aspect of context 
that is correlated with civic norms. However, it is worth noting that the model 1 regressions 
already control for some variables that would be expected to show associations with both 
sociocultural context and teacher accountability, i.e. student socioeconomic background, school 
autonomy (or school resources for TIMSS), and national GDP. As for the possibility that the 
CHAPTER 4   132 
significant sociocultural moderators are inadvertently proxying for some aspect of policy design 
or implementation quality, the matrix in Table 4.12 offers some suggestive evidence to the 
contrary. In this matrix, I summarise what interview participants said in response to a 
hypothetical situation: what would happen if their country adopted the other country’s teacher 
accountability instruments? That is, what would happen if Finland instituted Singapore’s system 
of performance standards, formal appraisal, competitive bonuses, and tiered promotions; or if 
Singapore replaced all of those instruments with a largely autonomous teaching profession? 
 
Table 4.12   Summary of interview participants’ responses when asked how they would respond if, hypothetically, 
their country adopted the other country’s teacher accountability instruments 
 
Note. This hypothetical question was posed in an open-ended manner. Thus, the statements in the table represent 
my summaries of participants’ responses; I did not present these statements to participants for their agreement or 
disagreement. 
 
As shown in the summary matrix, no interview participants unreservedly believed that the other 
country’s teacher accountability system would be more effective or more popular than the 
existing system. This is especially striking in the case of the Singaporean participants who said 
that they would personally prefer Finland’s system, but nonetheless doubted that it would 
effectively fulfil all the functions of Singapore’s performance management structures. Maggie, a 
Singaporean participant, said that Finland’s approach would give her the autonomy to pursue 
better long-term achievements, but added that: 
I think if you suddenly changed the system, most of the teachers will be very stressed 
because they have no idea what is being observed. Singaporeans find comfort, I think, 
in knowing exactly what is expected, and they like to do it to the letter. 
In turn, Finnish participant Juhani said that he appreciated Singapore’s structured approach to 
identifying teachers’ strengths and weaknesses, but added that: 
We are so independent here. And we like that independence in our classrooms so 
much, that even the bonuses would not make this system a good thing. […] And we are 
so equal, among teachers. […] We do not want to give others the possibility of rushing 
higher. 
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Whatever their personal preferences, many participants had similarly strong reactions against the 
other country’s accountability approach (e.g. Masa, describing Finnish teachers: ‘They would 
quit. They would go on strike’; Sonia: ‘The average Singaporean teacher will probably be up in 
arms’). 
 
Considering that the hypothetical accountability approaches were both internally coherent, and 
that each approach have been implemented successfully in an effective education system, these 
interviews suggest that some approaches to teacher accountability, however well-designed, may 
fail to be effective in uncongenial settings. Internal coherence within a set of teacher 
accountability instruments may be necessary for efficacy, but the interview participants’ 
responses suggest that it is not sufficient. In the next chapter, I explore teachers’ responses to 
accountability instruments in greater depth. For now, it is sufficient to observe that the 
interviews weigh against the likelihood that policy design can wholly account for the 
sociocultural moderation relationships observed in the regressions. Similarly, the regressions 
themselves weighed against the possibility of confounding effects from student background, 
school autonomy, and national wealth. Hence, my argument—that sociocultural context affects 
the relationship between teacher accountability and student outcomes—fits the empirical data 
better than the second alternative argument outlined above. 
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Chapter 5: Teacher accountability and teacher motivation 
Having demonstrated the possibility that at least one aspect of sociocultural context is associated 
with the efficacy of some teacher accountability instruments, I turn to a possible causal pathway 
through which accountability instruments may affect student outcomes. Accordingly, this 
chapter explores my second research question: to what extent, and how, does teacher motivation mediate 
the influence of teacher accountability instruments on student outcomes? 
 
First, I investigate the extent to which such mediation may occur, using cross-country data from 
TIMSS and PISA (Section 5.1). Next, I turn to the ‘how’ aspect, using field interviews that I 
conducted with teachers in Finland and Singapore to look at one step in this posited pathway. I 
begin by describing the teacher accountability instruments that the interview participants 
encounter in their work (Section 5.2). I then discuss their experiences of how accountability 
instruments influence teacher motivation (Section 5.3). I also explore the mechanisms underlying 
this influence: setting standards for teacher practice, communicating information on teacher 
practice, and allocating consequences based on stakeholders’ judgements of teacher practice 
(Section 5.4). Finally, as in the previous chapter, I discuss these findings and consider an 
alternative explanation (Section 5.5). 
 
5.1 TIMSS 2015 analysis: Teacher motivation and the relationship between 
teacher accountability and student outcomes 
In this section, I explore the relationship between teacher motivation, teacher accountability, and 
student outcomes, as shown in Figure 5.1. This exploration uses ILSA data and sociocultural 
survey data. I begin by describing the pre-existing scales that I use to proxy for teacher 
motivation in this thesis, before presenting results from the mediation analysis as well as some 
sensitivity checks. 
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Figure 5.1   Relationship between Section 5.1 and the overall conceptual framework 
 
 
Using proxy scales for teacher motivation 
As noted in Section 2.4, I adopt Schunk et al.’s (2010) definition of motivation as ‘the process 
whereby goal-directed activity is instigated and sustained’ (p. 4). Clear definition notwithstanding, 
motivation is difficult to measure. Schunk et al. (2010) further observe that motivation is a 
cognitive process that cannot be observed directly, but instead is inferred from observations of 
actions and verbalisations, such as an actor’s choice of tasks, level of effort, or degree of 
persistence. Motivation can also be measured using self-reported indicators of actors’ thoughts, 
choices, and feelings (Schunk et al., 2010), as with the self-report questionnaire items used to 
construct the proxy scales that I analyse. Such standardised questionnaires generated the teacher 
motivation data in most of the 130 studies analysed in a recent review of teacher motivation 
research (J. Han & Yin, 2016). Besides the problem of indirect observation, another challenge in 
measuring teacher motivation is that motivation is a multidimensional construct, such that any 
given scale will necessarily leave out some of its components. Among the instruments for 
assessing teacher motivation that Han and Yin (2016) reviewed, some instruments aim to capture 
various dimensions of motivation, such as different goal orientations (Butler, 2007, 2012; 
Nitsche et al., 2011; Roth et al., 2007), or the factors influencing teachers’ professional 
engagement (de Jesus & Lens, 2005). Overall, as discussed in Section 2.4, there is no consensus 
across empirically validated theories of motivation about the motivational factors that matter 
most. 
 
As noted in Section 3.3, I operationalise teacher motivation using three proxy measures: teacher-
reported job satisfaction from TALIS 2013, teacher-reported job satisfaction from TIMSS 2015, 
and principal-reported teacher morale from PISA 2012. In this chapter, the outcome of interest 
is student achievement. Consequently, the regression analysis below does not use the TALIS 
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2013 scale, since TALIS does not measure student outcomes. However, TALIS 2013 is the main 
dataset in Chapter 6, so I discuss the TALIS job satisfaction scale alongside the TIMSS and PISA 
scales here because it is important to consider the similarities and differences between all of the 
teacher motivation proxies in this thesis. 
 
One challenge in linking these proxy scales to teacher motivation in the conceptual framework is 
that the theoretical foundations of these scales are either weak or, at least, inadequately reported 
in the database documentation. The PISA 2012 teacher morale scale was included in the school 
questionnaires within a cluster of school climate variables, but I found no theoretical or empirical 
references justifying the scale design, whether in the PISA 2012 assessment framework, technical 
report, or results report on school factors (OECD, 2013a, 2013b, 2014b). Neither did I find any 
relevant scholarly citations in the documentation for PISA 2000 and 2003, which had also 
included this scale. The TIMSS 2015 assessment framework does cite an empirical study that 
found associations between teacher self-efficacy, teacher job satisfaction, and student 
achievement (i.e. Caprara et al., 2006), but I did not find any discussions of the theoretical basis 
for the questionnaire items (Mullis & Martin, 2013, p. 71). The TALIS 2013 results report 
mentions several studies that found associations between job satisfaction and job performance as 
well as other teacher-related variables, and it cites Locke’s (1969) conceptual overview of job 
satisfaction, but only in passing (OECD, 2014c, p. 182). 
 
Stepping back to examine job satisfaction and morale more generally, there are conceptual and 
empirical grounds for linking these constructs with motivation. Establishing this link 
conceptually requires a few steps for job satisfaction, but is straightforward for teacher morale. 
The APA Dictionary of Psychology defines morale as ‘the level of enthusiasm, sense of purpose, 
or confidence in the worthiness of a goal that can affect a person’s or a group’s overall 
performance in working toward that goal, especially when under pressure’ (American 
Psychological Association, n.d.)—which is a close cousin of motivation defined as ‘the process 
whereby goal-directed activity is instigated and sustained’ (Schunk et al., 2010, p. 4). In contrast, 
there is no widely agreed-upon definition of job satisfaction (Evans, 1997), perhaps because any 
job encompasses a range of needs—material and affective, primal and aspirational—that may or 
may not be satisfied. Nonetheless, some theories of motivation posit that motivation is founded 
on the pursuit of needs satisfaction (Herzberg, 1966; Maslow, 1954; Murray, 1938). Also, if 
motivation relates to not only the instigation but also the sustainment of goal-directed activity  
(Schunk et al., 2010), then job satisfaction may be considered a factor of motivation in that a 
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more satisfied actor is more likely to continue pursuing a given activity. As noted above, Schunk 
et al. (2010) identify persistence as one behavioural indicator of motivation; and job satisfaction 
can indicate some elements of the likelihood that an employee will persist in a particular job. 
 
Empirically, the reverse situation holds, in that it is much easier to establish an empirical link 
between motivation and job satisfaction than between motivation and teacher morale. To 
illustrate, a search in ERIC on 15 April 2020 for peer-reviewed publications containing both the 
terms ‘morale’ and ‘motivation’ in the title yielded only four results, of which the only 
quantitative empirical study was based on the same PISA 2012 teacher morale scale that I use 
(Abazaoglu & Aztekin, 2016). In contrast, a similar search for ‘job satisfaction’ and ‘motivation’ 
yielded 35 results. This is partly because there is an established, extensive strand of research on 
job satisfaction (Evans, 1997). In a special issue of Learning and Instruction focused on teacher 
motivation, one commentator observed that few studies of motivation have examined teacher 
motivation, ‘with the exception of writings about teachers’ sense of efficacy or teachers’ job 
satisfaction’ (Hoy, 2008, p. 492). Studies of teacher job satisfaction have found significant 
correlations between self-reported motivation and self-reported job satisfaction (variously 
operationalised) among teachers in China, the United States, Germany, and Indonesia (Chen, 
2007; Davis & Wilson, 2000; Kunter et al., 2008; Murtedjo & Suharningsih, 2016), as well as in 
related professions (see Munyengabe et al., 2016, on university lecturers in Rwanda; and L. Li et 
al., 2014, community health workers in China). Skaalvik and Skaalvik (2009) also found 
significant negative correlations between burnout and job satisfaction among Norwegian 
teachers. 
 
Turning to the proxy scales that I use in this study, it important to note that these three scales are 
not directly comparable with each other. As shown in Table 5.1, two items from the TALIS 2013 
job satisfaction scale are roughly comparable to two other items in the TIMSS 2015 scale, 
although they are not identical (‘I enjoy working at this school’ in TALIS vs. ‘I am satisfied with 
being a teacher at this school’ in TIMSS; and ‘All in all, I am satisfied with my job’ in TALIS vs. 
‘I am content with my profession as a teacher’ in TIMSS). However, the other scale items only 
relate loosely, at best, to items in the other scales. Given the interpretive, affective nature of 
these questionnaire items, it is difficult to determine how much the items align conceptually, and 
even more challenging to gauge the degree to which they overlap across survey respondents’ 
interpretations in practice. This applies particularly to the PISA 2012 principal-reported scale for 
teacher morale, which may be distorted by any number of conscious or unconscious biases on 
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the part of the principal. Statistically, the TALIS and TIMSS teacher job satisfaction scales are 
moderately correlated (r=0.640), as are the TIMSS teacher job satisfaction and PISA teacher 
morale scales (r=0.524), as shown in Table 5.2. However, there is no noteworthy correlation 
between TALIS job satisfaction and PISA teacher morale (r=0.185). Since these scales measure 
different motivation-related constructs, the sensitivity checks across different datasets are less 
likely to show similar patterns. Still, it is worth conducting analyses using these different 
constructs, because, as discussed above, motivation is multidimensional, and different constructs 
may proxy for different elements of it. 
 
Besides the fact that these three scales are not directly comparable, and that each scale only 
captures a limited, blurry view of teacher motivation, there is another possible source of 
statistical noise in the analyses that use these scales, reported in this section and Section 6.1. 
Namely, we would only expect these teacher motivation proxies to mediate the relationship 
between accountability instruments and student outcomes if the goals of the teachers and 
principals who responded to the questionnaires overlap at least to some degree with the forms of 
student learning measured by these ILSAs. It is entirely possible that a teacher may have a high 
levels of job satisfaction, while channelling their effort only toward personal financial goals, or 
bureaucratic compliance goals, or student development goals that are not captured in ILSA 
proficiency scales. This potential lack of convergence is less of a problem with the PISA 2012 
principal-reported teacher morale scale, where the four items include one that explicitly pertains 
to students’ cognitive outcomes (‘Teachers value academic achievement’) and one that broadly 
relates to school performance (‘Teachers take pride in this school’), as shown in Table 5.1. 
However, the lack of convergence is a real possibility with the TALIS 2013 teacher-reported job 
satisfaction scale, for which the eight items discuss ‘my job’, ‘working at this school’, and ‘being a 
teacher’ in general terms, with no orientation toward student wellbeing and development. The 
TIMSS 2015 teacher-reported job satisfaction scale falls between the two, with four of the seven 
items referring to teaching, work, and satisfaction in general terms; but with three items referring 
to enthusiasm, inspiration, and pride, which are more likely to be interpreted with a student-
oriented perspective. 
 
Notwithstanding these limitations, as well as the other limitations pertaining to self-report cross-
sectional survey data (see Section 3.6), the teacher job satisfaction scales in TALIS 2013 and 
TIMSS 2015, as well as the teacher morale scale in PISA 2012, are the best available proxies for 
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teacher motivation in these cross-country educational surveys. As discussed above, there is some 
conceptual and empirical basis for regarding these scales as proxies for motivation. 
 
Table 5.1   Items in the TALIS 2013, TIMSS 2015, and PISA 2012 teacher motivation scales 
 
 Note. Parentheses indicate items that are loosely related but not directly comparable. Sources: Martin, Mullis, & 
Hooper (2016); OECD (2014b, 2014d).  
*Item was reverse-coded in the scale. 
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Table 5.2   Pairwise correlations (and number of countries) for country-level weighted means of the teacher 
motivation scales 
 
                *p < 0.05. **p < 0.01. (two-tailed) 
 
The PISA 2012 teacher morale scale was scaled by survey administrators such that the OECD 
subsample of the data would have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one (OECD, 
2014b, p. 312). While the TIMSS 2015 and TALIS 2013 teacher job satisfaction scales were 
generated using different scaling procedures (Martin, Mullis, & Hooper, 2016, p. 15.4; OECD, 
2014d, p. 213), I standardised them for this analysis such that their respective means were zero 
and standard deviations were one in the overall sample. 
 
Mediation analysis with civic norms 
To investigate the extent to which teacher motivation mediates the relationship between teacher 
accountability instruments and student outcomes, I draw on results from both model 2 and 
model 3. As detailed in Section 3.3, model 2 is similar to the main moderation model presented 
in the previous chapter, but with the addition of a teacher motivation variable as well as an 
interaction between teacher motivation and sociocultural context. Model 3 is also a moderation 
model, but it explores the joint association of teacher accountability and sociocultural context 
with teacher motivation (rather than with student outcomes, as in model 1). To preview the 
analysis, there is no clear evidence that teacher motivation mediates the relationship between 
teacher accountability instruments and student outcomes. 
 
The main dataset for this analysis is TIMSS 2015, because TIMSS includes student outcome data 
matched with self-reported teacher job satisfaction data. I present full results from the 
regressions with civic norms. Given the relatively small number of TIMSS 2015 countries for 
which sociocultural data were available, using all six sociocultural constructs concurrently would 
result in multicollinearity from overfitting (see Appendix A). Moreover, sociocultural context is 
not of primary interest in this research question, so for the sake of conciseness I present full 
results only for one set of regressions with a single sociocultural construct. Among the six 
sociocultural constructs, I focus on civic norms since the model 1 analysis in the previous 
chapter found that the relationship between teacher accountability and student outcomes is 
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moderated by civic norms. Hence, it is worth looking at whether civic norms similarly moderates 
the relationship between teacher accountability and teacher motivation. I discuss the other five 
sociocultural constructs as sensitivity checks subsequently. (The sensitivity checks also look at 
PISA 2012, as described below.) 
 
First, I use model 2 to ascertain the degree to which the relationship between teacher 
accountability instruments and student outcomes changes when teacher motivation and its 
interaction with sociocultural context are added to the model. If (1) at least one of the teacher 
motivation terms is significant, and if (2) their addition to the model significantly reduces the 
coefficient on teacher accountability instruments, then this would indicate that teacher 
motivation significantly alters the relationship between teacher accountability and student 
outcomes. However, to constitute a mediation effect, it must also be true that (3) teacher 
accountability is a significant predictor of teacher motivation—which I investigate using model 3. 
 
Results from these analyses are shown in Table 5.3.  Columns (a) to (d) show a series of nested 
regressions culminating in model 2, where the outcome variable is pupil mathematics proficiency. 
Columns (e) to (h) show nested regressions for model 3, where the outcome variable is teacher 
job satisfaction. 
 
Focusing first on model 2, the TIMSS 2015 data do not offer any clear evidence that teacher job 
satisfaction affects the relationship between teacher accountability and student outcomes. The 
coefficient of teacher job satisfaction is significant, as shown in column (c), thus fulfilling 
condition (1). However, this coefficient is relatively small, and its addition to the model—that is, 
moving from column (b) to (c)—only changes the teacher accountability term and its associated 
interaction terms marginally, thus failing to fulfil condition (2). Likewise, adding the interaction 
between teacher job satisfaction and civic norms does not meaningfully reduce any of the 
accountability-related coefficients, as shown in column (d). Moreover, the coefficient of this 
interaction is insignificant and even smaller than that of the main teacher job satisfaction term. 
 
Turning to model 3, these data offer some limited evidence that teacher accountability 
significantly predicts teacher job satisfaction, conditional on sociocultural context. Although the 
main teacher country-level teacher accountability term is small and insignificant, as shown in 
column (g), the Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ *civic norms interaction term has a significant and relatively large 
effect on teacher job satisfaction, as shown in column (h). (For reference, the standard deviations 
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of teacher job satisfaction and civic norms are approximately 1, and the standard deviation of the 
country-level weighted mean of teacher accountability instruments is 0.42, as shown in Table 
3.4.) However, in this research question, I am not primarily interested in the determinants of 
teacher motivation, which I explore in detail the next chapter. 
 
Table 5.3   Models 2 and 3: results for multilevel regressions for TIMSS 2015, with and without teacher job 
satisfaction 
 
*p < 0.05. **p < 0.01. 
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Instead, the focus here is on the mediation relationship. The model 3 results in column (h) 
indicate (context-dependent) fulfilment of condition (3), i.e. that teacher accountability 
significantly predicts teacher job satisfaction. Nonetheless, models 2 and 3 together fail to show 
that teacher job satisfaction mediates the relationship between teacher accountability and 
sociocultural context, because the addition of the teacher motivation terms to model 2 does not 
alter the relationship between teacher accountability and pupil mathematics scores, as observed 
above. 
 
Sensitivity checks 
I conducted sensitivity checks to test whether this lack of evidence for conditions (1) and (2) of 
the mediation relationship may be a by-product of how the TIMSS data were constructed—
perhaps the TIMSS teacher job satisfaction scale did not capture the aspects of teacher 
motivation that matter for accountability, or perhaps there were too few countries in the sample. 
Table 5.4 presents sensitivity checks for model 2, showing selected variables only, and continuing 
to focus on the civic norms regressions. The first two columns replicate columns (b) and (d) of 
Table 5.3. The other columns present analogous models firstly for TIMSS 2015 data matched to 
accountability data from PISA 2012 (rather than 2015), and then for full and OECD-only 
samples of PISA 2012. 
 
In all of these regressions, the teacher motivation term is significant but small, as shown in each 
respective column (d), consistent with the main analysis above. The teacher motivation*civic 
norms interaction term is also small, although it is significant in the PISA regressions. More 
importantly, in comparing each pair of columns, the addition of these teacher motivation terms 
does not meaningfully affect any of the country-level teacher accountability terms, whether the 
unmoderated terms or the interactions (including the other Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ *context interaction 
terms that are included in each model but not shown in Table 5.4). In the PISA models, moving 
from the regressions in columns (b3) to (d3) and from (b4) to (d4) had similarly little effect on 
the school-level accountability terms, which are not shown in the table. 
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Table 5.4   Model 2: sensitivity checks for maths proficiency in TIMSS 2015 and PISA 2012, with and 
without teacher motivation terms (showing selected variables only) 
 
Note. The outcome variable is pupil mathematics proficiency. The teacher motivation variable for TIMSS 2015 is 
teacher job satisfaction (teacher-reported scale); and for PISA 2012, teacher morale (principal-reported scale). 
Columns (b1) and (d1) correspond to columns (b) and (d) in Table 5.3. Full results can be provided upon request. 
*p < 0.05. **p < 0.01. 
 
The fact that adding the teacher motivation terms to model 2 does not affect the parameter 
estimates of the accountability terms holds true not only for the civic norms models, but also for 
the other sociocultural constructs. For all four of the datasets shown in Table 5.4 above, 
swapping civic norms for any of the other five sociocultural constructs did not affect whether or 
not the model 2 regressions fulfilled the mediation conditions. As summarised in Table 5.5, 
regardless of which sociocultural construct was included in the model, these estimations resulted 
in significant but small teacher motivation coefficients, thus fulfilling condition (1) of the 
mediation relationship; with little effect on the teacher accountability coefficients, thus failing to 
fulfil condition (2). The same is true for PISA models with all six sociocultural constructs entered 
simultaneously, which are not summarised in the table. 
 
For the model 3 estimations across sociocultural constructs, results are less robust. As shown in 
Table 5.5, the country-level teacher accountability weighted mean is consistently insignificant 
across all four datasets for all six sociocultural constructs. Among the interactions between 
sociocultural context and teacher accountability, the only significant parameters are 
Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ *civic norms in the main TIMSS 2015 dataset, Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ *confidence in 
institutions in the TIMSS 2015 dataset matched with PISA 2012 accountability data, and 
Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ *power distance in both PISA 2012 samples. Accordingly, when analysing 
country-level teacher accountability, only the TIMSS 2015 civic norms model for the main 
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dataset, the TIMSS 2015 confidence in institutions model for the dataset with PISA 2012 
accountability data, and the PISA 2012 power distance models for both the full and OECD 
samples meet condition (3) of the mediation relationship, i.e. that the accountability term is 
significant in model 3. Given space constraints, I only present parameter estimates for model 3 
sensitivity checks in the next chapter, where the analysis focuses teacher motivation as an 
outcome variable.31 
 
Table 5.5   Summary of whether mediation conditions are fulfilled in TIMSS 2015 and PISA 2012, for all 
sociocultural constructs 
 
Note. Each column represents a separate mediation analysis. The outcome variable in all the models is pupil 
mathematics proficiency. ‘Motivation’ refers to the proxy for teacher motivation and its associated interaction terms. 
‘Accountability’ refers to the country-level weighted mean of the teacher accountability scale and its associated 
interactions (and, in the PISA 2012 data, includes both the country-level weighted mean and the school-level 
differentials). Full results can be provided upon request.  
 
For the purposes of RQ2, however, the sensitivity checks for model 2 clearly establish the lack of 
a mediation effect from teacher motivation—at least, for these combinations of TIMSS 2015 and 
PISA 2012 data alongside WVS/EVS and Hofstede data. There are several possible reasons why 
these regressions failed to find a mediation effect. Theoretically, as discussed in Section 2.5, the 
pathway from teacher motivation to student outcomes is contingent on numerous teacher, 
student, and classroom characteristics. Hence, it is possible that the straightforward correlational 
analysis in this section may obscure crucial steps along the causal pathway. Moreover, the three 
 
31  The foregoing discussion focused on the country-level teacher accountability weighted mean because the 
analysis as a whole focuses on country-level patterns in teacher accountability, rather than school-level variation. 
That said, the PISA 2012 model 3 regressions also include a school-level teacher accountability differential term. 
In these regressions, the school-level teacher accountability differential term is consistently significant across all 
the PISA 2012 regressions, thus fulfilling condition (3) of the mediation relationship for the school-level 
accountability term. However, as with its country-level counterpart, the school-level accountability term is not 
affected by the addition of motivation to model 2, thus failing to fulfil condition (2) of the mediation 
relationship. In short, the PISA 2012 data do not provide any evidence that sociocultural context mediates the 
relationship between school-level teacher accountability instruments and student outcomes. 
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key constructs in these models—teacher motivation, teacher accountability, and sociocultural 
context—are all measured using scales derived from self-report cross-country surveys. Such 
scales may incorporate substantial measurement error, which may attenuate possible mediation 
effects. 
 
Given the complexity of both the causal pathway and the constructs in question, it may be more 
appropriate to examine empirical data that offers a more nuanced view. Accordingly, in the rest 
of this chapter, I look at evidence for the relationship between teacher accountability instruments 
and teacher motivation in my other empirical data source: interviews with 24 teachers in Finland 
and Singapore. 
5.2 Teacher accountability instruments in Finland and Singapore32   
Although the statistical analysis in the previous section did not find a consistent association 
between teacher accountability instruments and teacher motivation, the interviews that I 
conducted with teachers in Finland and Singapore showed clear evidence of such a relationship. 
As observed in the introduction and methodology chapters, Finland and Singapore have strikingly 
different—but comparably effective—approaches to teacher accountability. As noted in Section 
3.4, Finland and Singapore fall respectively in the lowest and highest quartiles of Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  in 
PISA 2012, PISA 2015, and TALIS 2013. Despite these differences, interview participants in both 
countries regarded teacher accountability instruments as playing a positive causal role in their 
respective systems, to use Cartwright and Hardie’s (2012) terminology. Throughout the rest of this 
chapter, I make the case that this positive causal role takes place (at least partially) via the influence 
of accountability instruments teacher motivation. 
 
To lay the foundation for this argument, in this section I describe each country’s approach to 
teacher accountability, as indicated in Figure 5.2. This description focuses on teacher 
accountability instruments as experienced by my interview participants, although I do cite other 
sources for corroboration and context. 
 
32 Some of the material in this section is modified from a chapter titled ‘Contrasting approaches, comparable 
efficacy? How macro-level trust influences teacher accountability in Finland and Singapore’, which I wrote for a 
volume that is currently in preparation for publication, titled Trust, Accountability, and Capacity in Education System 
Reform: Global Perspectives, edited by Melanie Ehren and Jacqueline Baxter. In particular, material under the 
subsections titled ‘Setting standards’, ‘Collecting information’, and ‘Allocating consequences’ was taken (and, in 
some places, expanded or amended) from the book chapter manuscript. I am the sole author of the book 
chapter, and all data and analysis in the book chapter were carried out as part of this PhD project. All other 
parts of this section were written specifically for this thesis. 
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Figure 5.2   Relationship between Section 5.2 and the overall conceptual framework 
 
 
In the interviews, participants from Finland and Singapore painted very different pictures of the 
accountability instruments they encounter in their work. The matrix in Table 5.6 gives one 
snapshot of the instruments that participants mentioned.  
 
In interpreting this matrix, note that the absence of a symbol does not necessarily mean that the 
participant did not experience the instrument in question. Rather, it simply means that the 
participant did not mention the instrument during the interview, for any number of reasons (e.g. 
Hannele and Geok Ling had tight schedules on the days when we met, so their interviews 
covered less ground). Note also that I specifically asked participants about certain instruments 
(e.g. I asked Finnish participants about discussions with the headmaster and about lesson 
observations; and I asked most participants in both countries about parental feedback), whereas 
my questions on some areas were more general (e.g. ‘What rewards or penalties are there?’), and 
some other areas were only mentioned if the participant brought them up independently (e.g. 
standards for entry into teacher training). Even where the matrix shows that a teacher 
accountability instrument is present in both countries, there may be vast qualitative differences 
between the prevailing versions of the instrument, as I describe below for financial rewards. 
 
One immediate observation from Table 5.6 is that there is more within-country variation in 
teacher accountability instruments in Finland than in Singapore. While Singaporean participants 
differed on the prevalence of a few instruments (performance-oriented interactions with 
colleagues, ad hoc parent feedback, and student feedback), Finnish participants reported 
heterogeneous experiences across most instruments. This is partly because Singapore’s education 
system is highly centralised (Dimmock & Tan, 2013), whereas Finnish municipalities and school 
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leaders can determine many aspects of teacher accountability, within the limits established by 
central government agencies and trade unions (Simola, Rinne, Varjo, Pitkänen, & Kauko, 2009). 
 
Table 5.6   Teacher accountability instruments mentioned by interview participants in Singapore and Finland 
 
 
Another immediate observation is that there appears to be far more extensive use of teacher 
accountability instruments in Singapore than in Finland. The greater extent of accountability 
instruments was likewise evident in the PISA data on Finland and Singapore, as shown in Figure 
5.3. From this figure, it is worth noting that there is reasonably good agreement between these 
principal-reported PISA surveys and the teacher interviews, despite the time lags between the 
2012 and 2015 PISA surveys and the 2018 interviews. For example, based on PISA 2012 data, 
95.7% of school-going Singaporean 15-year-olds were then attending schools where teacher 
appraisals could lead to changes in the likelihood of career advancement (OECD, 2013b, Table 
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IV.4.35); and all 12 Singaporean interview participants similarly said that annual performance 
grades affect promotion speed. 
 
Where there are notable divergences, these are likely due to either (a) information sources, i.e. 
PISA questionnaire answers from principals versus interviews responses from teachers, and (b) 
the design of the data collection instruments. For an example of a divergence due to different 
information sources, 74.9% of Finnish school-going 15-year-olds and 89.8% of their 
Singaporean counterparts were attending schools where teacher appraisal could lead to public 
recognition from the principal, according to PISA 2012 (ibid). However, none of the interview 
participants mentioned such recognition specifically from the principal—although some did 
mention school-level or national-level awards for good teaching practice, with four Singaporean 
participants identifying such awards as a regular occurrence and two Finnish participants saying 
that such recognition may be awarded under certain circumstances. This divergence is likely due 
to teachers and principals having different notions of what constitutes public recognition from 
the principal, or to principals’ ideas of such recognition being too informal or commonplace for 
the interview participants to recall them during the interviews as rewards of good performance. 
As for a divergence due to instrument design, ‘teacher peer review’ in the PISA 2015 school 
questionnaires is much narrower than my interview categories of performance-oriented 
discussions or interactions with managers or colleagues,33 so it is unsurprising that Finnish 
principals in PISA 2015 reported the former far less than my Finnish interview participants 
reported the latter. Overall, though, there is broad agreement between the two sources, which 
strengthens the credibility of the field interviews. 
 
Below, I discuss in greater detail the accountability instruments experienced by interview 
participants. As in Table 5.6 and Figure 5.3, this discussion is organised according to the three 
accountability mechanisms in my conceptual framework: setting standards for teacher practice, 
communicating information about teacher practice, and allocating consequences based on 
judgements of teacher practice. In each subsection, I first discuss the teacher accountability 
instruments that operate via this mechanism in Finland, before turning to those in Singapore. 
 
 
33  In my interview coding, “performance-oriented discussions with managers” and “performance-oriented 
interactions with colleagues”, as shown in Table 5.6, interpret “performance-oriented” in the broad sense of 
helping a teacher to be a better teacher. While “performance-oriented” includes quantified or otherwise 
standardised performance evaluations, in this coding it goes far beyond those terns; also including, for example, 
an interview participant saying that they informally approach their headteacher for advice, or a participant 
saying that they collaborated with colleagues to develop formative assessments for a particular unit. 
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Figure 5.3   Teacher accountability instruments in Singapore and Finland, as reported in the interviews versus 
PISA 2012 and 2015 
 
Note. For the full phrasing of the PISA 2012 and 2015 questionnaire items, see Table 4.2 in the previous chapter. 
Sources: OECD (2013b, Table IV.4.35; 2016a, Tables II.4.33 and II.4.39). 
 
Setting standards 
As discussed in Section 2.5, one of the mechanisms through which teacher accountability 
instruments can influence teacher motivation is by setting standards for teacher practice, thus 
changing the goals or practices to which teachers’ motivation is oriented. To begin with the field 
interviews from Finland, setting high standards for teacher quality is fundamental to Finland’s 
teacher accountability approach. Almost every Finnish interview participant named the national 
curriculum as an accountability instrument. While the curriculum is set at the national level, every 
municipality publishes a localised version of the national curriculum, ‘which, of course, cannot 
be different from the national version, but it’s more specific’, as noted by interview participant 
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Anneli (see also Finnish National Board of Education, 2014). Additionally, subject-specific 
branches of the teachers’ union sometimes publish guidelines or exemplar assessments as 
benchmarks for interpreting curricular standards (as noted by Maarit and Masa). A further source 
of curricular interpretation is the textbooks produced by educational publishers, which many 
teachers rely on for planning their lessons (as noted by Masa and Emilia; see also Crehan, 2016, 
Chapter 4). Even if some teachers may not comply with all the minutiae in the curriculum, they 
still value its standard-setting role. For example, while calling the current curriculum ‘very 
complicated to understand’ and ‘sometimes unclear’, and saying that there were probably some 
curricular expectations that she was not fulfilling, Finnish interview participant Liisa also said: 
Well, we need to have a national curriculum. It’s definitely a ‘must’. If we didn’t have it, 
then we would not have a common ground for the students to continue on to upper 
secondary school. 
Similar observations were made by Antero, Satu, and Päivi. In addition to agreeing that the 
curriculum was important, participants also agreed that it left them substantial freedom in their 
practice. In Anneli’s words, ‘The national curriculum gives us guidelines, but I can still do my 
work the way that I feel is the best way for me, and for my students.’ Some of this freedom 
stems from policy changes in the 1990s that, among other things, abolished the school 
inspection system (Nikki, 2000; Webb, Vulliamy, Häkkinen, & Hämäläinen, 1998). However, 
much of this teacher autonomy is of even longer standing. As early as 1981, the director general 
of Finland’s National Board of General Education spoke to OECD officials about ‘the 
importance of traditional freedom for teachers in Finland to decide about the curriculum’, such 
that ‘[it was] common … for the teacher to decide what issues shall be stressed within the 
syllabus or the textbook’ (as reported in OECD, 1982, p. 81). Thus, Finland’s curriculum plays a 
fundamental role in maintaining common standards alongside teachers’ pedagogical autonomy. 
 
Arguably more important than the curriculum are the standards set by Finland’s famously 
stringent admissions processes for teacher training (Malinen, Väisänen, & Savolainen, 2012; 
Muhonen, 2017), as well as its rigorous, master’s-level teacher training programmes (Sahlberg, 
2015a; Tirri, 2014; Wiksten, 2018). There is an established literature on accountability 
instruments that affect the overall composition of the teaching profession—and, thus, their 
collective levels of motivation—via performance-based consequences such as merit pay, as 
outlined in Section 2.5. Although Finland does not use such consequence-based instruments to 
influence teachers’ self-selection into and out of the profession, it makes significant use of 
standard-setting in teacher training admissions and preservice training to influence the level and 
direction of teacher motivation collectively. The admissions process includes not only academic 
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requirements, but also aptitude assessments that evaluate ‘applicants’ suitability, motivation and 
commitment to teacher education and the teachers’ work’ (Malinen et al., 2012, p. 572; see also 
Sahlberg, 2015b). In turn, preservice training ingrains the expertise that orients future teachers’ 
motivation toward effective principles and practices. Although a few Finnish participants 
mentioned neither the admissions criteria nor the preservice training as accountability 
instruments, as shown in Table 5.6, this is probably because such point-of-entry instruments may 
be taken for granted in teachers’ day-to-day work. Nevertheless, Antero called the stringent 
admissions processes ‘the most important thing’ that Finland’s government can do for the quality 
of teaching. Likewise, Masa said that preservice teacher training was ‘the most influential thing’ 
in teacher-related policy, far more important ‘incentives and disincentives and that kind of 
stuff’.34  
 
In Singapore, teacher training is similarly selective, with one report stating that it admits roughly 
12.5% of applicants (Butrymowicz, 2014), comparable to Finland’s 11% admission rate for 
primary school teacher education programmes in 2016 (Paronen & Lappi, 2018). However, as 
shown in Table 5.6, Singaporean interview participants did not identify teacher training as an 
instrument for teacher accountability. The closest they came was Timothy mentioning that he 
had to apply twice before successfully getting a teacher training scholarship, and Andy saying 
that one of his lecturers had told their class of trainees that ‘sometimes you do need to know 
when to blow your own trumpet’ in order to get a good performance ranking. 
 
Such ranking takes places through Singapore’s Enhanced Performance Management System 
(EPMS). The EPMS is the education ministry’s version of the national civil service appraisal 
system, which was itself based on the performance management system used by the Shell 
Petroleum Company in the 1980s (J.-M. Ho & Koh, 2018; Neo & Chen, 2007; Quah, 2010). 
Central to the EMPS is its teaching career ladder, which has three tracks: teaching, leadership, 
and senior specialist (C. H. Teo, 2001). Every career track has distinct performance standards in 
several key results areas under three outcome categories, which vary according to the teacher’s 
position on the career ladder (Kan, 2014). To illustrate, Joseph said that: 
Under the teaching track, there are three areas that they will look at. The first, nurturing 
the child, will encompass your subject and your form teacher responsibilities, as well as 
aspects of your CCA [i.e. co-curricular activity]. Then you have professional 
 
34  I am grateful to Lucy Crehan for the observation that teacher accountability systems can concentrate their 
quality controls on different junctures, whether the inputs, processes, or outputs of the teaching profession. 
Similarly, Oates (2015) observes that the teaching profession in Finland emphasises ‘front-end restrictions’ 
rather than ‘back-end’ ones (p. 4). 
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development—so, what are the training plans that you have? Another one is 
organisational contribution—so, what are the portfolios and school programmes that 
you actually contribute to? 
Besides EMPS structures, many interview participants also mentioned standard-setting 
instruments within their subject departments. Department-level instruments include timelines for 
syllabus coverage and assessment frequency—as well as targets for student achievement in the 
national standardised exams that loom large over the school system. 
 
Alongside these standard-setting instruments, Singapore’s teacher management system includes 
some developmental structures. Some of these structures may not fall strictly within my 
definition of teacher accountability instruments, but they aim to help teachers to meet the 
accountability standards. For example, every school has a teacher in middle management who is 
designated as the school staff developer. As Eleanor explained, the staff developer considers 
each teacher’s career track and career goals, and ‘will work with the teacher to see what 
professional development this teacher requires in order to get to the next level that he or she 
desires to get to’. Besides the staff developer, every teacher is assigned a reporting officer who is 
responsible for monitoring their performance via the EPMS. Reporting officers, who are 
teachers holding management-level responsibilities in the same school, sometimes offer a great 
deal of support toward meeting standards. For example, Mark described a positive experience 
with a former reporting officer:  
Because I had an RO [reporting officer] who took EPMS very seriously from a 
developmental perspective, I did feel like I was developed well, based on what he and I 
had decided were my goals for the year. And I felt like if I was not on track, the system 
and my school leaders were very willing to say that, ‘Well, it seems like maybe to take 
that next step, you would need to attend a certain training course. Or you might need to 
meet with this senior teacher who’s done this before.’  
Mark’s and Eleanor’s accounts suggest that Singapore’s education system pays a great deal of 
attention to the standards set for each teacher, and invests resources in supporting them to reach 
these goals. However, some participants said that these developmental processes are not 
implemented effectively in their schools, partly because reporting officers are overworked. 
According to Jeffrey, ‘If you get feedback about how to do it better next time, it’s usually in the 
form of scolding. If they even tell you. (laughing) Or if they can be bothered to tell you.’ I 
describe some other aspects of teachers’ interactions with their reporting officers in the next 
subsection.  
 
CHAPTER 5   155 
To summarise, both the Finnish and Singaporean interview participants experience substantial 
teacher accountability via standard-setting. However, the structure and scope of these 
instruments differs considerably. Singapore’s teacher accountability approach includes a 
comprehensive set of nationally mandated standards for individual teachers’ performance in-
service, alongside school- and department-level standards guiding teacher practice collectively. 
These standards can be exacting, but teachers are (or, at least, are meant to be) given 
developmental support to reach these standards. In contrast, Finland sets high standards for 
teachers’ collective motivation via extensive preservice training and stringent selection processes 
to enter the training in the first place. However, in-service teacher practice is circumscribed 
primarily by the national curriculum, which leaves them considerable freedom. 
 
Communicating information 
Besides setting standards, teacher accountability instruments can also attempt to influence 
teacher motivation by collecting and communicating information on teacher practice. In many 
Finnish schools, one source of information on teacher practice is an annual developmental 
discussion between each teacher and their principal (Kumpulainen & Lankinen, 2016; NCEE, 
2016, pp. 5–6). While every Finnish participant mentioned such discussions, as shown in Table 
5.6, some said that these discussions did not take place every year, or that they took place in 
groups of subject teachers rather than as targeted individual reviews. For comparison, in a 2017 
survey, 65% of Finnish teachers said they had had one developmental discussion during the prior 
12 months, 27% said they had had two or more discussions, while 8% said they had not had any 
(OAJ, 2018, p. 31). Most interview participants said that the developmental discussions were 
informal in tone, involved two-way feedback, and did not lead to any follow-up (see also Webb 
et al., 2004, p. 100, for similar observations on a lack of follow-up to self-evaluation processes in 
Finnish schools). In Maarit’s account, 
I think that the sitting down and talking are sometimes forgotten after that. I’ll write 
down something fine, and then we talk, and then the year, every day continues, and 
probably now I don’t even remember what I answered. 
Apart from the developmental discussions, sources of information about teacher practice that 
were identified by Finnish participants include self-initiated collaborations between colleagues 
(e.g. to develop content for a particular unit, or to remedy a classroom problem), and discussions 
or lesson observations triggered by parental complaints. Such parent-triggered instruments 
appear to be rare, with participants mentioning only a few specific incidents over their careers. 
(That said, a few participants did mention that parents have become more demanding in recent 
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years, especially in more socioeconomically privileged areas. Similar observations were also 
reported by Singaporean participants.) 
 
Besides these relatively sparse instruments that communicate information in order to directly 
influence teacher practice, Finnish participants also mentioned some instruments that collect 
information on teacher practice in order to facilitate administrative decisions. For example, even 
though pupils in Finland do not take any national standardised tests until they reach the 
matriculation exam for university entry, the Finnish Education Evaluation Centre administers a 
system of sample-based tests to monitor national educational quality (Andere, 2014, pp. 88–89; 
Vainikainen et al., 2017). However, these sample-based tests do not play an accountability 
function in individual teacher practice. In Kristiina’s words, ‘I have never known anybody, or any 
school, or any teacher who has taken part in them. So they are not related to the everyday work 
of a teacher.’ Below the national level, each of Finland’s municipalities—of which, in 2018, there 
were 311 (Statistics Finland, 2018)—has considerable decision-making power over local 
education (European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2018; Simola et al., 2009). As a result, 
some municipalities frequently collect information from teachers (Emilia: ‘a massive amount of 
different questionnaires’), whereas others do not (Hannele: ‘not at all’). 
 
Contrastingly, under Singapore’s centralised EPMS structures, all teachers regularly report on 
their work through formal channels, which inform annual performance grades. These 
performance grades, which range from A to E (Singapore Teachers’ Union, 2014), are awarded 
based on several sources of information. At the beginning, middle, and end of each school year, 
every teacher is required to document their targets and achievements on an EPMS form, and 
then to discuss their performance toward these targets in a work review session with their 
reporting officer. Teachers are observed in the classroom once a year by their respective 
reporting officers, who also examine a sample of students’ work. These sources of information 
are then discussed at appraisal panels, where reporting officers triangulate each other’s 
observations and compare teachers across each level of the career ladder, before allocating 
performance grades for the year (Singapore MOE, 2018b). This can lead to the sense that 
teachers are constantly under observation by all reporting officers in the school. As Sonia said: 
Every time someone walks by, you know you are being judged. Say you turn up five 
minutes late to the parade ground for assembly, you know that someone out there is 
eyeballing you and marking you down and saying, ‘Okay, this is the person with the so-
called punctuality problem.’ 
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Besides heightening self-consciousness among some teachers, the informational requirements of 
the EPMS generate substantial administrative work for reporting officers, who may have to 
appraise numerous colleagues (Eleanor: ‘sometimes you have got a good ten staff to oversee, 
plus all the other admin work’). 
 
Although EPMS criteria do not formally include student test results, such results may 
nonetheless be used as EPMS performance targets or impact measures (Loh & Hu, 2014, p. 16). 
As shown in Table 5.6, almost all Singaporean participants mentioned accountability pressures 
from tests and exams, whether national exam results at the end of secondary school, or school-
level assessments throughout the year. Another frequently cited teacher accountability 
instrument was parental feedback. Participants gave varying accounts of the frequency and 
intensity of parental feedback, but it was clear that this feedback could sometimes be onerous. 
For instance, Mark said that ‘parents expect the teachers to be on call 24/7 for student needs’, 
and Maggie mentioned that some teachers use phone number masking services when contacting 
parents in order to forestall such 24/7 access. 
 
Interestingly, Finnish and Singaporean participants had similarly mixed views on the extent to 
which professional collaborations with other teachers functioned as an accountability instrument. 
Among Finnish participants, some spoke of regular collaborations, especially with colleagues 
who teach the same subjects. However, others said that collaboration was infrequent or only 
happened in specific situations, such as adapting new curricular requirements to their school’s 
needs. A few noted that levels of collaboration vary from school to school. Partly because of 
these differing levels of collaboration, Finnish participants mentioned different degrees of 
accountability to colleagues, ranging from clear accountability relationships (e.g. Emilia: ‘At least 
in this school, because we collaborate so much, it’s more difficult to do things your own way, or 
to cut corners, or things like that’) to tenuous ones (e.g. Satu: ‘Nobody knows what I do in my 
classroom, [...] only myself and the students, but not my colleagues or the headmaster, nobody’; 
see also Y. Li & Dervin, 2018.). 
 
Likewise, some Singaporean participants did not mention peer collaboration at all; whereas some 
said that they collaborated regularly with colleagues, whether through formal departmental 
structures and professional learning communities, or via informal information-sharing and self-
initiated partnerships. One participant, Maggie, said that most Singaporean teachers ‘hoard their 
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materials and information quite a lot’—but she also described an intensive, yearlong 
collaboration with a colleague as her proudest achievement in teaching. 
 
These similarly mixed pictures of professional collaboration among teachers contradict both the 
image of Finland as a haven of teacher professional collaboration (e.g. Strauss & Sahlberg, 2015), 
and the image of Singaporeans as relentlessly competitive, selfish people (e.g. Pierson, 2019). 
However, beyond professional collaborations, Singaporean participants experienced far more 
informational accountability instruments than their Finnish counterparts, partly because the 
former were subject to the monitoring demands of the EPMS. 
 
Allocating consequences 
Finally, the third teacher accountability mechanism in my framework entails allocating 
consequences based on judgements about teacher practice. Finland’s teacher accountability 
instruments for allocating rewards and penalties are similar to its instruments for collecting 
information on teacher practice: they are usually unobtrusive, and they vary across municipalities. 
Rewards come in the form of small salary supplements for teachers who take on extra tasks that 
are otherwise uncompensated—rather than bonuses based on how well teachers have performed 
their tasks. Some of these supplements are part of the union-negotiated salary structure, while 
others come from the municipality’s discretionary budget. Supplements from the discretionary 
budget are allocated in different ways (e.g. Antero: based on the principal’s decision; Liisa: based 
on an application to the municipality) and for different tasks, whether routine (e.g. Kristiina: ‘if 
you take care of the annual choir performances at the school’) or ad hoc (e.g. Emilia: ‘a project 
which has touched the whole school’; Juhani: ‘when there’s been renovations in some schools, 
and you had to figure out new ways of teaching and change places a lot’). 
 
Although there may be some element of merit in awarding the supplements for ad hoc tasks or 
in how the routine tasks are allocated, most Finnish participants did not regard these 
supplements as merit based. In Masa’s words: 
I see that as, ‘If you want to do this crap job, then we’ll give you money for it.’ And 
some crazy person is going to be okay with that, whereas the rest are like, ‘Phew, thank 
goodness I don’t have to do it.’ 
Different municipalities distribute these salary supplements differently, and they can be so 
inconspicuous that two participants from the same school disagreed about whether or not these 
supplements existed. Where they do exist, interview participants regarded them as token sums 
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(e.g. Liisa: ‘around a hundred euros a month’; Emilia: ‘a gift card somewhere for fifty euros or 
something’; Satu: ‘the [salary] difference is very low, maybe you can buy one movie ticket’). As 
for penalties, besides the developmental actions that can be triggered by parental complaints, the 
only penalty participants identified is being fired for egregious misconduct, such as drunkenness 
or physical violence in school. 
 
In contrast, every teacher in Singapore is eligible for an annual performance bonus—or subject 
to career progression penalties—based on their EPMS performance grade. According to Mark, 
top-performing teachers can receive bonuses of up to 3.5 months’ salary. Performance grades 
also affect the speed at which teachers are promoted along the career ladder. Additionally, good 
performance grades render teachers eligible for funded study leave (as noted by Maggie), whereas 
unsatisfactory grades lead to developmental coaching and extra monitoring (as noted by Jane and 
Joseph) and, eventually, firing (as noted by Maggie and Mark; see also Singapore Teachers’ 
Union, 2014, 2015). 
 
A noteworthy feature of Singapore’s EPMS is that performance grades do not derive solely from 
EPMS standards. Rather, as Geok Ling observed, ‘It’s criterion-referenced, and then it’s also 
norm-referenced.’ Within each school, performance grades are awarded on a forced curve that 
benchmarks teachers against colleagues of the same level of the career ladder. Official guidelines 
about the EPMS grading system are not publicly available, but one non-Ministry source says that 
approximately 30% of teachers receive A or B grades, 65% receive C grades, and 5% receive D 
or E grades (McMillan, 2017; see also Bruns & Luque, 2014). (In addition to their substantive 
grade, i.e. their rung of the career ladder, and their annual performance grade, every Singaporean 
teacher is also rated on their ‘currently estimated potential’ [CEP], which reflects managers’ 
expectations of the highest substantive grade the teacher will attain prior to retirement. A 
teacher’s CEP is never disclosed to them, but it shapes their professional development 
opportunities and the speed at which they are promoted [Neo & Chen, 2007; Quah, 2010; C. H. 
Teo, 2018]. Interview participants confirmed that they did not know their own CEPs.) However, 
despite its inbuilt competitiveness, and despite participants’ acknowledgement that the fairness of 
the grading system could vary vastly across schools and reporting officers, the EPMS did not 
appear to undermine collegiality among teachers. In Andy’s words, ‘We do recognise those who 
are deserving of credit because [...] something about them enables them to go above and beyond 
for the students, and we don’t begrudge them if they are rewarded accordingly.’ 
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Summary 
Finland’s approach to teacher accountability, as experienced by the interview participants, 
depends heavily on standards. These standards are set at the point of entry into the teaching 
profession, with selection processes for teacher training ensuring that those who enter the 
profession are capable and highly motivated, and the subsequent training ensuring that teachers 
know how to do their jobs well. Strikingly, Finnish participant Päivi suggested that these 
standards are not only sustained, but also strengthened, as teachers continue in their service. An 
experienced teacher who had once spent a stint in school leadership before choosing to return to 
classroom teaching, Päivi said: 
When I was the headmaster, I had the idea that when young teachers come to the 
school, then we could learn so many new things from them. […] But then I saw that, 
after a year or two, new teachers are just the same as old teachers. […] But I wouldn’t 
change it. Teachers are kind and they are caring and they are hoping for the children’s 
best. And that’s the way it is. 
These selected, socialised, and trained teachers are then accorded considerable autonomy in their 
classroom work, with few informational and consequential accountability instruments. In 
Helena’s words, ‘because the accountability system is so light, it actually works through the 
negative’. That is, rather than actively monitoring teachers’ performance, the system hinges on 
the probability that student dissatisfaction with subpar teaching would trigger complaints to the 
principal, which would in turn trigger remedial action. Helena also observed that: 
You don’t need as many control tools when the assumption is that we teachers are 
professionals who know their job and have the skills, and that we are all interested in 
the same goals and in delivering the curriculum. 
This reflected a general view among interview participants that Finland’s teacher accountability 
instruments are effective in supporting desirable educational outcomes. 
 
Singapore’s teacher accountability approach is far more extensive, depending on an interlocking 
system of standards, monitoring, and consequences within the annual EPMS cycle. Nonetheless, 
Singaporean participants likewise endorsed the efficacy of the accountability instruments they 
experienced. (See also Section 4.4, where I discuss participants’ negative responses when asked 
what would happen if Singapore adopted Finland’s teacher accountability approach, or vice 
versa.) In Mark’s view: 
I really do think that the EPMS works well for the identification of teachers who are in 
need of support, and the identification of teachers who are in need of greater 
opportunity in order to stretch them for greater impact. I also think that, on a simple 
day-to-day level, […] it helps to guide the work of every general education officer and 
senior education officer in the system. […] Now, from an incentives perspective, it 
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certainly incentivises hard work, if it’s done fairly. 
Like Mark, many other participants from Singapore agreed that the EPMS was effective on the 
whole, while indicating some degree of reservation about whether the system was uniformly fair. 
For example, Peter observed that the EPMS 
has to be taken with a pinch of salt as well, especially since certain things just cannot be 
captured by these measurements. But certainly it ensures that what you’re doing is 
visible to others, to your reporting officer, and that it matters—it counts toward 
something. And it also incentivises people to really work hard, because just being seen 
to be skiving would ultimately be reflected in a lower performance grade. 
Thus, despite the acknowledged limitations of the standardised EPMS in encompassing teachers’ 
multifaceted work, this combination of monitoring and rewards does influence teacher 
motivation and practice considerably. 
 
Nevertheless, the extent of this influence varies across teachers. Peter continued his observations 
by remarking,  
Having said that, I think if someone is just set on cruising, she’ll probably cruise 
regardless, you know? For teachers who give tuition [i.e. private tutoring] outside of 
school, they honestly may be fine with just getting a D for a performance grade, or a C. 
Doing the bare minimum that’s expected in school, because they don’t see that as a 
priority. So it does provide an incentive, but it incentivises people who want to do well 
anyway. 
Later in this chapter, I explore how the effects of teacher accountability instruments depend on 
teachers’ individual priorities and perspectives. 
 
5.3 The effects of accountability instruments on teacher motivation in 
Finland and Singapore 
Having described the accountability instruments that interview participants encounter, I turn to 
the effects that these instruments can have on teacher motivation. As indicated in Figure 5.4, in 
this section I focus on the effects of teacher accountability instruments jointly, rather than 
distinguishing between instruments that use different accountability mechanisms. 
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Figure 5.4   Relationship between Section 5.3 and the overall conceptual framework 
 
 
All 24 of the interview participants described multiple ways in which teacher accountability 
instruments influence their motivation or the motivation of the teachers around them. Their 
responses are summarised in Table 5.7. This table shows not only the intended effects of teacher 
accountability instruments, but also their undesirable side effects (Zhao, 2017, 2018). I classify 
intended effects as either raising teacher motivation (i.e. prompting teacher to work harder) or 
reorienting teacher motivation (i.e. prompting teachers to work differently, in ways that serve 
system-level goals). Side effects are: (a) demotivating teachers and generating stress; (b) 
introducing conflicting priorities, when accountability instruments prompt teachers to focus on 
tasks that they do not regard as central to their teaching practice; and (c) time-consuming 
paperwork, as a special case of conflicting priorities. Where there was ambiguity in whether an 
outcome was an intended effect or side effect, I relied on participants’ judgements of whether a 
given effect was desirable or undesirable. I recognise that participants’ evaluations of the 
desirability or undesirability of an effect may not match the intentions of those who initiated the 
accountability instrument. For the most part, however, there was little ambiguity about whether 
an effect was educationally and professionally positive or negative. 
 
Note that this table does not include the effects of one-off or spontaneous accountability-related 
interactions among colleagues, because such interactions lack the regularity to qualify as ‘tools, 
practices, or structures’, as in my definition of teacher accountability instruments. However, the 
table does include self-initiated practices that take place among colleagues with some regularity, 
such as informally but regularly troubleshooting with colleagues teaching the same subject. 
Neither does it include the effects of point-of-entry standards (e.g. teacher training admissions 
criteria) that can influence the collective level of teacher motivation, because I did not ask 
participants about such standards directly. Also, the table makes a distinction between 
accountability instruments having an effect on participants themselves and having an effect on 
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other teachers whom they know. However, in the discussion below, I do not draw a sharp 
distinction between these two categories, since this difference derives partly from participants’ 
phrasing (e.g. ‘we teachers feel …’ would be categorised as ‘self’, whereas ‘teachers tend to feel 
…’ would be categorised as ‘others’), and it is not central to this analysis. 
 
Table 5.7   Effects of teacher accountability instruments on teacher motivation in Singapore and Finland 
 
Note. This table summarises interview participants’ descriptions of the effects of teacher accountability instruments 
collectively, without distinguishing between particular instruments or mechanisms. The table does not include (a) 
one-off interactions that were autonomously initiated by teachers (e.g. spontaneous, informal encouragement); and 
(b) instruments that focus on the point of entry into the teaching profession (i.e. teacher training and selection). 
 
As shown in Table 5.7, every interview participant mentioned instances of accountability 
instruments reorienting teachers’ motivation toward particular tasks or goals. Also, every 
Singaporean participant and almost every Finnish participant reported instances where 
accountability instruments changed the level of teacher motivation, whether this desirably raised 
or undesirably lowered motivation levels. Most Singaporean teachers also observed that 
accountability instruments could introduce conflicting priorities and/or burdensome paperwork, 
whereas only a few Finnish participants reported such effects. 
 
In Finland, motivation-raising instruments often took the form of informal feedback. For 
example, Antero said that ‘the main motivator’ was: 
when my principal says something good to me, that ‘I am proud of you. You have done 
a very good job. Thank you for helping me.’ The words, they are very effective. 
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A few Finnish participants also said that another aspect of teacher accountability that contributed 
to their motivation was the autonomy enshrined in Finland’s approach to standard-setting. In 
Helena’s words: 
[The accountability instruments] affect my work in that I have the freedom to do what 
I think is necessary for each group, for each subject, for each topic. […] If I don’t have 
to tell anyone what my lesson objectives are, I can change them halfway, because it’s 
Friday afternoon, and things just aren’t working out. […] So it gives me the mental 
freedom to be flexible, and to change things, and to try new things. 
While Helena did not explicitly say that this principle of autonomy raises her motivation, the 
inclination to ‘try new things’ does indicate healthy levels of motivation. As I discuss in Section 
6.3, Helena’s observation aligns with Deci and Ryan’s (2000) argument that a sense of autonomy 
is crucial to intrinsic motivation. 
 
In Singapore, many participants identified performance targets as a motivation-raising 
instrument. For example, Adeline said that: 
Without the target-setting of, ‘You should at least try to aim for this,’ I’m someone who 
very easily lowers my expectations to just suit whatever is enough to tide me over. 
Middle manager Eleanor (Singapore) noted a change from her early days in her school, when ‘we 
were very much like a kampung [i.e. village community]’, to a recent push from the school board 
and the Ministry to enter a partnership with another school: 
And of course if you’re pushed toward partnership, then who wants to marry you if 
your standards are not so high, right? (laughter) So we had to say, ‘Okay, make sure that 
we get all these grades,’ and we pushed our students to that level. 
Thus, motivation-raising targets can operate at either the individual level, as in Adeline’s account, 
or at the school level, as in Eleanor’s. 
 
Besides raising motivation levels, accountability instruments also reorient teachers’ motivation 
and effort toward particular priorities. For most Finnish participants, this meant aligning their 
teaching with the curriculum. As Emilia said: 
Of course, I follow the curriculum. That’s what we do. […] But how I actually choose 
to execute it in my classroom, that’s up to me. And the main thing is that I can check at 
the end of the day that, ‘Okay, I’ve covered this. And I think my students have learned 
how this is done.’ But it’s not something that I think about that much. (laughter) 
Unlike this relatively loose alignment to accountability standards, Singaporean participants 
described more demanding alignments. According to Sonia: 
The EPMS is something that drives all the teachers in Singapore. A lot of us peg 
ourselves to the targets set for us, set by us, according to this EPMS framework, just to 
ensure that we do not end up being penalised. Because the penalty system if you don’t 
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meet their criteria can be rather severe, in my opinion. 
For example, Sonia noted that ‘these accountability instruments kind of force you to try out new 
things’ because ‘managers look favourably’ on teachers who try new pedagogical tools. More 
constructively, several participants said that EPMS structures give them useful insight into where 
they should channel efforts to improve their work. 
 
However, teacher accountability instruments can have negative side effects. Although Sonia 
(Singapore) said that a positive session with her reporting officer can make her feel ‘affirmed’, 
she added that: 
Sometimes, if you’ve just come out of a very bad review session—and when I say ‘very 
bad’ I mean that you feel the feedback is unfair—it does affect your motivation quite a 
bit. And sometimes you just feel like, ‘Okay, I wish I could just quit and resign!’ 
Thus, EPMS instruments that aim to develop teachers’ practice and raise their motivation can 
instead lower teachers’ motivation. Moreover, Sonia viewed the ‘pitting of one teacher against 
another’ in the EPMS ranking process as ‘the major flaw’ of the system, because it makes 
teachers’ work ‘very, very stressful’. Most Singaporean participants similarly highlighted the 
ambivalent effects of EPMS, as well the pressure generated by its competitive rankings. As 
reporting officer Jane noted, 
It feels good to affirm someone, to help someone to grow. But to monitor a person 
and to give an adverse performance grade, it’s very draining, honestly. It’s draining. 
Hence, EPMS rankings place considerable pressure not only on those receiving the grades, but 
also on those allocating them.35  
 
In Finland, some participants mentioned that they can be demotivated not by onerous or unfair 
feedback, but rather by the absence of any feedback. In Hannele’s words: 
I would like to have more, ‘Thank you,’ or, ‘You did well.’ But you can understand that 
these teenagers, they don’t normally […] say that. So I’m hoping that the headmaster 
would sometimes come to the classroom, and know more about your work, and give 
you feedback. Good or bad. 
 
35  To alleviate such pressure, some reporting officers award adverse D grades not strictly on the basis of 
performance, but based on the anticipated consequences of such grades or other justifications. For example, the 
Singapore Teachers’ Union (2009) observed that D grades may unexpectedly and undeservedly be awarded to 
teachers who are transferring to another school (and thus will no longer encounter their former reporting 
officer face-to-face), teachers who are approaching retirement (and thus will not be impacted by promotion-
related penalties), or teachers who have been on maternity leave for part of the year (and thus had not 
contributed as much to annual school outcomes as their colleagues had). The latter strategy was corroborated 
by one of my Singaporean friends, who said that her mother, a long-time reporting officer, always felt relieved 
whenever any of the teachers who report to her went on maternity leave, because this meant that she could 
award her expected quota of D grades with fewer qualms. 
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Päivi mentioned similar sentiments among some of her colleagues, while saying that she did not 
feel such a need herself, because she valued feedback from ‘pupils and their mothers and fathers’ 
over feedback from the principal. However, Liisa cautioned that parental feedback is ‘not always 
positive’, having witnessed Finnish colleagues who ‘got such bad feedback’ at a parents’ day ‘that 
they were crying afterwards’. 
 
Besides potentially causing undue stress, another side effect is that teacher accountability 
instruments can impose priorities that conflict with teachers’ personal goals. As shown in Table 
5.7, this was more prevalent among Singaporean participants. (Similar observations have been 
made in prior studies of Singaporean teachers, e.g. Loh, 2016; Loh & Hu, 2014.) According to 
Timothy: 
EPMS has many different criteria, right. So, as with many teachers, I find it a bit hard to 
focus on what, to me, is the essence of what I’m trying to do, when there are 
expectations of you in other areas. Like, ‘Oh, have I shared this with someone yet?’ 
And then, ‘Do I need to be a “knowledgeable other” to help this other colleague doing 
blah blah blah?’ […] Or, ‘Have I made sure that I have enhanced the character of my 
CCA [co-curricular activity] students?’ […] By nature, the job of a teacher now—at 
least in our school system—very much requires multitasking. 
Singaporean participants were especially critical of the numerous non-teaching requirements of 
their jobs. As Geok Ling put it, ‘I didn’t come into this job to be an event organiser.’ However, 
Mark accepted that such organisational responsibilities were part of the job, noting that, ‘MOE 
calls us education officers—not teachers—in their official parlance.’ He estimated that teaching-
related work ‘probably only takes up 40 percent of a teacher’s time’, with the balance going to 
committee work, co-curricular tasks, and the like. Accountability-related expectations also affect 
time allocations within the classroom. Adeline noted that, in a ‘time crunch’ when she has to 
‘meet all these teaching expectations’, then her teaching can get ‘a bit rushed’, or she may decide 
‘not to do a group activity, instead I will just do frontal teaching’. More generally, several 
participants bemoaned the volume of paperwork they faced, whether from EPMS structures (e.g. 
filling in EPMS forms or compiling students’ work to be reviewed by a reporting officer) or 
other administrative processes (e.g. Jeffrey enumerated 12 required steps for booking a bus for a 
student excursion).  
 
While Finland’s lighter accountability system meant that most participants did not mention any 
tension between personal priorities and accountability expectations, Maarit noted that her work 
as an assistant headteacher sometimes impinged on the time that she would have otherwise used 
for lesson planning. She added that teachers had to fill in ‘all kinds of forms on all kinds of 
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students’, which ‘takes a lot of effort’. Compatriot Emilia likewise mentioned that she was 
required to fill in a ‘massive amount of different questionnaires’, which sometimes ‘gets quite 
tiring’.36 Additionally, Juhani said that some Finnish teachers inflate students’ grades in order to 
appease parental demands—another perverse side effect of accountability. 
 
Apart from the motivation-related effects that I focus on in this section, Singaporean 
participants identified some other side effects from their country’s approaches to teacher 
accountability, which are not included in Table 5.7. For example, Timothy noted that the 
competitive EPMS rankings can reduce collegiality among teachers—although, as mentioned in 
the previous section, Andy and some other interview participants would dispute this. Also, the 
added pressure of higher-level responsibilities can make some teachers reluctant to be promoted 
(as noted by Sonia, Jeffrey, Eleanor, and Timothy), and prompt some managers to coerce their 
subordinates into additional tasks that bolster the manager’s performance ranking (as noted by 
Joseph and Andy). 
 
5.4 Mechanisms, perceptions, and pathways in teacher accountability 
In addressing the question of how teacher motivation mediates the influence of teacher 
accountability instruments on student outcomes, I adopt a realist perspective that looks for the 
mechanisms that actually generate these changes in teacher motivation. (For the theoretical basis 
of this approach, see Sections 2.5 and 3.1.) I posit three key mechanisms through which 
accountability instruments aim to influence teacher motivation: setting standards, collecting 
information, and allocating consequences. Each of these mechanisms influences teacher 
motivation in different ways, as discussed in Section 2.5. In this section, I explore interview 
participants’ experiences of how each mechanism can influence teacher motivation, as indicated 
in Figure 5.5. Accordingly, I place less emphasis on comparison between Finland and Singapore, 
and more emphasis on how teacher accountability mechanisms affect teacher motivation across 
both contexts. (As noted in Section 2.5, these mechanisms that link accountability instruments to 
changes in teacher motivation constitute only one step along the pathway to influencing student 
 
36  Emilia said that some of the questionnaires came from the central government, whereas some came from the 
municipality, and others were only for Swedish-speaking schools within her municipality. Some questionnaires 
were also issued by external organisations that were conducting research. I do not know definitively why 
teachers in Emilia’s school faced so many questionnaires while most other interview participants did not. 
Possible reasons include the management approach of her municipal officers; as well as the fact that she taught 
at a Swedish-speaking school. Since there are far fewer Swedish-speaking than Finnish-speaking schools, the 
former may be more likely to be selected for sample-based reporting processes. 
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outcomes. Unfortunately, given time and space constraints, I was unable to collect any empirical 
data that connect changes in teacher motivation to changes in student outcomes. I address this 
evidence gap further in Section 5.5 and in Chapter 7.) 
 
Figure 5.5   Relationship between Section 5.4 and the overall conceptual framework 
 
 
Table 5.8 summarises the accountability mechanisms that each interview participant mentioned, 
grouped by whether the mechanism affected teacher motivation in intended or undesirable ways. 
As such, this table is a form of cross-tabulation of Table 5.6, which grouped teacher 
accountability instruments by their underlying mechanisms, and Table 5.7, which categorised the 
effects of teacher accountability instruments. Crucially, every motivational change that 
participants identified could be traced to one of these three mechanisms, or to two or more of 
these mechanisms operating in concert. This suggests that the mechanisms presented in the 
conceptual framework may be an adequate characterisation of how teacher accountability 
instruments influence teacher motivation, at least in these two countries (given that the 
interviews reached saturation in each country). 
 
Among Finnish participants, all identified effects from instruments that use the standard-setting 
mechanism, as shown in Table 5.8. Such standards can have considerable sway over the direction 
of teacher practice, even in the absence of formal monitoring or rewards and penalties. Liisa said 
that: 
Now we have a new curriculum in Finland. […] The principal is not directing the work 
in such a way that, ‘You have to meet at 2 o’clock tomorrow to discuss this new 
curriculum.’ But we just know that we’re supposed to do it. And then I gathered people 
together and we discussed it and selected books for it. So we’re very independent. 
Standards-setting instruments can exert a similarly powerful effect on teacher practice in 
Singapore. Maggie noted that Singaporeans like ‘knowing exactly what is expected’, and that ‘they 
really like to do it to the letter […] even if it’s optional’. Maggie viewed this desire to comply 
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exactly with standards as ‘very unhealthy, really’. Thus, Liisa (Finland) and Maggie (Singapore) 
represent two different contexts, and two different opinions on the merits of complying with 
standard-setting instruments, but they both recognise the potential efficacy of these instruments 
in orienting teachers’ work. Standalone standard-setting instruments operate passively in concert 
with teachers’ pre-existing motivations—as in Liisa’s (Finland) account of changing her practice 
in response to the new curriculum simply because she knew that she was ‘supposed to do it’. 
 
Table 5.8   The mechanisms underlying teacher accountability instruments, by their intended and unintended 
effects on teacher motivation in Finland and Singapore 
 
 
In turn, informational instruments influence teacher motivation via their consciousness that 
stakeholders are actively comparing them to a set of standards, as noted in Section 2.5. When 
asked how accountability instruments affect his work, Timothy (Singapore) responded: 
It’s always at the back of one’s mind. […] Yeah, because you know that there are other 
people who are watching you, so to speak. […] I would consider it a negative 
motivation, or not the most desired form of motivation. But at least it helps to spur you 
on when you are drained. 
Beyond my field interviews, a similar observation was made by another Singaporean teacher: ‘I 
feared to let my guard down [in front of my reporting officer] as I felt that I was constantly being 
assessed’ (Ahmad, 2016, p. 111). Finnish participant Maarit offered a more benign example of 
the informational mechanism: 
A week ago, the special education teacher advised me that maybe these two students 
shouldn’t sit so near each other. Because I’m hopeless at doing very strict seating 
orders. (laughter) So that was a hint. Of course I knew it, but I just didn’t care. 
(laughter) But now I try to be more strict, so that they aren’t sitting together. 
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Thus, the awareness that a colleague was aware of her non-optimal seating arrangements 
prompted Maarit to channel more effort in that direction. 
 
Two observations are worth noting at this point. Firstly, as with the standard-setting mechanism, 
the effects of the informational mechanism are not uniformly positive. For example, Liisa 
(Finland) said that informal monitoring by colleagues can lead to excessive conformity to ‘certain 
ways’ in which teachers are expected to behave, because ‘it’s like there are a lot of little 
policemen around you’. She added that it was ‘easier’ to conform to behavioural expectations, at 
least ‘if you want to be friends with your co-workers’. Additionally, Liisa mentioned that, despite 
believing in the value of integrating technology into learning, she no longer assigned homework 
that required the use of a computer, because one parent had protested angrily because they did 
not want their child to use computers at home. Similarly, Finnish participants Masa and Juhani, 
as well as Singaporean participant Maggie, reported making what they viewed as peripheral 
modifications to their teaching practice in order to accede to parental feedback. 
 
Secondly, from interview participants’ accounts, there is no clear distinction between the 
mechanisms underlying instruments that communicate information informally (and/or to 
colleagues), and those that communicate information for official or codified purposes (and/or to 
managers and external stakeholders). As noted in Section 2.5, I had initially posited a mechanism 
that affected teachers’ motivation via their desire to maintain professional reputations and 
collegial camaraderie, as distinct from the main informational mechanism. I anticipated that the 
reputational mechanism would be associated with informal, social monitoring, whereas the main 
informational mechanism would be linked to formalised instruments. However, in the interview 
data there was no obvious analytical difference between the motivational mechanisms in 
participants’ descriptions of reluctantly changing their practice in response to informal 
monitoring (as in Liisa’s account of how ‘it’s like there are a lot of little policemen around you’), 
as compared to monitoring linked to codified instruments (as in Timothy’s account of how ‘you 
know that there are other people who are watching you, so to speak’). There was also little 
difference between participants’ descriptions of instances where they welcomed accountability-
related feedback that was informally offered by fellow professionals, compared to instances 
where such constructive feedback emerged from formal structures or from managers and 
parents. Accordingly, I concluded that all of these instruments worked via teachers’ desire to be 
regarded favourably when information about their practice, whether formally or informally 
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collected, is benchmarked against stakeholder expectations, whether the stakeholders are 
colleagues or others. 
 
The final mechanism through which accountability instruments can influence teacher motivation 
entails the allocation of consequences for teacher practice. The force of such instruments arises 
from the desire to gain rewards and avoid punishments. As Geok Ling remarked on Singapore’s 
EPMS: 
You know that, ‘Okay, they’re going to grade me like this, and this is how I can get 
more because of the bonus.’ So people will drive their behaviour towards the criteria. 
[…] But you can argue that it’s a necessary devil; it’s a double-edged sword. While it 
may raise the standard and it motivates some, because they see it as an affirmation, it 
will also demoralise some. 
Other Singaporean participants echoed her observations both on the strong influence of EPMS 
consequences, and on their varied effects on teacher motivation. In contrast, as shown in Table 
5.8, most Finnish participants did not mention any consequence-related effects, since such 
instruments are sparse in their context. However, Antero noted that Finland’s salary 
supplements, though small, could make colleagues ‘a little bit jealous, of course’. On the other 
hand, compatriots Kristiina, Satu, and Liisa mentioned that the absence of performance-based 
consequences (and the fact that many teachers hold permanently tenured positions) meant that 
some teachers lacked the motivation to work hard. 
 
Teacher accountability instruments often invoke multiple, interacting mechanisms for 
influencing teacher motivation. Singaporean participant Peter, who had recently been promoted 
to a middle-management role, said that: 
If my job title is in some ways an accountability instrument, having that subject head 
position now is something that’s at the back of my mind. […] It has changed my 
outlook of who I am as a teacher. […] Because I know that my performance is going to 
be evaluated in the lens of being a subject head, I guess that shifts my focus a little 
when it comes to how much I’m involved in things that aren’t subject-related. 
Thus, the expectations (standard-setting) associated with being a subject head alongside the 
awareness that his ‘performance is going to be evaluated’ (information-communicating) had 
influenced Peter to the extent of ‘chang[ing] [his] outlook of who [he is] as a teacher’. This is 
noteworthy since Peter explicitly said elsewhere that he did not value the consequences allocated 
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under the EPMS system.37 Nonetheless, one such consequence—his promotion to subject 
headship—operated in tandem with other accountability instruments to channel his motivation 
in accordance with EPMS performance standards. 
 
The linchpin: how teachers regard accountability instruments 
As shown above, teacher accountability instruments can shape teacher motivation via different 
mechanisms, and these mechanisms can have substantial effects. However, as argued in Section 
2.4, a teacher accountability instrument will only influence teacher motivation as intended if 
teachers regard the instrument as sufficiently persuasive. This persuasiveness can come from a 
range of sources, such as: regarding performance standards as being aligned with one’s personal 
beliefs about teaching, valuing the esteem of the stakeholders who monitor teacher practice, or 
desiring the offered rewards. To illustrate, Sonia (Singapore) said that Ministry expectations of 
teachers ‘converge quite a bit’ with what she prioritises in her profession, thus indicating that at 
least some of the government’s standard-setting instruments are meaningful to her. At another 
point in the interview, she said, ‘Singapore has this idea of pride, you know. If a teacher were to 
get a D grade, there is a lot of hurt to their pride.’ This indicates her expectation that the typical 
Singaporean teacher would regard EPMS performance grades as a compelling informational 
instrument to which they want to measure up. Furthermore, when discussing performance 
bonuses, Sonia said, ‘Let’s face it: over here, people are money-motivated—we need the money.’ 
This suggests that EPMS bonuses are a desirable incentive for good performance. 
 
Potential influence notwithstanding, teachers have diverse views of accountability instruments. 
This diversity is apparent in their heterogeneous responses to the same set accountability 
instruments. When discussing Finland’s light-touch approach to teacher accountability, Satu 
observed that: 
The freedom for me is like, ‘I can do everything.’ (laughter) ‘I can make a hundred 
exercises for the students if I want to.’ And some of my colleagues think that even one 
exercise is too much. So the freedom has two sides. 
Thus, a single accountability instrument can have divergent effects on teacher motivation. Similar 
encounters with colleagues who put in minimal effort were related by Finnish participants 
Maarit, Liisa, and Hannele, as well as Singaporean participants Jane, Peter, Maggie, Joseph. Also, 
 
37  Specifically, Peter said elsewhere in the interview that informal affirmations from students give him ‘greater 
validation than seeing that B grade for my performance at the end of the year’. Furthermore, in responding to 
the hypothetical question about Singapore adopting Finland’s teacher accountability approach, he said that the 
removal of performance bonuses ‘wouldn’t make a difference for me; I would want to teach well anyway’. 
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Joseph noted that different teachers may direct their energies toward different priorities, even 
under the same EPMS standards: 
It depends on individual teachers and their convictions. For me, I believe that nurturing 
the child’s character is more important. So if I need to, I would focus more on the child 
rather than on the lesson. 
He drew a distinction between teachers who join the profession because they intrinsically value 
teaching, and those who ‘are in it for the money only’. Thus, whether in Singapore’s extensive in-
service accountability system or Finland’s front-loaded, standards-focused approach, teachers’ 
personal perspectives on accountability instruments shape their responses to accountability 
instruments—and, consequently, the efficacy of these instruments within the school system. 
 
One implication of this is that teachers who do not genuinely agree with a standard-setting 
accountability instrument may only comply with it superficially. As Maggie (Singapore) said, 
Let’s say you have a top-down policy implementation. If you didn’t trust [the teachers] 
with the discussion beforehand, then when you do implement it, they would just do 
whatever it takes to survive, and it might not turn out the way you want it. Like, they 
will modify it, just to placate you and show you some semblance of what you want to 
see. 
Singaporean participant Eleanor agreed. When discussing her school’s attempt to promote a new 
pedagogical approach, she noted that ‘you need to have buy-in’ from teachers. In the absence of 
such buy-in, that teachers would follow managers’ recommendations during lesson observations 
‘just for show’, but would revert to routine pedagogies at other times, as Eleanor observed. Such 
superficial implementation can occur partly because teachers, like other client-facing public 
servants, serve multiple goals that cannot easily be monitored, as noted in Section 2.1. Moreover, 
teachers often face more expectations than can be feasibly fulfilled—and they differ in how 
selectively they prioritise their work. Päivi (Finland) noted that some of her younger colleagues 
felt exhausted from attempting to meet every stated standard and expectation, whereas her 
stance was that, ‘you do those things that you feel are important, and you do those things well’, 
because ‘no one can make [her] job or [her] situation any worse’ if she failed to meet their excess 
expectations. (Päivi added the caveat that ‘if you do something very, very wrong, then it’s okay 
[for other stakeholders] to say that you can’t do this work’, i.e. that you should leave the 
profession. In her view, professional autonomy should be enjoyed and safeguarded, but it was 
not unlimited.) 
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In turn, consequence-based accountability instruments may fail to deliver their intended effects if 
teachers do not regard the incentives as sufficiently appealing. For example, Jane (Singapore) said 
that: 
Sometimes the ‘smart’ ones will think, ‘Why do you want to put in so much effort and 
time? I might as well cruise a little, get a C grade, and give tuition [i.e. private tutoring].’ 
Elsewhere, Jane commented that despite the magnitude of EPMS performance bonuses, ‘tuition 
is much more lucrative’. (Peter made a similar remark, as quoted in Section 5.2 above.) Estimates 
from the Singapore government’s Household Expenditure Survey 2017–18 suggest that private 
tuition was a S$1.4 billion (approximately US$1 billion) industry in 2018, with the average 
household spending more money on private tuition than on clothing (Singapore Department of 
Statistics, 2019; Teng, 2019). Besides financial considerations, Jeffrey (Singapore) noted that 
‘some teachers aren’t keen to be promoted up the career ladder’, because ‘as a senior teacher you 
have to take on the responsibility of mentoring others, which most people can’t be bothered 
with because they’d rather just teach’ (see Ang, 2016, for a similar sentiment). Thus, for such 
teachers, the prestige and salary increment of a promotion does not outweigh the undesirable 
burden of responsibility. 
 
Additionally, both consequential and informational accountability instruments may prove 
ineffective when they are perceived as unfair. When asked how the EPMS affects her motivation, 
Maggie said: 
When it’s used correctly, it motivates me a lot, regardless of whether I just get a normal 
C grade or not. But when you don’t feel it’s fair, […] then you feel trapped. You feel 
that whatever effort you put in is not worth it. 
These sentiments were echoed by compatriots Timothy, Sonia, Peter, and Joseph. I discuss such 
perceptions of fairness and their interaction with Singapore’s sociocultural context in Section 6.3. 
 
The above examples are not a comprehensive catalogue of ways in which teacher accountability 
mechanisms fail to have their intended effects. Rather, they demonstrate that these mechanisms 
are contingent on the perspectives of those whom they seek to influence. 
 
An alternative pathway: changing stakeholder decisions 
As detailed above, teacher accountability instruments have the potential to affect the level and 
orientation of teacher motivation extensively. However, as posited in my conceptual framework, 
there is another pathway by which teacher accountability instruments can affect student 
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outcomes. Besides the teacher motivation pathway, accountability instruments can also 
communicate information on teacher practice to stakeholders, who then use this information to 
make decisions that aim to optimise student learning. Whereas changes in teacher motivation can 
result from the informational, consequential, or standard-setting mechanisms, changes in 
stakeholder decisions depend primarily on the informational mechanism, as noted in Section 2.5. 
 
I did not explicitly ask participants about this second pathway, but some addressed it 
nonetheless. Satu (Finland) mentioned some municipal feedback mechanisms, remarking that: 
It’s just a way to transfer the results to higher levels, but it doesn’t come down to me 
again. […] The municipality gives the money and the guidelines about what work you 
have to do. So they have to follow up about whether everything is okay, and if there are 
things to do better, in the future. It’s important. But most of the teachers continue 
teaching the same way, and it doesn’t affect them so much. 
Similarly, Andy (Singapore) said:  
I don’t think that [the EPMS] actually has much influence on me. I understand its 
administrative purpose, as a record of what I have done. […] To me, it’s just paperwork 
to fulfil that administrative function. 
Thus, Satu and Andy recognised that certain stakeholder-oriented teacher accountability 
instruments can communicate information for useful system-level purposes, even if such 
instruments have no direct effect on their work. 
 
5.5 Discussion 
Overall, the two empirical sources discussed in this chapter paint different pictures. The TIMSS 
2015 mediation analysis does not provide any clear evidence for the outcome-oriented aspect of 
RQ2, i.e. ‘to what extent does teacher motivation mediate the influence of teacher accountability 
instruments on student outcomes?’ Adding teacher motivation to model 2 does not noticeably 
alter the relationship between teacher accountability and student outcomes; thus suggesting that 
teacher motivation does not, in fact, play a mediating role here. However, the model 3 results do 
suggest that teacher accountability may, in some contexts, be associated with teacher motivation, 
thus giving a basis—albeit a weak one—for the first step of the mediation pathway. I examine 
this first step more closely in the next chapter, exploring the relationships between teacher 
accountability, teacher motivation, and sociocultural context. 
 
Turning to the second empirical source, the interviews with Finnish and Singaporean teachers 
shed light on the process-oriented aspect of RQ2, i.e. ‘how does teacher motivation mediate the 
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influence of teacher accountability instruments on student outcomes?’ As with the statistical 
analysis, the interviews do not offer evidence for the relationship between teacher motivation 
and student outcomes. However, unlike in the statistical analysis, this shortcoming of the 
interviews was by design, given the time and space constraints of a PhD project. Instead, the 
interviews offer considerable evidence that teacher accountability instruments can affect the level 
and orientation of teacher motivation, with every interview participant describing some effects. 
Moreover, the interviews clearly demonstrate the three accountability mechanisms posited in the 
conceptual framework, while illustrating how these mechanisms are contingent on teachers’ 
perspectives. The interviews also indicate agreement from some participants that certain teacher 
accountability instruments aim to influence stakeholders’ teacher-related decisions rather than 
teacher motivation itself. However, they did not give convincing evidence of teacher 
accountability instruments beneficially changing stakeholder decisions—although, again, the 
interviews were not designed for this aim. 
 
Figure 5.6 summarises the evidence for the conceptual framework from these ILSA and 
interview analyses. The evidence in this chapter makes the case that teacher motivation can be 
changed via the three mechanisms underlying teacher accountability. However, my data cannot 
credibly connect changes in teacher motivation to improvements in student outcomes. 
 
Figure 5.6   Evidence for the conceptual framework from the RQ2 analysis 
 
 
Hence, this chapter’s answer to RQ2 may be that (a) it is unclear how much teacher motivation 
mediates the influence of accountability instruments on student outcomes; but (b) teacher 
accountability instruments have the potential to influence teacher motivation, and mechanisms 
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for such influence can include setting standards that orient teachers toward particular goals, by 
communicating information that activates teachers’ desires to compare favourably with 
expectations about their practice, and by allocating performance-based consequences that 
incentivise certain efforts or practices. 
 
These interviews complement prior evidence that accountability instruments can play a positive 
causal role in raising teacher effort (Lavy, 2009; Macartney et al., 2018), as discussed in Section 
2.4, and in reorienting teachers’ decisions toward policy goals (Bassok et al., 2016; Mausethagen, 
2013), as noted in Section 2.5. However, my analysis also echoes the finding that accountability 
instruments can raise teachers’ stress levels (von der Embse et al., 2016) besides triggering other 
undesirable side effects, as discussed in Section 2.1. 
 
Still, it is important to note that some accountability instrument may fail to have any effect on 
teacher motivation and practice in certain settings (e.g. Yuan et al., 2013). As observed in the 
Finland and Singapore interviews, the degree to which intended and unintended effects may be 
triggered depends partly on teachers’ subjective perspectives and priorities—a finding that also 
emerged in some studies reviewed in Section 2.4 (e.g. Broekman, 2016; Mizel, 2009; Müller & 
Hernández, 2010; Narwana, 2015). 
 
Another possible explanation is that teacher accountability instruments primarily affect student 
outcomes by influencing the profile of people who choose to become teachers, rather than by 
influencing the level or orientation of teacher motivation in-service. That is, my framework may 
be mistaken in positing a teacher motivation pathway, because the relationship between teacher 
accountability instruments and student outcomes may instead occur primarily via a self-selection 
pathway (Biasi, 2018; Lazear, 2000, 2003; see also Section 2.5 in this thesis). Some interview 
participants pointed to such a self-selection pathway in their responses to the hypothetical 
question. When asked what would happen if Finland adopted Singapore’s EPMS, Masa said: 
If that system was in place, it would attract a whole different kind of person. With 
different goals, different ambitions that I don’t think are in line with what Finnish 
teachers currently consider to be their job. 
This sentiment was echoed by Helena (Finland) and by Andy and Jeffrey (both Singapore). 
 
Despite the theoretical plausibility of a selection effect that dominates any motivational effects, 
this selection effect was not evident in my interview data. Table 5.9 summarises participants’ 
responses to the question, ‘Why did you decide to become a teacher?’ Responses were coded 
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based on the Factors Influencing Teaching Choice framework (FIT-Choice; Watt et al., 2012), 
with modifications made inductively during coding, as noted below the table. 
 
Table 5.9   Summary of interview participants reasons for becoming a teacher 
 
Note. Shading demarcates groups of participants who entered the profession under different phases of the country’s 
teacher accountability approach. Categories were based on the Factors Influencing Teaching Choice (FIT-Choice) 
framework (Watt et al., 2012), with some modifications added inductively while coding the data. Modifications were: 
(a) broadening the ‘Intrinsic value’ category (originally: ‘I am interested in teaching’; ‘I like teaching’) to include 
specific aspects of the profession that do not fall under ‘Personal utility value’, such as ‘I wanted to interact with 
people’ and ‘I wanted to have autonomy over my work’; (b) broadening the ‘Personal utility value’ category 
(originally: ‘Job security’; ‘Time for family’) to include the availability of teacher training programmes and 
scholarships; (c) broadening the ‘Prior teaching and learning experiences’ category (originally: ‘I have had 
inspirational teachers’; ‘I have had good teachers as role models’; ‘I have had positive learning experiences’) to a 
general ‘Prior experiences’ category that includes positive teaching experiences in non-classroom contexts as well as 
experiences in other fields to which teaching compared favourably; (d) adding an ‘Interest in subject’ category for 
instances where passion for the subjects taught was a key motivating factor. 
 
As with the other interview matrices, respondents are sorted, within countries, from those who 
most recently entered the profession (i.e. Anneli and Adeline), to the longest-serving teachers 
(i.e. Juhani and Jane). Among Finnish participants, two (Päivi and Juhani) became teachers prior 
to the mid-1990s shift away from school inspections and other standardised tools for monitoring 
teachers’ classroom practice (Müller & Hernández, 2010; Simola et al., 2017). Another seven 
entered the profession before the 2001 release of the first PISA results that propelled Finnish 
education to international admiration, thus silencing local criticism of Finnish teachers (Simola, 
2014); while three participants (Anneli, Liisa, and Emilia) joined the profession after these two 
major events. Among Singaporean participants, three (Eleanor, Geok Ling, and Jane) became 
teachers prior to introduction of EPMS; six entered the profession when EPMS reporting was in 
its first iteration, which had more complicated performance standards than the current version, 
and which emphasised numerical targets and ratings; and three (Adeline, Jeffrey, and Maggie) 
have only experienced the most recent version of EPMS reporting, which was implemented in 
2014 (Kan, 2014; Low & Tan, 2017). These groupings are demarcated by shading in Table 5.9. 
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Within each country, there were no clear differences across the groupings in participants’ reasons 
for becoming teachers. Among Singaporean participants, the only discernible difference is that 
those who entered the profession during the most recent iteration of EPMS, together with 
Joseph from the middle group, all identified social influences in their decisions. In the FIT-
Choice framework, social influences denote friends, family members, or former colleagues 
thinking that you should become a teacher (Watt et al., 2012). There are no obvious reasons why 
Singapore’s current accountability approach would be favoured by people who are more inclined 
toward social influences. However, it is possible that these participants were more attuned to 
social influences since they were relatively young. Among Finnish participants, the only 
discernible difference between groups is that those who became teachers more recently all 
identified the intrinsic value of the profession as a motivation. However, this was the most 
commonly cited reason among both Finnish and Singaporean participants. Moreover, these 
recent Finnish entrants were no less likely to also mention the personal utility (i.e. extrinsic) value 
of the profession as well. Hence, these within-country comparisons do not offer evidence of a 
selection effect with changes in teacher accountability instruments over time. 
 
A between-country comparison does show some differences in reasons for becoming a 
teacher—but these run counter to the differences that would be expected given their respective 
accountability approaches. Specifically, some Singaporean participants (but no Finnish 
participants) mentioned social utility value; whereas some Finnish participants (but no 
Singaporean participants) mentioned their perceived teaching ability. This is contrary to a self-
selection framework, in which Singapore’s performance-based consequences would presumably 
attract people who believe in their abilities to teach, and Finland’s lack of material rewards would 
presumably attract people with altruistic (i.e. social utility) goals.38 In addition to these 
differences, some Singaporean participants, but no Finnish participants, mentioned social 
influences; whereas some Finnish participants, but no Singaporean participants, mentioned the 
desire to work with children/adolescents. However, there are no obvious connections between 
these reasons and either country’s configuration of teacher accountability structures. 
 
That said, none of this invalidates the possibility of a self-selection effect. Indeed, Liisa (Finland) 
and Adeline (Singapore) mentioned accountability-related job characteristics in their career 
 
38  However, this difference is aligned with Finnish and Singaporean participants’ respective concepts of 
motivation. I analyse these concepts of motivation in Section 6.3. 
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decisions. Liisa, who had previously worked in a large corporation, said that she moved into 
teaching because she wanted a role ‘that was more in [her] control, and that was more equal’, 
which aligns with the professional autonomy and egalitarian outlook of the Finnish teaching 
profession. Adeline did not mention any accountability-related elements when I asked why she 
decided to become a teacher, but her answer to the Finland hypothetical emphasised the appeal 
of EPMS career tracks in her professional decisions. When asked how she would react to 
Finland’s teacher accountability approach, she said,  
I think I might not stay in teaching as a lifelong career. For myself, I entered teaching 
on the MOE teaching scholarship, and so I entered knowing that, ‘Oh, okay, after two 
and a half years, I will get another opportunity to see the other side of education in 
Ministry work.’ And so the thought of being in my current position for a long, long 
time—maybe I’m like the semi-millennial generation, which makes me feel like I 
probably might think of switching out to see something else down the road. 
Thus, Liisa’s and Adeline’s observations quoted here suggest that teachers’ decisions to enter the 
profession may depend, to some extent, on accountability instruments. Furthermore, my 
interview samples were small, which particularly hampers the within-country comparison. Also, 
as noted in the methodology chapter, the samples may be biased because they comprise teachers 
who were sufficiently motivated to take the time to speak to a researcher about their work.  
 
Still, weighing the evidence solely from these interviews yields more extensive support for a 
motivation pathway through which accountability instruments influence teacher practice than for 
a self-selection pathway. I am not denying the possibility of a selection effect, but rather arguing 
that this possibility cannot in itself disqualify the evidence in Sections 5.3 and 5.4 for an in-
service motivational effect. Further, I am arguing that it is important to pay attention to the 
intended and unintended effects of teacher accountability instruments on teacher motivation, 
and to the mechanisms underlying these effects. 
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Chapter 6: The influence of sociocultural context on teacher 
accountability and teacher motivation 
Thus far, I have used cross-country survey data in Chapter 4 to show that the relationship 
between teacher accountability instruments and student outcomes may be affected by some 
aspects of sociocultural context. In Chapter 5, I used interview data to show that teacher 
accountability instruments can considerably but contingently influence teacher motivation. In 
this chapter, I turn to the third research question: to what extent does the influence of teacher 
accountability instruments on teacher motivation depend on sociocultural context? (As noted in Section 3.1 
and at the beginning of Chapter 4, the term ‘influence’ here does not imply causal inference in a 
statistical sense, but rather in a realist sense.) 
 
I explore this question using both cross-country surveys and teacher interviews. As with RQ1, I 
use a moderation model to analyse the cross-country survey data, comparing the moderating 
influence of sociocultural constructs to the influence of other contextual variables (Section 6.1). 
The main dataset for this analysis is TALIS 2013. Next, I analyse interview participants’ 
experiences of their respective sociocultural contexts (Section 6.2). Then, bringing the key 
concepts together, I examine how sociocultural context in Finland and Singapore influences the 
effects of accountability instruments on teacher motivation (Section 6.3). Finally, I discuss these 
observations and weigh the evidence for and against an alternative explanation (Section 6.4). 
 
Articulating and analysing sociocultural patterns is hardly a straightforward process, as discussed 
in Chapter 3. In the first place, culture is not only a construct, but a multifaceted and malleable 
one. For example, Eleanor commented on the interplay between different sociocultural patterns 
that have been variously prioritised in Singapore: 
Singapore is interesting, because while we try so hard to hold on to heritage and culture, 
the new culture that we have inadvertently created—because we were so focused on 
progress and meritocracy—is of course achievement and excellence. And sometimes 
these old values get sidelined because we’re trying to just get ahead, you know, to just 
get to the next step. 
Moreover, there can be a gap between the cultural values that people espouse and how they 
actually act. (For one example, see Juhani’s and Päivi’s observations about Finland’s 
egalitarianism in Section 6.2 below.) As noted in Section 3.6, this epistemological gap between 
articulations and reality poses a challenge for the self-report data in both the cross-country 
surveys and the field interviews. This challenge is heightened by the fact that many aspects of 
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sociocultural context can be tacit, taken for granted, or subconscious. As Anneli (Finland) 
reflected, ‘There are so many things I want to say, but I don’t know how to put them in words. 
[…] It feels like I’m blind to my own culture, somehow.’ The cross-cultural nature of this 
research project adds further complications, because my interpretations of participants’ 
sociocultural descriptions may differ from their own. 
 
With these challenges in view, I draw on multiple data sources and perspectives in an attempt to 
construct observations that accurately represent the contexts in question. Some of these 
comparative perspectives are internal to my main empirical sources. The analysis in this chapter 
includes a comparison between interview participants’ views and statistical aggregates from the 
WVS/EVS and Hofstede surveys. Also, I have been aided greatly by the observations of 
interview participants who have spent substantial amounts of time in other countries, and 
consequently had both insider and outsider lenses on the sociocultural context in which they 
taught. Such participants include Mark and Masa, who moved from the United States to 
Singapore and Finland, respectively, as adults. Additionally, Maggie grew up in Malaysia, 
completed secondary school in Singapore, attended university in the United States, married 
someone from another Asian country, and currently teaches in Singapore. Helena is Finnish and 
spent her childhood in Finland, but completed her ‘A’ levels and undergraduate studies in the 
United Kingdom, before returning to Finland for teacher training. Also, as noted in Section 3.4, 
one of the Finnish participants recently left the classroom and to work in international education. 
To corroborate the interviews, I also cite prior research on these contexts.39  
 
Notwithstanding these methodological challenges of analysing sociocultural context—and, as 
noted in Section 3.5, the ethical implications of doing so inadequately—I believe that such 
analysis is worthwhile. Whatever the epistemological complications of studying sociocultural 
context, I take the stance that sociocultural context is ontologically real and has real implications 
for teacher practice and educational quality (as discussed in Section 3.1 on the ontological and 
epistemological commitments of this thesis). As long as the interview participants were honestly 
sharing their sociocultural articulations with me, then even if these articulations may be 
 
39  Unfortunately, the recent English-language sources that I could find on Finnish culture were mainly journalistic 
accounts written by advocates for certain Nordic principles and practices (e.g. Booth, 2014 a British journalist 
who lives in Denmark; and Partanen, 2016 a Finnish journalist who has naturalised in the United States). 
Nonetheless, despite their evident admiration for Finnish/Nordic culture, these accounts were also critical of 
some aspects of this culture. Other non-scholarly analyses that I cite on Finnish education include Crehan 
(2016), Ripley (2013), and Walker (2017), none of whom are Finns, but all of whom have firsthand experience 
of Finnish schools. 
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somewhat idealised or otherwise divergent from participants’ behaviour, then these mental 
articulations are nonetheless as real as manifest behaviour—and, moreover, have a real likelihood 
of shaping participants’ responses to accountability instruments. 
 
6.1 TALIS 2013 analysis: Teacher accountability, teacher motivation, and 
moderating variables 
With the cross-country surveys, I use model 3 to explore RQ3 from a statistical standpoint. As 
outlined above in Section 3.3 and indicated in Figure 6.1 below, model 3 is a multilevel 
moderation model. It tests the extent to which the relationship between teacher accountability 
instruments (dependent variable) and teacher motivation (independent variable) is moderated by 
various contextual factors, including some sociocultural constructs. The structure of model 3 is 
similar to that of model 1, which I used in Section 4.3 to examine the extent to which 
sociocultural context moderates the relationship between teacher accountability and student 
outcomes—except that the outcome variable in model 3 is instead teacher motivation. In this 
model 3 analysis, the main dataset is TALIS 2013, which has self-reported data on teacher job 
satisfaction data matched with school-level data on teacher accountability instruments. (For a 
description of the teacher job satisfaction scale, see Section 5.1. For the construction of the 
teacher accountability scale, see Section 4.1.) 
 
Figure 6.1   Relationship between Section 6.1 and the overall conceptual framework 
 
 
As with the cross-country analysis using TIMSS 2015 data in Chapter 5, the TALIS 2013 sample 
has a relatively small country sample size (n=29). Given the number of country-level variables in 
the model, there is a risk of overfitting. (For a discussion of the multicollinearity that may result 
from such overfitting, examined primarily with TIMSS 2015 data but also with reference to this 
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TALIS 2013 dataset, see Appendix A.) To mitigate this risk, I present estimates from six separate 
regressions, each of which had one of the sociocultural constructs. 
 
The main results for these model 3 regressions are shown in Table 6.1. Column (a) shows the 
distribution of variance across each level of the model, column (b) shows parameter estimates 
for all variables except the sociocultural terms, and columns (c)–(h) give results for models with 
each of the six sociocultural constructs and their associated interaction terms. Note that the 
teacher job satisfaction outcome variable has been standardised such that its mean=0 and SD=1 
in the full TALIS 2013 sample. 
 
As shown in Table 6.1, these regressions indicate that more extensive teacher accountability is 
associated with lower levels of teacher motivation, as shown in the negative parameter estimates 
on the country-level teacher accountability term. These estimates are sizable, ranging from  
-0.168, for the confidence in institutions model in column (c), to -0.263, for the civic norms 
model in column (e). (For reference, the teacher job satisfaction variable has been standardised, 
as noted above; and the country-level Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  weighted mean had a standard deviation of 
0.58, as shown in Table 3.4.) The coefficient on the school-level teacher accountability 
differential is also consistently negative, though smaller, at approximately -0.06 across columns 
(b) to (h). However, these estimates for the Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ c and (Accountability–Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ )sc 
terms were significant at the 5-percent level in fewer than half of these regressions. In short, 
higher levels of the TALIS teacher accountability scale are associated with lower levels of teacher 
job satisfaction, but this association is not consistently significant. 
 
Additionally, there is some limited evidence that certain aspects of sociocultural context 
moderate the relationship between teacher accountability instruments and teacher motivation. 
This relationship is significantly moderated by confidence in institutions and social trust, as seen 
in the significant interactions between Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  and the respective sociocultural constructs 
in columns (c) and (f). Given that the scales for confidence in institutions and social trust were 
derived from factor analysis and thus have standard deviations approximately equal to 1, it is 
notable that the coefficients on their interaction terms are of a similar order to the coefficients 
on the main Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  terms. Specifically, the Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ *confidence in institutions 
coefficient was -0.131, slightly but insignificantly smaller than the Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  coefficient of -
0.168 in the same regression; and the Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ *social trust coefficient was -0.167, 
comparable to the Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  coefficient of -0.173 in the same regression. 
CHAPTER 6   185 
 
Table 6.1   Model 3: results for multilevel regressions of TALIS 2013 teacher job satisfaction against different 
sets of predictors 
 
Note. VPC=variance partition coefficient. N(teachers)=79 252; N(schools)=5 259; N(countries)=29.  
*p < 0.05. **p < 0.01.  
 
Figure 6.2 illustrates these relationships by showing predicted levels of teacher job satisfaction 
against Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  at the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles of different sociocultural 
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constructs, with all other variables held constant at their means. (This figure is similar to Figure 
4.6 for model 1.) In addition social trust and confidence in institutions, i.e. the two sociocultural 
constructs that significantly interacted with Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ , I also show predicted teacher job 
satisfaction levels for (a) civic norms, which significantly interacted with Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  in model 
1 (Section 4.3), but did not interact significantly with Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  in this analysis (parameter 
estimate=-0.106, SE=0.141); and (b) power distance, as an example of a sociocultural construct 
that did not discernibly interact with Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  (parameter estimate=-0.010, SE=0.087). 
 
Figure 6.2   Predicted TALIS 2013 teacher job satisfaction (and 95% confidence intervals) against 
Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ , for the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles of each contextual moderator 
 
Note. Each row shows predicted teacher job satisfaction against Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  for the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentile 
of the named contextual predictor. All other variables are held constant at their means. Rows are sorted by 
decreasing magnitude of the p-value on the coefficient of corresponding interaction term. Each row of predictions 
is based on a regression in Table 6.1: social trust from column (f) of the table, confidence in institutions from 
column (c), civic norms from column (e), and power distance from column (g). 
 
The downward slopes in most of these predicted plots reflect the negative overall relationship 
between teacher job satisfaction and teacher accountability instruments. However, this 
relationship is not uniform. The negative slope between job satisfaction and accountability does 
not appear to vary with different levels of power distance. For civic norms, this negative 
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association varies slightly (reflecting the nontrivial coefficient on the Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ *civic norms 
interaction term), but this variation is well within the very wide confidence intervals, especially at 
the 10th percentile of civic norms (reflecting the large standard error on the coefficient). 
However, the negative association between teacher job satisfaction and teacher accountability 
varies noticeably with social trust and confidence in institutions. At the 10th percentiles of social 
trust and of confidence in institutions, teacher job satisfaction does not meaningfully vary with 
Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ . In contrast, at the 90th percentiles of social trust and confidence in institutions, 
teacher job satisfaction decreases considerably as teacher accountability increases. 
 
To make these differential effects more concrete, at the 0th percentile of teacher accountability 
(i.e. the leftmost ends of each plot), an average teacher in a hypothetical country with social trust 
at the 90th percentile would be expected to have a job satisfaction score that is 0.55 points 
(≈0.55 SD) higher than a similar teacher in a hypothetical country at the 10th percentile of social 
trust, holding all other variables constant at their means. Conversely, at the 100th percentile of 
teacher accountability (i.e. the leftmost ends of each plot), the difference in these two teachers’ 
job satisfaction scores would be 0.46 points, but in favour of the teacher in the low-trust country. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the confidence intervals overlap across each of these 
plots at different levels of social trust, even at the extreme ends of each plot. That is, even 
though the moderation effects from social trust described in this paragraph may be fairly large, 
they are not significantly different from each other when all parameters are considered 
concurrently. 
 
Thus far, the answer to RQ3 from the TALIS 2013 analysis appears to be that the relationship 
between teacher accountability instruments and teacher motivation may depend to a limited 
degree on some aspects of sociocultural context. However, there are some indications that this 
conditional relationship may not be robust. Besides relatively imprecise estimates (as manifested 
in the overlapping confidence intervals described above), there is a possibility that the coefficient 
on the social trust interaction term may be inflated due to multicollinearity, as indicated by the 
large increases in the standard errors for the GDP and Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ *GDP terms in moving 
from column (b) to the social trust model in (f). That said, the confidence in institutions model 
in column (c) does not show any similar signs of multicollinearity. 
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Sensitivity checks 
To test the robustness of these sociocultural moderations, I re-estimated the models using the 
TIMSS and PISA datasets that were also used for sensitivity checks in Chapter 5. Specifically, I 
estimated different versions of model 3 for: the main TIMSS 2015 dataset, matched with 
Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  from PISA 2015; a TIMSS 2015 dataset with matched Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  from PISA 
2012; the full PISA 2012 sample; and an OECD-only PISA 2012 subsample. Similar to TALIS 
2013, the TIMSS 2015 proxy for teacher motivation was a job satisfaction scale derived from 
teacher-reported items. For PISA 2012, the proxy was a teacher morale scale derived from 
principal-reported items. As noted in Section 5.1, all of these scales were standardised (although 
the PISA 2012 teacher morale variable was scaled such that mean=0 and SD=1 among OECD 
countries, not across the wider sample).40  
 
These sensitivity checks show that the TALIS 2013 results described above are far from robust 
across comparator datasets. Table 6.2 summarises the sensitivity checks, showing the significance 
and direction of the main Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  parameter as well as the interactions between 
Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  and each sociocultural construct. As with Table 6.1, each regression summarised 
in this table included only one sociocultural construct and its associated interaction term. 
Accordingly, every cell in the ‘Interactions with Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ ’ section of table corresponds to 
separate regression with a distinct dataset-sociocultural construct pairing. 
 
As shown in Table 6.2, there is no consistency across these datasets either in the relationship 
between teacher accountability instruments and teacher motivation, or in the sociocultural 
constructs that moderate this relationship between accountability instruments and motivation. As 
reported above, social trust and confidence in institutions significantly moderated the effects of 
accountability instruments in the main TALIS regressions. However, social trust was not a 
significant moderator in any of the TIMSS 2015 and PISA 2012 regressions. While confidence in 
institutions was a significant moderator for both the main TALIS 2013 data and the TIMSS 2015 
 
40  I considered running sensitivity checks with the 2008 cycle of TALIS, but decided that this would be quite 
resource-intensive without a proportionate gain in analytical insight. While TALIS 2008 included 9 out of the 14 
questionnaire items that I used in constructing the TALIS 2013 teacher accountability scale, the response 
categories for 6 out of those 9 items in 2008 were binary, unlike their ordinal 2013 counterparts. Hence the 
TALIS 2008 dataset would have required a separate scale construction procedure for teacher accountability 
instruments. Additionally, the TALIS 2008 data predated the other educational datasets by several years, and 
thus would have required the construction of social capital scales from earlier WVS/EVS cycles. Given that the 
lack of robustness in the model 3 results was already apparent in comparisons of the TALIS 2013, TIMSS 2015, 
and PISA 2012 data, I deemed it unnecessary to conduct additional sensitivity checks using the TALIS 2008 
data. 
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dataset that was matched to Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  from PISA 2015, these moderation effects ran in 
opposite directions. 
 
Table 6.2   Summary of the direction and significance of the main effect and moderated effects of Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  
on teacher motivation 
 
Note. The teacher motivation variable for TALIS 2013 and TIMSS 2015 is teacher job satisfaction (teacher-reported 
scale); and for PISA 2012, teacher morale (principal-reported scale). For interactions with Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ , 1 symbol 
(+/–) indicates p<.05; 2 symbols (+ +/– –) indicate p<.01. Full results can be provided upon request. 
 
For a finer-grained view, Table 6.3 shows parameter estimates for selected predictors across the 
TALIS, TIMSS, and PISA regressions, for the sociocultural moderators that were significant in 
the main TALIS regressions above. The first three columns replicate columns (b), (c), and (f) 
from Table 6.1. The other columns present analogous results for TIMSS 2015 with 
Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  from PISA 2015, and for the full PISA 2012 sample, respectively. Each column 
(b) shows a regression without any sociocultural terms; column (c) shows the model with 
confidence in institutions terms, and column (f) shows the model with social trust terms. 
 
As shown in Table 6.3, the effect of the main (i.e. non-interacted) accountability term is 
inconsistent across the datasets, with relatively large negative coefficients in TALIS, but much 
smaller effects in TIMSS and PISA. Moreover, this accountability term is only significant in the 
TALIS model without any sociocultural variables. 
 
More pertinent for RQ3 is the fact that the interaction between teacher accountability and social 
trust has a sizable and negative coefficient across all three datasets, although it is only significant 
for TALIS. This Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ *social trust coefficient is also large and negative, though 
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insignificant, in the TIMSS 2015 dataset matched with accountability data from PISA 2012 
(which is not shown in Table 6.3, but results are available upon request). However, in the PISA 
2012 dataset with only OECD countries (also not shown in Table 6.3), the coefficient of the 
Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ *social trust term is, instead, positive, though insignificant. Such inconsistency was 
also present in the confidence in institutions regressions. While the Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ *confidence 
term was significant in the TALIS regression, it was smaller and insignificant for TIMSS and 
PISA—especially for PISA, where the coefficient was negligible.  
 
Table 6.3   Model 3: sensitivity checks for confidence in institutions and social trust (showing selected variables 
only) 
 
Note. The teacher motivation variable for TALIS 2013 and TIMSS 2015 is teacher job satisfaction (teacher-reported 
scale); and for PISA 2012, teacher morale (principal-reported scale). The TIMSS 2015 data here are matched with 
country-level weighted means for teacher accountability instruments from PISA 2015. The PISA 2012 dataset is the 
full sample. Full results can be provided upon request. 
+For TALIS 2013 and PISA 2012, school context=school autonomy. For TIMSS 2015, school context=school 
resources.  
*p < 0.05. **p < 0.01. 
 
It is also worth noting that likelihood ratio tests for the TIMSS 2015 and PISA 2012 data that 
compared the respective models with confidence in institutions and social trust to the model 
without any sociocultural predictors—i.e. comparing columns (c2) and (f2), in turn, to column 
(b2) for TIMSS, and corresponding comparisons for PISA—did not find significant 
improvements in model fit from adding the main and interaction terms for either confidence in 
institutions or social trust. For the TALIS 2013 models, the addition of the confidence in 
institutions terms improved model fit slightly but significantly. However, the change in model fit 
for social trust was insignificant, as shown in the likelihood ratio test in Table 6.1. 
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The lack of consistency between the TALIS and PISA results may be understandable, since their 
respective proxies for teacher motivation captured different constructs (teacher job satisfaction 
vs. teacher morale) and were derived from different categories of survey respondents (teachers 
vs. principals). However, the TALIS and TIMSS analyses both used teacher-reported job 
satisfaction to proxy for teacher motivation. Although these scales were derived from different 
questionnaire items, as described in Section 5.1, they are conceptually similar. Moreover, the 
correlation between the country-level weighted means of these TALIS and TIMSS teacher job 
satisfaction scales was moderately strong (r=0.64 for 15 countries, as shown in Table 5.2). 
Hence, the lack of consistency between the TALIS and TIMSS analyses does cast doubt on their 
overall robustness. (While the TALIS and PISA teacher accountability scales were also 
constructed in separate IRT analyses using different questionnaire items, the country-level 
correlations between these scales were strong, as reported in Section 4.1. Specifically, r=0.86 for 
the 35 countries with teacher accountability data for both PISA 2012 and TALIS 2013, and 
r=0.77 for the 34 countries with data for both PISA 2015 and TALIS 2013. Hence, 
inconsistency of the teacher motivation results is unlikely to stem primarily from the different 
teacher accountability measures. It would be theoretically possible to test whether the TIMSS 
2015 results are robust to the substitution of the country-level teacher accountability measure 
from PISA with the TALIS 2013 accountability measure. However, this is not feasible in 
practice, since there is an overlap of only 11 countries between the TIMSS 2015 and TALIS 2013 
datasets, giving too small a sample size at the country-level for the multilevel modelling.) 
 
It is difficult to disentangle the degree to which these inconsistencies are due to measurement 
issues, different teacher motivation proxies, sample design, or real-world variegation. However, 
as they stand, these datasets offer little clear evidence that national sociocultural context affects 
the relationship between teacher accountability and teacher motivation. 
 
6.2 Sociocultural context in Finland and Singapore 
In contrast to the cross-country surveys, the field interviews offered convincing evidence that 
sociocultural context influences the relationship between teacher accountability and teacher 
motivation, at least for the 24 teachers whom I interviewed. I drew on these interviews alongside 
secondary sources in Chapter 5 to outline Finland’s and Singapore’s approaches to teacher 
accountability, and how these approaches can affect teacher motivation. I now return to these 
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interviews to trace how sociocultural context affects this relationship between accountability 
instruments and teacher motivation. I begin in this section by identifying sociocultural patterns in 
each country that are salient to the workings of teacher accountability instruments, as indicated 
in Figure 6.3. 
 
Figure 6.3   Relationship between Section 6.2 and the overall conceptual framework 
 
 
To frame this analysis, I would like to emphasise, firstly, that Finland’s and Singapore’s 
sociocultural contexts—or, indeed, any national sociocultural context—are too complex to be 
classified along a set of unidimensional traits. Unidimensional traits facilitate the cross-country 
statistical analyses in this thesis. However, such traits are also reductive to the point of obscuring 
certain contextual characteristics that should inform policy design. To illustrate, one research 
programme in cultural psychology identifies different degrees of independence and 
interdependence in cultures (Markus & Conner, 2013; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In this 
framework, people in independent cultures tend to view themselves as individual, autonomous, 
and equal; whereas those in interdependent cultures tend to view themselves as relational and 
guided by tradition and hierarchy. In some senses, Finland’s culture is highly independent, and 
Singapore’s is highly interdependent. This is evident in Finnish participant Maarit’s assertion that 
‘our headmaster is, really, one of us’ (echoed by Anneli, Liisa, and Emilia) and a Singaporean 
participant’s recollection of their colleagues in an MOE department being ‘mortally afraid’ of 
visits from their top-level superior because ‘there was this belief that someone in that position 
needed to be treated in certain ways’. However, Timothy (Singapore) also asserted that ‘no 
matter what, Singaporeans are very me-first’—which other Singaporean participants agreed with, 
and which is hardly a hallmark of interdependence. Also, as I discuss below, Finns are highly 
attuned to social responsibility, thus departing from extreme independence in ways that are 
interlinked with accountability. 
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The fact that Finland and Singapore each combine independent and interdependent traits does 
not contradict Markus, Conner, and Kitayama (ibid), who argue that every individual and every 
cultural setting combine different degrees of independence and interdependence. That said, the 
sociocultural patterns influencing teacher accountability in Finland and Singapore include some 
characteristics that do not fit neatly under either independence or interdependence, nor under 
any one of the social capital or Hofstede scales that I used in the statistical analysis (see Figure 
3.2 for box plots showing Finland’s and Singapore’s scores on these scales). In this section, I 
sketch a portrait of the salient features of each country’s sociocultural context, based on 
interview participants’ accounts. One component of each portrait is a discussion of the degree to 
which participants agreed with key observations from the WVS/EVS and Hofstede datasets. 
While participants broadly endorsed these statistical aggregates, they also described more 
nuanced patterns that the standardised surveys were not designed to capture. 
 
Note, however, that I asked participants about the WVS/EVS and Hofstede data at the end of 
each interview, as shown in the interview guide (see Table 3.6). Besides participants’ view on 
these survey-based measures, this section draws heavily on their less-structured observations on 
sociocultural context, whether tangential remarks along the way or specific responses to 
pertinent questions, especially #8 in Table 3.6, i.e. ‘Can you tell me about aspects of 
[Singaporean/Finnish] culture that affect [Singapore’s/Finland’s] education system?’ In line with 
Tomlinson’s (1989) argument for ‘hierarchical focusing’, I asked the more general questions such 
as #8 before posing the specific questions based on the WVS/EVS and Hofstede data, in order 
to minimise undue influence on participants’ articulated views. (See Section 3.4 for more details.) 
 
Secondly, although there are many contrasts between Finland’s and Singapore’s sociocultural 
contexts, it would be inaccurate to regard them as polar opposites. This is partly because culture 
is complex and multidimensional, as noted above (see also Section 2.2; and Anderson-Levitt, 
2012). Furthermore, there are important similarities between these two contexts. For example, 
Singaporeans are commonly (and not wholly inaccurately, as I discuss below) regarded as 
deferential to authority. However, Finns are also ‘usually quite obedient’, in Emilia’s words 
(echoed by many Finnish participants; see also Simola et al., 2017). Another relevant similarity is 
that people in both contexts value education highly, whether for nation building or for individual 
mobility (see Barr & Skrbiš, 2008; Dimmock & Tan, 2016; Jones, 2019; Ng, 2013 on Singapore; 
and Chung, 2009; Klinge, 1993; Simola et al., 2017 on Finland). This was noted by both 
American interview participants. Mark, who taught in Singapore, argued that one reason why 
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Singapore, Finland, and Shanghai are educationally successful is because ‘there’s a societal 
expectation that students will do well in school’, and this ‘can’t be underestimated’. Similarly, 
Masa commented that Finland’s traditionally literary culture has ‘a huge effect that [he doesn’t] 
think has been measured, or even appreciated’ on educational outcomes. 
 
Similarities notwithstanding, there are clear differences between Finland’s and Singapore’s 
respective sociocultural contexts, as I show below. For convenience, I sum up the relevant 
sociocultural patterns in Finland as ‘complementary responsibility’, and those in Singapore as 
‘managed meritocracy’. 
 
Complementary responsibility in Finland 
Table 6.4 summarises Finnish participants’ responses to the penultimate set of questions in every 
interview, in which I asked whether the aggregate WVS/EVS and Hofstede data in my statistical 
analysis accurately represented their sociocultural context. In each country, I focused on three 
sociocultural constructs for which their country was in either the highest or lowest quartile. For 
Finland, these were: high social trust, low power distance, and high adherence to civic norms. 
 
Table 6.4   Interview participants’ level of agreement with indicators about Finland from the sociocultural surveys 
 
*This question was phrased as: ‘Would you agree that most Finns think that you should follow the official system 
rather than trying to find loopholes or shortcuts for your own benefit?’ 
 
As shown in Table 6.4, almost all Finnish participants endorsed these sociocultural 
characteristics. They agreed unanimously about high social trust, with most participants giving 
unqualified agreement. In Antero’s words: 
People can leave their doors open. Or, for example, I leave the keys in my car. […] If I 
have an emergency situation, I can give my wallet, my keys, my phone, my kids to a 
stranger who will help me. 
While acknowledging that ‘there are some people who will steal them’, Antero stated that ‘the 
common view is that we can trust’—a view that every participant affirmed. To illustrate this 
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using data from the European Values Study 4, when given a choice between the statements 
‘Most people can be trusted’ and ‘You can’t be too careful in dealing with people’, 65.1% of 
Finnish respondents chose the former. The proportion of trust-oriented respondents in Finland 
was exceeded only by Nordic counterparts Denmark (76.1%), Norway (74.2%), and Sweden 
(70.1%). For comparison, the lowest proportion of trust-oriented respondents was 4.7%, in the 
Turkish Cypriot Community of Northern Cyprus (EVS, 2016b). Separately, an analysis of the 
United States’ General Social Survey found that having ancestors who immigrated to the United 
States from Nordic countries was associated with being more likely to say that most people can 
be trusted (Uslaner, 2008). Admittedly, there are limits to how informative such self-reported 
data are. For corroboration, although Finland was not included in Cohn et al. (2019) civic 
honesty experiment with 17,000 ‘lost’ wallets in 40 countries, Nordic neighbours Norway, 
Denmark, and Sweden ranked among the top five places where a ‘lost’ wallet was most likely to 
be returned, whether or not it contained any money. 
 
When asked about the low power distance measured in the Hofstede survey—i.e. a preference 
for equal power distributions rather than hierarchies—most participants strongly agreed. This 
sociocultural egalitarianism is mirrored in Finland’s relative economic equality. During the ten 
most recent years for which Gini data are available (2005–2015), Finland consistently had one of 
the ten most equal income distributions in the world (World Bank, 2019). Finland also had the 
third highest score in Oxfam’s 2018 Commitment to Reducing Inequality index (Lawson & 
Martin, 2018). Klinge (1984, 1993) suggests that this egalitarianism is longstanding, due in part to 
the absence of a large landholding aristocracy. However, although Liisa said that ‘equality is a 
Finnish thing’, she also noted that it could cause inefficiencies: since all teachers ‘are on the same 
level’, this leads to the ‘big problem’ that ‘one principal has a lot of people to manage’. More 
controversially, Juhani argued that the stated preference for egalitarianism may not reflect actual 
practice: 
I think that’s what they want. But that’s not how they act. We want equality, yes. And 
power should be divided equally. But every time there is a problem anywhere, we need 
that hierarchy, and a person who is in a high enough position to say something. […] I 
think we still have not gotten rid of the centuries of Swedish and Russian bureaucracy. 
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Likewise, Päivi observed that Finns say they want horizontal power distributions ‘as much as 
possible’, but that in practice they ‘look up’: ‘We want to have, “You are doing wrong. This is not 
our fault. It’s yours.” (laughter) We want to have someone to blame.’41 
 
This tension between egalitarianism and a preference for orderly delegation was also apparent in 
participants’ views on Finnish adherence to civic norms. Most participants agreed with Emilia, in 
that ‘it’s very ingrained into Finnish culture to just follow rules, and to do it by the book’. 
However, Anneli gave a more qualified view, saying, ‘We trust the system, as long as it feels 
somewhat fair, and reasonable—which is usually true, but not always [emphasis added]’. American-
born Masa’s reservations went further: he argued that Finland has ‘creative flexibility in rules’, 
perhaps from its history of conforming superficially to appease ‘old Soviet influences’. Examples 
that Masa cited include: when a suitable candidate has been identified for a job vacancy before 
the vacancy has been advertised, school leaders may display the vacancy advertisement behind a 
plant or another obstruction in the teachers’ room in order to superficially fulfil the requirement 
for job vacancies to be displayed publicly; and when families visit their remote lakeside cabins in 
the summer and need to dispose of their rubbish, they save it for bonfires during the traditional 
Juhannus (midsummer) celebration rather than building illegal fires solely for rubbish disposal. 
However, he emphasised that the underlying intention is to streamline the system rather than to 
abuse it, and that ‘it doesn’t seem to be really hurting anybody’: 
There’s nothing really wrong [with this flexibility about norms], but it’s a common-
sense approach […] And yes, there is a rule, we can follow that rule, but we can still do 
pretty much whatever we want. And to me, that feels like a very Finnish thing. 
Masa’s observations about creative compliance were not simply an outsider’s contrarian view. 
Rather, they align with other participants’ descriptions of how some teachers perceive the 
national curriculum, as I discuss in the next section. 
 
Crucially, these sociocultural patterns interact closely with each other. When I asked Helena 
whether Finns trust others to behave fairly, she said: 
Yes, I think that’s the first thing. If someone asks me what’s special about the Finnish 
school system, I think the core thing is trust. […] I’ve met hundreds of visitors from 
different countries. […] And the one thing which they’re always equally amazed about 
 
41  It is also important to note that Finland is not a utopia without any socioeconomic differentiation. Helena 
noted that intergenerational inequalities do affect education: ‘We have research information that students whose 
parents have academic [rather than vocational] schooling do better academically. […] So it would be lying to say 
that doesn’t exist.’ Additionally, Hanifi’s (2013) analysis of Statistics Finland’s time use survey found another 
unequal distribution: people of higher socioeconomic status were more likely to participate in volunteer work 
and to agree that most people can be trusted, indicating association between socioeconomic privilege and social 
capital. 
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is that I can talk to my boss as an equal. […] But that’s also to do with the trust, I think. 
That you trust each other to do the job. 
When asked whether most Finns believe in following the official system rather than seeking 
loopholes or shortcuts, she said: 
I think that boils down to trust again. You’re more willing to follow the system if you 
trust that there’s a good reason for that system to exist. And if you feel that police are 
trustworthy, that they’re good people who are trying to do a job that benefits the whole 
society, then you will do what the police ask you to do. 
Other participants similarly believed that these sociocultural patterns were mutually reinforcing. 
Like Helena, Anneli linked civic norms adherence to trust: ‘I do trust the system, and I believe 
that somebody smarter than me, or more acquainted with the system, has decided that this is the 
system that works best.’ In turn, Kristiina linked norms adherence to egalitarianism: ‘If 
everybody follows the rules, then we are following the same rules, and we’re treated equally as 
well.’ This interaction between trust, egalitarianism, and civic responsibility is also stressed by 
Berggren and Trägårdh (2010) as well as Partanen (2016) in their discussions of Nordic society 
and culture. In their view, Nordic social responsibility enables a strong individual autonomy, 
because the trust ethic alongside egalitarian welfare policies serve to liberate individuals from 
dependency, such that children need not depend on family finances for their education, and 
employers are free to fire undesirable employees without the latter losing basic livelihood 
necessities or healthcare coverage. 
 
Finland’s blend of trust, egalitarianism, and civic mindedness constitutes a sociocultural context 
that I dub ‘complementary responsibility’. This sense of responsibility is far-reaching, and 
participants viewed it as being productive. Masa recalled a German colleague who believed that 
Finland’s PISA success derived not from its school system, but from its culture—‘the idea that 
we’re going to try and take care of everybody, […] responsibility on a societal level’. I 
characterise such responsibility as ‘complementary’ rather than ‘mutual’ or ‘reciprocal’ because it 
is not premised on transactional tit-for-tat. Neither is there the expectation that everyone in a 
particular setting should jointly pay attention to the same obligations. Rather, there is a belief that 
(almost) everyone, in their respective stations, will autonomously act for the common good. In 
Juhani’s words: 
Finnish society is stable. And it has never actually listened to others. We are stubborn. 
And we like to do things in our own way. And we tend to keep our own way within us. 
We don’t talk about it to others. And we expect everybody knows their roles, because, 
‘Come on, we are Finns, hey.’ 
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This idea of everyone having respective, complementary roles aligns with Juhani’s and Päivi’s 
previous comments about the desire for clear leadership despite a preference for egalitarianism. 
The notion that, within these distinct roles, people may ‘do things in [their] own way’ aligns with 
Masa’s observations about ‘creative flexibility’ in fulfilling shared norms. 
 
Remarkably, the expectation that ‘everybody knows their roles’ extends to children. The 
interview participant who currently works in international education contrasted their stint 
overseas where ‘you need to drive your children everywhere’ because ‘they cannot go anywhere 
by themselves’, with Finland, where primary school children commute by public transport 
independently. According to this participant, ‘Children need to take responsibility, but we also 
need to trust them. And we need to trust society that if something goes wrong, somebody would 
help.’ Likewise, Masa remarked on the high degree of autonomy accorded to Finnish 
schoolchildren (see also Partanen, 2016; Ripley, 2013; T. D. Walker, 2017, Chapter 3). As I show 
in Section 6.3, this ethos of complementary responsibility shapes teachers’ responses to 
accountability instruments. 
 
Managed meritocracy in Singapore 
Turning to Singapore, Table 6.5 summarises the degree to which participants agreed with 
WVS/EVS and Hofstede survey findings that Singaporeans, on average, are highly confident in 
public institutions, relatively willing to accept power hierarchies, and fairly tolerant of breaches in 
civic norms. As in Finland, participants broadly agreed with these descriptions of Singapore’s 
sociocultural context, although some challenged the notion that breaches in norms are justifiable. 
 
Table 6.5   Interview participants’ level of agreement with indicators about Singapore from the sociocultural 
surveys 
 
Note. Singaporean participant Andy does not appear in this table because he was the first participant to be 
interviewed, and I added these questions to the interview guide subsequently. 
*This question was phrased as: ‘Would you agree that most Singaporeans think it’s justifiable to go around the 
official system for your own benefit if you can get away with it?’ 
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As shown in Table 6.5, all participants agreed that most Singaporeans were highly confident in 
public institutions. However, Geok Ling and Timothy noted that this confidence may be eroding 
gradually, which Geok Ling attributed to higher levels of education and which Timothy 
attributed to a younger generation that tended to be demanding rather than ‘appreciative’. 
Another important nuance to this confidence in institutions came from Eleanor’s response: 
‘Generally, high trust and high expectations. So when expectations are not met, then they start 
getting upset.’ Thus, this confidence is not blind faith. Rather, it is contingent on the efficacy of 
public institutions. According to Jane, even those Singaporeans who in principle would prefer 
more political opposition ‘don’t want to rock the boat’ because they are happy that, ‘all the while, 
the country has been doing well’. 
 
Similarly, even though Joseph, Eleanor, and Peter noted that Singapore’s power distance is 
decreasing over time (see also Chua, 2018), only Peter believed that this acceptance of hierarchy 
was no longer dominant. A more typical response came from Timothy: 
To be respectful of your superiors is definitely a given. But I find there’s a tendency 
towards being overly deferential to them, and almost like they are—maybe not God, 
but like a king, and they are all-powerful. 
Still, this deference may be outward rather than deeply felt. For example, Adeline said that 
subordinates under ‘an incompetent boss’ would ‘grumble with people at the same level’ but 
would ‘still comply with the boss’ orders despite complaining behind their back’. Jeffrey, Jane, 
and Geok Ling echoed her sentiments. 
 
In contrast to the general agreement with the statistics on power distance and confidence in 
institutions, two Singaporean participants disagreed outright with the WVS/EVS finding that 
Singaporeans are relatively likely to justify breaches in civic norms for personal benefit. Maggie 
and Sonia disputed this finding, with the latter remarking that: 
I think even if anyone were to try [to circumvent the official system], our government is 
powerful enough to track them down. […] Plus, people here have been culturally 
conditioned to just obey. Yeah. ‘Obey blindly, don’t question, sit in your corner and 
shut up.’ 
Among those who agreed that Singaporeans were relatively tolerant of such breaches in civic 
norms, some participants related personal encounters with Singaporeans who exploit loopholes 
or shortcuts out of self-interest. For example, Geok Ling mentioned that some parents will 
falsify their home addresses (perhaps by temporarily renting a second property, or by using a 
family member’s address) in order to help their children gain admission to prestigious schools. 
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(For a documented instance of this practice, see Chong [2018].) According to Geok Ling, one 
reason for such behaviour is that Singapore is ‘so competitive, and resources are so scarce’. 
Additionally, a few male participants, like Jeffrey, laughingly recounted ‘the secret eighth core 
value of the army’ (which they had encountered during their compulsory two-year National 
Service stints for Singaporean men): ‘You can do anything, just don’t get caught.’ That said, 
whether participants agreed or disagreed with the WVS/EVS finding, they emphasised the 
importance of staying strictly within legal boundaries. Mark believed Singaporeans would do 
‘anything up to—or not even stated by—the law to get an added benefit’, but they would not 
transgress legal limits. 
 
As in Finland, these sociocultural patterns all interact. When asked about the civic norms finding, 
Eleanor first noted that there are ‘so many rules’ in Singapore, and that the rigidity of the system 
can make it ‘hard to get things done’, before saying: 
I do remember a conversation a long time ago about whether we can or cannot U-turn 
on the roads, and [former prime minister] Goh Chok Tong said, ‘If there is no sign that 
tells you you cannot U-turn, who’s to say you can’t?’ And that’s been something that I 
tell myself when I’m on the roads, or when I’m at work as well: if there’s no specific 
policy that tells you that you can’t, why don’t you just try it? […] As long as it’s not 
unethical. […] Singaporeans are always looking for loopholes, because it allows them a 
certain bit of freedom, a certain thrill that they’re able to escape the system. 
Thus, Eleanor is experimenting with actions that produce results more efficiently but may 
contravene tacit norms, although she intends to stay strictly within explicit institutional 
boundaries—and her basis for this experimentation is a remark from an authoritarian politician.42  
 
This combination of hierarchy, confidence in institutions, and a tolerance for strategies that yield 
a productive advantage is what I call Singapore’s ‘managed meritocracy’. This view that society 
is—and should be—competitive and progress-oriented, with a high degree of structure and 
stratification to ensure maximum productivity, has been actively fostered by Singapore’s single-
party government throughout the second half of the twentieth century (Barr & Skrbiš, 2008; K. 
Y. Lee, 2000; K. P. Tan, 2010; Tremewan, 1994; see also Y. Y. Teo, 2018). Singapore’s brand of 
meritocracy not only justifies the government’s emphasis on competitiveness, but also helps to 
reinforce government legitimacy more broadly (Chua, 2018). The government’s successful track 
 
42  I could not find a primary source for the Goh Chok Tong quote that Eleanor cited. However, ‘No U-Turn 
Syndrome’, or ‘NUTS’, is certainly discussed in Singapore as a detrimental local phenomenon. Coined by 
Singaporean technology entrepreneur Sim Wong Hoo (2003, excerpt accessed at 
https://singaporeelection.blogspot.com/2006/06/no-u-turn-syndrome-nuts.html on 18 July 2019; see also 
Seah, 2006), NUTS signifies excessive caution in only taking actions that are expressly permitted by a higher 
authority, at the expense of autonomous creativity. 
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record in economic development reinforces the view that it deserves to remain in power, as 
implied in Jane’s comment about not rocking the boat.43  
 
Unlike pro-meritocracy arguments that are wedded to libertarian ideals, Singapore’s meritocracy 
is centrally managed (Chua, 2018). The chief arbiter of merit is not the market, but rather the 
government. Ee (2018) further argues that most Singaporeans accept the government as the 
arbiter of moral questions, such as abortion, homosexuality, and the death penalty. To illustrate 
the degree of trust placed in the government, here is the beginning of interview participant 
Timothy’s response when asked whether Singapore’s teacher accountability instruments make 
the education system more effective: 
To use a very civil service phrase, these [accountability-related] expectations are all 
cascaded down from your ministers and the top policymakers. So what they would have 
in mind, I believe, is in line with what, hopefully, will help make the country a better 
one. 
This statement is all the more noteworthy since Timothy also expressed considerable doubt 
about certain government policies. Mark, the American who taught in Singapore, observed: 
Singapore’s education system is a model of how the government wants to structure its 
citizens’ time. […] Singapore’s government seems to view free time for citizens—where 
they are thinking on their own and not guided or given some push in a supposed right 
direction—as a bad thing. […] Students’ time is very structured. […] That is very 
different, obviously, from Western society and a lot of other societies where there’s a 
belief that it’s in those moments of free time that genius happens. 
Mark’s observations cohere with Jones’ (2019) observations on long school days and scheduled 
home routines for Singaporean primary school students, and also with Li’s (2012) analysis of 
Confucian (i.e. East Asian) and Western models of learning. Li argues that the Western 
educational tradition emphasises individual curiosity and mental ability, whereas the Confucian 
tradition entails a guided, diligent pursuit of self-perfection.  
 
In Singapore, this Confucian ethic has been fused with a hard-nosed competitiveness—
colloquially called kiasu, a Chinese Hokkien term meaning ‘afraid of losing’. As Andy relates, 
kiasu culture centres on ‘this idea that if you are not the best at what you do, then you can’t 
actually […] succeed in life’. The Oxford English Dictionary (2006), in turn, defines being kiasu 
 
43  Still, it is important to note that this preoccupation with meritocracy and competition does not encompass all 
Singaporeans. For example, Maggie spoke critically of how students hear messages from parents, teachers, and 
society about the importance of ‘grades, grades, grades’ and ‘tuition, tuition, tuition’ (i.e. private after-school 
tutoring), but noted that she ‘was in a neighbourhood school’ (i.e. a less prestigious, lower-achieving school), 
where ‘students are, thankfully, blissfully unaware and less competitive about things’ and consequently ‘they 
actually grow in a more balanced manner’. 
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as being ‘characterized by a grasping or selfish attitude arising from a fear of missing out on 
something’. Singaporean kiasuism was iconically captured in the hugely popular Mr. Kiasu comic 
series, by local artist Johnny Lau. In a recent interview, Lau’s remarks on the kiasu outlook 
mirrored my interview participant’s observations on civic norms adherence. According to Lau, 
being kiasu ‘can also mean that you always have a goal, and execute it. Singaporeans do things by 
the book, but very efficiently’ (Lui, 2018). As I show below, interview participants believe that 
kiasuism is amply evident in how teachers respond to accountability instruments. 
 
6.3 Teacher accountability, sociocultural context, and concepts of 
motivation 
In Chapter 5, I showed how teacher accountability instruments can affect the level and/or 
direction of teachers’ motivation, and how these motivational effects depend on teachers’ 
subjective perspectives. In the previous section, I described some dominant patterns in Finland’s 
and Singapore’s respective sociocultural contexts, which I summarised as complementary 
responsibility and managed meritocracy, respectively. In this section, I bring the two threads 
together, exploring how these dominant sociocultural patterns influence teachers’ motivational 
responses to accountability instruments, as indicated in Figure 6.4. 
 
Figure 6.4   Relationship between Section 6.3 and the overall conceptual framework 
 
 
To outline the argument, I find that a key aspect of sociocultural context is teachers’ implicit 
concepts of motivation. These implicit concepts of motivation influence teachers’ responses to 
accountability instruments. Moreover, there were clear differences between the concepts of 
motivation that were dominant among Finnish and Singaporean participants. This finding 
emerged inductively. Having identified interview quotations where participants linked teacher 
motivation, accountability instruments, and sociocultural context, I reviewed a range of 
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psychological theories of motivation with the aim of identifying an empirically validated 
framework to lend structure to the interview analysis. However, I found that these theories vary 
substantially in the factors that they view as fundamental to motivation. None of the major 
theories (as identified by Schunk et al., 2010; and Vroom & Deci, 1992) emphasised motivational 
factors that were equally salient to the teacher interview data from both countries. However, two 
distinct theories of motivation did overlap with the concepts of motivation that are implicit in 
the Finland and Singapore interviews, respectively. 
 
When Finnish participants discussed motivation, they emphasised factors that were also central 
to Ryan and Deci’s (2000b, 2000c) self-determination theory. This theory specifies, among other 
things, that intrinsic motivation is fostered by feelings of autonomy, competence, and relatedness 
to others, as described above in Section 2.4. Meanwhile, Singaporean participants emphasised 
factors that were also central to Vroom’s (1964) expectancy theory. In Vroom’s theory, 
motivation is a function of expectancy, instrumentality, and valence. Expectancy refers to the 
degree to which an actor believes that their effort will lead to successful performance; 
instrumentality is their degree of belief that such performance will lead to desired outcomes 
(gaining rewards and avoiding penalties); and valence is the degree to which they value such 
outcomes. As noted in Section 2.4, these theories differ not only in the explanatory factors they 
prioritise, but also in the fields where they are applied. While Ryan and Deci’s self-determination 
theory is often cited in education psychology, Vroom’s expectancy theory is prominent among 
management scholars and practitioners. 
 
Empirically, the boundaries between sociocultural context, concepts of motivation, and the 
level/orientation of teacher motivation are blurry, because all three are mental constructs. 
However, they are analytically distinct. Sociocultural context, which I defined in Section 2.2 as 
dominant patterns of ideas and practices in a given social system that influence people’s interactions with their 
environments, encompasses the concepts of motivation that may be influential in a given setting. 
While concepts of motivation are general abstractions that may be affirmed by many people 
across a given context, the level and direction of a particular teacher’s motivation is a person-
specific mental state, which in turn manifests in that teacher’s actions. In this analysis, I am 
primarily interested in how concepts of motivation influence teachers’ interactions with 
accountability instruments. (I use ‘theories of motivation’ to denote formally articulated and 
psychologically validated frameworks for understanding motivation, such as Ryan and Deci’s 
self-determination theory and Vroom’s expectancy theory, while ‘concepts of motivation’ 
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denotes the mental models that are implicit in participants’ accounts of their motivation-related 
reasoning and experiences.) 
 
Accordingly, for each country I (a) describe the concept of motivation implicit in participants’ 
observations, illustrating its consistency with the larger sociocultural context; (b) show how the 
teacher accountability approach is compatible with the concept of motivation; and (c) 
demonstrate that the reported side effects of accountability instruments on teacher motivation 
are consistent with the implicit concept of motivation. Throughout this analysis, I use Vroom’s 
and Ryan and Deci’s theories to lend conceptual clarity. 
 
Concepts of motivation and sociocultural context 
When discussing motivation, Finnish participants often linked it to the competence, relatedness, 
and autonomy that Ryan and Deci (2000c) regard as fundamental to intrinsic motivation. For 
example, when I asked Juhani how sociocultural context influences teacher accountability, he 
said: 
There’s something called Finnish sisu or stubbornness. Teachers are the kind of persons 
who are stubborn enough to feel the needs that the surrounding society gives them, and 
they will meet them. And they are also flexible enough to do it in a way that is quite 
effective. 
Sisu is a Finnish word that is notoriously difficult to translate but relates to internal fortitude 
amid challenges (Lahti, 2019; Nylund, 2018; Partanen, 2016; Strode, 1940). From Juhani’s 
perspective, this ‘stubbornness’ is directed toward meeting ‘the needs that the surrounding 
society gives them’, indicating a sense of relatedness. Moreover, he characterises teachers as 
being ‘flexible enough’ to meet these needs ‘in a way that is quite effective’, indicating 
competence. Similarly, when I asked Satu whether she received any financial rewards for extra 
effort in her work, she said that such rewards were negligible, but added that: ‘It’s inside me that 
I want to be good at my work. And I can meet parents knowing that I did my best, that I did 
things I didn’t have to do.’ Thus, Satu is intrinsically motivated ‘to be good at her work’, i.e. to be 
competent, and this motivation is linked to her sense of responsibility toward the parents of her 
pupils, i.e. a form of relatedness. Another Finnish participant, Antero, likewise said, ‘We teach 
from our personality. From what is inside us. Not from these orders and laws, but from the 
inside.’ He also noted that formal accountability instruments such as orders and laws can ‘kill our 
creativity’. Additionally, Anneli linked motivation to autonomy: ‘In Finland, teachers perform 
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better, I think, when we feel that we are trusted, and we can do our work our own way.’ Other 
participants echoed this belief.  
 
Finnish participants’ descriptions of unmotivated colleagues were also consonant with Ryan and 
Deci’s theory. For example, Liisa said, ‘I promised myself that when I’m tired of doing what I’m 
doing, then I will quit. I will never become that teacher who’s just doing their job and not being 
interested in it.’ Similarly, Helena contrasted ‘good teachers’ who are ‘really innovating, and 
trying new things, and doing a lot of prep work for the lessons’, and ‘bad teachers’ who are ‘just 
doing their job, just the minimum requirements, or without any passion, or just doing the same 
thing they’ve done for years, with minimal effort’. Thus, rather than exploring and extending 
their capacities, which is a hallmark of intrinsic motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000a), these 
unmotivated teachers stick to comfortable routines. All of this suggests that there is considerable 
overlap between Finnish participants’ concept of motivation and Ryan and Deci’s theory. 
 
More importantly, Finnish participants’ concept of motivation is compatible with the larger 
sociocultural context. After observing that Finnish teachers are more effective when they can 
work autonomously, Anneli added, ‘But that’s probably because our society is based on trust. In 
so many ways. So that’s why it works.’ This trust is not a carte blanche. Rather, the basis of this 
trust is expectation that other members of society will likewise fulfil their complementary 
responsibilities, as discussed in the previous section. In Päivi’s words: 
Finnish people know what’s wrong, and what’s right. And they are very interested if 
someone near them isn’t doing right. So I think teachers know very well if they’re doing 
right or wrong, and if the other teachers are doing right or wrong. It’s very much part 
of our culture. 
An interview participant in Müller and Hernández’s (2010) study made similar observations, 
adding that this social awareness is tacit rather than publicly expressed (‘we know what type of 
people they are […] even if we don’t talk about it’, p. 313). The unspoken nature of such 
awareness may contribute to the fact that my Finnish interview participants did not feel that it 
impinged on their actions. In Masa’s view, the ethos of ‘background responsibility’ in Finland 
includes ‘an understanding from other people that, “Oh, this is the job that you’re doing. I may 
not like it a lot, but I’m going to go along with it”’. Correspondingly, Masa attributed teachers’ 
sense of autonomy to the fact that children are deemed responsible for their own schoolwork, 
such that ‘the student’s actions don’t really reflect on the teacher’, which is ‘immensely liberating’ 
for teachers. Thus, the expectation that actors at all levels of the education system will fulfil their 
respective responsibilities—from the Ministry and central government agencies through 
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municipalities and schools to teachers and students, as Helena noted—safeguards teachers’ sense 
of autonomy. In turn, this sense of autonomy enables teachers to ‘perform better’, as Anneli 
said.44 
 
Singaporean participants emphasised a different set of motivational factors. While saying that 
‘remuneration […] is never a good way to assess the worth or value of a teacher’, Eleanor also 
noted that ‘Singapore’s a very expensive country to live in, so [remuneration] does matter to a 
large number of people’. To use Vroom’s (1964) terminology, salaries and bonuses have a large 
positive valence for many Singaporeans. This valence, together with the belief that good 
performance is reliably instrumental in reaping such rewards, can influences teachers’ outlooks. 
According to Adeline, ‘Singaporean teachers are very typical civil servants, and they like to have 
their various KPIs [key performance indicators] and know that if they meet them, they might get 
rewarded.’ Faced with this reward structure, teachers may redirect their effort according to their 
expectancy of where it will yield the best performance, as Jane observed: 
Some teachers may feel that certain areas are less debatable, like exam results, so they 
will chiong [i.e. rush towards, put effort into] that area. Then maybe you look at your 
CCA [cocurricular activity]: ‘Oh dear, it’s not possible.’ Whatever you do, it will be very 
hard [to win the inter-school competition], because maybe there’s another champion 
school in your zone already. So you strategize in this way. 
The concept of motivation that emerges from these descriptions—where motivation is driven by 
utility maximisation—matches Vroom’s (1964) proposition that motivational force is a function 
of valence, instrumentality, and expectancy. 
 
Singaporean participants’ descriptions of unmotivated teachers also tally with Vroom’s theory. 
As quoted in Sections 5.2 and 5.4 respectively, both Peter and Jane said that some colleagues 
decide to ‘cruise’ in school after calculating that it is more lucrative to invest their effort in 
private tutoring after school hours. In Jane’s words, ‘they look at the monetary reward’: if 
earnings from private tutoring are greater than bonuses and salary increments from good 
performance in school, then private tutoring has greater valence. Jane also observed that some 
colleagues at the middle of the career ladder ‘who have been in the system for more than 15 to 
20 years’ may be ‘not so responsive and they drag their feet’ when asked to complete tasks, 
 
44  Finland’s complementary responsibility also safeguards the autonomy of those working in other professions as 
well. Helena related an anecdote of how some foreign exchange students at her school reacted to school 
cafeteria food that seemed tasteless to them: ‘Their solution to it was very simple: “Why don’t you just tell the 
kitchen to make spicier food?” Which makes sense from the point of view of, “The kitchen staff’s job is to 
serve me food,” and, “They’re lower in the hierarchy.” But from our point of view, the kitchen is run by a 
company, which we buy the service of. And they’re just people working in the kitchen. And they don’t come 
and tell me how to teach maths, so I wouldn’t feel like it was my job to tell them how to make food.’ 
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because ‘they are the type who say, “Okay, fine. If I haven’t moved up the ladder by now, I will 
never move.”’ That is, they do not believe that performing additional work will be instrumental 
in promotions. Additionally, Eleanor and Maggie noted that some teachers may be reluctant to 
try new pedagogical approaches because, in Eleanor’s words, ‘they’re still getting their ‘A’s, so 
why rock the boat?’ That is, these new approaches are ambiguous in their expectancy, so 
channelling effort toward such approaches may not yield successful performance. 
 
Strikingly, echoes of expectancy theory appeared even in the observations of participants who 
themselves disavowed Singapore’s competitive, progression-oriented system. For example, Andy 
noted that the kiasu mentality described in the previous section does not apply to him and his 
‘band of merry colleagues who are just interested in developing the students’. However, he added 
that ‘we do recognise those who are deserving of credit because [...] something about them 
enables them to go above and beyond for the students, and we don’t begrudge them if they are 
rewarded accordingly’ (as quoted in Section 5.2). Thus, despite opting out of the meritocratic 
race, he endorsed its instrumentality, stating that superior performance is ‘deserving of credit’. 
This principle underpins the meritocracy that dominates Singapore’s sociocultural context.  
 
Motivation also interacts with the extensive government management of Singapore’s 
meritocracy. In Jeffrey’s view, Singapore’s dense urban geography enables a high degree of 
central management, which in turn compels effort: 
You’re kind of fenced in. […] So that very much forces you higher up on the value 
chain. You basically can’t choose to slack off. […] And that forces everyone to survive 
in the education system. I mean, you can say publish or perish—but you don’t even 
have the option (laughter) in the education system. It’s pass or distinction. That’s it. 
(laughing) Because no matter how badly you do, they’re going to put you somewhere 
[…] that they have specially designated for you. 45 
Similarly, in a study on performativity under the EPMS, Liew (2012) remarks: ‘Teachers that 
thrive and survive must perform, or else perish’ (p. 300). Thus, in this managed meritocracy, the 
 
45  Eleanor made an observation that echoes Jeffrey’s remarks on government-directed sorting and stratification in 
the education system. After describing how a partnership with another school prompted her school to ‘push 
their students’ to get better grades, she said: ‘Why I think the Ministry thought they needed to [introduce such 
partnerships] is to provide education options. Because on the ground people were saying that they wanted to 
have the kids stretched in different ways. […] I think you’re right to say that the socio-political climate affects 
the way in which education moves. So in the past it was about getting an education for everybody. And that was 
good enough. But then it moved towards getting a certain kind of education. And then they created N(A) 
[Normal (Academic) stream], N(T) [Normal (Technical) stream], Express [Express stream], GEP [Gifted 
Education Programme]; later moving towards this IP [Integrated Programme], and then the ITE [Institute of 
Technical Education]. And so the government really has a very big hand in deciding how the people are 
educated.’ For an account of these changes in Singapore’s educational offerings over time, see Goh and 
Gopinathan (2008). For a more detailed discussion of alternative education pathways offered to students who 
perform below typical grade-level expectations, see Ng (2017). 
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government has the power to manipulate motivational levers. Besides ‘specially designating’ roles 
at suitable levels of the value chain, the government also determines extrinsic reward structures. 
As I discuss below, the government uses these reward structures to maximise aggregate teacher 
motivation. Here it will suffice to note that the utility-oriented concept of motivation implicit in 
participants’ statements is fully compatible with the managed meritocracy in which it is 
embedded. 
 
Thus, Finnish and Singaporean participants had different mental models of how motivation 
operates. These models map onto different psychological theories of motivation, and cohere 
with the broader sociocultural contexts. Still, it is important to note that these mental models are 
not universally shared within each setting. For example, Adeline (Singapore) observed that some 
teachers ‘who have been in an independent school for a really long time’ might be ‘more 
Finland-ish’, in that ‘they’re experienced, they don’t care about career progression, and they 
know how to do their job’—thus emphasising a sense of competence and intrinsic motivation. 
(As noted in Section 3.4, independent schools have more administrative autonomy than the 
typical school, and tend to be prestigious and high-performing.) In turn, some Finnish 
participants noted that certain teachers are, to use Satu’s words, ‘very exact’, such that they will 
reject additional responsibilities on the basis that ‘[they] have done what [they] have been paid 
for’—thus following the effort-reward calculations of expectancy theory. However, participants 
presented both of these categories as exceptions to the norm. In general, Finnish participants 
regard the motivation to teach as an intrinsic force within the landscape of complementary 
responsibility. Singaporean participants, enmeshed in their managed meritocracy, regard 
motivation as an outcome-oriented process, although some teachers prize pecuniary outcomes 
and others prioritise pupil development for its own sake.   
 
Concepts of motivation and teacher accountability instruments 
As shown in Chapter 5, teacher training plays a vital standard-setting role in Finnish teacher 
accountability. Both the selectivity of the training process and rigour of the training itself ensure 
that teachers are motivated and competent. Importantly, teachers are not only competent in that 
they are capable of doing their jobs, but they also feel themselves to be competent—in Liisa’s 
words, ‘We know what we’re supposed to be doing, and then we do it.’ Ryan and Deci (2000a) 
argue that people have a basic need to feel competent, and that the fulfilment of this need 
supports intrinsic motivation. This sense of competence was also evident in Kristiina’s 
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observation that Finnish teachers, when asked to explain particular pedagogical choices, often 
say, ‘Of course, I just know that was the right thing to do.’ She added that ‘it’s very difficult to 
pinpoint’ what is special about Finnish education, because ‘so much of it comes from the 
inside’—another overlap with the notion of intrinsic motivation. Relatedly, Masa observed that: 
Finnish teachers have a master’s degree. There’s this sort of professional pride […] and 
a level of respect that goes with being a teacher. If somebody hears you’re a teacher, 
[…] it’s like, ‘Okay, that’s pretty impressive.’ And I think the combination of those 
factors means that the internal [desire to excel] from the teacher is more important than 
anything else.46  
The factors that Masa identifies as crucial to teachers’ intrinsic motivation suggest not only a 
sense of competence, but also a sense of relatedness. ‘Professional pride’ implies relatedness to 
colleagues and to collegial standards, while societal respect implies relatedness to society. 
 
This relatedness is strengthened by other aspects of Finland’s teacher accountability approach. 
The national curriculum provides ‘a common ground for the students’, in Liisa’s words. Liisa 
also emphasised that ‘there’s no teacher who’s not aware of the curriculum’—which was borne 
out in all of the Finland interviews. Thus, teachers are united in following the same overall 
guidelines to serve students, reinforcing both collegial and societal relatedness. Collegial 
relatedness is also maintained by the common pay structure. As Emilia noted: 
If you have a lot of rewards and people are evaluated against each other, then that 
makes a lot more competition, and that would eat away at collaboration. […] I wouldn’t 
say no to more money, (laughter) but I’m very happy that we don’t have a system of 
rewards and punishments, actually. 
Similarly, Anneli said that teachers ‘should get paid equally’ because they all gained their 
qualifications through the same duration of study, so ‘the baseline is that every teacher is as 
competent as everybody else’. Juhani also observed that performance-based compensation would 
undermine the egalitarianism ‘that is inside Finns’. He mentioned that some Finnish studies have 
 
46  At this point the interview, Masa’s actual words were ‘internal stuff [emphasis added] from the teacher’. 
However, later in the interview he used the phrase ‘internal reason, motivation’ which he summarised in his 
next sentence as ‘internal stuff’, and which he referred to in the subsequent sentence as ‘that internal desire to 
excel’—hence my substitution of the latter phrase into his quote here. Elsewhere, Masa also spoke of teachers 
being driven by ‘something inside says, “This is what needs to be done”’. 
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found that ‘when you reward people with money, it gives satisfaction for a shorter period of time 
than when you are valued by the society you work in’.47  
 
Besides contributing to teachers’ sense of relatedness, Finland’s lack of formal monitoring and 
consequences supports their sense of autonomy. According to Antero, 
When they selected me to study teaching, of course they checked that my personality 
and who I am fits the job. And after that, I have been on my own. Nobody has come 
here to say that, ‘You must change. And you must do it like this, not like that.’ I am in 
charge here. 
This autonomy is premised on the expectation that teachers are willing (i.e. motivated) and able 
(i.e. competent) to teach well without external inducements, because they ‘[fit] the job’. As 
Helena observed, quoted in full in Section 5.2, ‘the assumption is that we teachers are 
professionals who know their job and have the skills and that we are all interested in the same 
goals’. (See Partanen, 2016, p. 127 for a very similar observation.) Thus, Finland’s approach to 
teacher accountability enables a mutually reinforcing relationship between teachers’ competence 
(knowing their job, having the skills), relatedness (all being interested in the same goals), and 
their autonomy. Specifically, teacher training establishes competence and relatedness; widespread 
belief in teachers’ competence and relatedness grants them professional autonomy; this 
autonomy, together with competence and relatedness, supports their intrinsic motivation; and 
this motivation helps to maintain their competence and the public belief therein. 
 
Singapore’s teacher accountability approach follows a different but equally coherent logic. 
According to Mark: 
On one hand, most teachers view the EPMS […] like any rule that the government puts 
out, so they have to abide by it. But they do believe that it’s another example of the 
meritocracy in action. […] That the harder they work, the more strategic they are about 
 
47  As some Nordic commentators note, this emphasis on maintaining the appearance of equality has a dark side. 
Booth (2014) describes a phenomenon called Jante Law, so named because of a Danish novel lampooning 
social life in a town called Jante. The principles of Jante Law include, ‘You shall never indulge in the conceit of 
imagining that you are better than we are’ and ‘You shall not believe that you are more important than we are’ 
(ibid, p. 90). Jante Law may contribute to the preservation of egalitarianism and relatedness, but it is usually 
discussed critically, as a source of oppressive conformity and petty envy. Despite its Danish origins, Booth 
(ibid) and Partanen (2016) believe that Jante Law applies to other Nordics, including the Finns. Partanen, 
herself a Finn, notes that Jante Law is meant as ‘a critique of a rather sad aspect of the Nordic character that is 
often taken too far’, adding that ‘successful Finns have been to known to feel that other Finns are jealous or 
disparaging of their achievements’, and that ‘sometimes Finns betray a distasteful fondness for schadenfreude 
when a successful person falters’ (2016, p. 283). Interview participant Antero’s account of financial bonuses for 
teachers demonstrates a Jante Law-like pattern at work: ‘The Finnish mind is something like this: if I get a 
bonus, for example, I think “Not me. Take it back. Give it to her. Give it to him. Not me.” […] We are little bit 
ashamed, or something like that. And the other side of this coin is if somebody else gets the bonus, then we 
others think that, ‘Hmm, that’s very interesting. She’s a little bit lazy. Pupils don’t like her. Why did the principal 
give the money to her?’ And we are a little bit jealous, of course. But that’s the Finnish way of thinking, I think.’ 
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their work, the higher their performance ranking, and the larger their performance 
bonus would be. […] And that can be taken positively or negatively. 
Thus, if teachers highly value performance bonuses (i.e. if bonuses have a high valence), they will 
make strategic decisions to get higher performance rankings (i.e. allocate their effort based on 
expectancy), because they believe that the EPMS compensates hard work (i.e. they believe in its 
instrumentality). However, the teacher accountability system also influences teachers for whom 
performance bonuses have little valence. For example, Joseph believed that most teachers were 
in the profession ‘not for extrinsic reasons, but mainly for intrinsic reasons’. Instead, as he said 
elsewhere in the interview, his teaching experience had ‘really made [him] really believe in what 
MOE wants’ because ‘over time you realise the value of your work’ such that ‘it’s not so much 
about the recognition that you get, but you just do it out of your own personal passion’. Thus, 
his motivation is rooted in ‘the value of [his] work’, i.e. a different category of outcomes. 
Financial rewards may have low valence for Joseph, but he is driven by the valence of ‘what 
MOE wants’, i.e. a vision of shared productivity for Singapore’s survival. Like Joseph, four other 
Singaporean participants (Peter, Geok Ling, Jane, and Timothy) also accorded little value to 
EPMS rewards but likewise said that the Ministry’s expectations of teachers broadly overlapped 
with their own. Hence, the EPMS facilitates alignment between the teachers whose goals are 
primarily altruistic, and those whose goals are primarily material.  
 
(That said, despite this broad agreement with Ministry expectations, teachers were not uncritical 
of Ministry goals. For example, Geok Ling said she disagreed with the emphasis on committee 
work, event organisation, and ‘certain things that they evaluate teachers on, like organisation 
awareness and whether you have got helicopter view […], that are really very corporate’. In 
Singapore government parlance, ‘helicopter view’ refers to the ability to take a systems-level 
perspective, while still paying attention to necessary details [J.-M. Ho & Koh, 2018; Quah, 2010]. 
In turn, even though Jane said she agreed with ‘the big picture things that they say, like “mould 
the future of the nation” and ‘every child counts”’, she questioned the practical feasibility of 
some Ministry stipulations.)  
 
The EPMS is also designed to foster alignment between teacher appraisal standards nationwide, 
in order to maintain the perception that EPMS gradings are fair. As noted in Section 5.4, 
Singaporean participants observed that unfair appraisals can be highly demotivating. In Maggie’s 
words, such unfairness makes you ‘feel that whatever effort you put in is not worth it [emphasis 
added]’. To use Vroom’s (1964) terminology, teachers will only be motivated if they believe that 
the EPMS allows good performance to be instrumental for desirable rewards. The Ministry 
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invests considerable resources into maintaining this instrumentality. For example, Jane also noted 
that ‘they always call [performance grades] a collective decision’, and that an external moderator 
joins ranking meetings to ensure consistency across schools. Similarly, Andy said he ‘personally’ 
felt that EPMS rankings were ‘a fair and consistent kind of measurement’, since his school 
principal had ‘gone to great lengths to actually explain that it’s done before a ranking panel’, 
rather than depending on one supervisor’s or school leader’s vagaries. However, he added that 
some colleagues believe that EPMS rankings depend on ‘the willingness of your superior to 
actually fight for you at such ranking discussions and whether you have offended certain people’. 
On the whole, most participants agreed that the grading system was flawed, but not unacceptably 
so. In Sonia’s view, ‘I would say it’s 80 percent accurate, although sometimes it does not match 
what you think you should have gotten.’ Hence, the EPMS is viewed as an imperfect but 
adequate arbiter of teachers’ merit.48  
 
Some participants implied that the EPMS is intended not only to raise and reorient the 
motivation of Singapore’s teachers, but also to influence other actors within Singapore’s 
outcomes-oriented ecosystem. When asked whether Singapore’s teacher accountability approach 
made it easier or harder to be a good teacher, Timothy said that he ‘[did]n’t want to give it credit 
by saying it makes it easier’, and he noted that he had ‘many reservations’ about the way the 
EPMS was carried out, but conceded that: 
It’s good to have some expectations set in stone for me to base myself against, and to 
know what exactly you can potentially reach. […] We always tell students, ‘You must 
aim for something high. You cannot aim for just mediocrity.’ So, I guess, in the spirit of 
what we do, it’s just putting into practice what we preach. 
That is, if children are to learn how to motivate themselves in a meritocracy, they should see it 
modelled by their teachers. Zooming out from classrooms to national politics, Eleanor suggested 
that the EPMS indirectly factors into voters’ calculations of the value of supporting the 
government. When asked what would happen if Singapore replaced the EPMS with Finland’s 
accountability approach, she said: 
My immediate response is, it’s not going to work. […] It will be very teacher-
dependent, and so it will be the luck of the draw if your child gets into this classroom 
where this teacher is a bit more progressive or has more initiative, then you benefit. 
Whereas in other classrooms where the teacher is just happy with what she or he is 
 
48  One reason why teachers regard EPMS rankings as being reasonably fair is because they believe that egregiously 
unfair rankings would be reflected in an undesirable grade for the school leadership team in the biannual School 
Climate Survey, as mentioned by Jane and Joseph. Conducted nationwide every other year, the School Climate 
Survey allows teachers to anonymously evaluate their schools (J.-M. Ho & Koh, 2018; Singapore Teachers’ 
Union, 2011)—thus, maintaining meritocracy among schools and school leaders, just as the EPMS maintains 
meritocracy among teachers. 
CHAPTER 6   213 
doing, then the child is not going to learn as much. So that inconsistency is something 
the government will not want to risk, because the feedback from the people will be 
quite strong. 
That is, the EPMS maintains a sufficient baseline of teacher motivation, which in turn maintains 
consistent educational quality, which maintains public belief in the government’s merit. Not only 
is Singapore’s approach to teacher accountability fully compatible with interview participants’ 
concept of motivation, it is also fully integrated into the managed meritocracy that is evident in 
its social milieu. 
 
Concepts of motivation and side effects of teacher accountability instruments 
Thus far, I have shown that Finland’s and Singapore’s approaches to teacher accountability are 
compatible with participants’ implicit concepts of motivation, which are themselves compatible 
with the wider sociocultural contexts. However, this does not mean that the accountability 
instruments have uniformly desirable effects on teacher motivation. Given the complexity of 
motivational processes and the heterogeneity within any group of teachers, accountability 
instruments can have less-than-desirable side effects. In Chapter 5, I outlined some general 
categories of side effects and discussed their underlying mechanisms. Here I offer a different 
perspective. For each country, I describe specific unintended effects that participants reported, 
and explain these side effects using the respective concept of motivation. 
 
To begin with Finland, I noted in Section 5.3 that some Finnish teachers are demotivated not 
because feedback is burdensome or biased, but because it is absent. According to Päivi, 
Our headmaster is really so busy that he doesn’t have much time for us. So he’s happy 
when we are doing our work and he doesn’t hear anything about it. (laughter) […] But I 
know that there are teachers who would like to have more help. And who would like to 
have more thanks. They think that the headmaster doesn’t care about what they are 
doing. And they would like to have, ‘Oh, that went well. That was nice.’ 
As discussed above, this lack of monitoring and feedback is based on the assumption that most 
teachers are competent and intrinsically motivated. It is also compatible with the preservation of 
teacher autonomy, which itself is central to teachers’ intrinsic motivation. However, if the lack of 
feedback diminishes teachers’ sense of relatedness (e.g. if they ‘think that the headmaster doesn’t 
care about what they’re doing’), intrinsic motivation may be compromised. Deci and Ryan (2000) 
also propose that good feedback can reinforce feelings of competence, which in turn boosts 
motivation. Even among those who did not say that the relative lack of feedback reduced their 
motivation, several Finnish participants (Anneli, Antero, Helena, Liisa, Maarit, and Satu) said, 
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unprompted, that they would welcome lesson observations in order to get feedback on their 
teaching practice, and they lamented the lack of lesson observations in Finland—which aligns 
with the proposition that intrinsically motivated people seek to improve their capabilities. 
 
Another side effect of the Finnish approach to teacher accountability is that certain curricular 
changes may have no impact on teacher practice. Despite teachers’ general compliance with the 
curriculum, their autonomy and sense of competence may be such that they disregard curricular 
changes that clash with their beliefs about how best to fulfil their responsibilities. For example, 
Päivi mentioned that even though the Ministry currently prefers teachers to pose open-ended 
questions without supplying answers to students, she nonetheless preferred to ‘tell them what’s 
important and what’s not important’ because they were ‘still so small’. She added, laughing, ‘Yes, 
I should give more space to the children, and not teach so much. But I like teaching, and I think 
I know how things work.’ Similarly, Antero said he was ‘happy that the principal trusts [him] so 
much’ that he could channel his effort away from the curricular goals that are not congruent with 
his conception of his responsibilities. When asked whether accountability instruments make it 
easier or harder for him to be a good teacher, he replied, evoking a national icon: 
I’m a slightly old-fashioned teacher. I like the Finnish Formula 1 driver, Kimi 
Räikkönen, when he shouted in his team radio, ‘Shut up, I know what I’m doing.’ So I 
think in here [i.e. his classroom], too, I know what I’m doing. My focus is on the pupils. 
And I am on the right path. 
Liisa and Satu also said that curricular changes may not have any effect on the practice of veteran 
teachers. The fact that they both mentioned hypothetical teachers who have been teaching for 
more than ‘thirty-five years’ suggests that there may be a local trope of the stubborn teacher 
approaching retirement. Still, at different points in their interviews, they each also mentioned 
such autonomy in relation to themselves. In Satu’s words, ‘This curriculum is not so important, 
if you have worked for a long time. I know what I have to do.’ Likewise, Liisa noted that the 
current curriculum has many expectations, some of which were impractical: ‘So, I don’t want to 
punish myself for not doing everything, when nobody else is. […] It’s just me and my 
conscience, and if I feel that I’m doing most of it, and I cannot do more, then I’m happy.’ (For 
another example of Finnish teachers criticising the curriculum, see Y. Li & Dervin, 2018, p. 49.) 
 
However, in situations where Finnish teachers lack the capacity to resist external controls, their 
motivation may suffer. Juhani observed that if he is ordered to do something at a particular time 
and in a particular way, he instinctively resists, because ‘that takes out all the possibilities you can 
create in it’ and ‘it gives the signal that “I think you’re not quite good enough”’; whereas ‘when 
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it’s based on the trust that everybody tries to learn and educate oneself and become a better 
teacher, it works’. (Liisa made a similar observation.) A specific instance of motivational harm 
was given in Masa’s experience of Finland’s recent Kilpailukykysopimus (KIKY, i.e. 
competitiveness pact) policy. One KIKY stipulation is that all full-time employees in Finland 
must work an extra 24 hours annually without additional pay (SAK, 2016; see also Y. Li & 
Dervin, 2018, p. 108). According to Masa, this was an ‘extreme disincentive’: 
Teachers started complaining about being a teacher, which was new, for me. People 
were starting to think about changing jobs. Because all of a sudden, we’ve got this 
bureaucracy that’s keeping track of this time. They’re realising that we already do more 
than that anyway. And […] now they’re doing it for the time, which equates to money, 
rather than because something inside says, ‘This is what needs to be done.’ So the 
teachers’ personal standards have dropped. 
This decline in ‘teachers’ personal standards’ and their internal senses of ‘what needs to be done’ 
is consistent with Ryan and Deci (2000a) argument that unmet needs for autonomy may 
jeopardise intrinsic motivation. 
 
In contrast, several Singaporean participants noted instances where teachers’ motivation 
decreased because of lowered expectancy or instrumentality. Sonia gave an example of the 
former: 
There are only so many extra duties available to go around, to help you stand out from 
the crowd. And if everyone’s going to be grabbing them, those teachers who are in it 
generally for teaching end up taking the hard step of leaving the service, because this 
accountability procedure demotivates them so much. It is a huge bone that people have 
to pick with the system. 
Thus, if teachers believe that they will not be able ‘to stand out from the crowd’ (i.e. their effort 
will not lead to the desired performance), this diminished expectancy may be demotivating. 
Eleanor made a similar observation. As for instrumentality, Peter noted that reporting officers 
who are unfair or who do not convey their expectations clearly ‘can be quite demoralising for a 
teacher who’s put in a lot of effort, and then maybe is told that it’s not good enough, or just does 
not get any validation for it’. Thus, when effort and performance do not lead to valued 
outcomes, this diminished instrumentality may be demotivating. (Similar observations about 
perceived unfairness from Sonia and Maggie were quoted in Sections 5.3 and 5.4, respectively.) 
 
Another side effect of such competition for promotions and bonuses in Singapore is that some 
teachers may channel their effort away from fulfilling the spirit of their responsibilities, and 
toward prominent portfolios instead. Such strategies were mentioned by several participants. For 
example, Timothy said that: 
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The kiasuism of teachers versus teachers, to put it bluntly, may colour how some 
teachers choose to showcase what they’re doing, in a very targeted and purposeful 
manner. And I mean this in a negative way. I mean that they […] are doing it for the 
sake of being more visible, because they already have in mind what they want […] and 
then they are working towards it. 
Thus, teachers’ calculations of how to optimise positive-valence outcomes may prompt 
grandstanding that diverts motivation and resources away from student development. 
Grandstanding strategies run the gamut, from a colleague who only bothered to prepare 
presentation slides when their lesson was being observed (as Joseph reported), to ‘climbers’ 
aiming for promotions who ‘force their subordinates to embark on projects’ (as Andy reported). 
Additionally, Liew (2012) found that some teachers complete their EPMS work review forms 
using strategies to present themselves in disproportionately favourable light. 
 
Another unintended reorientation of motivation occurs when teachers channel substantial effort 
toward preventing negative-valence outcomes. This stems from the emphasis in Singapore’s 
accountability system not only on rewards, but also on punishments. While several participants 
talked about the kiasu (literally, ‘afraid of losing’) mentality, as discussed in the previous section, 
Adeline and Maggie also noted that teachers are kiasi—literally, ‘afraid of death’, or excessively 
cautious. In Maggie’s experience, 
It permeates the whole system. We have to cover our butts. […] You could speak about 
it in more positive words, such as, ‘Let’s ensure that we do our very best to protect the 
child, or to ensure their welfare.’ But very frequently, in informal conversation, you may 
meet colleagues speaking about it in terms of, ‘Oh, we have to protect ourselves.’ 
She added that she doesn’t ‘want to do things for that purpose alone’, but she had been in a 
situation where ‘if you leave a bit of weakness visible, then certain people can be like hyenas 
coming after you—even though it’s not your fault’. Mark made a similar comment about 
accountability and risk-aversion, saying that, ‘from a cynical perspective’, one advantage of the 
EPMS in ‘the ass-covering society that is Singapore’ is that it ‘allows for some paperwork to 
show why someone got a grade, or to prevent any supposed doubt’. To give a specific example, 
Jane mentioned that this cautiousness meant that ‘if you meet up with a parent, you make sure 
you have documentation, and then you make them sign it’, thus adding to the already weighty 
paperwork burden. 
 
All the aforementioned side effects of Singapore’s teacher accountability approach may 
somewhat dampen overall educational outcomes. More worryingly, one other unintended effect 
of the EPMS is that its orientation toward rewards and penalties (and Singapore’s competitive 
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orientation more broadly) has hampered a major policy platform that the Ministry has been 
pushing since the mid-2000s: a shift toward a more holistic, less exam-oriented view of education 
(H. L. Lee, 2004; Singapore MOE, 2013). In Peter’s words: ‘MOE has taken steps towards 
shifting the focus away from grades. […] All of that is great in terms of what it seeks to achieve. 
But, honestly, it hasn’t changed that competitive culture in Singapore.’ The inertia hampering this 
policy change was also reported by Sonia, Andy, and Eleanor (see also Ab Kadir, 2017; Hogan et 
al., 2013; Lam, 2014). Similarly, Adeline observed that, despite the Ministry’s push to move away 
from the preoccupation with grades, 
it’s still very entrenched in the exam-based mindset that you need to do well in order to 
get good grades, to go everywhere. And even parents buy in to that mindset. […] A lot 
of teachers want to buy in to the shift away from exam-based education. […] We’re 
quite torn between, ‘Yes, we believe in this more holistic education’—but yet we know 
that, in the end, the students will be judged for their exam grades. 
To use Vroom’s (1964) terminology, this ingrained ‘exam-based mindset’ means that ‘good 
grades’ have higher valence than the outcomes of ‘holistic education’. Even if teachers 
themselves may value the holistic alternative, the awareness that ‘students will be judged for their 
exam grades’ means that grades retain their high positive valence. The ‘shift away from exam-
based education’ not only has lower valence, but also lower instrumentality, since getting good 
grades is a familiar path to success, but the benefits of holistic education are less certain. Hence 
teachers do not invest much effort into this attempted shift, consistent with what expectancy 
theory would predict. Notably, Ryan and Deci’s (2000c) self-determination theory would instead 
predict that the attempted shift away from grades would raise teachers’ intrinsic motivation: if 
teachers personally concur with this shift (as in Adeline’s account), it would increase their sense 
of autonomy, thus boosting their motivation. However, participants reported low adherence 
rather than mobilised effort. Put differently, the way in which Singaporean teachers have 
responded to this accountability-related policy platform does not fit the concept of motivation 
articulated by Finnish participants. Rather, it fits the concept of motivation articulated by their 
Singaporean counterparts—as well as the broader sociocultural context in Singapore. 
 
Summary 
In this section, I have shown that Finnish and Singaporean participants understand motivation in 
fundamentally different ways. Finnish participants associated motivation with an internal drive to 
fulfil responsibilities to those around them. This drive is supported by teachers’ confidence in 
their abilities to fulfil their responsibilities, and it is sustained by the autonomy that teachers 
enjoy. Singaporean participants associated motivation with the pursuit of outcomes, whether 
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these outcomes relate to student growth or personal gain. The force with which these outcomes 
are pursued depends on both their desirability and their attainability. 
 
Each of these concepts of motivation is consonant with the sociocultural context in which it is 
embedded. Each concept is also compatible with the respective teacher accountability approach. 
In Finland, strong standard-setting instruments safeguard teachers’ competence levels and 
maintain their relatedness to colleagues and students, and the sparseness of formal instruments 
for monitoring and rewarding performance ensures that teachers have the autonomy that they 
regard as crucial to intrinsic motivation. In Singapore, an interlocking system of standards, 
information-gathering tools, and performance-based consequences helps to align teachers’ 
actions toward system-level plans, whether the teachers personally prioritise social or economic 
goals. 
 
It is worth noting that, among the six sociocultural constructs that I included in the statistical 
analysis, civic norms comes the closest to capturing these concepts of motivation that influence 
teachers’ responses to accountability instruments. When asked about the civic norms statistics, 
participants’ comments reflected many of the qualities that relate to their understandings of 
motivation: Finnish participants said that it was important to follow civic norms, i.e. fulfil their 
responsibilities, unless they could fulfil those responsibilities more competently through some 
alternative route; whereas Singaporean participants said their compatriots were likely to subvert 
norms for personal benefit, i.e. for positive-valence outcomes, but they would not risk being 
caught breaking the law, i.e. they would avoid negative-valence outcomes. These mental models 
of motivation were also evident throughout participants’ descriptions of how teachers respond 
to accountability instruments. The consonance between beliefs about norms and concepts of 
motivation may be due to the questionnaire items underlying the sociocultural scales. While 
some items for other sociocultural constructs asked about respondents’ actions (whether they 
were members of certain networks) and some asked about their beliefs (whether they were 
confident in institutions, trusted other people, tolerated power differentials, or preferred stability 
over uncertainty), the civic norms items addressed both areas, i.e. whether respondents believed 
certain actions could be justified. Thus, the civic norms scale, like participants’ concepts of 
motivation, relates to why people do what they do. Based on the evidence in the field interviews, 
I believe that this ‘why’ is socioculturally contingent and crucial to teacher accountability. 
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6.4 Discussion 
This chapter has investigated RQ3, to what extent does the influence of teacher accountability instruments on 
teacher motivation depend on sociocultural context? As in Chapter 5, the ILSA data and the teacher 
interviews imply different answers. While the TALIS 2013 data suggested that higher levels of 
social trust and of confidence in institutions may intensify the negative effects of teacher 
accountability instruments on teacher job satisfaction, these results were not consistent across 
the TIMSS 2015 and PISA 2012 data. Results for the main (i.e. non-interacted) effect of 
accountability instruments on teacher motivation were similarly inconsistent, as were the results 
for moderation by other contextual variables. Hence, the ILSA data suggests that sociocultural 
context affects the relationship between teacher accountability and teacher motivation to a very 
limited extent, if at all. 
 
However, the teacher interviews suggest that sociocultural context strongly shapes the 
relationship between accountability instruments and teacher motivation. Specifically, participants’ 
mental models for understanding motivation are closely tied to their sociocultural contexts. 
These concepts of motivation, in turn, influence their responses to accountability instruments, 
whether consciously or unconsciously. For example, Singaporean participants’ motivational 
responses to accountability instruments can be explained using the valence-instrumentality-
expectancy model (Vroom, 1964) that matches Singaporean participants’ implicit concept of 
motivation—but at least some of their responses cannot be explained by Ryan and Deci’s 
(2000b) model of intrinsic motivation, which matches Finnish participants’ implicit concept of 
motivation. 
 
Figure 6.5 summarises the evidence presented in this chapter for the conceptual framework. 
While the ILSA analysis did not find robust evidence of a moderating role for either 
sociocultural context or the other contextual variables, the interview analysis found considerable 
evidence that sociocultural context does play such a role. Given that teacher motivation entails 
mental processes that are better captured in individual interviews than in statistical aggregates, I 
believe that the answer to RQ3 is that the influence of teacher accountability instruments on 
teacher motivation depends on sociocultural context to a large extent, at least in Finland and 
Singapore. (I discuss the cross-country generalisability of these interview findings in Section 7.3.) 
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Figure 6.5   Evidence for the conceptual framework from the RQ3 analysis 
 
 
In arguing that different sociocultural contexts may entail different concepts of motivation, I 
echo psychological studies that posit context-dependent models of motivation (e.g. Klassen et 
al., 2010; J. Li, 2012; Plaut & Markus, 2005). For example, S.S. Iyengar and Lepper’s (1999) 
experimental work found that Anglo-American children had higher intrinsic motivation when 
they were free to choose their own tasks, whereas Asian-American children had higher intrinsic 
motivation when the task was ostensibly chosen by their mothers or classmates. In my fieldwork, 
Finnish participants’ emphasis on autonomy mirrors these Anglo-American children’s 
demonstrated preferences. Others have found that Chinese and Japanese mothers were more 
likely than Caucasian-American mothers to attribute unsatisfactory mathematics performance to 
their child’s lack of effort (Hess, Chang, & McDevitt, 1987; S. D. Holloway, Kashiwagi, Hess, & 
Azuma, 1986). This emphasis on effort was also evident in Singaporean participants’ descriptions 
of motivation. 
 
That said, concepts of motivation are only one facet of sociocultural context—and some other 
facets are also salient to teacher accountability. In another analysis of these Finland and 
Singapore interviews, I explain Finnish and Singaporean teachers’ comparably positive responses 
to their disparate teacher accountability systems by showing that each system accords authority 
to those who are most trusted to deliver desirable educational outcomes.49 In Finland, trust is 
distributed among stakeholders at each level of the education system, such that the most trusted 
actor at the level of the classroom is the teacher—hence their great latitude in classroom practice 
 
49  This analysis was also conducted during the course of my PhD, for a chapter in an edited volume that is 
currently in preparation for publication. For details, see footnote 32. 
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(see also Aho, Pitkänen, & Sahlberg, 2006). In Singapore, trust is instead concentrated on the 
government, hence the government-led performance management system (see also S. K. Lee et 
al., 2008, ‘Conclusion’). It would also be possible to use these interviews to argue that the 
effectiveness of these contrasting teacher accountability systems depends on perceptions of 
efficacy (i.e. what works) or perceptions of fairness (and, by extension, legitimacy, as discussed in 
Section 2.4), although these arguments would have somewhat thinner substantiation from the 
interviews than the concepts of motivation or the distribution of trust arguments. 
 
The fact that this argument can be constructed along different narratives is unsurprising, given 
the complexity of sociocultural context and human behaviour. Still, concepts of motivation offer 
a useful organising device for the purposes of this thesis, which investigates the validity of a 
motivation-centric framework for teacher accountability. Concepts of motivation may likewise 
be a useful area to consider for teacher accountability policymaking that seeks to influence the 
level and/or direction of teacher motivation. Moreover, as discussed above, there are established 
psychological research programmes supporting not only the context-dependence of concepts of 
motivation, but also each of the concepts of motivation that I outline. 
 
More importantly, in arguing that sociocultural context influences teachers’ motivational 
responses to accountability instruments, this chapter aligns with other studies underscoring the 
importance of tailoring educational management to the local context (Pritchett, 2015; UNESCO, 
2017; A. Walker & Dimmock, 2002). As discussed in Section 2.1, there is abundant evidence of 
teacher accountability instruments working in one context but failing in another. Based on the 
evidence in this chapter, I conclude that one way to forestall such failures is to include 
sociocultural context among the elements considered in the design of teacher accountability 
policy. 
 
One challenge to my attempt to claim a causal pathway from accountability instruments to 
teacher motivation, conditioned by sociocultural context, is that policy instruments and 
sociocultural context are mutually influencing. That is, sociocultural context influences the 
choice of policy instruments, and chosen policy instruments influence sociocultural context 
down the line. This feedback loop makes it difficult to identify cause and effect. 
 
This difficulty is heightened by the fact that policy instruments can be designed expressly to 
influence sociocultural context. For example, the Finnish government has a unit devoted to 
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building Finland’s international image. Its strategies include coordinated messaging that 
emphasises Finns’ belief in equality, social responsibility, and education, among other things 
(Finland Promotion Board, 2017a, 2017b). In Singapore, the National Education campaign 
meant that from 1997 to 2017, students regularly encountered six specific statements about 
Singapore—including ‘We must uphold meritocracy and incorruptibility’ and ‘No one owes 
Singapore a living’—whether on posters, at annual school events, or in social studies lessons 
(Chia, 2018; Sim & Print, 2005; Singapore MOE, 2018a; J. Tan, 2010). The efficacy of 
Singapore’s national messaging is apparent in my field interviews: many participants used the 
government’s favoured terminology conversationally. For example, Joseph said that: ‘The 
Singapore teacher accountability system is based on the context where, to ensure survival in 
Singapore, our manpower and the economy need to be productivity-driven.’ The emphases on 
ensuring survival, building manpower, and being productivity-driven are all common 
government refrains.50 While these culture-influencing instruments may not be explicitly 
connected to teacher accountability, it would be difficult to deny the possibility of such a link. 
For example, Low (2016) notes that both the Singaporean and Finnish governments consistently 
put forth advertising campaigns about teachers’ valuable role in nation-building (see also Crehan, 
2016 on Singapore; and Ripley, 2013 on Finland)—which may well influence standard-setting in 
teacher accountability. 
 
Given these feedback loops between policy and culture, one alternative explanation for the 
sociocultural compatibility of Finland’s and Singapore’s respective teacher accountability 
approaches, as experienced by interview participants, is that their sociocultural contexts affect 
the teacher accountability causal pathway only at the point of policy design—rather than also 
affecting teachers’ motivational responses to accountability instruments, as I posit in Figure 6.5. 
This alternative explanation could proceed as follows:  
 
Teachers’ motivational responses depend solely on the accountability instruments themselves. 
Holding all else equal, two groups of teachers facing the same set of accountability instruments 
would have similar aggregate responses even if their sociocultural contexts diverged. Any 
 
50  To give another example, Eleanor mentioned that Singapore had ‘fifty years to progress from third world to 
first world’, mirroring the title of a book by national patriarch Lee Kuan Yew’s (2000), From Third World to First: 
The Singapore Story: 1965-2000. In her study of the Singapore government’s influence over complex moral issues, 
Ee (2018) also found that her interview participants’ language frequently mirrored government discourse. 
Similarly, when a group of Massachusetts educators visited Singapore in 2015, several observed that there was 
remarkable overlap in how actors at different levels of the education system used identical phrases to describe 
education plans. Beyond education, see K.P. Tan (2018) on Singapore’s approach to building a national 
narrative and international brand more generally. 
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apparent resonance between the sociocultural context and teachers’ responses to the 
accountability instruments (or their descriptions of their responses) is coincidental. Perhaps 
sociocultural context influenced policymakers to articulate accountability standards using 
terminology that resonated with dominant cultural values, so teachers’ concepts of motivation 
simply reflect these accountability standards or politicians’ rhetoric about them. Whatever the 
origins of this coincidence, the alternative argument being advanced is that sociocultural context 
is irrelevant to how teachers respond to accountability instruments. 
 
Stated so baldly, this argument may seem implausible. Yet it is implicit in some public 
discussions of educational ‘best practices’, as described in Section 1.1, with news headlines such 
as ‘The Japanese Education System May Solve the Problems of US Public Education’ (Easterday, 
2017) or ‘The Secret to Finland’s Success With Schools, Moms, Kids—and Everything’ (Khazan, 
2013). 
 
However, the field interviews suggest that sociocultural context does influence not only teachers’ 
responses to accountability instruments, but also other aspects of their daily work. For example, 
when I asked participants what they were most proud of in their work, there was a between-
country difference in the orientation their responses, as shown in Table 6.6. These differences 
correspond to their sociocultural contexts. (As shown in the interview guide in Table 3.6, I asked 
this towards the beginning of the interview, and the questions about sociocultural context came 
much later. Thus, there is no possibility that the process of formulating descriptions of 
sociocultural context inadvertently influenced their framing of professional accomplishments. 
Instead, any resonances between the two must be due to a third element, i.e. sociocultural 
context itself.)  
 
Most Finnish participants said that they were most proud of something in their own actions or 
abilities. For example, Juhani said: 
For some pupils, mathematics can be actually revolting. And I understand that. So I just 
try to give all an equal opportunity to learn it. But I don’t force anyone to learn it. I think 
that’s what I’m most proud of: that I can understand the views of different pupils. 
This focus on one’s actions and skills fits Finnish participants’ concept of motivation as intrinsic, 
autonomous, and competence-based, within the wider sociocultural context of complementary 
responsibility. Singaporean participants were more likely to articulate their achievements in terms 
of students’ responses, whether in the form of expressed gratitude or observable growth. For 
example, Peter said: 
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I think it’s those moments when I realise that, the process of walking with a student, I 
was able to help them see significant breakthroughs, be it in the academic subject that 
I’m teaching […] or, in the process of being a teacher in charge of the students’ council. 
This focus on student outcomes fits Singaporean participants’ concept of motivation as the 
pursuit of desirable outcomes, within a broader emphasis on outcomes-based meritocracy.  
 
Table 6.6   Summary of interview participants’ responses when asked what they are most proud of in their work 
as a teacher 
 
Note. Singaporean participants Sonia and Geok Ling do not appear in this table because time constraints prevented 
me from asking them this question. 
 
(This between-country difference in how participants conceptualised their accomplishments was 
not accompanied by between-country differences in the areas of accomplishment that 
participants valued. In each country, roughly half the participants cited social, emotional, or 
relational accomplishments; approximately half also cited academic or pedagogical 
accomplishments; and one or two cited organisational accomplishments. In terms of within-
country variation, there appears to have been a shift over time in Finland in that teachers who 
entered the profession earlier all mentioned accomplishments related to pupils’ socioemotional 
development, whereas those who entered the profession more recently all mentioned academic 
or pedagogical accomplishments. This may be related to changes over time in how teachers’ roles 
are viewed. For example, as several participants mentioned, it used to be taboo for Finnish 
teachers to be seen drinking alcohol in public, but this has since become acceptable; although 
participants noted that they still try to set a good example socially. However, since the discussion 
here is focusing on sociocultural differences between countries, I do not explore this within-
country variation in depth.) 
 
Beyond the snapshot in Table 6.6, others have found evidence that the Singaporean sociocultural 
context has hampered attempts to promote critical thinking (C. Tan, 2017) and differentiated 
instruction (Heng & Song, 2020) in schools. Additionally, the Finnish interview participant who 
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currently works in international education noted that the main challenge in recruiting teachers for 
Finland-inspired schools overseas did not relate to pedagogical skills, which were ‘the easy part’. 
Rather, the challenge was finding qualified local teachers who were predisposed to the Finnish 
approach to teaching and were open to ‘changing their mindset’ even further. This emphasis on 
compatible mindsets adds weight to the argument that sociocultural contexts—dominant values, 
practices, and decision-making patterns—affect teacher practice. Given this suggestive evidence 
that sociocultural context influences a few different aspects of teacher practice, it is reasonable to 
expect that sociocultural context would also influence how teachers respond to accountability 
instruments, as I have argued in this chapter. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
7.1 To what extent does the evidence support the proposed conceptual 
framework? 
In this thesis, I have explored the relationship between teacher accountability and sociocultural 
context. I began by developing a theory-driven framework for mapping the intended outcomes 
of teacher accountability instruments. I then attempted to validate this framework using cross-
country survey data alongside interviews with Finnish and Singaporean teachers. Overall, the 
empirical data offered evidence for some aspects of the framework, but gave no evidence for 
others, as summarised in Figure 7.1. 
 
Figure 7.1   Proposed and validated conceptual frameworks for teacher accountability instruments 
(a)  
Proposed 
conceptual 
framework 
 
 
(b)  
Elements 
of the 
framework 
that were 
validated 
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Most importantly, both the cross-country surveys and the teacher interviews suggest that 
sociocultural context affects at least some of the processes underlying teacher accountability. The 
ILSA analysis in Chapter 4 showed that the relationship between teacher accountability 
instruments and student outcomes is significantly moderated by the strength of country-level 
civic norms. The interview analysis in Chapter 6 found socioculturally aligned differences in how 
interview participants’ motivation is influenced by teacher accountability instruments. These 
differences correspond to cross-context differences in how they understand motivation and in 
the factors that they regard as beneficial or detrimental to motivation. As discussed in Sections 
6.3 and 6.4, I characterise these understandings as ‘concepts of motivation’, which are a 
component of the dominant (but not necessarily universal) patterns of ideas and practices that 
constitute the sociocultural context. Together, these sources add suggestive evidence to the case 
for designing accountability policies that are compatible with sociocultural context (see Section 
2.3 for evidence from other studies). 
 
Additionally, in Chapter 5, I demonstrated that teacher motivation can be a useful construct for 
working through the various intended and unintended teacher-level effects of accountability 
instruments. As emphasised throughout the thesis, raising or reorienting a teacher’s motivation is 
only an intermediate step along the pathway to raising student outcomes. Still, it is a vital step. 
Teachers are an important (arguably, the most important) interface between education policy and 
students. I have also identified three different mechanisms by which accountability instruments 
can influence teacher motivation: setting standards, communicating information, and allocating 
consequences. As discussed theoretically in Section 2.5 and empirically in Section 5.4, these 
mechanisms are distinct not only in form but also in psychological function. Accordingly, any 
discussion of ‘what works for whom in what circumstances’ for teacher accountability policy 
would do well to consider the respective affordances and constraints of these mechanisms. 
 
However, neither the cross-country surveys nor the teacher interviews offered evidence to 
substantiate the next step along the intended causal pathway: from teacher motivation to student 
outcomes, via changes in teaching and learning processes. To use Pawson and Tilley’s (1997, p. 
xv) terminology, I have shown evidence for the importance of mechanisms (Chapter 5), the link 
between mechanisms and contexts (Chapter 6), and the link between contexts and outcomes 
(Chapter 4), but I do not have evidence to complete the ‘context + mechanism = outcome’ 
equation. Although I analysed cross-country survey data that had the potential to support (or 
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weaken) the pathway from accountability instruments through teacher motivation to student 
outcomes (Section 5.1), these data did not give any conclusive support. Evidence for the pathway 
via changes in stakeholder decisions is likewise incomplete, since neither the statistical analyses 
nor the field interviews were designed to examine the relationship between stakeholders’ 
decisions and student outcomes. 
 
7.2 What I am arguing 
While my empirical sources did not comprehensively validate the conceptual framework, the 
evidence presented in this thesis constitutes a meaningful contribution to the polarised debate on 
teacher accountability. (See Sections 1.1 and 2.1 for an overview of this debate.) I argue that 
teacher accountability policy is not a matter of whether performance bonuses are inherently good 
or bad, or whether test-based accountability is anathema or panacea. Every approach has 
advantages and disadvantages. Teacher accountability is a realm of trade-offs, which stakeholders 
must choose between and perhaps attempt to mitigate. (See Section 2.1 for a summary of some 
side effects of accountability instruments.) For example, one trade-off in Singapore’s approach is 
that the strong alignment of goals across teachers comes at the price of high stress levels, as 
described in Section 5.3. One risk in the Finnish model is its dependence on intrinsic motivation, 
such that there are few safeguards if teacher motivation is eroded over time, a risk which some 
participants expressed concerns about (see, for example, Masa’s account of the KIKY policy, 
Section 6.3).51  
 
An essential part of deciding between such trade-offs is to look closely at the implementation 
context, as in the context-sensitive models for policy analysis discussed in Section 2.2. I argue 
that such analyses must also consider sociocultural patterns. Sociocultural context is complex, 
and it can be intractable to the standardisation and quantification that dominate some types of 
education discourse and economically oriented policy planning. But it can be a powerful enabler 
or inhibitor of teacher accountability nonetheless. 
 
51  More generally, relying on teachers’ intrinsic motivation does little to help the students whose teachers happen 
to lack such motivation at a given point in time. In the words of the Finnish interview participant who is 
currently working in an international education organisation: ‘As a teacher, […] it didn’t really matter whether 
there were restrictions here or rewards there. Because everything was working smoothly. And I’m sure this is 
the case in most schools in Finland. […] But if there’s a problem—for instance, as a parent, if we notice from 
our children that things are not right in the classroom—there’s no official protocol for how this is being 
handled. Because we need to talk to the principal, and it’s her or his responsibility to talk with the teacher. But if 
the principal thinks that the teacher is fine, what can we do?’ 
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Accordingly, context in general and sociocultural context in particular should be incorporated 
into frameworks and theories of change for analysing and designing teacher accountability policy. 
Some existing frameworks for educational accountability do leave room for sociocultural 
context, such as in Pritchett’s (2015) framework of accountability actors and relationships 
(outlined in Section 2.5), where the ‘motivation’ element is sufficiently open-ended to 
accommodate sociocultural variation in motivation. However, frameworks that do not explicitly 
bring sociocultural context into their theories of change run the risk of sidelining it. 
 
Similarly risky are those frameworks that explicitly include context but assign it an erroneously 
limited role. For example, the McKinsey report How the World’s Most Improved School Systems Keep 
Getting Better (Mourshed et al., 2010) does emphasise context, but mainly for its role in informing 
how policymakers should frame and introduce interventions in order to gain stakeholder 
support—and such contextual concerns are deemed ‘secondary to getting the fundamentals 
right’ (p. 11), where the fundamentals entail choosing from a menu of best practices to suit the 
current level of student outcomes in the education system. Contrary to the assumptions in this 
McKinsey report, such best practices are not context-neutral. For example, some of the 
interventions in their menu, such as teacher career ladders and performance-based rewards, 
would likely have more negative side effects than desirable effects in Finland. 
 
In making a case for the importance of sociocultural context in teacher accountability policy, I 
have drawn on evidence from both cross-country surveys and teacher interviews. Neither of 
these empirical sources could make the case adequately on its own. Instead, they play 
complementary roles. The statistical analysis in Chapter 4 constitutes a highly reduced 
representation of the elements in my conceptual framework: teacher accountability instruments 
are represented by a limited selection of instruments compressed to a unidimensional scale, 
student outcomes are reduced to scores on a small set of cognitive proficiency tests, teacher 
motivation is proxied fuzzily by job satisfaction or principal-reported morale, and sociocultural 
context is replaced by a handful of survey-based constructs. Nonetheless, the argumentative 
weight of these analyses derives from showing that the same ILSA datasets that typically 
underpin ‘best practice’ arguments (as noted in Section 1.1) can equally underpin the argument 
that it is worthwhile to look at sociocultural context in designing teacher accountability policy. 
However, the ILSA data on their own only indicate vague associations: more extensive teacher 
accountability seems on average to work well in some sociocultural contexts, but less effectively 
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in others. These associations do not provide a clear basis for a theory of change or for policy 
reform, nor for designing particular teacher accountability instruments for particular contexts. 
 
To start understanding how and why sociocultural context may matter, I turned to the teacher 
interviews in Finland and Singapore. Despite drawing on a relatively small number of interviews, 
this analysis shows that sociocultural context can profoundly affect teachers’ motivational 
responses to accountability instruments, at least among the interview participants and the 
colleagues whom they have encountered over the years. The interviews also demonstrate that 
what is best for teacher accountability in one context may be ineffective in another, as suggested 
by some studies discussed in Section 2.1. In the words of Helena, a Finnish interview participant: 
We have been getting a lot of visitors in the past years, because of the PISA results. 
And you can see that they come in here thinking, ‘Okay, can we copy this?’ And they 
usually leave, I think, with, ‘No, we can’t.’ 
Given the realist approach to validity in this thesis, as discussed in Section 3.1, I do not aim to 
claim that the observations from interviews with a non-random sample of 12 participants in each 
country has external validity for all Finnish lower secondary school teachers or for all 
Singaporean secondary school teachers. Rather, these interviews strengthen the overall validity of 
the argument that the effects of teacher accountability instruments are shaped by sociocultural 
context (among other factors). They contribute to the validity of this argument both by 
demonstrating, in granular firsthand narratives that are corroborated by prior studies, the 
influence of sociocultural context on teachers’ responses to accountability instruments (in 
Chapters 5 and 6), and by offering suggestive evidence that weighs against certain 
counterarguments—that is, validity threats (Maxwell, 2017; Pawson, 2013)—to the overall 
argument of this thesis (in Sections 4.4, 5.5, and 6.4).  
  
Thus, whether a given policymaker is more inclined to be persuaded by large-scale input-output 
analyses, or small-scale narratives of particular accountability processes, I have shown evidence 
suggesting that it would be prudent for them to think seriously about sociocultural context when 
designing teacher accountability policy. 
 
7.3 Caveats 
That said, the extent to which my empirical findings are generalisable remains an open question. 
In addition to the limitations of the cross-sectional ILSA data, as discussed in Section 3.6, there 
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are nontrivial considerations about the field interviews. Firstly, even though my interviews in 
both countries reached saturation, they were based on relatively small non-systematic samples. 
 
Perhaps more importantly—although I have less of a methodological or empirical basis for this 
concern—I suspect that Finland and Singapore may have unusually distinctive sociocultural 
patterns at the national level. This is not to imply that all Finns trust all other Finns, or that all 
Singaporeans affirm the government’s brand of meritocracy. In fact, I presented evidence to the 
contrary in Chapter 6. Neither am I implying that Finland and Singapore are as demographically 
homogeneous as their media images may suggest. As noted in Section 3.4, both countries have 
nontrivial ethnolinguistic diversity. What I am suggesting is that the overwhelming majority of 
Finns would recognise the presence and, to some extent, the legitimacy of sociocultural patterns 
related to complementary responsibility; and that the same is true of Singaporeans and managed 
meritocracy (however the terminology may differ in practice). These dominant sociocultural 
patterns provide clear orientations for teacher accountability policymaking. 
 
This degree of clarity is lacking in the other countries where I have lived (i.e. Malaysia, the 
United States, and the United Kingdom), at least in my estimation. Had I conducted fieldwork in 
countries other than Finland and Singapore, it may have been more difficult to trace the 
convergence between the sociocultural patterns affecting teachers’ responses to accountability 
instruments and the larger sociocultural patterns affecting the general population. Nonetheless, I 
anticipate that in most policy jurisdictions it would be both possible and valuable to identify 
some recurring, socioculturally embedded patterns in teachers’ responses to accountability 
instruments. Even where there is a multiplicity of sociocultural patterns among different 
subgroups of teachers, identifying and forestalling these patterns could potentially strengthen 
teacher accountability policymaking. For example, observational studies have found that teacher 
appraisals can be ineffective as accountability instruments when the appraisals are designed 
conducted by actors with insufficiently high social status, i.e. less-educated villagers in India 
(Narwana, 2015) and fellow teachers (rather than supervisors or head teachers) in Indonesia 
(Broekman, 2016), as noted in Section 2.3. A similar pattern was observed in a recent 
randomised-control trial of a social accountability mechanism in Indonesia, where committees of 
local residents struggled to resist pressure to award high appraisal scores to teachers when the 
scores were associated with financial incentives (Gaduh et al., 2020). Even though India and 
Indonesia are large, socioculturally plural contexts with diverse value orientations, the 
importance of social status is an identifiable sociocultural pattern that can and should be factored 
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into the design of teacher accountability policy. More generally, even in a setting where it is 
difficult to identify shared sociocultural priorities that can positively raise and reorient teacher 
motivation, it may well be more feasible to identify sociocultural pitfalls that may hamper the 
intended influence of an off-the-shelf accountability instrument on teacher motivation in that 
context, at least for teachers whose concept of motivation fits the modal pattern. 
 
Apart from these generalisability issues, there are several other caveats to my argument. Firstly, 
although the conceptual framework ends with ‘Student outcomes improve’, I am not arguing 
that there are specific sets of student outcomes that matter most. The desirability of different 
student outcomes is defined by stakeholders in a given context, often based on both 
sociocultural priorities and expectations of future needs. Determining which student outcomes 
are most important (and what constitutes valid evidence of these outcomes) should be 
fundamental to the design of teacher accountability policy in any education system—not least 
because accountability instruments that optimise for student achievement may have negative side 
effects for socio-emotional development (Mausethagen, 2013; Walsh, 2006; Zhao, 2017), well-
being (Heller-Sahlgren, 2018), and equity (Harris & Herrington, 2006). Moreover, empirical 
evidence suggests that the teachers and classroom practices that are associated with higher test 
scores do not always overlap with the teachers and practices that develop students’ socio-
emotional skills, attitudes, and happiness (Blazar & Kraft, 2016; Kraft & Grace, 2016). These 
tensions were evident in the field interviews, wherein some Singaporean participants lamented 
the lack of creativity and risk-taking among their high-scoring students, and some Finnish 
participants worried about recent survey findings that Finnish students are not happy in school. 
 
Additionally, I am not arguing that there is only one possible mode of effective teacher 
accountability for a given sociocultural context. Even in the small sample of Finnish teacher 
interviews, there was considerable diversity in accountability practices, such as in the degree to 
which colleagues and principals informally monitored teacher practice via professional 
collaborations. Yet these various degrees were all part of an effective system. 
 
Neither am I arguing that there are specific, definable aspects of sociocultural context that 
definitively matter for teacher accountability across countries. Classroom teaching involves 
numerous entangled demands and interactions which may be difficult for external observers to 
identify (as noted in Section 2.1; see also Brown & McIntyre, 1993; Scott, 1998)—and, 
consequently, the sociocultural patterns that affect classroom teachi/ng may not be apparent 
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from afar and may not be easily standardised. This was evident in the contrast between the 
aggregate cultural statistics from the cross-country surveys and the nuances and ambivalences 
mentioned by interview participants. Although the analysis in Chapter 6 indicated that teachers’ 
implicit concepts of motivation are central to accountability, this is partly an artefact of focusing 
the analysis on teacher motivation to begin with. There are other ways of conceptualising the 
salient sociocultural patterns that my interview participants identified, as noted in Section 6.4. 
 
Despite the focus on national-level sociocultural context in this project, other levels of context—
such as schools, local communities, ethnolinguistic subgroups, and districts—also matter 
tremendously to the implementation of teacher accountability policy, as noted in Section 2.5. 
Similarly, Singaporean interview participants emphasised that teachers’ experiences of 
accountability vary considerably depending on their line managers and school leaders. It is also 
important to note that cultural patterns do not divide neatly along national borders (Anderson-
Levitt, 2012). I focused on national-level culture simply because I was interested in national-level 
differences in teacher accountability policy, and did not have the time or resources to examine 
other levels of sociocultural context. 
 
Moreover, I am certainly not arguing that sociocultural compatibility is the only contextual factor 
influencing the efficacy of teacher accountability instruments. Numerous other contextual 
factors—including student academic preparation, teacher knowledge, and material resources—
also matter, as noted in Section 2.1. This is indicated in the conceptual framework diagram, and 
suggested by the significant interaction term between teacher accountability and GDP in the 
student outcome regressions in Section 4.3. 
 
I also do not mean to imply that compatibility between teacher accountability policy and 
contexts yields faithful policy implementation across the board. In both Finland and Singapore, 
there are gaps between stated accountability instruments and heterogeneously implemented 
reality—and between each country’s idealised international image and on-the-ground 
experiences. As noted in Section 6.3, notwithstanding the centrality of Finland’s national 
curriculum to its school system and teacher accountability approach, some teachers have few 
qualms about diverging from the curriculum when they believe they know better. Also, despite 
Finland’s emphasis on egalitarianism and shared standards (Vainikainen et al., 2017), a few 
participants noted that there is significant inconsistency in student assessment grades across 
schools. (The teachers’ union recently called for better assessment guidelines to reduce such 
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inconsistency; Yle Uutiset, 2019.) In Singapore, notwithstanding the highly centralised and 
codified EPMS, participants mentioned that managers in some schools do not rely on EPMS 
paperwork when assigning grades to teachers, instead referring to school-specific documentation 
tools. Also, despite the extensive teacher performance standards, some Singaporean participants 
said that most of these standards were negotiable, as long as teachers dealt effectively with 
finances, exams, and student safety (which Jeffrey dubbed ‘the Holy Trinity’ and Maggie deemed 
to be ‘cardinal rules’). 
 
Finally, I am not suggesting that teacher accountability policymaking is a straightforward, 
technical process. There are far too many entangled factors and processes for this to be the case. 
Teacher accountability is a small subset of the policy landscape and the historical trajectory of 
any country. Moreover, education and culture not only change over time—but they also 
influence each other in complex ways. This is a particular concern given the temporal flatness of 
both the cross-country surveys and my fieldwork. Still, interview participants noted several 
ongoing changes in Finland’s and Singapore’s educational and cultural contexts; including deep 
education budget cuts in Finland, increasing questioning of authority in Singapore, and growing 
pressure from parents and difficulties in engaging technologically preoccupied students in both 
countries. These trends, and their possible implications for current teacher accountability 
models, are reminders that teacher accountability policymaking is an open-ended, iterative 
process. 
 
7.4 Directions for future research 
These caveats suggest a few directions for future research on teacher accountability and 
sociocultural context. Firstly, the cross-country statistical analysis could be extended by looking 
at a wider range of student outcomes, including equity within and between schools, as well as 
socioemotional outcomes. Recent work using survey item response rates as a non-self-reported 
proxy for students’ (Hitt, Trivitt, & Cheng, 2016; Zamarro, Hitt, & Mendez, 2016) may be a 
germane approach—although such analyses would need to take into account cross-country 
differences in survey response styles (e.g. He et al., 2014). Another way to extend the statistical 
analysis would be to examine other sociocultural constructs that would be expected to influence 
accountability processes, such as survey-based measures of cultural tightness and looseness 
(Gelfand et al., 2004, 2011) or observational measures of civic honesty from ‘lost wallet’ 
experiments (Cohn et al., 2019). Furthermore, it would be worthwhile to test the mediation 
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model using other measures of teacher motivation—although, as noted in Section 2.4, all such 
standardised measures will be imperfect proxies. The statistical analysis may also be improved 
with more sophisticated modelling techniques, such as using Bayesian-inspired approaches to 
incorporate the measurement uncertainty of the survey-based aggregates for accountability and 
sociocultural context into the calculations. 
 
This line of research into teacher accountability and sociocultural context would also be greatly 
strengthened by detailed analyses of other country contexts, including a similar interview analysis 
to examine teachers’ perceptions and motivational responses in these other contexts. In 
particular, the conceptual framework could be weakened or further validated by investigations of 
teacher accountability in (a) education systems that have comparably strong track records but 
lack Finland’s and Singapore’s clearly defined sociocultural priorities; (b) education systems 
where the teacher accountability approach is similar to Finland’s or Singapore’s but without 
comparably high performance; and (c) socioculturally similar education systems with different 
teacher accountability approaches and student outcome configurations, such as Finland and its 
Nordic neighbours. For example, Camphuijsen, Møller, and Skedsmo (2019, 2020) argue that 
even though Norway has moved away from its former light-touch educational accountability 
(which was similar to Finland’s current approach) toward test-based accountability, the influence 
of Nordic-style social democracy remains amply evident. A key impetus for Norway’s adoption 
of test-based accountability was inequitable student outcomes, rather than the desire to compete 
at the top of the league tables. Also, despite the test-based approach, Norwegian teachers do not 
face performance-based consequences because the assumption is that the mere publication of 
school result comparisons will activate teachers’ sense of responsibility toward the trusting 
public. Among these possible case selection approaches for extending the interview study, I 
anticipate that the greatest value for policy applications would be gained from (a), because it is 
unlikely that policymakers in most countries can depend on easily identifiable sociocultural 
orientations to guide their teacher accountability policymaking, as noted in Section 7.3, and much 
could be learned from how teacher accountability policy can successfully accommodate more 
variegated sociocultural contexts. 
 
Finally, it may be worthwhile to conduct observational and/or longitudinal studies on the 
pathway from teacher accountability instruments to student outcomes via teacher motivation and 
classroom practices, and on how these relationships are influenced by sociocultural context. As 
noted above, my empirical analysis could only validate the first step along this pathway, from 
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accountability instruments to teacher motivation, but did not find evidence for completing the 
pathway to student outcomes. Beyond this thesis, the educational research base includes some 
empirical evidence for a connection between teacher motivation and student outcomes, but this 
evidence base is relatively weak, as noted in Section 2.5. Nonetheless, the teacher motivation 
pathway is the implicit theory of change in much of teacher accountability policy. As such, this 
pathway warrants further study to examine both the mechanisms and pitfalls along the way. 
 
7.5 Final reflections 
In Seeing Like a State, James Scott (1998) describes how the scale and complexity of the modern 
state can compel government officials to view people, property, and resources in simplified, 
standardised form. While this bird’s-eye view may be necessary for organising large-scale 
interventions, it can lead to disaster when governments forget that the real picture is more 
variegated and then impose policies that are dangerously reductive, as Scott documents. Such a 
high-level, distant view is evident in some versions of the push for best practices and evidence-
based education policy. These versions assume that effective policies can always be transferred 
from one educational setting to another, with equal efficacy, regardless of context and history (as 
noted in Section 1.1; see also Feniger & Lefstein, 2014; Wiseman, 2010). 
 
In contrast, others argue that teachers’ subjective perspectives are central to any education policy 
reforms. For example, Waller (1932) argued that: 
The common-sense understanding which teachers have of their problems bites deeper 
into reality than do the maunderings of most theorists. Teachers will do well to insist 
that any program of educational reform shall start with them, that it shall be based 
upon, and shall include, their common-sense insight. (p. 457) 
Without making any similarly trenchant judgements of theorists, I agree that teachers are pivotal 
to school improvement and that their firsthand perspectives are an important source of policy 
insight—as is evident in the interviews presented in Chapters 5 and 6. The centrality and 
complexity of such firsthand articulations is one reason why I do not attempt to determine 
which aspects of sociocultural context are most salient to the design of teacher accountability 
policy, since salience is likely to vary from context to context. 
 
Over the course of this research project, I have come to believe that the most likely path to 
effective teacher accountability policy would entail policymakers (a) learning as much as possible 
from the experiences of other education systems, in order to identify not only the teacher 
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accountability instruments that may work well in their context, but also the sorts of contextual 
factors that may enable or inhibit such instruments; and (b) speaking at length with a large 
number of teachers, school leaders, and frontline administrators in their context, in order to 
better understand their motivations, priorities, and constraints. Ideally, (a) and (b) should occur 
concurrently and iteratively. However, my beliefs here are hardly novel, and policymakers face 
limitations of time, resources, and political acceptability that are far from ideal. Be that as it may, 
if the discourse around teacher accountability can be shifted such that the question of ‘What is 
our sociocultural context?’ becomes as routine as ‘What are high-performing countries doing?’ 
and ‘How much money do we have?’, then policymakers may be more likely to design 
accountability instruments that prompt teachers to work harder and more effectively, with fewer 
negative side effects and more lasting benefits for students. 
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Appendix A: Minimising multicollinearity in TIMSS 2015 and TALIS 2013 
regressions   
As noted in under ‘Modelling’ in Section 3.3, the relatively small country sample sizes in the 
TIMSS 2015 and TALIS 2013 datasets mean that there is a risk of multicollinearity if too many 
country-level variables are included in a regression model. In this appendix, I demonstrate this 
risk using the main TIMSS 2015 dataset, and explain how I addressed it in the reported analysis. 
Table A.1 shows TIMSS 2015 results for model 1, which looks at the degree to which 
sociocultural context moderates the relationship between teacher accountability instruments and 
student outcomes. 
 
In Table A.1, column (a) shows the empty model for partitioning variance across levels of 
analysis, and column (b) shows results for a model with all non-sociocultural predictors and their 
associated interaction terms. Next, column (c) has all six sociocultural predictors as well as the 
full complement of interaction terms, thus is analogous to model 1 for PISA 2015, as shown in 
column (e) of Table 4.9. This model has 15 country-level predictors: (i) the weighted mean of 
teacher accountability instruments (Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ ), (ii) GDP per capita, (iii) six sociocultural 
variables, and (iv) seven interactions between teacher accountability instruments and GDP as 
well as the sociocultural variables. Despite the large number of cases at the pupil, teacher, and 
school levels, the inclusion of so many country-level predictors for a sample of only 23 countries 
is highly likely to constitute overfitting. 
 
One indication that the column (c) model was overfitted—and, consequently, is affected by 
multicollinearity—is that standard errors of the parameter estimates for both the GDP term and 
Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ *GDP interaction term more than doubled in moving from column (b) to column 
(c). Such increases in standard error suggest collinearity issues. Additionally, the coefficient of the 
Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ *GDP term in column (b) was large and positive (+25.47), suggesting that 
wealthier countries benefit more from additional teacher accountability instruments than their 
less wealthy counterparts—which was consistent with direction of the corresponding interaction 
terms in all of the PISA 2015 and 2012 models. However, in column (c) this coefficient is large 
and negative (-38.10). Hence, the model with all six sociocultural constructs is likely to be 
unreliable for the TIMSS 2015 data. (Although Table A.1 only shows results for the main TIMSS 
2015 dataset that is matched with accountability data from PISA 2015, similar changes occurred 
to the standard errors and coefficients of the GDP-related terms in moving between the 
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analogous models for the TIMSS 2015 dataset matched with accountability data from PISA 
2012.) 
 
Table A.1   Model 1: results for multilevel regressions for TIMSS 2015 for different combinations of 
sociocultural constructs 
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Table A.1 (continued) 
 
Note. Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ c is taken from PISA 2015 data. N(pupils)=118 363; N(teachers)=6 147; N(schools)=3 761; 
N(countries)=23.  
*p < 0.05. **p < 0.01. 
 
Given the likelihood that the TIMSS models with all six sociocultural constructs were overfitted, 
I focus instead on TIMSS 2015 models that only have one sociocultural context, entered singly 
in turn, as shown in columns (d) through (i) in Table A.1. (These columns correspond to the 
results summarised in Table 4.10 in the column for TIMSS 2015 data matched with 
Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  from PISA 2015.) Each of these single-sociocultural-construct models have 5 
country-level predictors, rather than 15. Looking the standard errors of the GDP main effect and 
the GDP interaction across columns (b) through (i), it is clear that the single-sociocultural-
construct show far less indication of multicollinearity than the model with all six sociocultural 
constructs. This is especially true for civic norms in column (f), where the precision of the GDP-
related parameter estimates improved marginally relative to column (b), as indicated by the 
slightly smaller standard errors. Similarly, the standard errors of these GDP-related parameters 
for the civic networks model in column (e) are also comparable to those in column (b). While the 
standard errors of these two GDP-related parameters show increasing deviation for confidence 
in institutions in column (d), uncertainty avoidance in column (i), social trust in column (g), and 
power distance in column (h), they are still far closer to the values in column (b) than is the case 
for the model with all six sociocultural constructs. This is especially noticeable for the 
Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ *GDP interaction term: while its standard error in column (b) is 12.70, and the 
standard error ranges between 10.55 and 20.31 for the single-sociocultural-construct models, it 
reaches 29.00 in the model with all six sociocultural constructs. 
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To summarise: firstly, the civic norms and civic networks models show no more collinearity than 
the model with minimal country-level predictors in column (b). Secondly, although the 
confidence in institutions, social trust, power distance, and uncertainty avoidance models do 
appear to have more collinearity issues than the model in column (b), these collinearity issues are 
considerably smaller than those in the model with all six sociocultural constructs. Thus, in using 
the TIMSS 2015 models with single sociocultural constructs as sensitivity checks for RQ1 in 
Chapter 4 and RQ3 in Chapter 6, I am not implying full confidence in the robustness of these 
estimates. Rather, I use these models because they are the best available way of addressing these 
research questions using the TIMSS 2015 data. (Although TIMSS 2015 is the main dataset for 
RQ2 in Chapter 5, this issue of country-level collinearity is less important since the main 
parameters of interest for RQ2 are at the pupil and school levels rather than the country level. 
See Section 5.1 for more details.) 
 
Furthermore, to check whether the single-sociocultural-construct models were already overfitted, 
I tested a model that was similar to the civic norms model in column (f) of Table A.1, but 
without the main GDP parameter and the GDP interaction parameter. This reduced the number 
of country-level predictors from five to three. However, dropping these two parameters instead 
raised the standard errors of the other country-level predictors: the standard error for civic 
norms increased from 8.22 to 12.16; the standard error for Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  increased from 15.98 
to 31.37; and the standard error for the Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ *civic norms interaction ballooned from 
16.48 to 38.10. Hence, based on these standard errors, the models with Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ , GDP, 
one sociocultural construct, and the interactions between Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯  and the other two 
country-level predictors, as shown in columns (d) through (i) of Table A.1, appear to generate 
the most precise country-level estimates for this dataset with this multilevel statistical approach. 
 
In addition to the small country-level sample size, another contributing factor to the 
multicollinearity in the overfitted TIMSS 2015 model with all six sociocultural constructs is that 
GDP is correlated with some of the sociocultural constructs, as shown in Table A.2. These 
correlations are already evident across the larger combined set of countries, where n=70 for the 
WVS/EVS social capital scales, and n=66 for the Hofstede power distance and uncertainty 
avoidance indices. However, they are especially large in the TIMSS 2015 subset. Among the 23 
countries in the TIMSS 2015 main dataset, three sociocultural variables—confidence in 
institutions, uncertainty avoidance, and social trust—have correlations with GDP exceeding an 
absolute value of 0.5. That is, the small country sample size in the TIMSS 2015 dataset not only 
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reduces the available statistical power, but also appears to reduce the variability of the country-
level predictors, as indicated by the larger correlations as compared to the set of all available 
observations and the PISA 2015 main dataset. 
 
Table A.2   Pairwise correlations (and number of countries) between sociocultural constructs and 2014 GDP per 
capita in different subsamples of the data 
 
Note. Values for sociocultural constructs are from 2014 or earlier.  
*p < 0.05. **p < 0.01. (two-tailed) 
 
From Table A.2, it is also worth noting that the correlation between per capita GDP and civic 
norms is consistently negligible. This may partly account for the stability of the standard errors 
for the GDP-related parameters between columns (b) and (f) of Table A.1. In addition, this may 
contribute to the fact that civic norms is the only robust sociocultural moderator of the 
association between teacher accountability and student outcomes, as shown in Table 4.10 of 
Section 4.3. However, correlation between country-level predictors is not the only factor 
underlying the degree of collinearity in the multilevel models: the power distance model in 
column (h) of Table A.1 appeared to have more collinearity issues than any of the other models 
with a single sociocultural construct, despite the correlation between GDP and power distance in 
the TIMSS 2015 dataset being smaller than the corresponding correlations for confidence in 
institutions, uncertainty avoidance, and social trust. 
 
While the PISA 2015 and PISA 2012 models with all six sociocultural constructs did not appear 
to have similar issues with multicollinearity, such issues were evident in the TALIS 2013 analysis, 
which had 29 countries in the main dataset. In the TALIS 2013 model for teacher motivation 
without any sociocultural predictors (shown in column (b) of Table 6.1, analogous to column (b) 
of Table A.1 in the TIMSS 2015 discussion here), the standard errors on the GDP parameter and 
Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ *GDP parameter were 0.038 and 0.044, respectively. After adding in all six 
sociocultural constructs and their associated interaction terms, the standard error for the GDP 
parameter was largely unchanged at 0.040, but the standard error on the interaction term more 
than doubled to 0.097. (Full results from this model are not presented in the thesis text, but are 
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available upon request.) Thus, as with the TIMSS 2015 student outcome regressions, the TALIS 
2013 teacher motivation regressions appear to be overfitted when all six sociocultural constructs 
are included simultaneously. In the models with each sociocultural construct entered singly, the 
standard errors on the Accountability ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ *GDP parameter range from 0.036 (for civic norms, in 
column (e) of Table 6.1) to 0.083 (for social trust, in column (f) of Table 6.1). This is similar to 
the TIMSS 2015 single-sociocultural-construct models, where some of the models show no more 
country-level collinearity than the model without any sociocultural constructs; whereas some 
appear to have considerably more collinearity, but less so than the model with all six 
sociocultural constructs. Hence, under the circumstances, presenting results from the models 
that each have a single sociocultural construct is most balanced analytic approach. 
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Appendix B: Interview documentation 
 
In the pages that follow, I present copies of the documentation that I used in conducting the 
field interviews. Documents are presented in the following order: 
• participant information sheet for teachers in Singapore (2 pages) 
• consent form for Singapore participants (1 page) 
• participant information sheet for teachers in Finland (2 pages) 
• consent form for Finland participants (1 page) 
• interview guide printout for Singapore, used for my reference during interviews (2 pages) 
• interview guide printout for Finland (2 pages) 
• teacher accountability instruments definition sheet for Finland, used to facilitate 
conceptual clarity for any participants who may otherwise have struggled with an 
extended English-language definition delivered orally (1 page) 
The versions of the documents included here are those that I circulated and/or printed out prior 
to each leg of the fieldwork. As such, they do not reflect amendments that were made along the 
way. In particular, as noted in the ‘Designing the interview guide’ subsection of Section 3.4, after 
the first interview in Singapore I added questions about my working hypothesis and about the 
WVS/EVS and Hofstede aggregate sociocultural measures. Also, after the second Singapore 
interview, I stopped asking the first of the two hypothetical questions (i.e. #10 in the Singapore 
interview guide below) because it was neither informative nor theoretically sound. These changes 
are reflected in the Finland interview guide below, which I updated and printed after returning to 
Cambridge from Singapore. 
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